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A B S T R A C T
This essay examines the developm ent of the major themes in the natu ral law account of 
p roperty , and of the conceptions of social life and moral action on which they rely, from Hugo 
G rotius to David Hume. In the opening two chapters, the two main variants of modern 
na tu ra l law theory, those of G rotius and Pufendorf, are explained in some detail. Their 
understanding of na tu ra l law, as a science of morals grounded in hum an nature, is spelled out, 
and it is shown how this results in an understanding of property relations as a natural 
response to the changes in hum an circumstances w rought by increasing sophistication in 
hum an social life. It is a natural response because it reflects the requirem ents of hum an 
natu re , such reflection being shown by the fact th a t it arises necessarily, through peaceful 
processes, from the recognition of the elemental moral realm  of what is “one’s own” . In this 
sense property has a na tu ra l history; but it is also shown th a t, for these theories, the division 
between natu ra l history and actual history is not sufficiently clearly draw n, an inadequacy 
which is well illustrated  by problems in the account of the place of slavery in the account of 
property . But Pufendorf, a t least, recognizes th a t the problem  of slavery can be reduced if the 
principal incentive to voluntary enslavem ent, m aterial necessity, can itself be overcome. In 
th is way the problem  of slavery can have an economic solution.
By carefully examining the im plications of the basic notion of “one’s own” , which, 
following English practice, he calls property in one’s person, Locke concludes both th a t 
slavery is always unacceptable (is unnatural) and th a t  the origin of property in no way 
depends on consent. Rather, property is shown to be the inevitable consequence of hum an 
self-preserving action in a world given to us by God. N either does m aterial necessity provide a 
reason for enslavem ent: on the one hand, the right of charity  of the poor against the surplus of 
the w ealthy makes enslavem ent an avoidable option for the individual; and on the other, the 
productive power of improving labour is so great th a t, where a system of private property is 
established which secures the fruits of their industry to the industrious, necessity itself (and 
thereby slavery also) becomes avoidable for a whole society, by making even the w orst off 
w ealthier than  the richest in a prim itive economy.
Thus the question of property undergoes a significant shift. The concern of Locke’s 
successors with political economy, and the m anner in which this concern modifies their 
in terest in slavery and necessity as serious problems for society shows the extent to which 
Locke’s conclusions win the day. The question of w hat it is to have a social theory which is 
grounded in hum an natu re  becomes very pressing, however, because of difficulties perceived to
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be generated by Lockean (and, more generally, all “self-love” ) theories of human motivation. 
Such theories were perceived as compromising the natural law stress on the naturalness of 
hum an social life. The issue hinges on the nature of obligation. Hutcheson (and, following 
him, Hume) defends an account of human motivation which allocates a central role to 
impartial benevolence, and which thereby offers an understanding of moral obligation 
independent of theological commitments. Hutcheson’s programme runs into difficulties in its 
account of property, however, stressing the necessity of strict rule-following while at the same 
time providing general principles which threaten it. Hume’s account of the source of our 
obligation to respect the rules of property (the cornerstone of justice) is explained as an 
a ttem p t  to overcome this tension, by adapting some Pufendorfian distinctions to account for 
different types of moral obligation, grounded in different aspects of human sociability. So, 
despite some well established assumptions to the contrary, Hume can be recognized to be an 
im portan t contributor to the natural law tradition. Together, he and Hutcheson pave the way 
for the more complete critical natural history of Adam Smith.
P R E F A C E
As is not uncommon, this thesis shows little evidence of the roots from which it grew. 
Its genesis lies in two related dissatisfactions - in a sense of the inadequacy of the 
philosophic method of conceptual analysis when applied to social phenomena; and in 
frustration at the distortion of theories of historical figures, usually due to a too-hasty 
determination to make them speak to our problems. To avoid misunderstanding, I should 
stress th a t  I hope they can be made to speak to our problems, and tha t  being clear about 
the meanings of our terms is indeed a worthy goal. But equally worthy is sensitivity to 
processes, to time and activity and the difference they make; and the need to see both 
intellectual and social phenomena in their appropriate contexts. In these respects, this 
thesis reflects an intellectual outlook which arose gradually, acquiring force by a slow 
progression, and which owes much to my former teachers, Ross Poole and Jim Baker, and 
to discussions and disputes with my brother Phillip.
But theses are not simply distillations of intellectual outlook - they have to be written; 
and to this end I am greatly indebted to the attentions of my gang of three - Knud 
Haakonssen, Thomas M autner, and Jerry Gaus. W ithout their assistance - both academic 
and personal - this thesis would simply not have been written. I also owe a substantial 
debt to my original Ph.D. supervisor, the late Stanley Benn. Finally I must express my 
thanks to John Kleinig for his support and encouragement over a number of years; to 
Richard Campbell and Onora O'Neill: and also to Frank Jackson.
Concerning m atters of a less academic nature, it is a pleasure to record the support and 
assistance of many relatives and friends. My greatest debts are to my parents for their 
different kinds of support, to Hedda Murray, Susanne Schulz-Fuhrmann and Andre 
Fuhrm ann, Liz and Jack Smart, and Kim Sterelny. But I also owe much to Catherine and 
Alan Cunningham, Liz and Paul Dartnell, Jane and John Foulcher, Philippa Mein Smith, 
Debbie Trew, and Nicholas Watkinson; and to Jenny Gibson and my brother Peter. And 
also, of course, to the philosophers of the Research School. Finally, for the physical 
production of this thesis, I have to thank Hazel Gittins and Loraine Hugh for their typing, 
Michaelis Michael for his assistance in proof-reading, and especially Nona and David 
Bennett, not only for their typing, but also for their skill in transforming the Coombs 
computer into a docile servant.
Note on style: in order not to distort the meaning of the texts under consideration in 
this study, I have followed the practice of my authors in employing male nouns and 
pronouns throughout.
Even Philosophy went to Wrack by this moap- 
ing recluse Method of Study, and became as 
chimerical in her Conclusions as she was 
unintelligible in her Stile and Manner of 
Delivery. And indeed, what cou’d be expect­
ed from Men who never consulted Experience 
in any of their Reasoning ...?
David Hume 
"Of Essay Writing'
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C h apter  One
H U G O  G R O T IU S
I: In tro d u c tio n
Towards the end of the Enquiry Concerning the Principles o f  M orals , in the appendix 
on justice, Hume remarks tha t
This theory concerning the origin of property, and consequently of justice is, in 
the main, the same with tha t  hinted at and adopted by G ro tius .1
To illustrate the connection, he includes a short quotation from G rotius’s major work, De 
Jure Belli ac P a d s , first published in 1625. The passage in question runs as follows:
From these sources we learn what was the cause on account of which the 
primitive common ownership, first of movable objects, later also of immovable 
property, was abandoned. The reason was tha t  men were not content to feed on 
the spontaneous products of the earth, to dwell in caves, to have the body either 
naked or clothed with the bark of trees or skins of wild animals, but chose a 
more refined mode of life; this gave rise to industry, which some applied to one 
thing, others to another.
Moreover, the gathering of the products of the soil into a common store was 
hindered first by the remoteness of the places to which men had made their way, 
then by the lack of justice and kindness; in consequency of such a lack the proper 
fairness in making division was not observed, either in respect to labour or in the 
consumption of the fruits.
At the same time we learn how things became subject to private ownership.
This happened not by a mere act of will, for one could not know what things 
another wished to have, in order to abstain from them - and besides several 
might desire the same thing - but rather by a kind of agreement, either 
expressed, as by a division, or implied, as by occupation.
As it stands, this passage tells us rather little about wherein lie the crucial similarities 
between the two theories. It seems to be no more than a potted history of the origin and
^David Hume, Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of  
Morals, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge; third edition, revised by P.H. Nidditch, Oxford: Clarendon Press
(1975), p. 307n.
9"Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pads Libri Tres, trans. F.W. Kelsey, Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, New York: Oceana Publications (1964), Bk.II, chapter II, section ii.4-5. 
(Subsequent references to this work will be abbreviated. Thus this reference would appear as 
D JBP , II.II.ii.4-5.)
development of private property from primitive communistic beginnings. So, how are we 
to understand the connection? This may not seem too difficult a task, but the m atter is 
complicated by the fact tha t  Grotius was widely recognized as a fountainhead from which 
flowed a modern tradition of theories of natural law. So, in order properly to understand 
Hume's remark, we need to know whether he means to place himself with Grotius and  the 
whole tradition he spawned, or with Grotius rather than  with his successors. For both 
these reason, it would be inadequate to seek to resolve this m atter  simply by comparing 
Humean with Grotian doctrines. It is necessary to understand something of the 
intellectual tradition stretching from Grotius to Hume. This essay will be concerned to 
sketch in the major elements of that tradition, in so far as it is germane to the theory of 
property. It will therefore be concerned with elucidating the main features of the modern 
theory of natural law, and with charting the continuities and discontinuities of the natural 
law tradition as it was taken up in England and (especially) Scotland.
It is im portant to point out, however, th a t  by tracing the development of the theory of 
property in the natural law theories stemming from Grotius, this essay will have a focus 
both broader and narrower than  the modern reader may expect. In the first place, the 
theory of property is not, for natural law, a m atte r  which can be settled independently of 
other issues of moral and social philosophy. Rather, property is the first and most 
essential element of justice; justice is the pillar on which society rests; and society, in its 
tu rn , is necessitated by the essential features of human nature. The theory of property is 
thus inextricably linked with conceptions of human nature and society, of psychology and 
history, of action and obligation. All these will therefore be im portant matters for this 
essay.
In the second place, the focus on property will have a narrowing effect by separating out 
those philosophers who, despite their dependence on the Grotian tradition (to whatever 
degree), nevertheless have no place for a theory of property. Hobbes is the most notable 
member of this camp, the existence of which, according to Richard Tuck, reflects the fact 
th a t  De Jure Belli ac P a d s  ‘‘is Janus-faced, and its two mouths speak the language of
9
absolutism and liberty^.° Tuck's claim has its limitations: it will be suggested below
th a t  Grotius’s m agnum  opus is rather less two-faced than Tuck believes, and his contrast 
between absolutism and liberty ignores the fact tha t  sometimes absolutism was seen as a 
key  to liberty, by controllng the ravages of the nobility. However, his remark does neatly
9
^Richard Tuck, Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and Development. Cambridge: C.U.P. 
(1979), p.79.
3capture the fact tha t  different aspects of G rotius’s work produced political theories of 
markedly different kinds. The absolutist version produced no theory of property because 
absolutism needs no such theory: property is. on such views, just  what the absolute ruler 
decrees. This essay will therefore be concerned only with the anti-absolutist strand of 
natural law theories.
As Tuck notes, there are two aspects of G rotius’s thought where the anti-absolutist 
strain is most explicit: these concern the right of property and the right of resistance, 
those rights characteristically associated with the political thought of John Locke. Both 
these rights are recognized, however, by all the writers on the anti-absolutist side of the 
Grotian inheritance. This essay will not be concerned with the right of resistance, but it 
is worth remembering th a t  the various theories of property to be considered are in each 
case part  of a larger political theory which includes a right of resistance, and which is 
formulated in self-conscious opposition to absolutism - whether of a Hobbesian or of an 
older form (as, for example, with Filmer). The theory of property is part of a political 
theory of a fundamentally anti-absolutist stamp.
II: N atural Law and H istory
In opposition to some widespread assumptions, it will be shown here tha t  the theories of 
property to be considered are evolutionary theories in an im portant respect. They are, in 
fact, characteristically part  of a wider conception of the evolution of human society. The 
evolutionary character of society and of social laws is increasingly stressed by the later 
writers in this tradition, but it is im portant to recognize tha t  this is more a m atte r  of an 
increased level of self-consciousness (especially of methodological self-consciousness) than 
a new departure. For the earlier writers, principally G rotius’s seventeenth-century 
descendants, the evolution of society and of social laws - including relations of property - 
is a genuine but not a self-conscious feature of their social theory. This is accurately 
caught in Duncan Forbes’ remark, in his im portant book H um e's Philosophical Politics, 
that
for none of these thinkers is the idea of social evolution at the centre of 
a ttention; nowhere is it dwelt on or elaborated for its own sake. However it is 
not a forced or distorted interpretation which points out how, for the natural 
law writers, as for Hume, government or ‘civil society’ is a purely human 
expedient which emerges with the development of society to meet human needs . 4
It is im portant to recognize this fact not least because it is so frequently denied.
4Duncan Forbes, Hume's Philosophical Politics, Cambridge: C.U.P. (1975),p.28.
4Natural law within the Grotian tradition is commonly understood as an essentially 
ahistoricai enterprise .0 For example, Paul Foriers and Chaim Perelman, in a dictionary 
article on Natural Law, claim that
G rotius’ method opened the door to the construction of a rational law no longer 
verified by experience but deduced abstractly, without considering “any 
particular fact” , taking as initially given only the nature of m an .6
It may be tha t  some of G rotius’s methodological remarks were used to “open the door to” 
an anti-empirical form of natural law, but this is a rather loose expression - what we can 
be said to “open the door to ” need not be part of either our intentions or our practices. It 
is not either part for Grotius. This will be shown in more detail in the following sections, 
where we shall have the opportunity to observe his method directly. At this stage, it is 
sufficient to consider one of his more im portant methodological remarks. There are, he 
says, two ways of establishing th a t  something is “according to the law of na tu re” :
Proof a prion  consists in demonstrating the necessary agreement or 
disagreement of anything with a rational and social nature; proof a posteriori, in 
concluding, if not with absolute assurance, at least with every probability, tha t  
tha t  is according to the law of nature which is believed to be such among all 
nations, or among all those tha t  are more advanced in civilization. For an effect 
tha t  is universal demands a universal cause; and the cause of such an opinion can 
hardly be anything else than the feeling which is called the common sense of 
mankind.'
Ironically, of these two ways of establishing the law of nature, it was the la tter  which was 
seen as distinctively Grotian. As Forbes notes, the a posteriori approach “was the 
approach which Grotius seems to have been usually regarded as having made peculiarly 
his own” , and for which he was stoutly criticised: his heavy reliance on authorities was
Q
seen as a major weakness.3 (W hether fairly or not will not be considered here, although it
°For perhaps the most recent example of this view, see Paul Bowles, “The Origin of Property and 
the Development of Scottish Historical Science", in Journal of the History of  Ideas, XLVI: 2 
(April 1985), pp. 197-209.
r*
DPaul Foriers and Chaim Perelman, “Natural Law and Natural Rights”, in P. Wiener (ed.), 
Dictionary of the History of  Ideas, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons (1973), III, p.20.
~DJBP,  I.I.xii.l. For a slightly (but intriguingly) different formulation, cf. DJBP,  Prolegomena, 
40.
Forbes, op.cit. p.18.8
5should be noted tha t  Grotius was not naive in his use of authorities .0
If Grotius’s characteristic method was seen as the a posteriori method, then it is 
difficult indeed to see how he could have opened the door to “rational law no longer 
verified by experience"’ . The fact tha t  Grotius allows also the a priori method does not 
establish the conclusion drawn by Foriers and Perelman. Even more im portant, however, 
G rotius’s practice of what he calls his a priori method shows it to be not an “abstract 
deduction ... taking as initially given only the nature of m an” . Rather, for Grotius and 
his successors, an essential role is played by their assumptions about history. Their 
method consists in showing th a t  the acknowledged facts of human history are not 
arbitrary  or accidental, but necessary. The a priori method a ttem pts  to show the logic of 
history. This is not to say tha t  it is devoted to elaborating laws of historical development 
(if such there are), but with elucidating what has been called the “logic of situations” .10 
G rotius’s a priori method characteristically proceeds by showing how the facts of human 
nature, concretely realized in specific social situations (most commonly drawn from 
ancient history), so drastically constrain possible solutions to given problems that the 
particular outcome or outcomes can be seen to be inevitable. He could be said to hold the 
view th a t  human history reveals the logic of the distinctively human s itua tion . 11 For this 
reason, I suggest, we can understand why it is tha t  - especially in his earlier published 
work, M are Liberum  - Grotius treats the law of nature as both innate and historical.
We shall examine some aspects of this trea tm ent in the following section, and then show 
how such an understanding of natural law is implicit in the account of the origin and 
limits of property. For our purposes, there are two advantages to be gained from an 
investigation of the earlier work before turning to his later, more famous De Jure Belli ac
°Cf. DJBP,  Prol.40: “Not that confidence is to be reposed in them without discrimination; for 
they were accustomed to serve the interests of their sect, their subject, or their cause. But when 
many at different times, and in different places, affirm the same thing as certain, that ought to be 
referred to a universal cause ...”
10Most notably by Karl Popper, in The Poverty of Historicism,  London: RKP (1957), esp. 
p.149: “There is room for a more detailed analysis of the logic of situations.  The best historians 
have often made use, more or less unconsciously, of this conception: Tolstoy, for example, when he 
describes how it was not decision but ‘necessity’ which made the Russian army yield Moscow 
without a fight and withdraw to places where it could find food”.
^ T o  modern eyes, this sort of connection between logic and history looks like either fudging or 
the thin end of a Hegelian (or “historicist”) wedge. That it was not characteristically seen to be so 
in the period we will be considering can be seen in the remarkable statement of W. Duncan in his 
Elements of Logick (1748), that “Logic may be justly stiled the history of the human mind in as 
much as it traces the progress of our knowledge from our first and simple perceptions”. (Quoted by 
Forbes, op.cit., p.!5n.)
6Pacts. Firstly, it will show G rotius’s implicit commitment to a form of historical 
understanding as the manner of understanding appropriate  to social phenomena such as 
property (a commitment which, although preserved in the later work, is less explicit). 
Secondly, it will show his explicit acknowledgement tha t  the concept of property has itself 
evolved part passu  with this history. Grotius’s account is, in short, what we would now 
describe as evolutionary in character. Recognizing this is the first step in coming to see 
th a t  the historical science of society developed most notably in eighteenth century 
Scotland, and to which Hume is an imporant contributor, is a natural development of the 
Grotian natural law tradition, not a decisive break from it.
I l l :  M are Liberum: T he L aw  o f N a tu r e  and th e  H isto ry  o f P r o p e r ty .
. 1 0 .
In his early work, M are L iberum , Grotius deploys a battery of arguments against the 
Portuguese, the public opponents of the principle of the freedom of the seas. The specific 
reasons for his concern with the freedom of the seas are well documented, and so will not
i  9
be repeated here. The im portant m atter  is th a t  he appeals to the law of nature as the 
highest tribunal. This law spells out the principles of natural justice, principles which are 
not arbitrary but which have a natural foundation. Defenders of the natural law are thus 
necessarily in opposition to those powerful men who
persuade themselves, or as I rather believe, try to persuade themselves, that 
justice and injustice are distinguished the one from the other not by their own 
nature, but in some fashion merely by the opinion and the custom of mankind . 14
In fact, not only is the law of nature not arbitrary , it is so firmly grounded in nature that 
it cannot be ignored or denied, not even by the most powerful of authorities. Grotius 
points out, for example, tha t
1 9 .1 Mare Liberum was published in 1609, but the discovery of the unpublished treatise De Jure 
Praedae Commentanus in 1864 showed the former work to be. in all essentials, chapter XII of the 
latter. Nevertheless I have limited myself almost exclusively to the originally published piece, since 
the significance of Grotius for this essay is tied to his influence on subsequent writers. I have, 
however, availed myself of two different translations of Mare Liberum, one of which is part of the 
translation of De Jure Praedae. These two sources are: Grotius on the Freedom of the Seas 
(trans. R.V.D. Magoffin), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York: Oxford
University Press (1916) (hereafter cited as ML); and De Jure Praedae Commentarius (trans. G.L. 
Williams, with W.H. Zeydel), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Classics of 
International Law, No. 22), Oxford: Clarendon Press (1950) (hereafter cited as DJPC).
13See, for example, James Brown Scott’s ^Introductory Note” to ML, pp.v-x.
14ML, p.l.
It is also a fact universally recognized that the Pope has no authority  to commit 
acts repugnant to the law of na tu re . 15
The importance of the law of nature is thus.clear. But what does Grotius understand this 
law to be? It is, first of all, a divine creation: “the law of nature arises out of Divine
Providence” . This does not mean, however, tha t  it is no more than a divine command, 
the command of an arbitrary divine ruler. Rather, the divine providence is shown in the 
internal constitution of our nature:
He had drawn up certain laws not graven on tablets of bronze or stone but 
written in the minds and on the hearts of every individual, where even the 
unwilling and the refractory must read th em .1'
The model for the law of nature  is thus not positive law of any kind, not even the tablets 
of stone of the Decalogue. Rather, the law of nature is a set of innate ideas. Its 
innateness guarantees its imm utability, as another passage makes clear:
The law by which our case must be decided is not difficult to find, seeing that it 
is the same among all nations; and it is easy to understand, seeing tha t  it is
. . .  1 ft ^
innate in every individual and implanted in his m ind . 10
By consulting this innate law, human beings have created systems of positive justice. Of 
course, not all systems of positive law can be characterised as just (men of great wealth 
and power in particular are able to construct legal systems which ignore this innate law, 
observes G rotius19), and hence attr ibu tab le  to providence. Nevertheless, Grotius must 
hold tha t  providence will prevail, and so he concludes tha t  positive law springs from the 
law of nature:
those very laws themselves of each and every nation and city flow from that
15ML.  p.46. It might be thought that this sort of remark, coming from a Protestant, ought not 
to be taken at face value. This would, however, be a mistake. Grotius’s claim that the limit to the 
Pope’s authority is “universally recognized” is clearly meant to remind Catholics of their own 
position. Mare Liberum is, at least in intention, an attempt to persuade the learned world, 
Protestant and Catholic alike, of the insupportability of the Portuguese position.
16ML,  p.53.
11 ML,  p.2.
18M L , p.5. 
19 ML,  p .l .
8Divine source, and from that  source receive their sanctity and their m ajesty.“0
To say this, however, appears to create a problem: how is it tha t  positive law, which is 
mutable, can flow from the immutable natural law written on our hearts? How is the 
mutable a product of the immutable? In one passage Grotius even appears to deny tha t  it 
is. He says:
since the law of nature arises out of Divine Providence, it is immutable; but a 
part  of this natural law is the primary or primitive law of nations, differing from 
the secondary or positive law of nations, which is m utable.2*
This passage separates the positive , mutable, laws of nations from natural law, which goes 
no further than the “primitive'’ law of nations. But the preceding passage states tha t  the 
laws “of each and every nation and city” , which cannot be anything but positive laws, all 
“flow from that Divine source” . So the secondary, or positive, laws of nations, even if not 
identical to natural law, must nevertheless “flow from” that  law. How is this possible?
The complete explanation of this m atter  will not be available until Grotius’s account of 
the development of positive laws of property has been considered. In general outline, 
however, the answer can be obtained by considering what at first looks like a further 
complication: G rotius’s acceptance of the ancient notion, shared by Latins and Greeks, 
tha t  the law of nature was the historically original law, the law of the “Golden Age” 
before any positive laws existed. He speaks, for example, of
the primitive law of nations, which is sometimes called Natural Law, and which 
the poets sometimes portray as having existed in a Golden Age, and sometimes 
in the reign of Saturn or of Justice.22
The implication here is not th a t  in the “Golden Age” only  the law of nature existed, 
because there was as yet no positive law, but tha t  the rule of the law of nature was 
limited to tha t  bygone age, and has now (in some sense) been replaced by the rule of 
positive law. Clearly this can be so only if the original natural law has somehow been 
incorporated into the subsequent positive law, or, as Grotius himself puts it, if positive 
law can be seen to “flow from” natural law. G rotius’s remarks here are not, then, merely 
metaphorical, but to be taken as they stand: positive law can be seen as flowing from
20ML, p.2.
21ML, p.53.
22 ML, p.23.
9natural law if there is a procedure which is itself sanctioned by natural law. This is 
indeed Grotius’s position, as we can see from some of his remarks concerning the 
development of positive property laws. Despite the fact tha t  “in the eyes of nature no 
distinctions of ownership were discernible*’23 (which is to say, there was no ownership in 
the “Golden Age” ), the development of positive laws of property was not contrary to 
nature because
The present-day concept of distinctions in ownership was the result, not of any 
sudden transition, but of a gradual process whose initial steps were taken under 
the guidance of nature herself.24
These initial steps involved both the recognition tha t  “a certain form of ownership was
• O  C
inseparable from use” , and also the requirement tha t  the law of property which thus 
arises must in some way reflect  such inseparability. This latter requirement will be 
examined below. First it must be recognized th a t  positive law arises in response to 
natural promptings, and reflects ( that is, in so far as it is just) these promptings:
The recognition of the existence of private property led to the establishment of a 
law on the m atter , and this law was patterned after n a tu re ’s p lan .26
It is of course possible to have a variety of laws which could be plausibly regarded as 
“patterned  after nature 's plan” . Equally clearly, however, not any  positive law could 
plausibly be so regarded. If positive laws are not to be contrary to nature, then, they can 
allow of a measure of variation, but not of boundless diversity. Mutable positive law can 
thus be part of immutable natural law as long as it is recognized tha t  the mutability of 
the former is not unlimited, and tha t  the immutability of the latter does not imply a set 
of hard and fast rules, but a s tarting  point attended with procedural constraints. Positive
2ZDJPC, p.227.
O  A
~^DJPC, p.228. Cf. ML, p.24: “the transition to the present distinction of ownerships did not 
come violently, but gradually, nature herself pointing out the way” .
25DJPC, p.228.
~VDJPC , p.229. Cf. ML, p .25: “When property or ownership was invented, the law of property 
was established to imitate nature”.
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law is part  of natural law as long as it is '‘patterned after na tu re ’s plan77.“ ' Grotius shows 
what is involved in following na tu re’s plan in his account of the development of property 
law in M are Liberum. Elements of this account have so far been alluded to; it is now 
time to consider it in detail.
If we are to understand how property has arisen, Grotius points out, we must first 
recognize tha t  the concept of property has itself undergone development. (The first step 
in understanding property, we might say, is to recognize th a t  we are not dealing with a 
timeless concept.) The story of the origin of property is not a story of the spontaneous 
generation of the modern concept of property, arriving fully-fledged in an underprepared 
world. Rather,
it must be understood tha t ,  during the earliest epoch of m an ’s history, ownership 
d o m in iu m ] and common posession communio] were concepts whose
significance differed from that now ascribed to them. For in the present age, the 
term  “ownership’’ connotes possession of something peculiarly one’s own, tha t  is 
to say, something belonging to a given party in such a way tha t  it cannot be 
similarly possessed by any other party; whereas the expression “common 
property” is applied to tha t  which has been assigned to several parties, to be 
possessed by them in partnership (so to speak) and in mutual concord, to the 
exclusion of other parties. Owing to the poverty of hum an speech, however, it 
has become necessary to employ identical terms for concepts th a t  are not 
identical. Consequently, because of a certain degree of similitude and by 
analogy, the above-mentioned expressions descriptive of our modern customs are 
applied to another right, which existed in early times. Thus with reference to 
th a t  early age, the term  “common" is nothing more nor less than  the simple 
antonym  of “private” proprium j; and the word “ownership” denotes the power 
to make use rightfully of common ,i.e. public] property.^®
G rotius’s point can be summarised as follows: the term  “d o m in iu m ” (commonly
translated  as “ownership” or “property” ), which now is taken to mean private or exclusive 
property, did not always have this meaning. Instead, it originally meant the power to 
make use of what was not privately possessed. It identified a use-right. So, when we ask 
about the origin of ownership, or the origin of property, we need to understand whether 
we mean property in the developed modern legal sense (exclusive property), or property in 
its original sense of a use-right. There are then two separate questions we can ask: What
"'Grotius goes even further, repeating “the accepted precept and rule that all things are supposed 
to be permitted which are not found expressly forbidden” (ML,  p.55). His account of the 
development of property, however, implies a narrower, more directed rule. Nature does not simply 
allow what is not forbidden, but points out the general direction in which laws are to develop if 
they are not to violate nature.
28 DJPC\ pp.226-7.
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is the origin of the use-right, and, How was the concept of a use-right transformed into 
the modern concept of exclusive property?
G rotius’s answer to the first question is only alluded to in M are L iberum , but is not the 
less im portant for tha t .  Rather, his view that  the natural world exists ufor the use of 
m ankind7*“ is not considered there in any detail because, not only does he take it for 
granted, so also does his audience. T ha t the world exists for the use of hum an beings, in 
so far as that use is necessary for their preservation, is a commonplace of natural law 
theories. As we shall see, Grotius gives a more explicit acknowledgement of this principle 
in De Jure Belli ac Pacts. We can see the long pedigree of the principle by considering an 
authorita tive  mediaeval source. In the S u m m a  Theologica , Thomas Aquinas points out 
tha t
the order of the precepts of the natural law is according to the order of natural 
inclinations. Because in man there is first of all an inclination to good in 
accordance with the nature which he has in common with all substances, 
inasmuch as every substance seeks the preservation of its own being, according 
to its nature; and by reason of this inclination, whatever is a means of preserving 
human life and of warding off its obstacles belongs to the natural law.
W ith this principle in hand, we only need to recognize tha t  “man is helped by industry in 
his necessities, for instance, in food and clothing” in order to see that an original right 
to use at least parts of the natural world is a necessary part of natural law. Grotius’s 
comparative silence on the m atter  is no more than a reflection of the extent to which this 
principle lies beyond dispute. He is quite happy to apply what he will later call the a 
posteriori method. He approvingly quotes Seneca: in the earliest ages,
... To all the way was open;
the use of all things was a com m on  r ight .°2
29M L , p.2.
30Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I-II, Q.94, A.2; in Dino Bigongiari (ed.), The Political 
Ideas o f St. Thomas Aquinas (trans. by English Dominican Fathers), New York: Hafner Press 
(1953), pp.45-6.
Summa Theologica, I-II, Q.95, A.2; op.cit. p.56.
32Seneca, Octavia, 402f; DJPC , p.228. Although Grotius does not, in Mare Liberum , describe 
his reliance on authorities as the a posteriori method, as he does in De Jure Belli ac Pads , he is 
nevertheless already quite self-consciously adopting it as a method. He says: “Moreover, we ought 
not to be censured if, in our explanation of a right derived from nature, we avail ourselves of the 
authority and express statements of persons generally regarded as pre-eminent in natural powers of 
judgment”. [DJPC, p.226).
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We can now turn to the second question: How does the original use-right develop into
modern private property? Grotius gives a brief but revealing sketch of this process. In the 
“Golden Age” there was a universal use-right. Anything could be freely used by anyone 
for the purposes of their preservation. But some things, once used, cannot be re-used, or 
at least cannot be used without a diminution of their value. To some degree, using may 
am ount to using up. To the extent tha t  this is so, the initial user excludes the possibility 
of subsequent users. Where use amounts to using up, then, the exercise of the original 
use-right is in practice the exercise of an exclusive right. Where using does not amount to 
using up, but does result in a diminution of the possibility or extent of re-use, exercising 
the use-right approximates more or less closely to the exercise of an exclusive right. Some 
cases of exercising the original universal use-right can thus be regarded as the creation of 
de facto  private property. Grotius puts it as follows:
there are some things which are consumed by use, either in the sense tha t  they 
are converted into the very substance of the user and therefore adm it of no 
further use, or else in the sense tha t  they are rendered less fit for additional 
service by the fact tha t  they have once been made to serve. Accordingly, it very 
soon became apparent, in regard to articles of the first class (for example, food 
and drink), tha t  a certain form of private ownership was inseparable from use.
For the essential characteristic of private property is the fact tha t  it belongs to a 
given individual in such a way as to be incapable of belonging to another 
individual.00
The very practice of exercising the original universal use-right thus gives rise to a form 
of natural private property. The creation of a positive law to recognize such forms of 
na tura l property will thus mirror nature itself, or “imitate na ture” :0**
The recognition of the existence of private property led to the establishment of a 
law on the m atter , and this law was patterned after na tu re ’s plan. For just as 
the right to use the goods in question was originally acquired through a physical 
act of a ttachm ent, the very source (as we have observed) of the institution of 
private property, so it was deemed desirable tha t  each individual’s private 
possessions should be acquired, as such, through similar acts of attachm ent.
This is the process known as “occupation” occupatioJ, a particularly appropriate 
term in connexion with those goods which were formerly at the disposal of the
°*DJPC, p.228. A somewhat similar argument, which likewise stresses the inseparability of 
using an object from consuming the object itself, was employed by Aquinas in criticising usury. 
Aquinas says (Summa Theologica, II-II, Q. 78, A.l) that “there are certain things the use of which 
consists in their consumption: thus we consume wine when we use it for drink, and we consume 
wheat when we use it for food. Wherefore in suchlike things the use of the thing must not be 
reckoned apart from the thing itself, and whoever is granted the use of the thing is granted the 
thing itself”, (op.cit.. p.148).
34ML, p.25.
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TScommunity.
To illustrate the naturalness of the legal principle of occupation, Grotius refers to a 
famous example of Seneca’s:
the equestrian rows of seats belong to all the Roman knights; yet the place that I 
have occupied in those rows becomes my ow nA6
In this way, in the imitation of nature, the first principle of private property arises 
through the recognition of the consequences of exercising the original universal use-right. 
Once the implications of occupation have been recognized in a human community, an 
elementary form of private property has come into existence. The process which leads to 
the development of modern forms of property is thus underway.
G ro tius’s particular purposes in Mare Liberum  lead him away from considering the 
nature of this development in any detail. Since all forms of property acquisition depend, 
either directly or indirectly, on occupation,*" and since his main aim in this work is to 
show tha t  neither the Portuguese, nor anyone else, can lay claim to the open sea because, 
unlike the land, it cannot be occupied, Grotius’s concerns are both limited to the principle 
of occupation and preoccupied with its starting point. If, with respect to the sea, it is not 
possible to begin a process of occupation which in any way imitates nature, then clearly 
the law of nature does not allow that  the sea can be occupied. Given these aims, it is not 
surprising that Grotius here limits himself to a few remarks on the manner in which the 
initial form of occupation leads to other, more extensive, forms of occupation. 
Nevertheless, what he does say is quite revealing. After pointing out th a t ,  because in 
some cases using involves using up, “a certain form of private ownership is inseparable 
from use” , he goes on to show how this basic form of property is extended:
This basic concept was later extended by a logical process to include articles of 
the second class, such as clothing and various other things capable of being 
moved or of moving themselves. Because of these developments, it was not even 
possible for all immovable things (fields, for instance) to remain unapportioned, 
since the use of such things, while it does not consist directly in their 
consumption, is nevertheless bound up in some casesi with purposes of 
consumption (as it is when arable lands and orchards are used with a view to
Z5DJPC , p.229.
°®Seneca, De Bene ficiis, Vll.xii; DJPC , p.229.
""'The nature of this dependence is an im portant feature of Adam Sm ith ’s jurisprudence, in 
which the development of the different rules of property is tied closely to the development of 
different stages of society.
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obtaining food, or pastures for animals intended to provide; clothing), and since 
there are not enough immovable goods to suffice for indiscriminate use by all
9 0  J
persons .0
Here we see, in brief, Grotius showing how the logic of historical situations leads to the 
extension of the notion of property to include new forms of occupation - in fact, to create 
a new, extended concept of occupation itself, since occupation in these later cases no 
longer requires physical a ttachm ent. The original principle - the use-right sanctioned by 
the natural law of self-preservation - is adapted and interpreted to meet the exigencies of 
particular factors and situations (such as the limited re-usability of some things, and 
pressures caused by limited amounts of usable land) as they come to bear. The “logical 
process’’ mentioned in the quotation is a process of reasoning1"9 conducted from within a 
historical situation, about th a t  situation: i.e., a process which produces principles relevant 
to th a t  situation, principles which will stand in need of revision as new situations arise. 
Grotius is quite happy to idealize history49 - a practice which, to some degree, no 
historical method can avoid - and this fact, together with the purposes of M are Liberum  
referred to above, means tha t  he provides no extensive historical investigations into the 
development of property. Nevertheless, human history is the stage on which the story of 
property unfolds.
Before turning to consider the account of property and its foundations in Grotius’s 
m ature work, it is worth noticing one factor which serves not only to encourage a 
historical approach to the elucidation of social relations such as property, but also to 
discourage extensive or detailed historical investigations of a modern kind. This factor is 
the role of providence. Providence is a historical notion, a reflection of the Judaeo- 
Christian idea of sacred history - the purposes of God are worked out, and thus shown in. 
the history of his people (whether Jews or Christians, but of course in characteristically 
different ways for Judaism and Christianity). For any social theory in which providence 
is to be accommodated, then, not only must history play an im portant role (thus
Z8DJPC , p.228. (Square brackets enclose additions by the translator.)
39ML, p.24, translates the expression as “the process of reasoning”.
49ML, p.22: “It will be most convenient ... if we follow the practice of all the poets since Hesiod, 
of the philosophers and jurists of the past, and distinguish certain epochs, the divisions of which are 
marked off perhaps not so much by intervals of time as by obvious logic and essential character”. 
Cf. DJPC, p.226: Property “will be very easily explained if ... we draw a chronological distinction 
between things which are perhaps not differentiated from one another by any considerable interval 
of time, but which do indeed differ in certain underlying principles and by their very nature”. This 
strategy is - in fact, must be - adopted by all historical theories which aim to elicit stages of 
historical development.
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encouraging the development or maintenance of historical social theories), but it must 
play a particular kind of role, a role which shows the providential logic of successive 
situations. The historical concerns of such theories will thus be idealized and thematic, 
showing the broad sweep of the providential hand, rather than highly detailed. Unlike 
much modern history, such theories will be concerned to show the forests rather than the 
trees. Keeping this in mind helps to explain why it is that even in De Jure Belli ac P ads  
Grotius gives a historical account of human society, with sketches from history (where 
needed) to illustrate im portant principles, but without any great concern for examining 
historical detail. The contrast with later theories is quite marked: where providence is 
put aside, detailed histories become necessary to fill the breach. Having noted this, we 
can now turn to consider the more detailed foundation Grotius provides for natural law in 
his major work, De Jure Belli ac P ads, and the nature of the account of property he 
builds upon it.
IV: The F oundation  o f N atural Law
G rotius’s ambitions in M are Liberum  have a markedly practical stamp. As a result, he 
devotes little space (and all of it in a preface) to explaining the foundations of natural 
law. As we have seen, he contrasts natural law with the doctrine of the abritrariness of 
moral distinctions. Natural law is denied by all those who hold
th a t  justice and injustice are distinguished the one from the other not by their 
own nature, but in some fashion merely by the opinion and the custom of 
m ankind ."11
In contrast, natural law holds tha t  justice is distinguished by its own nature. In so far as 
there is an “au thor” of nature, natural law can also be said to flow from this author. This 
is G ro tius’s view. God, being “the founder and ruler of the universe” , and especially being 
therefore “the Father of all m ankind” , is the au thor of the natural law itself. The natural 
law is the law of our nature, and so Grotius provides a thumbnail sketch of the main 
elements of our nature. God has, he says, given human beings
the same origin, the same structural organism, the ability to look each other in 
the face, language too, and other means of communication, in order tha t  they all 
might recognize their natural social bond and kinship.1^
41 ML,  p.I.
ML.  p.2; cf. Seneca, Epistles,  xcv (quoted also by Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et G e n t i u m , 
III.iii.1.)
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This point is not elaborated in Mare L iberum , but its importance can be seen with the 
benefit of hindsight, since it provides an early indication of the important role to be 
a ttr ibu ted  to human sociability in Grotius’s later work.
De Jure Belli ac Pacts , in sharp contrast to the restricted polemical purposes of Mare 
Liberum, aims at providing a “comprehensive and systematic” treatm ent of “the mutual 
relations among states or rulers of sta tes” . It aims at providing the first complete treatise 
of this kind, the first to deal with “the whole law of war and peace” . Such a treatise 
cannot be concerned solely with the foundations of the natural law, but must include 
consideration “of treaties of alliance, conventions, and understandings of peoples, kings,
i O
and foreign nations” . In short, it must be a study of the foundations of natural law, 
and an empirical study of human history, of the particular sets of circumstances in which 
positive laws are produced, and against which they must be judged.44 The empirical 
study, as it relates to the institution of property, will be considered in the next section; 
here we will be concerned with the more detailed account Grotius provides in this later 
work of the foundations of the natural law.
* ★ *
As in M are Liberum, G ro tius’s first concern in De Jure Belli ac P ads  is to show what 
natural law must deny. The opponents of natural law are all those who hold th a t  there is 
no real or objective distinction between justice and injustice. To hold this is, for Grotius, 
to be sceptical about morality itself. For all such moral sceptics, Grotius chooses 
Carneades as mouthpiece, “in order tha t  we may not be obliged to deal with a crowd of 
opponents” .45 Or, it would be more accurate to say. he chooses Carneades as a paradigm 
of the sceptic but without allowing him the role of mouthpiece. Instead, he settles for 
quoting Horace's thumbnail sketch, in the Satires, of the scepticism of the Academy.
iZDJBP, Prol., 1-2.
44Cf. DJBP. Prol., 55: “The French have tried ... to introduce history into their study of laws. 
Among them Bodin and Hotman have gained a great name ... their statements and lines of 
reasoning will frequently supply us with material in searching out the truth'’. And cf. also Prol., 
37-8, where Victoria and others are said to lack not only system, but also “the illumination of 
history” .
45DJBP, Prol., 5. For a much more detailed consideration of the role played by Carneades at 
this point - the “crowd of opponents” he is taken to represent - see Richard Tuck, “Grotius, 
Carneades and Hobbes” , Grotiana, New Series, Vol. 4 (1983), pp.43-62.
This is not too surprising, however, since there are no extant writings of Carneades (or of 
the other principal sceptic of the later Academy, Arcesilaus). G rotius’s choice of 
Carneades as the paradigm of the sceptic depends on two famous orations made by 
Carneades in Rome: in the first, praising justice, showing its foundations in natural law; 
in the second, praising injustice, while reducing justice to mere expediency.4^ Grotius 
thus describes him as having
atta ined to so perfect a mastery of the peculiar tenet of his Academy that  he was 
able to devote the power of his eloquence to the service of falsehood not less 
readily than to tha t  of t ru th .47
To show the falsehood of Carneades; position, Grotius needs, firstly, to provide a natural 
foundation for justice, and, secondly, to show that this foundation is more than the purely 
expedient.
The first, or more general, of the sceptic’s claims, summarised (for Grotius) by the poet 
Horace’s line
And just from unjust Nature cannot know48 This is the translation provided in 
D JB P .  Cf. the translation of H. Rushton Fairclough, in Horace, Satires, 
Epistles and Ars Poetica , London: Heinemann (1926) (Loeb Classical Library): 
“Between right and wrong Nature can draw no such distinction as between 
things gainful and harmful, what is to be sought and what is to be shunned” .
The view being presented here is tha t ,  unlike the natural difference which exists 
between the gainful and the harmful (X is gainful, Y harmful, precisely because 
of their natural characteristics), there is no such natural difference between right 
and wrong. Typically, two kinds of conclusion are generated from this position: 
justice is said to be mere convention, or, alternatively, it is said to be, as 
Thrasymachus put it, “the interest of the stronger” .}
depends, according to G rotius’s account of Carneades’ main argument, on the claim that 
all hum an beings act solely from self-interest.49 Justice is, on this view, either a cloak for 
self-interest, or an expedient adaptation to it. Grotius takes it for granted that self- 
interest is the motivation of animals (and tha t  therefore - we may conclude - there is
46uPhilip P. Hallie, “Carneades”, in The Encyclopedia of  Philosophy, editor-in-chief Paul 
Edwards, New York: Macmillan and The Free Press (1967). vol. 2, p.33.
47DJBP.  Prol., 5.
48Horace, Satires, I.iii.113.
49This is the mam version. There is also a derivative version of the doctrine, which holds that, 
because most people most of the time pursue only their self-interest, one ought to pursue one’s own 
interest also, since to fail to do so will be, in such an environment, simply to do oneself harm. See 
DJBP , Prol., 5.
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indeed no justice natural to animals). If the sceptical denial of natural justice is to be 
met, then, it must be met by showing tha t  human nature differs crucially from animal 
nature. This is Grotius’s response:
Man is, to be sure, an animal, but an animal of a superior kind, much farther 
removed from all other animals than the different kinds of animals are from one 
another; evidence on this point may be found in the many traits peculiar to the 
human species. But among the traits  characteristic of man is an impelling desire 
for society, tha t  is, for the social life - not of any and every sort, but peaceful, 
and organized according to the measure of his intelligence, with those who are of 
his kind; this social trend the Stoics called "sociableness” . Stated as a universal 
tru th , therefore, the assertion tha t  every animal is impelled by nature  to seek 
only its own good cannot be conceded .5(1
Grotius does admit tha t  some animals other than human beings can also be impelled by 
motivations other than self-interest. His explanation for this need not detain us, since the 
notion of sociableness he has in mind is more than having some sorts of altruistic 
motivations, and more than what we might now call “sociability” - i.e., the enjoyment of 
the company of others. Rather, Grotius has in mind a special capacity for 
disinterestedness, for the framing of a general understanding, and for acting from general 
motivations. The mature man (and also, to a lesser extent, children and some animals) 
has “some disposition to do good to others” , and this is indeed part of sociableness. But, 
in the relevant sense, sociableness is more than this:
The mature man in fact has ... an impelling desire for society, for the 
gratification of which he alone among animals possesses a special instrument, 
speech. He has also been endowed with the faculty of knowing and of acting in 
accordance with general principles. Whatever accords with that faculty is not 
common to all animals, but peculiar to the nature of m an .51
The “impelling desire for society” here referred to is clearly more than an impelling 
desire for company. It is a desire for a social order, for being part of a culture: the mature 
man desires a society “organized according to the measure of his intelligence, with those 
who are of his kind” . Sociableness in this sense is thus the foundation of human social 
organization, and the impelling desire for such organization is itself the source of law. 
Sociableness is therefore the natural foundation of law, the foundation of a law natural to 
human beings. The basic requirements of an organized social life are the basic principles 
of the natural law. Grotius sketches the main elements as follows:
50D JBP , Prol., 6. 
51 DJBP , Prol., 7.
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This maintenance of the social order ... which is consonant with human 
intelligence, is the source of law properly so called. To this sphere of law belong 
the abstaining from tha t  which is another’s, the restoration to another of 
anything of his which we may have, together with any gain which- we may have 
received from it; the obligation to fulfil promises, the making good of a loss 
incurred through our fault, and the inflicting of penalties upon men according to 
their deserts.
The examination of all these elements is not to our purpose here, but this passage clearly 
indicates the im portant role played by the notion of “what is another’s” , or, more 
generally, what can be said to be “one’s own” . The passage shows tha t ,  for Grotius, 
sociableness does not imply the absorption of separate individuals into an amorphous 
social whole, but requires instead the clear delineation of what is one’s own and what is 
ano ther’s, of what is due to each. Since founded in sociableness, then, natural law must 
give an account of the nature of one's own, and how it can be modified. Explaining the 
nature and development of what is one’s own is, of course, the major concern of this essay.
How does Grotius’s account of sociableness answer the second, the more specific, of the 
sceptic’s two claims: th a t  justice is not natural because it is merely expedient? Once 
again his discussion of the issue begins with a quotation from Horace’s Satires :
Expediency is, as it were, the mother of what is just and fair .53 
This view is, he says, “not true, if we wish to speak accurately” . It is not tha t  it is simply
^  D J  BP, Prol., 8. Note th a t  the final feature of the natu ra l law listed here is the naturalness of 
punish ing .  Locke’s “strange Doctrine” (Two Treatises, II. 8-9) of the natural right to punish is 
certainly not a new doctrine.
- 9
'“’Horace, Satires,  I.iii.98; as translated in D JB P ,  Prol., 16. As a sta tem ent of the sceptical 
position Grotius wishes to attack, this passage will undoubtedly serve. But his use of it is 
nevertheless ra ther odd. Expediency is. as we have seen, one part of a larger sceptical position, in 
which a seif-interested psychology of action is the cornerstone. This of course allows that,  in a 
different context, expediency need not serve a sceptical purpose. Horace’s context is one such case: 
he is making an Epicurean-style attack on the Stoic doctrine tha t all evils are all equally evil. 
Expediency is thus appealed to as a way of differentiating degrees of evil: “Those whose creed is 
th a t  all sins are much on a par are at a loss when they come to face facts. Feelings and customs 
rebel, and so does Expedience herself, the mother, we may say, of justice and r ight” (Fairclough, 
op.cit.). The fundamental role allotted to expediency here is not part of an a t tem pt to reduce 
justice, but to show what is its point. H um e’s different use of this passage - as we shall see later - 
helps to underline this point. The misunderstandings he had to ward off also helps to show the 
risks implicit in invoking considerations of expediency: expediency is not always mere expediency. 
This is certainly Hum e’s point when he says in his famous letter to Hutcheson (immediately after 
quoting this very passage from Horace), “I have never called justice unnatural, but only artificial” 
(Letter to Hutcheson, 17 September 1739: letter no. 13 in J.Y.T. Greig (ed.), The Letters o f  David  
H um e,  Oxford: O.U.P., 1932). For Hume the artificiality of justice is not evidence for its 
unnaturalness because justice arises necessarily. (See Treatise, p.484; cf. Enquiries,  p.307.) 
G ro tius’s point is much the same: justice, although expedient, is not mere expediency because it 
arises necessarily from hum an sociableness.
20
false, more tha t  it is misleading. He does accord an important place to expediency, but 
the foundation of justice lies not in expediency but in human nature:
the very nature of man, which even if we had no lack of anything would lead us 
into the mutual relations of society, is the mother of the law of na ture .3^
As for the positive law of specific human societies (which Grotius calls municipal law33), 
it is a natural descendant of the law of nature, and hence is also founded in “the very 
nature of m an“1, or nature itself:
the mother of municipal law is tha t  obligation which arises from mutual consent; 
and since this obligation derives its force from the law of nature, nature may be 
considered, so to say, the great-grandmother of municipal law.3®
Thus the law of nature and its descendants arise necessarily from “the very nature of
m an” . Even if there were no advantage to be gained therefrom, th a t  is, “even if we had
no lack of any th ing” , society would still arise, and with it the law of nature and positive 
— ^
municipal law.3' However, human weakness implies tha t  society is advantageous. 
Natural law. although not founded in expediency, therefore is expedient:
The law of nature nevertheless has the reinforcement of expediency; for the 
Author of nature willed tha t  as individuals we should be weak, and should lack 
many things needed in order to live properly, to the end tha t  we might be the 
more constrained to cultivate the social life.3^
Not only is social life itself expedient, but political societies are formed directly because of 
expediency. T h a t  is, they are formed precisely because they are advantageous:
expediency afforded an opportunity also for municipal law, since tha t  kind of 
association of which we have spoken, and subjection to authority , have their 
roots in expediency. From this it follows tha t  those who prescribe laws for 
others in so doing are accustomed to have, or ought to have, some advantage in
54 DJBP , Pro!., 16.
55«Municipal law is that which emanates from the civil power” . DJBP, I.I.xiv.l.
5QDJBP , Prol., 16.
3~uEven if no advantage were to be contemplated from the keeping of the law, it would be a 
mark of wisdom, not of folly, to allow ourselves to be drawn towards that to which we feel that our 
nature leads”. DJBP , Prol., 18.
-  Q
DJBP , Prol., 16. Cf. Hume's account of the natural disadvantages of human beings, and of 
the consequent advantages of society (Treatise, pp.484-5).
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view.
In this sense, positive municipal law has its roots in expediency. But both natural law 
and its grand-child, municipal law, are therefore expedient without being ultim ately  
founded in expediency. Rather, the ultimate foundation of the law of nature, and thus of 
its descendants, lies in the natural sociableness of human beings.
G rotius’s account of the relationship between natural law and expediency may appear to 
be something of a storm in a teacup, but it has some important consequences. Firstly, the 
positive side of his position - tha t  natural law, even if not founded in expediency, 
“nevertheless has the reinforcement of expediency’’ - implies tha t  there is no conflict 
between his natural law theory and those later “u til ita rian” theories for which utility is a 
function of a determinate (sociable) human nature; a nature which, in its turn, requires an 
organized social life. Unlike Bentham ’s utilitarianism, the theory of David Hume is one 
such theory, self-consciously worked out by Hume as a development of some basic 
principles of natural law theory. Any stark contrast of natural law with all those theories 
which make an appeal to utility is thus simplistic. Secondly, the fact tha t  natural law is 
not reducible to mere expediency means, most importantly , tha t  laws are not suspended 
in tha t  situation where they are often inexpedient, in war. Grotius sees the claim “that  
war is irreconcilable with law” as one of the characteristic elements of the denial of 
natural law. He treats it as also similar to the more general view “th a t  for those whom 
fortune favours might makes right” ; and both these are treated as “of like implication” as 
the mere expediency thesis .60 For Grotius, all such views are implicit denials of natural 
law. which, far from holding tha t  all laws are suspended between combatants in times of 
war, holds instead th a t  there are laws of war governing specific sorts of belligerent 
situations. To show what these laws are is a governing concern of De Jure Belli ac Pacts, 
and it is for his stance on this m atter  tha t  Grotius earned his reputation as an irenicist, 
despite Rousseau’s attack on him (as an apologist for the powerful) in On the Social
59DJBP , Prol., 16. 
60 DJBP , Prol., 3-4.
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Contract.®^
Of rather more immediate concern for many of Grotius’s contemporary readers, 
however, was the provocative conclusion he drew from his account of the foundation of 
natural law in human sociableness. This is the famous e tiam si darem us  passage:
W hat we have been saying would have a degree of validity even if we should 
concede tha t  which cannot be conceded without the utmost wickedness, tha t  
there is no God, or th a t  the affairs of men are of no concern to H im .^
Although an influential remark in the history of political philosophy, by affirming the 
possibility of at least a partially secularized political theory, its significance can be 
overrated, or misunderstood. It is certainly not the thin end of an atheistic wedge; it is, 
rather, a conclusion typical of the theological rationalism of the late sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries, a theory which met its most famous rejection in the philosophy of 
Descartes. Descartes developed his theological voluntarism in self-consciousness 
opposition to the M etaphysical D ispu ta tions  of Francisco Suarez (1548-1617), one of the 
most famous of the rationalists. It is not surprising, then, to see that Suarez, in his work 
on natural law, should give the law of nature a degree of autonomy comparable to that 
which it enjoys in Grotius. In answer to the question. Whether God can grant 
dispensation from natural law?, Suarez argues in favour of the opinion th a t  “those 
commandments which involve an intrinsic principle of justice and obligation are not liable 
to dispensation” . The most notable of those commandments of which this is true are the 
Ten Com mandments, so Suarez adopts the conclusion tha t  “none of the Commandments 
of the Decalogue admits of dispensation, even by the absolute power of God” . Moreover, 
Suarez does not present this as a bold and innovative thesis: in its favour he several times 
cites Aquinas, who had, he says, declared tha t  “not even God is able to grant isuchj a
61i Grotius!s reputation as a man of peace is a matter of course in Gunter Grass’s recreation of the 
end of the Thirty Years Wax (in 1647), the earlier periods of which form an important part of the 
political background of Grotius’s major work. See Gunter Grass, The Meeting at Telgte (trans. 
Ralph Manheim), Harmondsworth: Penguin Books (1983), pp.22-3, 87. For Rousseau’s attack on 
Grotius, see especially On The Social Contract. Bk. I Ch. II: Grotius’s “most persisent mode of 
reasoning is alsays to establish right by fact. One could use a more rational method, but not one 
more favourable to tyrants” . On The Social Contract (ed. R.D. Masters, trans. J.R. Masters), New 
York: St. Martin’s Press (1978), p.47. Rousseau’s objections are exaggerated, but not empty.
However, it is not to our purposes to consider them here. It is worth noting that Locke’s rather 
easy justification of killing in the state of war (see especially chapter 3 of the Second Treatise), is 
not contrary to Grotius’s defence of law in the state of war, since, for Grotius, “by the law of nature 
it is permissible to kill in defence of property” (D JBP, Il.I.xi).
62 DJBP, Prol., 11.
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dispensation; for He cannot act contrary to His own justness*1.60
If God cannot change the natural laws, it is because he cannot do so justly.  But if the 
natural laws cannot be justly changed by God, but must in fact be necessarily willed by 
him (because he cannot but be just), then it could be said, as Grotius does say, tha t  the 
natural law would have “a degree of validity, even if we should concede ... that there is 
no God” . In so saying, Grotius stresses th a t  he is not denying the natural law a divine 
source:
the law of nature of which we have spoken, comprising alike tha t  which relates 
to the social life of man and tha t  which is so called in a larger sense, proceeding 
as it does from the essential traits implanted in man, can nevertheless rightly be 
a ttr ibu ted  to God. because of His having willed tha t  such traits  exist in us .64
Thus it can be said tha t  the obligations imposed by the law of nature are “in themselves” 
obligatory, because “it is understood tha t  necessarily  they are enjoined or forbidden by 
God” . But, we may ask, if God does not exist, would there still be an obligation to 
conform to the law of nature (since this law would be enjoined or forbidden by no 
author)? Grotius appears to accept th a t  there would be, but in so doing he failed to 
satisfy Pufendorf and others, and thus helped to make the question of our obligation to 
obey the law central to the later natural law debates, as we shall see. Grotius himself 
seems rather untroubled on the m atter  - he is content to spell out, in very rationalistic 
terminology, the nature and foundation of natural law. We should now turn to examine 
this account.
W hat is the law of nature? It is, says Grotius,
a dictate of right reason, which points out tha t  an act. according as it is or is not 
in conformity with rational nature, has in it a quality of moral baseness or moral 
necessity .00
To understand this passage, we must of course determine what Grotius means by “a 
d ictate  of right reason” . (It is also worth remembering at this point that Locke was later
6oFrancisco Suarez, De Legibus ac Deo Legislatore , in Selections fro m  Three W orks , trans. G.L. 
Williams, A. Brown, and J. Waldron, Oxford: O.L’.P. (1944), Carnegie Endowment: Classics of 
International Law, volume 2 (translation), p p .297-8.
64D J B P , P ro l ,  12.
66D JB P ,  I.I.x.2. (my emphasis).
66D J B P , I.I.x.l.
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to speak of “the Law of Nature, which is the Law of reason” .6  ^ Such dictates of reason are 
discerned by having ~a quality of moral baseness or moral necessity” . Exactly what such 
a quality would be Grotius does not say, but he gives an important clue when he adds 
tha t  he has made it his concern
to refer the proofs of things touching the law of nature to certain fundamental 
conceptions which are beyond question, so tha t  no one can deny them without 
doing violence to himself.
So it seems that, by *a dictate of right reason", Grotius means what we cannot deny 
without doing violence to ourselves, specifically to our fundamental characteristic of 
sociableness.
It will also be remembered tha t  the notion of sociableness is acknowledged by Grotius to 
be of Stoic origin. His elucidation of the relationship between the dictates of right reason 
and instinctive nature shows another element of affinity with Stoic (and other ancient) 
views. The law of nature has its beginnings in instinctive nature, but it is certainly not a 
mere cloak of rectitude over our instincts. Rather, reason is our highest characteristic 
good, and so the law of nature must in some way reflect our rational nature. Grotius 
approvingly quotes Seneca to this effect:
Just as in every case a nature, unless brought to its highest perfection, does not 
manifest its type of good, so the good of man is not found in man unless reason 
has been perfected in him .69
The law of nature is, then, the law of our nature, and thus of rational nature: it is not 
merely the transformation of instincts into laws.
Nevertheless, it does not take our instinctive nature lightly. Grotius follows the account 
Cicero provides (but which is, in fact, shared by the Stoics and other ancient writers) on 
the relation between reason and our instinctive nature. In general outline, the account is 
as follows. All animals are, from birth, impelled by the “first principles of nature” . These 
principles imply tha t  the animal
has regard for itself and is impelled to preserve itself, to have zealous 
consideration for its own condition and for those things which tend to preserve 
it, and also shrinks from destruction and from things likely to cause
Two Treatises , I. 101.
&SDJBP,  Prol., 39.
£ » Q
^Seneca, Letters , cxxiv (XX.vii.ll);  quoted at DJBP,  I.II.i.2, note 1.
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destruction . ' u
This natural impulse of preservation gives rise to a “duty to keep oneself in the condition 
which nature gave to him” , and also to live “in conformity with nature” , and to reject 
what is “contrary” to nature. This is, however, only one's “first du ty” . If such a “first 
d u ty ” was incorrigible, then the law of nature would amount to no more than a cloak of 
rectitude over the instinctive. But the quotation from Seneca suggests tha t  the “first 
d u ty ” is to be regarded as a kind of initial aproximation to the truth.
G ro tius’s position can be spelt out a little more fully as follows. As human beings grow 
and develop the use of their reason, their initial instinctive principles are re-examined and, 
where necessary, recast in the light of reason. This is appropriate because the mind is 
more worthy than the body (and, or because, it is more truly characteristic of the nature 
of human beings). To live in conformity with nature thus requires our living in 
conformity with reason, the most im portant element of our nature:
there follows a notion of the conformity of things with reason, which is superior 
to the body. Now this conformity, in which moral goodness becomes the 
param ount object, ought to be accounted of higher import than the things to 
which alone instinct first directed itself, because the first principles of nature 
commend us to right reason, and right reason ought to be more dear to us than 
those things through whose instrumentality we have been brought to it ... in 
investigating the law of nature it is necessary first to see what is consistent with 
those fundamental principles of nature, and then to come to that which, though 
of later origin, is nevertheless more worthy - tha t  which ought not only to be 
grasped, if it appear, but to be sought out by every effort . ' 1
Such a shift - from an original, but lower, principle to a higher, but later - would not
^ DJBP, I.II.i.l. Cf. passages from Cicero: “the first ‘appropriate ac t’ ... is to preserve oneself in 
one ’s natural constitu tion” (III.vi.20 - spoken by Cato the Stoic); “every natural organism aims at 
being its own preserver, so as to secure its safety and also its preservation true to its specific type” 
(IV.vii.16 - spoken by Cicero in an approving account of the doctrines of “the ancients” ). From 
Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum, trans. H. Rackham, Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard U.P., and London: Heinemann (1971).
^ D JBP , I.II.i.2-3. Cf. Cicero, De Finibus, IV.vii. 16-17: The ancients affirm that,  to better 
achieve the aim of preservation, “man has called in the aid of the arts also to assist nature; and 
chief among them is counted the art of living, which helps him to guard the gifts tha t nature has 
bestowed and to obtain those th a t  are lacking. They further divided the nature of man into soul 
and body. Each of these parts they pronounced to be desirable for its own sake, and consequently 
they said tha t the virtues also of each were desirable for their own sakes; at the same time they 
extolled the soul as infinitely surpassing the body in worth, and accordingly placed the virtues also 
of the mind above the goods of the body. But they held tha t  wisdom is the guardian and 
protectress of the whole man, as being the comrade and helper of nature, and so they said that the 
function of wisdom, as protecting a being th a t  consisted of a mind and a body, was to assist and 
preserve him in respect of bo th” .
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particularly deserve a ttention if it were not for the fact tha t  the two principles are not 
only different but recommend different ends. The point of establishing a hierarchy of 
principles is, obviously, to show which principle is to be followed in the case of a conflict. 
In stressing the superiority of reason over instinctive nature Grotius thus is, as were the 
ancients, affirming tha t  reason must triumph over mere passion.
It is necessary to be careful here, however, and to recognize tha t  this does not in any 
way imply a fundamental opposition of reason and passion. Neither, therefore, does it 
imply the most common version of this oppositional psychology, the Platonic political 
m etaphor of reason as the ruler over the unruly, anarchistic, passions. The account of the 
superiority of mind over body given above would not, of course, make sense if, in cases of 
conflict, reason did not have sway over the passions; did not direct them. But the 
relationship between reason and passion is not to be understood as opposing tendencies. 
Rather the relationship is tha t  between knowledge and ignorance, or between the sighted 
and the blind. Cicero speaks of “wisdom” as being “the guardian and protectress of the 
whole man, ... the comrade and helper of nature” , ' “ and, given Grotius’s explicit approval 
of Cicero in this context, we can reasonably regard Grotius as following a similar line. 
Reason is, on this view, the natural guide of instinctive nature, the guide of the 
passions . ' 0  The fundamental aims of instinctive nature  - in particular the fundamental 
urge of self-preservation - are thus not denied by reason, but fulfilled. We act in 
conformity with our nature when we pursue our fundamental aims rationally instead of 
instinctively; with our eyes open to the relevant circumstances, rather than from blind 
internal imperatives. In this way we act more success fu lly , we successfully conform our 
actions to our natural ends. In this light we can understand why the law of nature, as a
72 De Finibus, IV.vii.17 (part of the passage quoted in the preceding note).
73
°Some instructive comparisons can be made with H um e’s view. It is first necessary to recognize 
th a t  H um e’s famous dictum, that “Reason is, and ought only to be. the slave of the passions” 
[Treatise, p.415) is a potentially misleading account of his own psychology of action. His view 
could be described as making reason the guide of the passions, as does the Ciceronian view, in tha t 
his theory also is concerned to show tha t  the passions are blind and can only be directed by reason. 
However, this would not do justice to the differences between his account and the Ciceronian (and 
more common ancient) view, since the latter, although not fundamentally oppositional, allows the 
possibility of conflict between reason and passion - a possibility denied by the former. The 
similarities between the two views are genuine - they both firmly reject the oppositional psychology 
of the political m etaphor - but the differences can be summed up by observing that,  on the Humean 
view, the passions are not only blind, but know themselves to be so: they therefore seek the help of 
the sighted. (The model of the blind person led by a guide dog is apposite in this case.) On the 
ancient view, the passions are blind (or near-sighted) but do not recognize themselves to be so; 
reason points out their errors but frequently has trouble convincing them of the fact. Conflicts are 
inevitable but not continual. (For a short account of the Humean psychology, see J.L. Mackie, 
Hume's Moral Theory, London: R K P  (1980), section III (pp.44-50).)
27
dictate of right reason, is nevertheless in accord with the fundamental aims of our 
instinctive nature. The law of nature is the guardian of our natural tendency to 
preservation, and also to those tendencies which flow from it, whether specific cases like 
self-defence,'-* or the more general tendency of sociableness which we have already 
discussed.
The law of nature is also a dictate of right reason because it is founded on the essential 
human tra it  of sociableness. Sociableness is, for human beings, a specific aspect of the 
more general phenomenon of the necessity of preservation. Because the law of nature has 
this determinate character, it “would have a degree of validity” even if there was no 
divine au thor of nature. Here we can usefully distinguish between the origin and the 
content of natural law. For Grotius, it can make no sense to speak of the origin of 
natural law without speaking of God. because God is its author. (It can make no sense to 
speak of the origin of A la recherche du temps perdu without speaking of Proust.) The 
content of natural law is, however, a different m atter. God has made the world such that 
it has a determinate character, so we can discuss this character without discussing its 
author. (We can discuss P rous t’s text without speaking of Proust.) The elaboration of 
the law of nature is thus independent of theology, in the sense tha t  the dictates of the law 
of nature are discovered by examining what the essential tra it  of sociableness requires.
W hat exactly does sociableness require? Grotius spells this out most succinctly in a 
passage concerned with the justifiability of force (part of the larger question, “Whether it 
is ever lawful to wage war” ). After pointing out tha t  “the first principles of nature” (that 
is, instinctive nature) are not opposed to the use of force, he goes on to consider the 
higher implications of our rational nature:
Right reason, moreover, and the nature of society ... do not prohibit all use of 
force, but only tha t  use of force which is in conflict with society, th a t  is which 
a ttem pts  to take away the rights o f  another. For society has in view this 
object, tha t  through community of resource and effort each individual be 
safeguarded in the possession of what belongs to h im
We see here tha t  the implication of sociableness is not to merge all individuals into an 
undifferentiated social whole, but precisely to preserve the original distinctness of persons. 
Grotius employs two expressions in this passage to express the distinctness of others from 
ourselves: he speaks of “the rights of another” (a better translation would be “the right of
T-i' ror the justifiability of self-defence, see DJBP , I.II.iii.; Il.I.iii. 
75DJBP , I.II.i.5 (emphasis added).
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another7’), and of “what belongs to him” . These two expressions are not quite identical in 
meaning, but they are closely related. Explaining them will explain the distinctive 
character of the natural law tradition stemming from Grotius’s work.
W hat belongs to a person is what is one’s own - in Latin, suum . The suum  is a pre- 
legal notion (that is, prior to positive  laws), as Grotius makes clear immediately following 
the above quotation. W hat belongs to a person is prior to private ownership according to 
positive law. Essentially it includes a person's life, limbs, and liberty: “It is easy to 
unders tand” , he says, th a t  society aims at preserving or protecting what belongs to a 
person
even if private ownership (as we now call it) had not been introduced; for life, 
limbs, and liberty would in that case be the possessions belonging to each, and 
no attack  could be made upon these by another without injustice.
The su u m  is thus a set of essential possessions, understood by Grotius to be - at least - 
life, limbs, and liberty. The suum  is what naturally belongs to a person because none of 
these things can be taken away without injustice. Reason and the nature of society thus 
dictate  th a t  the life, limbs, and liberty of individuals be protected. The law of nature is, 
in other words, ineluctably committed to the defence of the suum . Once it is allowed, 
further, tha t  the suum  can be extended , then the law of nature is likewise extended. 
Grotius hints at this extension in the immediately following passage: where there is no 
private ownership, but only the original s u u m ,
Under such conditions the first one taking possession would have the right to use 
things not claimed and to consume them  up to the limit of his needs, and any 
one depriving him of th a t  right would commit an unjust act. But now that 
private ownership has by law or usage assumed a definite form, the m atter  is 
much easier to understand.' ‘
This is a most im portant passage. It shows tha t  the suum  necessarily gives rise to a 
use-right, since the preservation of life requires the using of natural resources. Since the 
use-right arises precisely because of the person’s needs, it extends no further than the 
satisfaction of those needs. But, as we have seen in the Mare Liberum  passage on the 
development of property, some kinds of use imply, or result in, using up. Thus the 
exercise of the use-right amounts, in im portant cases, to the operation of an exclusive 
right. The exercise of the use-right, which is no more than the satisfaction of needs,
IDD J B P , I.II.i.5. Note the reference to “private ownership (as we now call i t ) ” (my emphasis), 
which echoes the sensitivity to language already observed in Mare Liberum.
17D J B P , I.II.i.5.
29
thereby gives rise to a form of property. The necessity of recognizing publicly this form of 
property begins the institution of private ownership, so through this process the 
satisfaction of our needs comes to require the institution of private ownership. The suum  
has thus been extended: it comes to include not only life, limbs, and liberty, but also other 
socially recognized private possessions. Private property (as we know it) is the set of 
extensions to the suum ,  and for this reason private property laws become an essential 
part of the system of natural justice.
Not every positive law of property is part of (extended) natural justice, of course. The 
positive law must be the product of a just process, and such a process is a reflection of the 
fact tha t  we naturally possess a justified power to act to preserve the suum .  These moral 
powers Grotius brings to the fore in re-introducing the notion of rights.'® A right is the 
power to act rightfully, thus rights are the powers necessary for the just extension of the 
natural law. Grotius introduces them as follows:
There is another meaning of law viewed as a body of rights ... which has 
reference to the person. In this sense a right becomes a moral quality of a 
person, making it possible to have or to do something lawfully.
Since the suum , and the rule of law, can only be extended through lawful actions, it is 
thus through the exercise of rights tha t  the realm of law is extended. It is also through 
the possession of rights th a t  the obligations of natural (and thus positive) law are limited. 
Each of these aspects can be considered briefly.
The exercise of rights is essentially concerned with the protection and extension of the 
suum .  There is, however, another class of moral quality which promotes social goods 
other than the protection of the suum .  Because Grotius sees such goods as ‘‘fitting” (and 
thus good but not obligatory) he describes these moral qualities as aptitudes. The 
stronger, suum-protecting qualities he calls faculties. These are the rights. Only moral 
faculties, or rights, give rise to legal rights, so they alone are the qualities which give rise 
to ‘‘justice properly or strictly so called” . For this reason moral faculties can be called
on
"perfect” , whereas the moral aptitudes are “not perfect” . The perfect moral qualities 
include the following:
power, now over oneself, which is called freedom, now over others, as that of the
78 For the earlier history of natural rights, see Richard Tuck, op.cit.
79DJBP, I.I.iv.
80 DJBP, I.I.iv-viii.
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father and that of the master over slaves; ownership, either absolute, or less than 
absolute, as usufruct and the right of pledge; and contractual rights, to which on 
the other side contractual obligations correspond.8*
The imperfect moral qualities, on the other hand, are
associated with those virtues which have as their purpose to do good to others, 
as generosity, compassion, and foresight in matters of government.82
Since only the perfect moral qualities extend the obligations of the law of nature, there 
can be no legal obligation to generosity, compassion, or the like. So, in G ro tius’s hands, 
the law of nature does not stipulate a morally exacting, or even morally demanding, social 
order. Rather,
it is not ... contrary to the nature of society to look out for oneself and advance 
one’s own interests, provided the rights of others are not infringed.80
So, with his distinction between rights and imperfect moral qualities, Grotius limits the 
law of nature to the protection of the su u m  of each individual member of society, 
restraining it from requiring any positive acts of general benevolence. In this light, it is 
not surprising that laws of private ownership should be a central element in the natural 
laws which govern human society. However, these laws are not an arbitrary m atter . There 
is a rational process which governs the just  extension of the original right over one’s own 
(the original s u u m , comprising life, limbs, and liberty) and its accompanying use-right, to 
the development of complex forms of private ownership. G rotius’s account of this process, 
the historical development of property, will be examined in the next section.
Before turning to tha t  task, however, a brief remark on the nature of the enterprise is in 
order. Since the history of the uses of a social institution can readily amount to no more 
than  a catalogue of abuses, writing the history of property may seem a pointless task. 
But for Grotius there is a rational history of property - the natural history of property - 
which is the story of extensions to the su u m  by just processes. This latter  history is thus 
simultaneously a justification of property. The important question then is, W hat is the 
relationship between the two histories? Rousseau’s attack on Grotius in On The Social
811 DJBP, I.I.v. Grotius thus places rights over slaves on an equal footing to rights to freedom. 
How he is able to do this (or, whether he is consistent in so doing) will not be considered here. It 
only needs to be pointed out that it is remarks such as these which help to earn the ire of Rousseau 
in On The Social Contract. Also, for Locke, of course, the natural liberty which the law of nature 
protects renders slavery unjustifiable.
S2D JBP , I.I.viii.l.
SZD JBP , I.II.i.6.
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Contract shows tha t  he thought Grotius guilty of collapsing the latter history into the 
former, thereby producing a mere apology for ty ra n n y .84 Many of G rotius’s successors 
are well aware of this issue, and a ttem pt to deal with it in different ways. Hutcheson, on 
the one hand, distances his political enquiries from history ;85 Adam Smith, on the other 
hand, employs his account of the distinctively moral standpoint to generate a critical 
history of social institutions, including property. G ro tius’s confidence in the m a n ifes t  
logic of history (that is, the degree to which the facts of human history are able to mirror 
natural history) is not a confidence so easily shared by his successors.8®
This aspect of the critical reception of G rotius’s thought need not, however, concern us 
greatly here. This is because his more contentious uses of history do not include his 
account of the origin of private ownership of things. His treatm ent of the origin of 
private ownership of human beings - i.e. of slavery - is another matter, and for this reason 
many of his successors are greatly concerned with the question of whether the natural law 
account of property can allow slavery, or whether it renders it impossible. This question 
arises directly from G ro tius’s own concerns in his t rea tm en t of property. Although the 
historical character of G rotius’s account of the origin of property has been stressed in the 
preceding sections, this is not of particular concern for Grotius himself: not because he 
lacked a historical story, but because he treated  it as a m atte r  of course. Both Mare 
Liberum  and De Jure Belli ac Pacts offer only brief historical accounts of the origin of 
property simply because such an account could be taken for granted, and was not in any 
case the point of the account of property. It could be taken for granted because it is part 
and parcel of the classical accounts of the origin of human society, accounts on which he
o  i
^Rousseau, op.cit. (Discussed briefly at note 61.) See especially his own footnote, quoting the 
Marquis d’Argenson: “Learned research on public right is often merely the history of ancient 
abuses, and people have gone to a lot of trouble for nothing when they have bothered to study it 
too much”. This is, Rousseau adds, “exactly what Grotius has done”. On The Social Contract , 
op.cit., Bk. I, Ch. II, p.47.
o r
“We are inquiring into the just and wise motives to enter into civil polity, and the ways it can 
be justly constituted; and not into points of history about facts”. Francis Hutcheson, A System of  
Moral Philosophy (1975), in Collected Works , Hildesheim: Olms facsimile edition (1969), vol.VI, 
pp.224-5.
O f *
JThis distinction, between natural history and actual history, is treated most directly by Adam 
Smith in Book III of The Wealth of Nations.  Smith contrasts the “natural progress of opulence” 
with its actual progress from ancient times to modern commercial society. Such a distinction is 
necessary for the writing of a critical history of social institutions, which Smith attempts to carry 
out. See The Wealth of Nations , ed. R.H. Campbell, A.S. Skinner, and W.B. Todd, Oxford; 
O.U.P. (1976), Book III chapter I (the natural progress of opulence), and chapters II-IV (the actual 
progress of opulence in Europe).
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frequently and explicitly calls. ^  It is not the point of his account of property because - 
especially in NIare Liberum  - his aim is to show not just how property can be acquired, 
but also how it cannot (i.e., without injustice). His aim is to show the naturalness of 
appropriation, and also thereby its natural l im its .  In De Jure Belli ac P a d s , as in- Xfare 
Liberum , G rotius denies the possibility of occupying the open sea. More importantly for 
our purposes, however, he also denies tha t  the property of any person (understood as a set 
of extensions to the original s u u m ) can ever be so extended as to invade the suum  of 
another. This is because, in the world of developed property relations, the original use- 
right implied by the suum  is not lost, but is retained in the form of a general right of 
necessity. As we shall see, this right of necessity has far-reaching implications especially 
with respect to the possibility of slavery. These implications, not fully appreciated by 
Grotius, become the centre-piece of the political theory of John Locke in the Second 
Treatise
Perhaps one reason for failing to see tha t  Grotius provides a historical account of the 
development of property is tha t  the historical sources on which he calls are no longer 
regarded as historical documents. This should not deter us, however: to offer a historical 
account of the development of any phenomenon is not to offer an adequate historical 
account. Our explanations can only ever be as good as our sources, so, if Grotius’s 
sources include what are for us myths, y then his historical explanations will not compel 
assent, and may perhaps seem bizarre. But this question, of historical adequacy, should 
not blind us to the type of explanation Grotius is offering. To produce an account based
87See, for example, the brief account of the development of society in Horace's Satires (I.iii.99ff) 
- a passage which Grotius refers to a number of times in the Prolegomena to DJBP, and the 
detailed account of the history of society in Lucretius’s De Rerum Natura (v.925-1457). In DJBP, 
unlike ML, Grotius does not simply follow these classical sources, but blends them into an account 
based on the Book of Genesis.
88To put the matter a little more accurately, it should be said that the problem for Grotius arises 
out of a tension in his doctrine of rights. The right of necessity, if it is to play any sort of role at 
all, needs to be understood as an inalienable right. But Grotius’s general doctrine of rights - that 
they are moral powers possessed by individuals - allows them to be freely alienated as if they are 
just like the ordinary possessions of individuals. For a more detailed account of Grotius’s 
conception of a right, see Karl Olivecrona, Law as Fact (second edition), London: Stevens k  Sons 
(1971), Appendix 1 (pp.275-96).
Q Q
H use the word wmyth” here in its anthropological sense. Myth signifies not what is false (as in 
the more everyday sense) but what serves a special symbolic or religious purpose within a 
community. It is an outsider’s (an observer’s) term, but it is employed as a neutral or agnostic 
term. Myths may be historically accurate, or they may not; what makes myth myth is the purpose 
it is meant to serve.
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on modern historical researches is not to provide a different kind  of account, but a more 
sophisticated, more cautious explanation of the effects of changed circumstances. It is, 
among other things, to upgrade the d a ta .90
Grotius’s da ta , in De Jure Belli ac Pacts , comes, as he tells us, principally from “sacred 
history“ - th a t  is, the Book of Genesis - with supplementation from the “philosophers and 
poets71 of the classical sources. He makes this explicit when explaining one aspect of his 
account. Contrasting his method there with tha t  of Mare Liberum , he says:
This is what we are taught in sacred history; and it is quite in accord with what 
philosophers and poets, whose testimony we have presented elsewhere, have said 
concerning the first s tate  of ownership in common, and the distribution of 
property which afterward followed.91
We should now turn  to a direct consideration of Grotius’s account of “the first state  of 
ownership in common*1 and the subsequent distribution of property.
V: P ro p er ty : D e v e lo p m e n t and L im its
Grotius begins his chapter on property by considering “the division of th a t  which is our 
own” . This division, which is the suum , is itself divisible into two parts:
some things belong to us by a right common to mankind, others by our 
individual r igh t.9'^
The story of the development of private property is a story of the creation of an 
individual right out of the “right common to m ankind” . To understand this transition it 
is first of all necessary to determine the nature of this “common” right. In an important 
passage, Grotius describes it as follows:
Soon after the creation of the world, and a second time after the Flood, God 
conferred upon the human race a general right over things of a lower nature.
“All things” , as Justin  says, “were the common and undivided possession of all 
men, as if all possessed a common inheritance” . In consequence, each man could 
at once take whatever he wished for his own needs, and could consume whatever
90This is just what is done by, most particularly, Adam Smith in his Lectures on Jurisprudence. 
Without wishing to labour this point too much, it is just this relation which Paul Bowles, op.cit., 
fails to see in his simple contrast between natural law and historical science. Whether successfully 
or not, natural law nevertheless characteristically aims at producing historical science.
91DJBP. II.II.ii.3.
92 DJBP, II.II.i.1.
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was capable of being consumed. The enjoyment of this universal right then 
served the purpose of private ownership; for whatever each had thus taken for 
his own needs another could not take from him except by an unjust act. 0
To illustrate this Grotius refers, as he did in M are L iberum , to the example of the seats 
in the theatre, on this occasion giving the version employed by Cicero:
Although the theatre  is a public place, yet it is correct to say tha t  the seat which 
a man has taken belongs to him. 4
This passage shows th a t  the original “right common to mankind” is the same sis the use- 
right implied by the suum , which we have already encountered. The right is common to 
mankind in the sense th a t  all have this right: it is not, however, a right to a common
possession (in the sense of jo in t ownership). A common right in the latter sense would 
give more than a simple use-right, it would also give rights to control or limit the 
activities of others. Grotius gives no hint tha t  the right common to mankind gives 
anything more than the right to use things for the purpose of one’s preservation (of 
satisfying basic needs), so he must mean only tha t  this right is a right which everybody 
has. The quotation from Justin  must, therefore, be treated with care. All things can be 
“the common and undivided possession of all men” only in a weak sense: only, in fact, in 
that sense Grotius refers to in M are Liberum  as the original meaning of “common” - i.e., 
not private .^5 All things were thus “the common and undivided possession of all men” 
only in the sense tha t  there was nothing which was a private possession. The “common 
inheritance” of all hum anity  referred to by Justin  in the quotation thus refers to the same 
situation described by Seneca (and quoted in M are L iberum ) as
... To all the way was open;
The use of all things was a com m on  r ig h t .^
T ha t  all things were originally the “common inheritance” of all humanity does not 
mean, then, th a t  in the earliest ages of human history all human beings were to be 
regarded as joint owners of the earth: no such ownership then existed. Like all distinctive 
forms of ownership, joint ownership is the creation of a later historical age. The earth
9ZDJB P , II.II.ii.1.
^4Cicero, De Fimbus,  III.xx.67. This is the translation provided in DJBP,  II.II.ii.1. In Mare 
Liberum Grotius had employed Seneca’s version. (See the text to footnote 36 above.)
^ S ee DJPC,  pp.226-7. (Text to footnote 28 above.)
DJPC.  p.228 (cf. footnote 32 and text.)
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was originally a common inheritance only in the sense tha t  it could be used by all, and it 
is the “poverty of human speech" which sometimes obscures this from us. (This 
particular example of the poverty of speech is overcome by Pufendorf in his account of the 
origin of property.)
The original common inheritance of all humanity was the use-right implied by the 
suum.  This use-right was the “universal r ight” which “served the purpose of private 
ownership” . But the purpose of the original use-right was to satisfy human needs, to 
preserve the individual and the species, so this must have been the purpose of private 
ownership. Grotius is thus committed to holding tha t  at least the first purpose of private 
ownership was to protect the things or actions necessary to preservation - in other words, 
to satisfy needs. Private ownership and the original use-right both have the purpose to 
guarantee (as far as possible) tha t  “whatever each had thus taken for his own needs 
another could not take from him except by an unjust ac t” . This does not, of course, 
preclude private ownership from serving additional ends as well, but it must at least serve 
this end. The later parts of this section show G rotius’s recognition of this requirement in 
his discussion of the rights of necessity.
The more immediate question, however, is, If the original use-right served the purpose of 
private ownership, why was the introduction of private ownership necessary? Why should 
human beings have abandoned this original condition in which their needs were satisfied? 
Grotius’s answer is tha t
This primitive state  might have lasted if men had continued in great simplicity
QSor had lived on terms of mutual affection such as rarely appears.
Grotius appears to be of the opinion that ,  since the “terms of mutual affection” are so 
rare, they can be regarded as a historical accident. The norm is a rather limited degree of 
mutual affection, so it was the abandonment of the lifestyle of primitive simplicity which 
was the crucial factor in the development of private ownership. The abandonment of the 
simple life was the abandonment of the self-subsisting life: to satisfy the needs of all 
subsequently required the fair division of a heterogeneous and diversely produced product. 
But the normally limited degree of mutual affection, together with the logistical problems 
created by the spread of human population, made such a fair division unlikely. This is the 
kernel of Grotius’s account. If we consider it in a little more detail we can see the use he 
makes of history - tha t  is, of sacred history and the classical authors.
91DJPC, p.227.
98DJBP , II.II.ii.1.
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For a modern example of the primitive simplicity of human life, Grotius turns, as do so 
many of his contemporaries, to '‘certain tribes in America” ; but he calls on Tacitus and 
other classical authors to demonstrate tha t  such simplicity was the original condition of 
human society. This original simplicity had a kind of m oral.purity about it, but this was 
a m atte r  of “ignorance of vices rather than  knowledge of virtue” . For this reason the 
condition of original simplicity was not stable: the original s tate  of innocence, having no 
knowledge of vice, could not resist it. Although the state  of innocence had a somewhat 
idyllic character - “They lived easily on the fruits which the earth  brought forth of its own 
accord, without toil” - it inevitably succumbed to a succession of different vices.00 
G rotius’s account of these vices is heavily dependent on the Book of Genesis, with again 
supplementation from ancient authors, especially Philo and Seneca. He identifies three 
main sources of corruption - knowledge of good and evil, rivalry, and ambition. Each of 
these is represented in passages of the Book of Genesis.
The first corruption, the knowledge of good and evil, is obviously centred on the story of 
the Garden of Eden. The symbol for this knowledge, says Grotius, “was the tree of 
knowledge of good and evil” , and this knowledge was itself “a knowledge of the things of 
which it is possible to make at times a good use, at times a bad use” . This would not 
appear to exclude much, but Grotius mainly has in mind the pursuit of frivolous 
enjoyments. He quotes an ancient source to this effect:
to the man who came after the first the craft and various inventions devised for 
the advantage of life proved not to be very useful; for men devoted their talents 
not so much to the cultivation of bravery and justice as to devising means of 
enjoym ent . 100
This same indulgence in physical pleasures occurred again “after the world had been 
cleansed by the Deluge” . There was on this occasion “a passion for pleasure, to which 
wine ministered” . This rather surprising remark becomes clear if we remember that, after 
disembarking from the Ark with his family, Noah is shamed by being seen naked after 
becoming drunk . 101 The wine comes from a vineyard planted by Noah after the Flood, so 
this event has a distinctively post-diluvian character. Grotius's reference to the “passion 
for pleasure, to which wine ministered” is thus not an abstract speculation, but a 
reference to what is for him a specific event in sacred history. Similarly, there are
°°A11 the quotations in this paragraph are from D J B P , II.II.ii.1.
100D J B P ,  II.II.ii.2.
101See Genesis,  IX.20ff.
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references to specific Biblical narratives in the accounts of the other two sources of 
corruption.
The second form of corruption is rivalry, which grows into violence. Such rivalry is a 
result of the division of labour, and for Grotius it is shown to be so by the story of Cain 
and Abel:
The most ancient arts, agriculture and grazing, were pursued by the first 
brothers, not without some interchange of commodities. From the difference in 
pursuits arose rivalry, and even m urder .102
This gave rise to an age of violence, an age swept away by the Flood. The principal 
destroyer of the harmony necessary for maintaining the original state  prior to private 
property, however, was the third form of corruption:
Harmony ... was destroyed chiefly by a less ignoble vice, ambition, of which the 
symbol was the tower of Babel.103
How did ambition destroy harmony? We know that  ambitions commonly cause rivalries, 
but Grotius has already dealt with rivalry. He must, therefore, have in mind a different 
factor. Since he immediately follows the above quotation with the remark tha t  “presently 
men divided off countries, and possessed them separately” , we must conclude that he is 
here taking the story of the tower of Babel at face value. The aim of the story is to 
explain the division of humanity into separate nations with separate tongues, which 
through loss of understanding makes the avoidance of conflict so much harder. This 
division into nations and tongues, since it is a source of conflict, is understood as a curse 
on the human condition. The human ambition to achieve divinity is seen as the cause of 
divine punishment.10“1 In this way ambition can be seen as a separate cause of loss of 
harmony through the divine creation of separate nations. Only if Grotius is taking the 
Babel story seriously, in fact, is there reason for treating the separation of humanity into 
nations as the effect of ambition.
A Final indication of the constant background presence of Biblical narratives is provided 
by Grotius's remarks about the further division of lands after the separation of nations. 
After the division into countries, he observes,
there remained among neighbours a common ownership, not of flocks to be sure,
102DJBP , II.II.ii.2.
10ZDJBP , II.II.ii.3.
l0^Genesis, X .ll.
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but of pasture lands, because the extent of the land was so great, in proportion 
to the small number of men, th a t  it sufficed without any inconvenience for the 
use of many ... Finally, with increase in the number of men as well as of flocks, 
lands everywhere began to be divided, not as previously by peoples, but by 
families. Wells, furthermore - a resource particularly necessary in a dry region, 
one well not sufficing for many - were appropriated by those who had taken 
possession of them. This is what we are taught in sacred history .. .1^
Not only do we have here the explicit reference to sacred history; we have also a 
significant reference to wells. Why should Grotius (writing long before archaeological 
discoveries in Mesopotamia and the Near East) connect the early history of human beings 
with arid regions of the world? The natural answer is tha t  once again he has in mind the 
patriarchal narratives of the Book of Genesis. It even seems likely that the division of the 
land into the separate possessions of families, to which he refers above, is based on the 
story of Abram and Lot. Genesis tells us that ,  because their respective flocks had grown 
so large, there were numerous incidents of friction between their respective servants. 
Their solution was to divide the land of Canaan into separate western and eastern 
territories, with the two households restraining themselves within their respective 
territories.1^  Given the incidental clues (to wells, for example), and the other references 
to the Book of Genesis tha t  we have discerned, it seems undeniable tha t  Grotius’s view, 
tha t  “increase in the number of men as well as of flocks” led to the first division of land 
by families, is based on the story of Abram  and Lot. So, once again we see that what may 
appear, to the modern reader, to be vague or speculative remarks about the early history 
of human society are in fact indirect references to what is for Grotius a historical source - 
the Book of Genesis. When Grotius tells us tha t  his account is “what we are taught in 
sacred history” , we can take him at his word, and recognize tha t  what he is trying to 
provide, in outline, is an account of those developments in human history which made the 
primitive system of common ownership impractical.
G rotius’s summary of the causes of abandonment of common ownership is thus a 
summary of the significant events of sacred history (with gaps filled in by philosophers 
and poets):
From these sources we learn what was the cause on account of which the 
primitive common ownership, first of movable objects, later also of immovable 
property, was abandoned. The reason was tha t  men were not content to feed on 
the spontaneous products of the earth, to dwell in caves, to have the body either
105DJBP , II.II.ii.3.
106Ceneszs, XIII.
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naked or clothed with the bark of trees or skins of wild animals, but chose a 
more refined mode of life; this gave rise to industry, which some applied to one 
thing, others to another.
Moreover, the gathering of the products of the soil into a common store was 
hindered first by the remoteness of the places to which men made their way, 
then by the lack of justice and kindness; in consequence of such a lack the proper 
fairness in making division was not observed, either in respect to labour or in the 
consumption of the fruits.
Obviously all the details of this potted history are not simply extracted from the Book of 
Genesis - the problem of remoteness does not seem to be considered there at all - nor from 
any other single source. But it is im portant to recognize th a t  Grotius is not making it up, 
nor saying what must have been. As already pointed out, the refined mode of life has 
numerous instances in Genesis; the division of labour is the story of Cain and Abel; and 
the lack of fairness in dividing pasture is the problem resolved in the story of Abram and 
Lot. Grotius is simply reminding us of what is for him the well-known history of the 
beginnings of human society, as described in the sacred book devoted to tha t  subject.
The end of common ownership, made necessary by the factors referred to in the above 
quotation, is not, of course, the beginning of private ownership. It is, rather, the 
beginning of a process which culminates in private ownership. Before private ownership is 
achieved, the originally undifferentiated use-right in the earth is, as we have seen, 
transformed by agreement or division into the territories of first, nations, and secondly, 
households. The development of private ownership is a further stage in a sequence of 
divisions or agreements. Thus the factors which lead to the abandonment of common 
ownership are the same general factors which lead to the establishment of private 
ownership (even though these are quite distinct events):
At the same time we learn how things became subject to private ownership. This
happened not by a mere act of will, for one could not know what things another
wished to have, in order to abstain from them - and besides several might desire
the same thing - but rather by a kind of agreement, either expressed, as by a
division, or implied, as by occupation. In fact, as soon as community ownership
was abandoned, and as yet no division had been made, it is to be supposed that
all agreed, th a t  whatever each one had taken possession of should be his 
108property.
The problems of sharing out a common stock (“the lack of justice and kindness” ) 
eventually make even the more restricted forms of common ownership - those which arise
i07DJBP, II.II.ii.4. 
l08DJBP, II.II.ii.5.
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from the early divisions of the earth into the property of peoples or families - 
unmanageable. The simple abandonment of such sharing creates a form of private
possession: every man now provides only for his own, principally by being left in 
possession of flocks or land which no. longer produce common goods. If this original 
private possession is allowed to continue to exist (i.e., is not incorporated into a new 
collective possession), then it can only be regarded as a private occupation. To allow it to 
remain in private possession is to recognize, or tacitly to agree to, the legitimacy of such 
possession, and thus to recognize it as private property through occupation. This is why 
Grotius speaks of occupation as implied agreement, and why he says tha t  “as soon as 
community ownership was abandoned” , but where no express division had been made, “it 
is to be supposed  th a t  all agreed” tha t  private possessions should be regarded as private 
property. In modern terms, G rotius’s position is tha t  there is no morally relevant 
difference between acts and omissions. To fail to object to a situation is tacitly to accept 
it. The collapse of a system of sharing, actively or passively accepted by the concerned 
parties, is the beginning of private ownership. To establish private ownership as a 
socially recognized rule, an express agreement is perhaps the norm, but passive acceptance 
of a s tate  of affairs is itself to be regarded (can only be regarded) as a public act of 
acceptance.
We can see, then, tha t  for Grotius the fact or otherwise of an explicit original agreement 
or contract is a m atte r  of little importance. Private property arises in a series of steps, 
steps which may or may not involve explicit agreements. It is no doubt preferable to have 
explicit agreements wherever possible, since these more easily and more emphatically 
satisfy the requirement th a t  a publicly recognized act has occurred; nevertheless omissions 
are to be regarded as acts of forebearing or abstaining, thus exhibiting the necessary 
public character, and thus showing the fact of agreement, even without an explicit act. 
G rotius’s unconcern about whether explicit agreements occurred or not reflects not only 
his trea tm ent of omissions as effectively equivalent to actions, but two other factors as 
well.
The first is perhaps the more theoretically significant: it is the fact tha t  the suum
implies an original use-right, and “the enjoyment of this universal right then served the 
purpose of private ownership” . Or, to put it another way, private property stands in no 
special need of justification, since it is a social institution developed to serve the same 
purpose as the necessary purpose served by the universal original use-right. In the light of 
this perspective, how property comes about can be regarded as a m atter  of only moderate 
importance: what m atters  is just  th a t  property does come about as a natural response to 
circumstances generated when human beings abandoned their original life of primitive 
simplicity.
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The second factor is his straightforward belief tha t  the development of property was in 
fact a process involving a number of distinct events, some of which involved explicit 
agreements while others did not. The abandonm ent of primitive simplicity was, as we 
have seen, the simple seduction of human beings by tempting pleasures of a (not initially 
recognized) vicious character. The development of the division of labour, as indicated in 
the story of Cain and Abel, was, it seems, a m atte r  of rivalry between the first brothers. 
The division and scattering of human beings into separate peoples was, as the story of the 
Tower of Babel shows, the consequence of excessive human ambition. All these are 
important elements in the story of the development of property, but none of them involve 
explicit agreements. They all indicate significant' but not intended developments. The 
archetypal division of the land according to families rather than nations, however, is 
contained in the story of A bram ’s and Lot’s division of the land of Canaan, and this is a 
specific agreement. So, for Grotius, the actual history of the development of property 
involves both explicit agreements and tacit acceptances of fa it  accompli. As we have 
already remarked, he is inclined to identify natural history with actual history; and when 
the sources of his history are sacred books this tendency is certainly not discouraged. The 
combination of these two factors, then - the purpose of property and its actual history - 
leads Grotius to regard the role of explicit agreements as an indifferent part of the natural 
history of property. The battles to be fought over this issue by subsequent philosophers 
are here not even imagined.
The im portan t m atter  for Grotius in De Jure Belli ac P a d s  is, as it was in Mare 
Liberum , th a t  “the transition to the present distinction of ownerships did not come 
violently, but gradually, nature  herself pointing out the way” .109 Whether this transition 
was principally or even crucially a m atter  of explicit agreements is rather beside the point. 
W hat m atters  is tha t  property relations have developed over time because such changes as 
were accepted were so accepted (tacitly or explicitly) because they were recognized to be 
in accord with the purposes of the original use-right: to effectively secure the preservation 
of human beings. The fact of their acceptance is im portant principally, it seems, because 
such acceptance is necessary if the history of the development of property is to be a 
peaceful, not a violent, process.
It is also worth noting at this point what may be an im portan t difference in doctrine 
between M are L iberum  and De Jure Belli ac P a d s. In the earlier work, nature points
109.V/L, p.24; cf. DJPC , p.228: “the present-day concept of distinctions in ownership was the 
result, not of any sudden transition, but of a gradual process whose initial steps were taken under 
the guidance of nature herselP.
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the way to private ownership in a stronger sense than tha t  to which the later work is 
committed. The argument of Mare L iberum , it will be remembered, was tha t  the exercise 
of the original use-right, by using up consumable goods and thereby effectively excluding 
others from likewise using them, implied tha t  “a certain form of private ownership was 
inseparable from use” .110 On this account, the largest role tha t  can be accorded an 
explicit original agreement concerning consumables is the mere rubber-stamping of a 
natural fa it  accompli. In the later work, however, Grotius says only tha t  the original 
use-right and later private property serve the same purpose.111 This allows a larger role 
for agreements: they must be constrained by the necessary purpose, but need not be a 
mere rubber-stamp. It is unclear, however, whether this represents a tension between the 
two works: it may be only th a t  the later work is (innocently) silent on one feature of the 
original human state  of primitive simplicity.
This completes the examination of G rotius’s account of the rise of property. No 
trea tm ent of his views on property would be complete, however, if it failed to show how 
the original use-right, which “served the purpose of private ownership” , and thus out of 
which the institution of property grew, also operates to constrain private ownership in 
particular circumstances. Private ownership being, as we have seen, a set of extensions to 
the s u u m , it cannot justifiably conflict with the original use-right implied by the suum. 
By excluding all but the owner from free enjoyment of its product, however, systems of 
property will, if applied indiscriminately, exclude even those in dire necessity. The use- 
right to the fruits of the earth  possessed by the necessitous would therefore be denied in 
such cases. This is to deny the natural purpose of private ownership (the preservation of 
human beings in sophisticated societies), so such a situation cannot be tolerated. The 
way of protecting the original use-right, and thereby the purpose of private ownership, is 
achieved in modern or developed societies through the recognition of a right o f  necessity.
For Grotius, the right of necesity takes two forms: “the right to use things which have 
become the property of another” ;112 and “the right to such acts as human life 
requires” .112 Of these two, the former is the more im portant, since, unlike the latter
n 0 DJPC, p.228. 
n i DJBP, II.II.ii.1.
112DJBP, II.II.vi; discussed II.II.vi - II.II.xvii inclusive. 
112DJSP, Il.II.xviii.; discussed II.II.xviii - II.II.xxiv inclusive.
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(which Grotius seems to understand as a right to trade in necessities), it is “a question of 
what may be done against the will of an owner’’ . 114 So we shall turn first to consider this 
most important right of necessity.
Grotius introduces this issue by asking “whether men in general possess any right over 
things which have already become the property of another” . He is well aware that this 
may seem an odd question to ask, but a ttr ibu tes  its apparent oddity to a 
misunderstanding of the purpose which private property was intended to serve:
Some perchance may think it strange tha t  this question should be raised, since 
the right of private ownership se'ems completely to have absorbed the right 
which had its origin in a state  of community of property. Such, however, is not 
the case. We must, in fact, consider what the intention was of those who first 
introduced individual ownership; and we are forced to believe tha t  it was their 
intention to depart as little as possible from natural equity. For as in this sense 
even written laws are to be interpreted, much more should such a point of view 
prevail in the interpretation of usages which are not held to exact sta tem ent by 
the limitations of a written form . 110
As Richard Tuck observes, Grotius employs this appeal to the original intentions of the 
founding fathers on a number of occasions. 110 Nevertheless it is potentially misleading to 
describe this argument, as Tuck does, as an appeal to “interpretive charity” .* 11' It is, I 
think, better understood as a reminder - to recognize the problem which the introduction 
of property was designed to solve, and which therefore supplies the natural l im its  of the
1 1 Q
right of property. 10 It is not simply tha t  we should assum e  th a t  the founding fathers had 
the best or most appropriate  intentions; rather we are forced  to believe “th a t  it was their 
intention to depart as little as possible from natural equity” . And, because natural equity 
implies the original universal use-right, this right can never be denied. From 
understanding the point of first introducing private property,
1 U DJBP , Il.II.xviii. 
n 5 DJBP, II.II.vi.1.
^^See Tuck, Natural Rights Theories, pp.79-80.
1 1 ^
11'As Tuck acknowledges, the term is borrowed from Quine; i b i d p.80n.
1 I  Q
On this reading, Tuck appears to be himself the first victim of the misleading potential of his 
own terminology, if we can apply what he says of a passage he treats “similarly” to the one we have 
quoted. He says of that passage: “In principle, Grotius was arguing, all our rights could be
renounced; but interpretive charity requires that we assume that all were not in fact renounced” 
(p.80). Rather, I suggest, Grotius’s view is that all our rights could not be renounced “without 
injustice”. (See DJBP , I.II.i.5), or without doing violence to nature by ignoring the way she points 
out (see ML, p.24).
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it follows ... tha t  in direst need the primitive right of user revives, as if 
community of ownership had remained, since in respect to all human laws, - the 
law of ownership included - supreme necessity seems to have been excepted . 119
After noting that' this principle in favour of necessity is recognized “even among the 
theologians” most notably by Aquinas* 1“0
The reason ... is not, as some allege, tha t  the owner of a thing is bound by the 
rule of love to give to him who lacks; it is, rather, tha t  all things seem to have 
been distributed to individual owners with a benign reservation in favour of the
191primitive right.
Grotius needs to stress this because, by allowing the right of necessity to use what belongs 
to another, he may seem to be requiring tha t  there exists a general duty of charity; that 
the welfare of others is our necessary concern. But we have already seen th a t  he has 
denied just this:
It is not ... contrary to the nature of society to look out for oneself and advance 
one’s own interests, provided the rights of others are not infringed.1““
The right of necessity to use things belonging to another is thus no more than a limit on 
the natural extent of property, since it captures those cases where the private owner’s 
advancing his own interests infringes the rights of another. It is not to impose on the 
property holder a general duty to secure the welfare of the less fortunate. Grotius thus 
rejects the traditional adage tha t  “Property has its duties” ; an adage which seems to 
capture the most humane elements of the mediaeval world. G rotius’s adage, if we are to 
treat it so, would not be without humane effect, but it would indicate nevertheless a less 
interdependent social world: “Property has its limits” . This is not to suggest tha t  Grotius 
errs in calling the limit to property “a benign reservation” . It does guarantee tha t  no one 
need be faced with the dilemma: if not starvation, then crime. Since it is a principle
which operates only in situations of “direst need” , Grotius stresses tha t  it does not apply
n 9 DJBP,  II.II.vi.2.
1“°See Summa Theologica, II-II, 2.66, A.7; op.cit., p.138.
V l lDJBP , II.II.vi.4.
122 DJBP,  I.II.i.6.
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when the need is not genuinely serious; when, as he puts it, the necessity is avoidable . 1 *“3 
Further, it does not entitle the needy to take from another in equal need, and it is to be 
treated as a debt to be repaid if possible - it is not the simple abolition of the property- 
holder’s r igh t . 124
At this point Grotius also discusses another use-right which cannot be denied by the 
owner of property, even though it involves no necessity. This is the right of “innocent 
use” , and holds wherever using the property of another “involves no detriment to the
I O C
owner” . This general right covers such im portant cases as the right to use running 
water, and the right of passage over land and rivers . 126 This right of innocent use, like 
the above right of necessity, can be regarded as “a benign reservation in favour of the 
primitive r ight” , since all such innocent uses are implied by the original use-right.
The second right of necessity is the right to such acts as human life requires. As already 
noted, Grotius appears to mean by this a right to engage in trade for the purpose of 
satisfying needs. This right concerns “acts indispensable for the obtaining of the things 
without which life cannot be comfortably lived” . It does not require the same degree of 
necessity as the right to use things belonging to another, since in this case
it is not ... a question of what may be done against the will of an owner, but 
rather of the mode of acquiring things with the consent of those to whom they 
belong.
Nevertheless, necessity is not weakened too much, since it remains true that
we are here dealing not with things which are superfluous and ministrant to 
pleasures only, but with things which life requires, as food, clothing, and
i 9 ^
DJBP , II.II.vii. This principle probably explains why both Hume and Adam Smith show no 
desire to consider the right of necessity, at least in terms of physical survival. Commercial society 
puts an end to economic necessity. On the other hand. Smith recognizes that it creates new kinds 
of spiritual necessity, and so he becomes a strong advocate of public education. For a discussion of 
these issues, see Donald Winch.Adam Sm i th ’s Politics, Cambridge: C.U.P.(1978), esp. pp.72-80 
and 113-120.
12i DJBP, Il.II.viiijix.
DJBP, II.II.xi. This right can be regarded as the converse of the rights of property which 
arise naturally wherever using results in using up (see the argument of ML). If there is no using up, 
then neither is their ground for exclusive use.
126 DJBP, II.II.xii,xiii.
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medicines.1“ '
Most conspicuously, this general right includes the right to buy necessary goods, and at a
I  O  Q
fair price1 , surprisingly, however, it “does not oblige a man to sell what belongs to 
him” , since “every one is free to decide what he will or will not acqui re” - and, 
presumably, part with. The right to buy necessary goods cannot, however, oblige anyone 
to sell; as Grotius says it is “not ... a question of what may be done against the will of an 
owner” . Presumably, the profit to be gained from sale is seen by Grotius as a sufficient 
consideration in these cases. The point of this right, then, seems to be simply to protect 
trade in necessities. It is directed against political authorities who try to restrict such 
trade, and is not directly an a ttem p t to protect those in dire necessity. Nevertheless it 
remains connected to necessity: it is not a right to free trade per se, only a right to free 
trade in necessary goods, and to pay a fair price for them. It is not a right to economic 
laissez-faire.
For our purposes, the right to acts tha t  human life requires can be set aside. One 
im portant point, however, needs to be made about the principal right of necessity, the 
right to use things belonging to another where necessity requires: this right makes one
im portant form of slavery, self-enslavement because of poverty, quite unnecessary. 
Grotius allows tha t  rights are transferable, and this prevents him from disallowing self­
enslavement out of hand; tha t  is, it prevents him from treating self-enslavement as a 
necessarily unjust act, as Locke was later to do. This does not mean (pace Rousseau) that 
he does not care about slavery. He condemns self-enslavement as a base act:
The basest form of voluntary subjection is tha t  by which a man gives himself
into complete slavery, as those among the Germans who staked their liberty on
1 o n
the last throw of the dice.
Nevertheless, he is forced to regard it as an unfortunate, but not an impossible act. It is 
not an impossible act principally because, for him, it does not violate the fundamental 
right of self-preservation. In a rather sympathetic assessment of slavery, he says
That is complete slavery which owes lifelong service in return for nourishment
127DJBP, Il.II.xviii. 
l 2SDJBP, II.II.xix. 
l 29DJBP , II.II.xx. 
lZ0DJBP, II.Y.xxvii.l.
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and other necessaries of life: and if the condition is thus accepted within natural 
limits it contains no element of undue severity. For the lasting obligation to 
labour is repaid with a lasting certainty o f  support , which often those do not
1 9 1
have who work for hire by day . 1 0 1
Grotius’s account here is not adequate because it overlooks a crucial fact: although the 
slave has a lasting claim of support, he or she has absolutely no certainty that support 
will in fact be forthcoming. If the master chooses to ignore his side of the relation, the 
slave’s dependent condition leaves no comeback. Grotius recognizes this fact in the 
section immediately following th a t  quoted above, but without, apparently, seeing the 
problems it causes for his own account of the slave’s situation. To answer the question, 
“To what extent the right of life and death may be said to exist in the right over slaves” , 
he says:
Masters do not have the right of life and death (I am speaking of complete moral 
justice) over their slaves. No man can rightly kill a man unless the latter has 
committed a capital crime. But according to the laws of some peoples the master 
who has killed a slave for any reason whatsoever goes unpunished . 1 0 ,6
The master, in other words, though he is not in possession of what is “properly called a 
right” , nevertheless has impunity in action. Here we can see clearly why, although 
Grotius does not “establish right by fact” as Rousseau later claimedA,>'>, he nevertheless 
earned the la t te r ’s polemics. (If impunity in action can extend to power over the lives of 
others, what could possibly be gained by having a right?) The fact is th a t ,  because of the 
m aster’s impunity in action, the slave not only has no “certainty of support” , but is in a 
situation in which self-preservation is constantly under threat. The m aster’s impunity of 
action is a latent denial of the compatibility of the institution of slavery and the right of 
self-preservaton.
Grotius accepts that the most powerful cause of acts of self-enslavement is the very 
necessity which he has recognized as founding a right to the use of things belonging to 
others. Considering the question whether enslaved parents are allowed to sell ther 
children into slavery, he says:
Surely, if there were no other method of bringing up the children, the parents 
could adjudge to slavery, along with themselves, the offspring liable to be born 
to them, since under such conditions parents are allowed to sell children born 
free.
DJBP, II. V.xxvii.2. (emphasis added).
lZ2DJBP, II.V.,xxviii.
133Rousseau, op.cit., Bk. I Ch.II (p.47).
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But since this right derives its origin from necessity only, without such necessity 
the parents do not have the right to enslave their children to any one.lu4
But if w ithout such necessity the parents lack the right to enslave the children, while with 
the necessity they do not have the need, since they then have the right of necessity to use 
things belonging to others, how can self-enslavement or the enslavement of one’s children 
ever be other than an unnecessary and unjust act? The right of necessity makes such 
enslavement unnecessary or avoidable; the insecurity of the right of self-preservation 
under slavery makes enslavement a deliberate exposure to the possibility of injury. 
Although Grotius is not recklessly insensitive to the vulnerability of slaves - he does allow 
that ,  uif the cruelty of the master is excessive, even those slaves who have voluntarily 
given themselves into slavery can take counsel for their welfare by flight” 135 - his 
concessions are clearly inadequate. No slave has protection against the arbitrary violence 
of the master, yet no enslavement through necessity is ever reasonable. In allowing 
enslavement through necessity he has emptied the right of necessity to use things 
belonging to others of its principal significance. Conversely, if the right of necessity to use 
things is treated seriously (and if the right to such acts as life requires is expanded to 
include the right to those actions which safeguard one’s future), then the right of necessity 
becomes a genuine stumbling-block to any form of slavery. As we shall see, this is the 
course taken by Locke in the Second Treatise.
★  *  *
This chapter has not a ttem pted  a complete account of the intellectual corpus Grotius 
bequeathed to posterity. The aim has been, rather, to identify some main themes which 
are taken up in various ways by his intellectual successors, and also to rebut a common 
misunderstanding of Grotius’s method. The misunderstanding concerns the nature of 
G ro tius’s rationalism, and hence of the role of history in his thought. The law of nature 
he describes as “a dictate of right reason” , but he shows tha t  he does not take this to 
imply the freedom to determine the nature of human laws wholly by abstract deduction. 
Rather, reason is a tool human beings use in specific situations and thus is the guiding 
principle behind necessary (unavoidable) historical developments. Reason is a historical
1 U DJBP, II.V.xxix.1-2. 
1Z5D JBP , II.V. xxix.2.
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force, perceived historically. It was also pointed out tha t ,  although not reducible to 
expediency, the law of nature “has the reinforcement of expediency7’ . Unqualified 
contrasts between natural law theories and theories which stress the role of utility are 
thus simplistic; natural law theories typically allow a significant place for u til ity . 136
The main themes discussed here, which G rotius’s successors take up in various ways, 
can be summed up as follows. Firstly, Grotius founds natural law on the natural 
“sociableness” of human beings. The lim ited  sociability implicit in this notion of 
sociableness is shown by Grotius’s view tha t  “it is not ... contrary to the nature of society 
to look out for oneself and advance one’s own interests, provided the rights of others are 
not infringed” ; and this limited sociability is behind his distinction between two sorts of 
moral qualities, perfect and imperfect. The former are “legal rights strictly so called” , 
whereas the latter are “aptitudes” , and are not enforceable. Secondly, he stresses tha t  the 
original community of possession differed quite significantly from the modern notion of 
common ownership. Thirdly, and most importantly, private property is a late stage in a 
process of extensions to the swum  by adapting and developing the original use-right. For 
this reason property is, in the final analysis, a system designed for the better or more 
effective preservation of human beings, and so cannot frustrate the use-right of the needy. 
Systems of property thus have a necessary limit: they must recognize a right of necessity 
to use things belonging to others.
In this chapter I have said rather little about Grotius’s doctrine of rights. For our 
purposes, the im portant m atter  is tha t  property, being a species of right, is for Grotius a 
power to use things without injustice. By failing to see tha t  this power cannot include use 
of other persons (as slaves) without emptying of all significance the fundamental right of 
self-preservation (and its corollary, the right of necessity), Grotius is led by his 
understanding of rights to accept the naturalness of the institution of slavery. Hobbes’s 
acceptance of this doctrine guaranteed the centrality of this issue to later seventeenth 
century political theory. Most explicitly in John Locke, the question of the possibility of 
slavery, given natural property, is of crucial theoretical significance.
1 O ß
° The most pronounced example of this is the explicitly utilitarian natural law theory of 
Richard Cumberland in De Legibus Naturae. An implication of this chapter is that Cumberland’s 
theory is not a deviation from “authentic” natural law.
C h apter T w o
S A M U E L  P U F E N D O R F
I: M oral S cien ce  and the E lem en ts  o f Law
If Grotius s s tar  shines only feebly in the modern philosophical firmament, that of 
Samuel Pufendorf not uncharacteristically suffers a total eclipse.1 * In the latter stages of 
the seventeenth century, however, m atters were vastly different. Pufendorf was then the 
best known and, by and large, the most respected, writer on natural law, not least because 
he was recognized as an authoritative interpreter and defender (and, where appropriate, 
critic) of Grotius. Thus his main work, De Jure Naturae et G e n tiu m , was described by 
Locke as “the best book of tha t  kind” - better even than Grotius’s^; and his shorter text­
book, De Of f i c i o  H o m im s et C ivis, was very widely used in courses on natural 
jurisprudence in the universities of Europe, and provided a model for many subsequent 
such books. Francis Hutcheson, for example, explicitly acknowledges his debt to Pufendorf 
in the preface to his own student textbook, written over seventy years later0; and the 
structural dependence of A  Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy  on De Of f i c i o  can 
readily be discerned by a chapter-by-chapter comparison.
Despite such widespread acceptance, respect for Pufendorf was not universal. Possibly 
his sharpest critic was Leibniz, for whom Pufendorf wras ua poor jurist and a worse 
philosopher.”4 This is worth noting, not merely for the sake of recognizing the existence
1C.B. Macpherson’s The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke, Oxford: 
O.U.P. (1962), can serve as an example here: Grotius receives only a dismissive footnote, but 
Pufendorf is not mentioned at all, even though this is a work concerned with the seventeenth- 
century intellectual context.
9
“Quoted by Peter Laslett, in his editorial introduction to John Locke, Two Treatises of 
Government, Cambridge: C.U.P., second edition (1967), p. 74. The remark comes from Locke’s 
Thoughts concerning Reading and Study, in Works (1801), vol. Ill, p. 272.
O
^Francis Hutcheson, A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy, Glasgow (1747). Reprinted in 
Collected Works, Hildesheim: Olms facsimile edition (1969),vol. IV, p.i. Hutcheson identifies 
Pufendorf as amongst a select group of moderns who rank in importance with such ancient 
luminaries as Cicero and Aristotle.
4Quoted, from a letter of 1709, by Leonard Krieger, The Politics o f  Discretion, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press (1965), p. 1. Patrick Riley, The Political Writings of Leibniz, 
Cambridge: C.U.P. (1972), points out that Barbeyrac defended Pufendorf against Leibniz’s
criticisms in editorial notes to his translation of De Officio.
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of a dissenting voice, but because an examination of Leibniz’s main criticism of Pufendorf 
helps to reveal an important and influential feature of PufendorPs account of natural law. 
Prior to carrying out this task, however, some remarks on the nature of PufendorPs 
enterprise are in order.
PufendorPs aim is to establish a science of morals. Although such a description of his 
work may invite misunderstanding, it is necessary to recognize this in order to see some 
distinctive features of his enterprise. By a science of morals Pufendorf does not mean (as 
the modern reader may take him to mean) a body of factual knowledge. He means rather 
a system atic  body of knowledge, so tha t  true moral principles may be established by 
demonstration. A moral science is a body of certain, demonstrable, moral truths. Thus 
Pufendorf speaks not only of “the certainty of the moral sciences"’ , but also that 
“demonstration is possible ... in tha t  moral science which treats of the goodness and evil 
of human actions.”  ^ There is, however, an important qualiPication to this claim, as will 
be shown below.
In treating moral science as a m atter  of systematic, demonstrative knowledge, Pufendorf 
employs the common seventeenth century notion of scientia , or systematic knowledge. 
This Latin term  was translated into English as “science” , and can be illustrated by a 
passage in Hobbes’s Leviathan. In a short but important chapter, “Of the Several 
SUBJECTS of KN OW LED GE” , Hobbes distinguishes knowledge of fact from knowledge 
of relations. The latter kind of knowledge is called Science, and, he adds, “this is the 
Knowledge required in a Philosopher; tha t  is to say, of him that  pretends to Reasoning.” 
This is the knowledge Pufendorf seeks to provide.
Like many of his contemporaries, Pufendorf was impressed greatly by the method of 
geometry or mathematics. He associated it with Descartes in particular, and with “the 
new way of philosophy” in general. He described this method as a m atter  of “deducing 
everything from Pixed principles and hypotheses through the mathematical mode of 
dem onstration” .^ His a t tem p t to apply this method, however, was stronger in theory than
^Samuel Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium Libri Octo (hereafter DJN G ), translated by 
C.H. and W.A. Oldfather, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York: Oceana 
Publications, London: Wildy and Sons (1964), Bk. I, ch. iii, introductory headings.
^Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C.B. Macpherson, Harmondsworth: Penguin (1968), Part 1 
chapter IX (pp. 147-8).
^Quoted by Krieger (from PufendorPs Eris Scandica), op.cit., p. 51.
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in practice, especially in his later works. In the early work, Elem entorum  Jurisprudentiae  
Universalis , Pufendorf made a concerted a ttem p t to produce a work as closely based on 
the mathematical method as the subject m atter  would permit. Beginning with definitions- 
and “principles '1 he a ttem pted  to deduce conclusions which were necessarily true. For the 
discipline of law, the principles were of three kinds - axioms derived from metaphysics, or 
primary philosophy; axioms based on rational intuitions; and “experimental11 principles, 
or observations. From these principles could be derived “propositions” , and even, in some 
cases, a fourth set of judgements which lacked the certainty of the preceding principles. 
This method is mirrored in the structure of the E lem en torum : it is divided into two parts, 
the first of which deals with definitions, the second with rational and experimental 
principles (axioms and observations).®
In the later De Jure Naturae et G e n t iu m , however, this method is “less explicit and less 
intrusive” , as Krieger puts i t .0 The quasi-mathematical format has disappeared, and, 
although Pufendorf holds to the position tha t  the moral sciences are indeed sciences, and 
thus admit of certainty, he allows a significant scope for uncertainty. T ha t moral science 
is indeed capable of certainty is implicit in the term itself, for science is
th a t  which we seek by means of demonstration, that is, a certain and pure 
knowledge, in every way and at all times constant and free from error . 10
Moral science manifests this certainty because
th a t  knowledge, which considers what is upright and what base in human 
actions, the principal portion of which we have undertaken to present, rests 
entirely upon grounds so secure, tha t  from it can be deduced genuine 
demonstrations which are capable of producing a solid science. So certainly can 
its conclusions be derived from distinct principles, that no further ground is left 
for doubt . 11
There are, however, two main aspects of moral science, of which this passage describes 
only one - “what is upright and what is base in human actions” ; tha t  is, that which
®This account of Pufendorfs method is based on Krieger’s (o p . c i t pp. 51-2.) 
0o p . c i t p. 53.
l0DJNG , I.ii.3.
11 DJNG , I.ii.4.
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“concerns the rectitude of human actions in their order according to laws” .* “ As we have 
seen, this branch of moral science gives certain knowledge - “no further ground is left for 
doub t” . The second branch of moral science fails to produce this certainty. This latter 
branch
concerns the successful management of one’s own actions and those of others, 
with an eye to the security and welfare primarily of the public.*°
Pufendorf recognizes th a t  this branch of moral science is a m atter of prudence, as 
defined by Aristotle. He approvingly quotes Aristotle’s definition of prudence in the 
Nicom achean E th ics  (“a true rational and practical state of mind in the field of human 
good and evil” *4) and in the same spirit quotes some features of Aristotle’s account of the 
prudent man. He then sums up, using his own terminology, that the prudent man bases 
his conclusions concerning appropriate behaviour “upon axioms drawn from a keen 
observation and comparison of the customs of men and the events of human history” . 
Pufendorf clearly accepts th a t  from these axioms the prudent man gains moral knowledge, 
but because of the general reliability of the axioms, not from any presumed certainty 
concerning them:
These axioms, however, do not appear to be so firm that  infallible 
demonstrations can be deduced from them.
He lists several factors which contribute to the fallibility of these axioms; for our purposes 
it is most appropriate to acknowledge one in particular. This factor is the natural limits 
of human knowledge. It contributes to fallibility in that “the wit of man often goes astray 
in the application of those axioms, because of unforeseen events which suddenly upset all 
calculations” . For this and other reasons, he concludes:
Therefore, those who are engaged in the conduct of affairs do not endeavour to 
draw their plans to the nicety of demonstrations, but when they have used the 
wisest circumspection and a kind of divination, as it were, they leave the
12 ibid. 
n ibid.
*4Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk VI chap.v; quoted ibid. (The translation given in the text 
of DJNG , which I have reproduced here, is that of Welldon. Cf. The “ List of Classical Authors 
and Translations”, DJNG, p. 1369.)
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outcome in the hands of fate .lD
If, as seems likely, Pufendorf means by “a kind of divination” no more than a kind of 
predicting, or perhaps (more weakly) conjecturing, then his account of conduct based on 
circumspection plus divination - a process which will “leave the outcome in the hands of 
fate” - exhibits some marked similarities with Locke’s account of the central importance 
of probability in practical affairs, and therefore likewise of judgem ent. As for Pufendorf, 
for Locke one crucial factor is simply the natural limits of our knowledge, and it is for this 
reason tha t  we must rely on probabilities:
Therefore as God has set some Things in broad day-light; as he has given us 
some certain Knowledge, though limited to a few Things ... So in the greatest 
part  of our Concernment, he has afforded us only the twilight, as I may so say, 
of Probability, suitable, I presume, to tha t  S tate of Mediocrity and 
Probationership, he has been pleased to place us in h e re .^
Probabilities are themselves calculated by the faculty of Judgement, “which God has 
given Man to supply the want of clear and certain Knowledge in Cases where th a t  cannot 
be had” . ^
We have already seen that ,  like Locke, Pufendorf accepts the existence of demonstrable 
moral knowledge. This further similarity, tha t  practical knowledge is nevertheless to a 
significant degree uncertain, being a m atter  of circumspection and divination (or 
judgement of probabilities), is for both a qualification on the former claim; there is  
certainty in practical affairs, but not in all practical affairs. We shall see below further 
similarities between Locke and Pufendorf - particularly on the nature of natural laws, 
including the question of innateness - and if, as is not unlikely, Pufendorfs views exercised 
some influence on the development of Locke’s own, then we can begin to see why he 
(Locke) should have considered De Jure Naturae et G en tium  to be “the best book of th a t  
kind” .
15DJNG, I.ii.4. He goes on to quote Aristotle again: “It is right, therefore, to pay no less
attention to the undemonstrated assertions and opinions of such persons as are experienced or 
advanced in years or prudent, than to their demonstrations; for their experienced eye gives them 
the power of correct vision” (E.N. VLxi, Welldon translation.). Aristotle’s view here is rather 
stronger than Pufendorfs (more like Grotius’s defence of the a posteriori method, in fact): 
Aristotle claims that prudence or experience gives correct vision, whereas Pufendorf holds only that 
it gives generally reliable, but fallible, conclusions.
16uJohn Locke, ^4n Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P.H. Nidditch, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press (1975), IV.xiv.2.
11 ibid., IV.xiv.3.
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Leibniz’s judgement of Pufendorf stands in stark contrast. It can be explained as 
follows. In a short work, originally written in the form of a letter, entitled “Opinion on 
the Principles of Pufendorf” he discusses PufendorFs shorter work, De O f f ic io  
H o m i m s  et Civis.  His conclusion is tha t ,  despite its au thor being “a man long renowned 
for his merit” , ^  PufendorFs work, “although it is not to be despised, has nonetheless need 
of many corrections in its very principles” In part, Leibniz’s objections to Pufendorf 
can be seen as part  of a wider dispute. PufendorFs account of the foundations of natural 
law partly reflects the metaphysical opinions of Descartes, and, given Leibniz’s opposition 
to Descartes’s views on the relationship between the world and its creator, it is not 
surprising tha t  PufendorFs applications of these views should meet similar opposition.
The objection to Pufendorf which it is appropriate to consider here occurs in the final 
two sections of Leibniz’s “Opinion” . Leibniz charges th a t  Pufendorf fails to give a 
defensible account of the efFicient cause of the law of nature. He notes th a t  Pufendorf 
deFines law as “a command by which the superior obliges the subject to conform his 
actions to what the law itself requires” . F r o m  this it follows that “all law is prescribed 
by a superior” , and thus the state of nature, because it is a state  without superiors, is a 
s ta te  governed by no (natural) law. In addition, such an account of law appears to 
provide no basis for criticising or opposing the actions th a t  superiors in fact prescribe:
Now, then, will he who is invested with the supreme power do nothing against 
justice if he proceeds tyrannically against his subjects; who arbitrarily despoils 
his subjects ... who makes war on others without cause?“0
In Leibniz’s eyes, then, PufendorFs account of law, by basing law and thus justice on the 
command of a superior, renders the idea of justice empty. Even tyrannical acts, because
^G .W . Leibniz, “Opinion on the Principles of PufendorP (1706); in Patrick Riley (ed.), The 
Political Writings of Leibniz, op.cit., pp. 64-75.
^ ibid., p. 65.
20ibid., p. 75.
21 Pufendorf, De Officio Hominis et Civis,  I.ii.2. This is quoted in ibid., p. 70, and is, 
apparently, Riley’s own translation. Subsequent references to De Officio  are to the translation of 
F.G. Moore, New York: O.U.P. (1927).
Leibniz, op.cit., p.70.99
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they proceed from the prescription of a superior, will become lawful or just acts. Neither 
can Pufendorf solve this problem by calling on the divine superior, because
one must pay attention to this fact: th a t  God is praised because he is just. 
There must be, then, a certain justice - or rather a supreme justice - in God, 
even though no one is superior to him ... Neither the norm of conduct itself, nor 
the essence of the just, depends on his free decision, but rather on eternal truths, 
objects o f  the divine intellect , which constitute, so to speak, the essence of 
divinity itself ... And, indeed, justice follows certain rules of equality and of 
proportion 'which are1 no less founded in the immutable nature of things, and in 
the divine ideas, than are the principles of arithmetic and geometry .^4
In this passage Leibniz invokes a Platonic picture of the relationship between God and 
the creation in order to criticise Pufendorf. We have already seen tha t  comparable views 
were held by Grotius and Suarez, so it comes as no surprise tha t  Leibniz approvingly 
refers to G rotius’s etiamsi daremus  passage:
Grotius justly observed ... that there would be a natural obligation even on the 
hypothesis - which is impossible - tha t  God does not exist, or if one but left the 
divine existence out of consideration .^5
Leibniz’s opposition to Pufendorf on this issue is thus tied to a standpoint which is very 
similar to G rotius’s. Given that Pufendorf explicitly rejects G rotius’s position,^6 the 
proper evaluation of both Pufendorf and his opponents would require a consideration of 
Pufendorfs likely reasons for being dissatisfied with the Platonic picture. This issue 
would, however, take us too far into the metaphysical disputes of the seventeenth century. 
We shall have to settle with noting tha t  Pufendorf has powerful allies in this dispute.
But it is not this difference of viewpoint alone th a t  causes Leibniz to consider Pufendorf 
such a bad philosopher. For, as we have noted, Pufendorf is here following the lead of 
Hobbes and Descartes, and Leibniz does not, for the same reason, consider them  bad 
philosophers, even though he is just as strict in his opposition to the same or related
24ibid., p. 71 (emphasis added).
25 ibid.
“ See DJNG, II.iii.4-6, and also I.ii.6. PufendorPs view, in brief, is that there is a kind of
necessity pertaining to natural law, but that it is a hypothetical necessity. It is hypothetical in so
far as it is based on the free will of God, who need not have created rational and social creatures 
such as human beings. It is necessary because, having created rational social creatures, the 
conditions for their well-being become thereby fixed. So, although not eternal, the basis of natural 
law in divine voluntary actions does not imply that it is not founded in the social nature of human
beings. Having allowed this much, however, it may seem odd that Pufendorf should object to
passages such as Grotius’s etiamsi daremus passage. As we shall see, his dissatisfaction stems from 
his conviction that law must compel assent.
doctrines in their work. (By such doctrines, Descartes, he says, “showed how great can be 
the errors of great men” . ) Pufendorfs failings are, for Leibniz, compounded by the fact 
tha t  not only does he hold to this “great error” , he also fails to hold to it consistently. He 
falls into a contradiction because on the one hand “he makes all juridical obligations 
derivative from the command of a superior” (the “great error” ), while on the other
he states tha t  in order that one have a superior it is necessary that they 
[superiors] possess not only the force necessary] to exercise coercion, but also 
th a t  they have a just  cause to justify their power over my person.* 2®
But this means tha t  Pufendorf is committed to holding tha t  “the justice of the cause is 
antecedent to this same superior, contrary to what has been asserted” . Leibniz concludes:
Well, then, if the source of the law is the will of a superior and, inversely, a 
justifying cause of law is necessary in order to have a superior, a circle is created, 
than which none was ever more manifest.2^
In all this, it must be remembered, Leibniz is considering only Pufendorfs short 
textbook, De O f f ic io  H om in is  et C iv is , and, as long as only this work is taken into 
account, his criticisms seem perfectly just. However, if we turn to consider Pufendorfs 
remarks on the nature of law in general in De Jure Naturae et G e n t iu m , a different 
picture emerges. From the latter work we can determine tha t  Leibniz is quite right in 
pointing out tha t  Pufendorf appeals to two different factors in explaining law - both 
power and justice - but quite wrong in thinking this commits Pufendorf to hopeless 
circularity. This is because the latter work shows Pufendorf to hold tha t  law depends for 
its existence on the conjunction of two different elements. He employs the traditional 
notions of formal and material elements to describe the two kinds of element which 
comprise laws.
Laws are, for Pufendorf, moral entities, which means they are a specific kind of attr ibute  
given to things, an imposition or addition to physical things or relations by intelligent
o n
beings. Moral entities are impositions on the created order of material things. 
(Pufendorfs  account of “moral entities” has thus some marked similarities with Locke’s
97 .
'  Leibniz, op. cit.
98 .ibid., p. 73; the reference is to De Officio, I.ii.5.
2^i b i d pp. 73-4.
30DJNG,  Li.1-5.
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account of "‘archetype”’ ideas, especially that sort he calls “mixed modes” .***■) Laws, as 
moral entities, have a material element, in that they reflect the created order of material 
things, and a formal element, which is the imposition itself. For this reason Pufendorf 
requires of law both the will of a superior, which is necessary for the act of imposition (the 
formal element), and  just reasons for its imposition (reflecting the order of the material 
element). The reasons for imposition must be ju s t  reasons because, in considering law, 
Pufendorf is concerned with explaining “genuine” law, enactments which are just. An 
imposition has just reasons when it reinforces or protects the beneficial structure of 
natural states of affairs. The most important set of just laws are of course the natural 
laws. Unlike positive laws, their formal element lies only in the will of the divine superior. 
The justice of the material element is shown by the fact tha t ,  unlike positive law, natural 
law has a “necessary agreement ... with its subjects” . Natural law
so harmonizes with the natural and social nature of man that the human race 
can have no wholesome and peaceful social organization without it; in other 
words, it has a natural benefit and utility from its own continued efficacy for the 
human race in general.*^
Pufendorf s appeal to the twin elements of the will of a superior and the existence of just 
reasons in his account of law is thus not, pace Leibniz, a confusion or vacillation about the 
efficient cause of law, but an a ttem pt to specify two different kinds of elements, both of 
which are necessary for the existence of law. We could perhaps say, for Pufendorf, tha t  
the will of a superior, w ithout just reasons, is only coercion; while just reasons, without 
the will of a superior, are only reasons for law, but not law itself. (They are not 
compelling.) Leibniz’s judgement of Pufendorf s account of law, by failing to look beyond 
the abbreviated account found in De Of f ic io ,  is rather too hasty. Pufendorfs account is 
more complex than  his critic recognizes. Some of the main features of this account will be 
provided in the next section.
9 1
Locke, Essay, III.v; especially III.v. 12: “the Essences of the Species of mixed Modes ... are 
the creatures of the Understanding, rather than the works of Nature”. Pufendorf similarly refers to 
moral entities as “modes” (rather than “substances”) because they “ do not exist of themselves”; 
and, although “some modes flow, as it were, from the very nature of the thing itse lf , moral ideas 
differ in that they “are superadded by intelligent agency to physical things and modes” (D JN G , 
Li.3). These matters are discussed in James Tully, A Discourse on Property: John Locke and his 
Adversaries, Cambridge: C.U.P. (1980), chapter 1, esp. pp. 16-18, 30-32.
32 DJNG, I.vi.18.
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II: T he Law  o f N a tu re
Pufendorf parts company with Grotius on the question of the ultimate foundation of the 
law of nature. The law of nature is not, he says, independent of the Divine Will. 
Therefore, neither is it properly to be called “eternal” , since God alone is eternal. It can
0 9
be called “eternal” only in contrast to the changeability of positive law .00 In addition, 
although it is true tha t  natural law can be correctly described, as a “dictate  of right
o i
reason” , this does not mean tha t  this law can have a “degree of validity” if God is left 
out of account. This is because
if these dictates of reason are to have the force of laws, it is necessary to 
presuppose the existence of God and His providence, whereby all things are 
governed, and primarily m ankind .35
God is necessary for law because, as we have seen, for Pufendorf all “law is the bidding of 
a superior” . Obligation, therefore, exists only where there is a superior. This means 
th a t  there can be no natural law in the proper sense if God is left out of account: w ithout 
a superior there is no “degree of validity” because there is no obligation.
Pufendorfs  position depends on denying the existence of any obligation where there is 
no law. His reason for holding this is, at least in part, because he denies th a t  reason can 
of itself create obligations. Reason lacks moral power, or moral effect:
if we consider reason, in so far as it is not imbued with an understanding and 
sense of law, or a moral norm, it might perhaps be able to permit man the 
faculty of doing something more expeditiously and adroitly than a beast, and to 
supply sagacity to his natural powers. But tha t  reason should be able to 
discover any morality in the actions of a man without reference to a law, is as 
impossible as for a man born blind to judge between colours.ot
The impotence of reason, its inability to produce moral effects, is most im portantly  an
9 0
inability to create obligations, since obligations are moral effects.0 This is not to say
ZZDJNG,  I.ii.6. 
34DJNG.  Il.iii.13,19. 
ZbDJNG,  Il.iii. 19. 
ZQDJNG,  I.ii.6.
Z7ibid.
38See, for example, DJNG,  IV.iv.9.
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th a t  reason has no part to play in the formation of obligations: in fact, it has a crucial 
role. Its importance in Pufendorfs scheme is often concealed by the fact th a t  his notion 
of a superior is not reducible to mere physical superiority:
An obligation is properly laid on the mind of man by a superior, th a t  is, by one 
who has both the strength to threaten some evil against those who resist him, 
and just reasons why he can demand that  the liberty of our will be limited at his 
pleasure. °9
Furthermore, because obligation has these two aspects, we can speak of two kinds of 
obligation (as long as we remember tha t  obligation proper requires both): thus the threat 
of evil, because it secures bodily compliance, can be called “extrinsic5”’ obligation; while the 
just reasons, because they “intrinsically affect the conscience of a m an55, can be called 
“intrinsic 51 obligations.* 4 *^
This view has a great impact on later writers. For example, Francis Hutcheson 
distinguishes between two senses of obligation, one being “the inward sense or conscience51 
(intrinsic), the other being “a motive of interest superior to all motives on the other side51, 
which motives “indeed must arise from the laws of a omnipotent being51 (extrinsic ) . 4 4  As 
the above quotation from Pufendorf indicates, however, Hutcheson is mistaken when he 
goes on to claim that ,  among others, Pufendorf is chiefly concerned only with the latter 
meaning, tha t  is, with extrinsic obligation. This analysis of obligation is an im portant 
m atter ,  although its importance will not become fully clear until we consider the question 
of obligation in the moral science of Hutcheson and Hume.
Of similar importance to the later writers is Pufendorfs insistence on the moral 
inertness of reason. His view is, a t bottom, an old one, reflected in Aristotle’s view that
i  O
reason alone cannot move us to action: as he puts it, “intellect itself ... moves nothing51. 
Understanding the development this view undergoes in the hands of the “moral sense51 
theories of eighteenth century Scotland is essential for understanding the major
Z9DJNG, I.vi.9.
40DJNG, I.vi.10.
41 Hutcheson, Short Introduction, p. 121.
4^ibid., pp. 121-2.
 ^ o
° Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. by W.D. Ross (with revisions by J. L. Ackrill and J.O. 
Urmson), Oxford: O.U.P. (1980), vi.2.
61
motivations of “moral sense51 moral science. If we consider the quoted passage from 
Pufendorf carefully, we see first of all that reason is inert because it is essentially 
in s trum en ta l : reason can “permit man the faculty of doing something more expeditiously 
and adroitly than a beast5’ . If reason is purely instrumental, then clearly it cannot move 
us to action, even though it can show us, in given circumstances, how to act. As we shall 
see, this instrumental conception of reason is at the bottom of the “moral sense” school’s 
rejection of reason as the foundation of morals. Secondly, we can see that Pufendorfs 
closing analogy almost invites a moral sense resolution of the issue. For reason to 
“discover any m orality” , he says, “is as impossible as for a man born blind to judge 
between colours” . As in the physical world, then, where reason is blind without the initial 
input provided by the physical senses, so in the moral world reason is blind until 
enlightened by the activity of a prior appropriate form of sensing - moral sensing. Thus 
we see how easily the doctrine of moral sense can be grafted onto Pufendorfs acceptance 
of the inertness of reason.
Pufendorfs  second departure from Grotius concerns the location of the laws of nature. 
Grotius treats  the original unwritten laws of nature as innate ideas, but Pufendorf 
emphatically does not - even though he is prepared to accept the apparently innatist 
terminology which Grotius and many others had employed. (The law is, he allows, 
“written in the hearts” of m en .44 In both doctrine and language he is thus a precursor of 
Locke, whose E ssay  has usually been regarded as the locus classicus  of the attack on 
innate ideas.) If we consider Pufendorfs rejection of innate ideas as the fundamental 
elements of natural law, we shall gain some im portant insights into the intimate 
connections between nature, reason, and history in his account of natural law.
For Pufendorf, natural law is not innate:
The common saying that tha t  law is known by nature, should not be understood 
... as though actual and distinct propositions concerning things to be done or to 
be avoided were inherent in men's minds at the hour of their birth. But it means 
in part tha t  the law can be investigated by the light of reason, in part that at 
least the common and im portant provisions of the natural law are so plain and 
clear tha t  they at once find assent, and grow up in our minds, so tha t  they can 
never again be destroyed, no m atter  how the impious man, in order to still the 
twinges of conscience, may endeavour to blot out the consequences of those 
precepts. For this reason in Scripture too the law is said to be “written in the 
hearts” of men. Hence, since we are imbued from childhood with a consciousness 
of those maxims, in accordance with our social training, and cannot remember 
the time when we first imbibed them, we think of this knowledge exactly as if we
44 De Off i cio , I.iii. 12; cf. DJAGJI.iii.13.
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had had j t  already at birth. Everyone has the same experience with his mother 
tongue .45
Natural law is thus tha t  law which we inevitably come to accept in our social training. 
Social trainings vary, of course, so it is not any or every principle we come to accept in 
this manner tha t  is a part of natural law. This would empty the notion of natural law of 
one of its characteristic elements: the denial tha t  law is simply conventional, being 
founded in human nature. Only those precepts which are inevitably  acquired through 
social training are elements of natural law; such precepts are inevitably acquired because 
social life requires them. The necessities of social life found the principles of natural law. 
This law itself thus
so harmonizes with the natural and social nature of man tha t  the human race 
can have no wholesome and peaceful social organization without it; in other 
words, it has a natural benefit and utility from its continued efficacy for the 
human race in general.4^
Natural law reflects the fact of human sociableness. Its efficacy for the human race is its 
necessity for any rationally organized social life.
It is important to show the connections between the idea of natural law as that law 
which is necessary for social organization and social harmony, and natural law as a 
“dictate  of right reason*. Obviously, a law necessary for social harmony, but which 
nonetheless could be neither discovered nor achieved even if known, would be a law 
inapplicable to the affairs of human beings. The claim that  the law of nature is a dictate 
of right reason is a denial of such possibilities. The law of nature does not require divine 
revelation to become known or effective in human affairs. Rather, it
can be discovered and understood from the mental endowment peculiar to man, 
and a consideration of human nature in general.4 '
Natural law “can be investigated by the light of reason” ; and at least its “common and
45De Officio , I.iii. 12. Cf. DJNG , II.iii.13: “we do not ... feel obliged to maintain that the
general principles of the law of nature came into and are imprinted upon the minds of men at their 
birth as distinct and clear rules which can be formulated by man without further investigation or 
thought as soon as he acquires the power of speech” . Note also Pufendorfs use of language as an 
example of something natural but not innate. Hume, in what could be called his defence of the 
“naturalness” of the artificial virtues in .4 Letter from a Gentleman to his friend in Edinburgh, 
also employs the example of language. Language, he says, is artificial (i.e., a human artifact) but 
not unnatural. Hume, Letter, ed. E. C. Mossner and J.V. Price, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press (1967), p.31.
ie>DJNG , I.vi.18.
47ibid.
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im portant provisions ... are so plain and clear tha t  they at once find assent, and grow up 
in our minds, so tha t  they can never again be destroyed” .“*® The most common and 
im portant provisions of the natural law are thus so widely recognized, and so firmly 
acknowledged, tha t  they provide the basis for social interactions between human beings.
But what of the less common or important provisions of natural law? On this m atter 
Pufendorf indicates tha t  the requirement tha t  natural law be a dictate  of right (or 
‘‘sound” ) reason means tha t  the provisions of natural law need to be discovered by the 
more exacting process of rational inquiry. These provisions, not being im m edia tely  
obvious to all (they do not “a t  once find assent” ) have to be discovered by reflection. 
This is achieved by rational inquiry which reflects a sensitivity to states of affairs in the 
world:
the dictates of sound reason are true principles tha t  are in accordance with the 
properly observed and examined nature of things, and are deduced by logical 
sequence from prime and true principles.“*9
Natural laws thus become established in human affairs (become recognized as natural 
law) through rational inquiry. Various principles might be recommended as being 
principles of natural law. but all such candidate-principles must be subjected to rational 
examination. For any such candidate-principle, its advocate’s “appeal to reason” - that 
is, appeal to recognition by others as rational - “will be vain if he The advocate] is unable 
to prove his assertions from principles which are legitimate and agreeable with the nature 
of things” .50
Pufendorf recognizes tha t  the “nature of things” includes not only the nature of human 
beings as such, but also relevant physical and social facts:
There seems to us no more fitting and direct way to learn the law of nature than 
through careful consideration of the nature, condition, and desires of man 
himself, although in such a consideration other things should necessarily be 
observed which lie outside man himself, and especially such things as work for 
his advantage or disadvantage .51
The natural law is a dictate of right reason in the sense that it is known rationally, that 
is, through a rational response to the specific circumstances of human social life. Some of
4®De Officio,  I.iii. 12. 
i 9 DJNG,  II.iii.13.
50ibid.
51 DJNG,  Il.iii. 14.
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these laws are ‘‘so plain and clear that they at once find assent” , but others are less 
obvious, and can only be recognized as such through rational enquiry. Thus natural law 
can be characterised as having a core which is immediately obvious to all, but as also 
having further layers which are worked out in the course of human history, as the 
particular exigencies of different human situations come to bear. In this sense, 
Pufendorfs  theory of natural law reflects a historical conception of human society. This 
will be illustrated when we consider his account of property, with its account of the 
genesis of more extensive property relations from a limited starting point in the justified 
use of things for one’s self-preservation.
Our immediate concern, however, is to spell out some of the basic features of the natural 
law. We have seen above tha t  Pufendorf has not hesitated to stress the utility of natural 
law: “it has a natural benefit and utility from its continued efficacy for the human race in 
general” , and a man learns the law of nature by discovering “such things as work for his 
advantage or d isadvantage” . This does not mean, however, tha t  the law of nature is 
founded in utility (unless we very carefully restrict its meaning). It is more accurate to 
say, instead, that ,  as it is for Grotius, the law of nature is expedient even though not 
founded in expediency. This is because it is founded in the social nature of human beings, 
in their need for an organized social existence; and at bottom  in the exigencies of their 
self-preservation. Utility is therefore a fact about natural law, but not its ultimate 
foundation. In the following passage, perhaps his most emphatic trea tm ent of the matter, 
he leaves no room for doubt concerning the disutility of ignoring natural law:
not justice but injustice is supreme folly, which is of no general or lasting 
advantage even though a m an’s evil conduct may seem to him to succeed for a 
time.
Such temporary successes are ultimately bound to fail because they are not built firmly in 
sociability; they do not see tha t
all strength, indeed, comes from union with other men whom you may by no 
means hold together by your own strength alone ... the safety of every man, 
however powerful he be, would be uncertain so long as any one thinks it to be to 
his advantage for him to die.
The utility of natural law lies in its accurate reflection of the fundamental elements of 
human sociability. The law is not itself reducible to utility: Pufendorf is quite at one
with Grotius on this point. His remarks have a similar flavour to Grotius’s, although 
they are a little more sympathetic to the purveyors of the contrary view:
52 DJNG,  Il.iii. 10.
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differences between the laws and customs of different peoples have undoubtedly 
given some men excuse for alleging tha t  there is no such thing as natural law, 
and tha t  all law has arisen from the convenience of individual states, and cannot 
be measured in any other way.°°
As exemplars of this viewpoint, he quotes the passage from Horace’s Satires  quoted by 
Grotius, and, also like Grotius, acknowledges Carneades as a famous advocate of this 
opposed point of view. He is more sympathetic than Grotius, however, because he 
implicitly acknowledges tha t  this viewpoint can be the fruit not merely of evil motives, 
but of conceptual confusion. For there is  a sense in which utility is not unjustly regarded 
as the foundation of natural law. The whole issue has been confused by the advocates of 
mere expediency, in tha t  they “have imposed upon the less informed by employing the 
ambiguous word ‘u t i l i ty ’, which has a double use, as it is considered from different points 
of view” . The two uses are as follows:
One kind is what appears to be useful to the depraved judgement of disordered 
affections, which centre upon advantages which are for the most part immediate 
and fleeting, and are little concerned with the future. The other kind is judged 
to be useful by sound reason which not only examines what lies before its very 
feet, but also weighs the future consequences. 04
The First kind can be called mere apparent (or short-run) utility, since the appearance of 
utility is rather misleading, the utility gained being an advantage which is outweighed by 
a ttendan t disadvantages which emerge in the longer term. The latter kind, because it is 
“judged to be useful by sound reason” can be called rational (or genuine) utility, and 
since the core of the natural law is composed of such rational utilities (in dictates of sound 
reason which show the necessary advantages or disadvantages of various states of affairs), 
it is possible to say th a t  natural law is based in rational utility. Thus it is not a mere 
accident that:
actions in conformity with the law of nature have ... this characteristic, tha t  not 
only are they reputable, tha t  is, they tend to maintain and increase a m an’s 
standing, reputation, and position, but also they are useful, that is, they procure 
some advantage and reward for a man, and contribute to his happiness .00
So, for Pufendorf, there is at bottom  no conflict between the demands of sociability and 
of a rational utility. When later writers, then, come increasingly to talk of utility - most
5Zibid. 
54ibid. 
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conspicuously, writers such as Locke, Hutcheson and Hume - it is im portant not to jump 
to the conclusion tha t  a new approach has emerged, tha t  the important position occupied 
by considerations of utility indicates the emergence of a new, more calculative rationality 
in human life. Shifts in terminology are not per se shifts in thought: whether or not a 
new picture of human society emerges with the increased prominence of judgem ents of 
utility depends on the notion of utility being employed, and its implications for, 
presuppositions about, the nature of the social life proper (appropriate) to human beings.
W hat is this life? Like Grotius, Pufendorf acknowledges the primacy of individual self- 
preservation, but his conception of the social life proper to human beings is less 
individualistic than  that of his predecessor. Concerning the former, Pufendorf is at one 
with both Grotius and the Stoic tradition in holding tha t  nothing is more natural than 
the desire of self-preservation. He puts the m atter  as follows:
man has this in common with all beings which are conscious of their own
existence, tha t  he has the greatest love for himself, tries to protect himself by
every possible means, and tries to secure what he thinks will benefit him, and to 
avoid what may in his opinion injure him.5^
Although he does not accept Grotius’s defence of the a posteriori method as a legitimate
r **
means of establishing natural law,0 ' Pufendorf does not hesitate to marshall support from 
the best of ancient authorities on this point. He refers to Cicero, Marcus Aurelius, Seneca, 
and yet others in support of the naturalness of the desire of self-preservation. Of course, 
no appeal to ancient authorities is necessary to show the instinctiveness  of the desire of 
self-preservation, but neither is the discovery of such an instinct of crucial value in 
settling whether or not this desire is natural in the requisite sense - that is, whether or not
it is vindicated by the judgem ent of sound reason. Pufendorf is aware of this, and offers
three arguments for the primacy of self-preservation.
The first could easily be misunderstood. At first blush it looks like nothing more than a 
reiteration of the original assertion. The passage in question runs as follows:
It should be observed ... that in investigating the condition of man we have
56D JXG , II.iii.14.
57 DJNG , II.iii.7: After quoting Cicero and Aristotle in support of the a posteriori view - which 
holds that agreement can provide the key to the nature of natural law - he objects that this view 
“does not show at all why the law of nature was so constituted” , and it is “also in very truth a 
slippery statement, involving numberless obscurities” . The situation is not helped by limiting the 
measure of agreement to the best of men (as does Grotius), because there will be no basis for 
agreeing who are these best of men: “For what people, endowed with enough judgement to preserve 
its existence, will be willing to acknowledge that it is barbarous?”
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assigned the first place to self-love, not because one should under all 
circumstances prefer only himself before all others or measure everything by his 
own advantage, distinguishing this from the interests of others, and setting it 
forth as his highest goal, but because man is so framed that  he thinks of his own 
advantage before the welfare of others for the reason tha t  it is his nature to 
think of his own life before the life of others.5^
It might seem tha t  Pufendorf is here saying tha t  self-love comes first because, well, it just 
does. But to say this would be hopelessly to confuse right and fact,6  ^ so it is worth asking 
whether a more charitable interpretation is possible. I think it is. Behind this passage I 
suggest we should see the Stoic maxim to live “according to nature” , a maxim which 
means not simply to do what we like, but to understand properly the nature of ourselves 
and our environment, so that our choices do not a ttem pt the impossible by denying what 
we are, and thereby do violence to ourselves. (Grotius, it should be remembered, appeals 
to this principle when he says that acts contrary to natural law cause violence to 
ourselves.66) Natural law is the law of action for a being with a determinate nature, and 
as such must be a ttuned to this nature. It is not a law which regards the actions of some 
sort of “purely rational” being .61 On this interpretation, Pufendorfs point is, then, that 
self-love must be accorded a central place in any workable ethical theory regarding human 
beings, or indeed beings like us. For this reason it is central to natural law.
Pufendorfs  second reason in support of the primacy of self-love is more readily 
understood. It is tha t  recognizing the primacy of self-love reflects the undeniable good of 
being a responsible being, tha t  is, of accepting responsibility for oneself:
it is no one’s business so much as my own to look out for myself. For although
S8D JN G , Il.iii. 14.
66Cf.' Rousseau’s strictures on Grotius for allegedly deriving right from fact, as discussed in 
chapter one.
60L>J£P,Prol., 39.
'''Natural law theories are thus, in an important philosophical sense, “pre-modern” moral 
theories in that they are wedded to a particular moral psychology, in contrast to the 
characteristically modern (post-Kantian) conception of moral agents as “noumenal choosers”. On 
this issue see in particular the writings of Alasdair MacIntyre, especially “How Moral Agents 
Became Ghosts, or how the history of ethics diverged from that of the philosophy of mind”, 
Synthese 53 (1982), pp. 295-312. See also, for a characteristic remark, his essay “Hume on Is and 
Ought”, reprinted in Against the Self-Images of the Age, New York: Schocken Books (1971), p. 
124, where he says: “the virtue of Hume’s ethics, like that of Aristotle and unlike that of Kant, is 
that it seeks to preserve morality as something psychologically intelligible”. Whether or not 
MacIntyre’s account is fair, it allows us to stress that this also is something Pufendorf seeks (or, 
perhaps, takes for granted). It is also worth noting that the binding role played by moral 
psychology in theories such as Pufendorfs is neglected by many commentators.
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we hold before ourselves as our goal the common good, still, since I am also a 
part  of society for the preservation of which some care is due, surely there is no 
one on whom the clear and special care of myself can more fittingly fall than 
upon my own self.62
If we are to accept responsibility for ourselves, of course, one of the central tasks of social 
organization will be to make it possible for us to act so as to preserve ourselves and our 
vital interests. And this in turn requires that we have a clear understanding of what 
constitutes ourselves and our vital interests. That is, there must be a notion of what is 
‘‘one’s own” : of the suum  and of its legitimate (necessary or rationally useful) extensions. 
We shall return to this m atter  below: at this stage it is sufficient to note that Pufendorfs 
commitment to the primacy of self-love shows tha t  his notion of human sociableness is 
(negatively) like Grotius’s in tha t  it is not a notion of absorption into a social whole. 
Human sociability requires, in fact, th a t  we recognize and respect our separateness as 
individuals. (It is important to point out, however, tha t  it requires us to recognize more 
than this alone. Unlike some modern theories, it does not mean tha t  “There are only 
individual people, different individual people, with their own individual lives” .
This fact can serve to introduce Pufendorfs third reason for accepting the primacy of 
self-love: far from being in conflict with sociability, the primacy of self-love shows
sociability to be necessary. It does so in this way: self-love is vital because of the very 
fragility of human existence, and this fragility itself makes social life necessary. As Hume 
would later put it, “society becomes advantageous” because of the “additional force , 
ability , and security” 64 it provides for individuals. Pufendorf puts it this way:
It is quite clear tha t  man is an animal extremely desirous of his own 
preservation, in himself exposed to want, unable to exist without the help of his 
fellow creatures, fitted in a remarkable way to contribute to the common good, 
and yet at all times malicious, petulant, and easily irritated, as well as quick and 
powerful to do injury. For such an animal to live and enjoy the good things that 
in this world a ttend  his condition, it is necessary tha t  he be sociable, that is, be 
willing to join himself with others like him, and conduct himself towards them in 
such a way tha t ,  far from having any cause to do him harm, they may feel that 
there is reason to preserve and increase his good fortune .65
Q2D J N C , II.iii.14.
60As Robert Nozick puts it. See Anarchy, State, and Utopia, New York: Basic Books (1974), 
P-33.)
64Hume, Treatise, p.485. 
65D JN G , Il.iii. 15.
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Pufendorfs  account of sociability is thus distinctively less individualistic than Grotius’s. 
He does not, unlike Grotius, restrict sociability to respect for “the rights of another” , to 
the safeguarding for each individual of “the possession of what belongs to him.”^  
Rather, he insists that
by a sociable a tt i tude  we mean an a ttitude  of each man towards every other 
man, by which each is understood to be bound to the other by kindness, peace, 
and love, and therefore by a mutual obligation.
This stronger account of sociability probably reflects Pufendorfs desire to debar 
Hobbesian conclusions. He argues against the “Hobbesian” position tha t  “nature has 
ordained discord and not society between men” . In outline, his strategy is to argue that 
the “natura l s ta te  of men” is not a state  of war, since the desire for self-preservation 
implies a limit on natural liberty.®^ He denies tha t  “men have both the ability and the 
desire to harm one another .” ^0 But how does the desire for self-preservation imply a limit 
on natural liberty? It does not do so alone, but in conjunction with the further fact that 
“a s tate  of nature and its rule presupposes a reason in m an” ; 1 and reason, having in the 
state  of nature “a common ... an abiding, and uniform standard  of judgem ent” is able to 
show men “the nature of things, which offers a free and distinct service in pointing out 
general rules for living, and the law of na tu re” , especially “th a t  peace to which his reason 
urges him.” '* Therefore the “Hobbesian” account of the state  of nature is inadequate, 
because it is not the account of a s ta te  natural to a rational being: it “was not worthy of 
man or true to his life, being more suitable to the life of beasts, to the nature of which
66DJBP,  I.II.i.5.
Q7D JN G , II.iii.15.
DJNG,  II.iii.16. This is a quotation from a contemporary Hobbes critic, and represents a view 
which Pufendorf takes to be a distortion of Hobbes’s views as expressed in De Cive , i.2. Pufendorf 
wants to debar the view attributed to Hobbes; whether or not it is an accurate interpretation of 
Hobbes is another matter.
Q9DJNG,  II.ii.3.
70D J N G , II.ii.6.
71DJNG,  II.ii.3.
72 DJNG,  II.ii.9.
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both reason and speech are foreign.*’ ' '5
In order to show what sociability does require, Pufendorf formulates his own version of 
the “fundamental law of na ture” :
it will be a fundamental law of nature, that ‘Everyman, so far as in him lies, 
should cultivate and preserve toward others a sociable attitude, which is peaceful 
and agreeable at all times to the nature and end of the human race.5' 4
The requirement of this fundamental law can be determined by considering two matters: 
Pufendorfs remarks on the general duties of humanity, and his discussion of Cicero on the 
nature of sociability. The general duties of humanity are those duties which are the 
expression of the sociable attitude. They are summarised by the stipulation tha t  “a man 
should advance the interests of another m an” . Pufendorf spells this out as follows:
A man has not paid his debt to the sociable a tt i tude  if he has not th rust me from 
him by some deed of malevolence or ingratitude, but some benefit should be done 
me, so tha t  I may be glad th a t  there are also others of my nature to dwell on 
this ea rth .77>
It is not sufficient, therefore, if we live peacefully in the privative sense of not injuring 
others, but otherwise looking out for ourselves. For Pufendorf the general duty of 
humanity requires an actively helpful policy to others. He maintains this strong position 
in his short textbook, where he says th a t  the duties of human beings require “tha t  any 
man promote the advantage of another, so far as he conveniently can” .
Pufendorfs  strong view on the requirements of sociability is echoed by later 
philosophers. Locke, often considered a philosopher of a strongly individualist stamp, 
advocates a version of it in the Second Treatise , where he says the following:
Every one as he is bound to preserve h im se l/ ,  and not to quit his station 
wilfully; so by the like reason when his own Preservation comes not in 
competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest o f  M a n k in d .1 ‘
This is a most significant passage, since it shows tha t ,  for Locke as for Pufendorf, the
7ZDJNG.  II.ii.4. 
7 iDJNG , Il.iii. 15. 
75DJNG,  III.iii.1.
‘®De Offic io , I.viii.l. 
77Locke, Two Treatises. II.6.
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requirements of sociability and of self-preservation are intimately linked. (The account of 
Locke as a “possessive individualist"’ overlooks this f a c t . '* 8) Hutcheson's views, as we shall 
see below, include an even stronger notion of sociability, in tha t  the general good is not 
merely on an equal footing with the good of individuals, but occupies a pre-eminent 
position. His basic specification of the general duties of humanity is, however, directly 
comparable to PufendorPs: since “we are formed by nature for the service of each other, 
and not each one merely for himself” , therefore “mankind, as a system, seems to have 
rights upon each individual, to demand of him such conduct as is necessary for the general 
good.”79
Pufendorf is able to find support for his position in a passage from Seneca:
We are members of a great body. Nature has made us all akin; we are formed of 
the same elements and produced to the same ends. She has implanted in our 
breasts mutual affection, and made us apt for social intercourse. She has
O A
constituted justice and equity.
The nature of our social interdependence is brought out by Seneca with an architectural 
metaphor. He says this:
Let us consider tha t  we are born for the common good. Our human society is 
altogether like a vaulted stone roof, which would fall were it not held up by the 
natural thrust of stone against stone.81
This metaphor has a famous subsequent employment. In order to catch the same feature, 
the interdependence of acts of justice, Hume also uses the metaphor of the vault in the
Q O
2nd Enquiry. The popularity of the metaphor should not be surprising. It neatly 
captures the basic fact of human interdependence on which the general duty of sociability 
is based. The metaphor neatly captures PufendorPs insistence tha t  this duty is more than 
simply leaving each other alone, but requires tha t  we contribute to the common good, so
"  Q
‘ i here is a great deal of literature on this topic, spawned by C B Macpherson’s The Political
Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke, Oxford: O.U.P. (1972). This is not the place
to document this controversy; the main strands have been summarised in David Miller, “The
Macpherson version”, Political Studies , vol. 30 (1982), pp. 120-127.
‘^Francis Hutcheson, A System of Moral Philosophy (1755), in Collected Works, vol. VI., p.
105.
8^Seneca, Epistles , xcv; quoted D J N G , III.iii.1.
S1ibid.
82Hume, Enquiries , p. 305.
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th a t  each of us “may be glad that there are also others of our nature to dwell on this 
ea rth” .
PufendorFs observations on some Ciceronian remarks on sociableness help to clarify his 
position; but they also. I suggest, indicate a possible missed opportunity. The passages in 
question are concerned with a feature of human nature which for Cicero is a powerful 
indicator of human sociableness, but which Pufendorf regards as “less im portan t” , as
Q O
“only among the secondary reasons of sociableness” . Pufendorf accepts “the fact that 
nothing is sadder for man than continued solitude” , but he does not accept Cicero’s 
employment of this fact as evidence for human sociability. Cicero puts this view in a 
number of places. In De Finibus he observes tha t  “no one would like to pass his life in 
solitude, not even if surrounded with an infinite abundance of pleasures.” The view is 
repeated, more elaborately, in De Of f i c i i s .  He notes there tha t  even “every man of 
excellent genius” , committed to the pursuit of “knowledge and learning” ,
would fly from solitude and look for a companion in his pursuits; and would 
desire sometimes to teach and sometimes to learn, sometimes to listen and
o r
sometimes to speak.
From our rejection of the solitary life, he concludes, “it is easily perceived tha t  we are 
born for communion and fellowship with man, and for natural association.” For 
Pufendorf, however, this line of thought is not particularly satisfactory because human 
sociableness is an a tt i tu tde  towards others of a more purely practical kind: we called man 
a sociable creature because men are so constituted as to render mutual help more than 
any other creature” ;5 ' the sociable a tt i tude  engenders “a mutual obligation” . 
Sociableness is thus not significantly connected to the pleasure we gain from company, nor 
the pain of its extended absence. Pufendorfs  view here is plausible enough, but it is 
nevertheless, I think, a missed opportunity. We saw above that the rational necessity of 
self-preservation was not grounded independently of the instinctive tendency to the same
83
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DJNG , II.iii.15.
Cicero, De Fxnibus. III.xx; quoted ibid. 
Cicero, De Officiis , I.xliv; quoted ibid. 
De Finibus, op. cit.; quoted ibid.
DJNG , Il.iii. 16.
DJNG , Il.iii. 15.
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end. The mutual obligation of sociability could have been treated in like manner, by 
arguing that our natural pleasure in company, and pain at its extended absence, was a 
crucial aspect of our natural sociability by comprising a powerful natural motive^9 to that 
end; a motive which at least helps to explain why “men are so constituted as to render 
mutual help more than any other creature.” One way of developing such an account of the 
motivation to sociability would be by a psychology of action which accorded a central 
place to mechanisms of sympathy  in human behaviour. This is, of course, the general 
approach taken by Hume and Smith; an approach which can thus be seen to be readily 
developed from the stronger view of sociability Pufendorf advances.
We are now in a position to consider how this account of sociability affects Pufendorf s 
view of the individual, and of the relation between the individual and society. This can be 
dealt with rather briefly, because one im portant element in this view will be considered in 
more detail below. We have already seen that, despite his stronger views on sociability, 
Pufendorf nonetheless insists on the primacy of self-love, in particular its practical aspect 
of self-preservation. In doing so he is following not merely Grotius, but a major strand of 
natural law thinking that stretches back to Aristotle and the Stoics. He has three reasons 
for insisting on this primacy: firstly, it is so central to instinctive human nature that no 
ethical theory can deny it and remain workable; secondly, it reflects the moral good of 
responsible independence; and thirdly, self-love does not conflict with sociability, but 
depends on the very foundation that shows sociability to be necessary. This foundation is 
the fragility of human existence.90 The primacy of self-love is thus an ethical principle of 
great importance, and is expressed in the notion of an inviolable realm which surrounds 
the individual and whatever is (or becomes) necessary for its continued existence. This 
realm is the realm of “one’s own” , the suum.
89By “motive” I mean a motivating force. The relationship between motivations and obligations 
is a central part of the “Newtonian” theory of moral action begun by Locke, and further developed 
by Hume.
90Pufendorf occasionally waxes quite lyrical about this fragility. He says, for example, “if you 
conceive a man who even in adult age is left alone in this world, and without any of the comforts 
and supports with which the ingenuity of men has made life more civilized and less hard, you will 
see an animal, naked, dumb, needy, driving away his hunger as best he can by roots and herbs, his 
thirst by any water he chances upon, the severity of the weather by caves, an animal exposed to the 
wild beasts, and alarmed when he meets any of them”. The “natural state” is to be distinguished 
from community life in that “in the one there is the rule of passion, war, fear, poverty, ugliness, 
solitude, barbarism, ignorance, savagery; in the other the rule of reason, peace, security, riches, 
beauty, society, refinement, knowledge, good will” (De Officio, II.i.9). In these more colourful 
passages, Pufendorf seems to have forgotten that, against Hobbes, he urges that “the natural state 
of men ... is not one of war, but of peace”, even if “this natural peace is but a weak and 
untrustworthy thing, and therefore ... a poor custodian of man’s safety”, since even in the natural 
state reason can determine general laws for living, pre-eminent among which is “that peace to 
which his reason urges him” (DJNG , II.ii.9,12).
Pufendorf does not provide a concise account of the nature and limits of “one’s own” , 
but we can see that his position is very similar to Grotius’s. Thus he holds th a t  not only 
do we naturally seek our own preservation, but we are legitimately entitled to resist 
threats  to it, even when these spring from the actions of other persons (who are likewise 
justified in preserving themselves). Thus self-defence, even violent self-defence, is lawful, 
provided of course that the situation is one where “we cannot in any other way preserve 
our safety because of the aggression of a n o t h e r . W h e r e  other courses are open, of 
course, injury cannot be inflicted. In contrast to Grotius, he allows no right to punish in 
the natural state, but this is because “human punishment, in the proper sense of the word 
... cannot fall upon those in natural liberty” . This follows from his view th a t  law requires 
the will of a superior: punishment requires legal sovereignty, but legal sovereignty does
not exist in the natural state. Therefore, despite the absence of punishment in the natural 
state , violent retaliation against an injuring party is perfectly justified:
in such cases we cannot only proceed to seize the o ther’s arms, raze or occupy his 
fortified places, keep him in perpetual bonds, and the like, but even put him to 
death, if we are satisfied that his freedom will only mean another th rea t against
Q9
our existence, and tha t  we can find no better way to avoid him.
This procedure obviously achieves whatever punishment by a legitimate superior achieves; 
in the natural state this procedure is w a r . °  Pufendorfs denial of natural punishment is 
thus not a denial of the legitimacy of violent exaction of penalties or reparations, but a 
consequence of his theory of law. In both these cases - self-defence and exaction of 
penalties - the moral importance of the suum  is shown by the fact that force is justified in 
preserving what is one's own.
The necessity of extending one’s own to include things necessary for one’s preservation 
means th a t  such extensions are also necessarily legitimate, so, in the natural state, even 
though there is no property, there is nevertheless “indefinite” or “potentia l” property. 
This is a “right ... to things” which “has the same effect as dominion now has, that, 
namely, of using things at one’s own pleasure” . ^  In another place he puts the same 
point:
9 l DJN G , II.v.l. 
92DJNG,  VIII.iii.2.
9Zibid.
94 DJNG , IV.iv.3.
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when at the creation all things were in common, man had the right to apply to 
his own ends those things which were freely offered for the use of all .95
These remarks on the original power to use things "at the creation7’ are most important: 
they show some of the powers contained within the suum.  So, if we are to come to an 
accurate understanding of Pufendorf s conception of the suum  (and of its relation to such 
other im portant concepts as rights, duties, and sociability), it is necessary to consider 
these quoted passages rather carefully, and to clarify them in the light of other poassages 
from De Jure Naturae et Gent ium.
In the first place, Pufendorf describes the legitimacy of using things as a right. This is 
best understood as a simplification on his part. This is because the notion of a right is a 
legal notion: he describes “right” as meaning either law, including “a body or system of 
homogeneous laws” , or (subjectively) as
the moral quality by which we legally either command persons, or possess things, 
or by virtue of which something is owed us ... Right ... directly and clearly 
indicates tha t  a thing has been lawfully acquired and is lawfully now retained .96
Being a m atter  of lawfulness, right, like law itself, requires the will of a superior. The 
natural state, however, being a state  of natural liberty, is a state without superiors. How 
then can there be rights in this state? Pufendorfs answer mirrors his treatm ent of 
property itself. Just as the original property in things in the natural s ta te  is only 
“potentia l” property, so the original right to use things in that state  is no more than a 
“potentia l” or “indefinite” right:
God allowed man to turn the earth, its products, and its creatures, to his own
Q7use and convenience, tha t  is, he gave men an indef ini te  right to them.
An “indefinite” right becomes a right in the fullest sense only through mutual consent or 
agreement:
assuming an original equal faculty of men over things, it is impossible to 
conceive how the mere corporal act of one person can prejudice the faculty of
95DJNG,  I.i. 16.
96DJNG,  I.i.20.
97 DJNG,  IV.iv.4 (emphasis added). Cf. III.v.3: “A right to all things, precious to every human 
deed, must be understood not exclusively, but only indefinitely, that is, not that one man may 
claim everything for himself to the exclusion of the rest of mankind, but that nature does not define 
what particular things belong to one man. and what to another before they agree among themselves 
on their division and allocation” .
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others, unless their consent is given, tha t  is, unless a! pact intervenes.^8
A pact is necessary because, without it, human actions do not have a moral effect, that 
is, they do not create obligations on the part of others .99 Obligations bind the will, and, 
where there is no superior, the will can be bound only by consenting  to be, because 
consent is a form of voluntary  submission of the w ill.*^ Therefore rights, including 
rights to use things, arise through agreements wherever there is no established sovereign, 
or where the sovereign’s edicts do not extend. Pufendorf is at pains to point out, 
however, tha t  agreements need not be express agreements: for example, property, like 
other rights, '‘presupposes absolutely an act of man and an agreement, whether tacit or 
express.” ^  (In tacit agreements, consent is “inferred” : it “is not shown by the signs 
which men regularly make use of in their transactions, but ... is clearly to be gathered 
from the nature of the business and other circumstances.” An example of this is the case 
of a foreigner entering a country friendly to foreign visitors. The foreigner, provided he 
understands what the laws of the country are, by entering thereby shows “his willingness 
to conduct himself by the laws of tha t  st at e. ” The position of human beings in the 
natural s tate , with respect to the created order, can, therefore, be summed up as follows:
man has by nature a faculty to take for his use all inanimate objects and 
animals. But tha t  faculty, thus exactly defined, cannot properly be called a 
right, both because such things are under no obligation to present themselves for 
m an ’s use, and because, by virtue of the natural equality of all men, one man 
cannot rightfully exclude the rest from such things, unless their consent, 
expressed or presumed, has let him have them  as his very own. Only when this 
has been done, can he say tha t  he has a proper right to the thing. °
98 DJNG, IV.iv.5.
^S ee  D JN G , III.v.3: “not every natural faculty to do something is properly a right, but only 
that which concerns some moral effect, in the case of those who have the same nature as I. Thus ... 
when a man takes inanimate objects or animals for his use, he exercises only a purely natural 
faculty, if it is considered simply with regard to the objects and animals which he uses, without 
respect to other men. But this faculty takes on the nature of a real right, at the moment when this 
moral effect is produced in the rest of mankind, that other men may not hinder him, or compete 
with him, against his will, in using such objects or animals”.
^*^See Karl Olivecrona, Law as Fact, London: Stevens, 2nd edition (1971), p. 12; and DJNG 
I.vi.12, III.v.3.
i 0 l DJNG, IV.iv.4.
l02DJNG, III.vii.2.
103D JN G , III.v.3.
The original s u u m , then, includes no rights. It includes a natural faculty or power to 
take and use things, especially those things needed for preservation, but rights proper 
arise only through agreements between human beings. Pufendorf draws some important 
conclusions from this doctrine. Firstly, Hobbes is shown to be mistaken in holding that 
there is an original right to all th ings.104 Secondly, because rights arise as a result of 
agreements, and such agreements typically bind the other party to corresponding 
obligations, rights and duties are commonly (but not necessarily) correlative. The 
existence of an obligation entails the existence of another’s right, but, although the 
existence of a right typically corresponds to another’s obligation, this is not always the 
case.10  ^ From a modern perspective, it is also worth noting tha t  on this account rights 
function only weakly as a limit on, or bar to, specific kinds of social organization. 
Pufendorfs  position is sharply different from modern libertarians like Nozick10®, and also 
different, though much less sharply so, from Locke. This latter difference will show up 
most clearly in the case of slavery.
On the question of rights, some m atters  need pointing out. The first is that ,  despite 
being themselves a social creation, Pufendorfs rights are nevertheless natural rights in an 
im portan t  sense. (The different senses of “natural” will be discussed in the next section.) 
They are natural in just the sense th a t  the law of nature is itself natural: th a t  is, they are 
either necessary to peaceful social existence, or possess a rational utility to that end. 
Their generation through agreements is no bar to such naturalness, for not only does the 
law of nature approve of all agreements “which have been introduced about things by 
men, provided they involve no contradiction or do not overturn society” , it in fact 
requires agreements (tacit or express). With respect to the role of agreements in the 
development of property, for example, Pufendorf says that:
natural law clearly advised tha t  men should by convention introduce the
assignment of such things to individuals, according as it might be of advantage
104See DJNG , III.v.2-3, where Pufendorf discusses Hobbes’s views in De Cive.
105D JN G , III.v. 1: “when an obligation arises for one person, there springs up in another its 
corresponding right ... Although the opposite of the case does not always hold: that is, when one 
man has a right, there is at once an obligation in another; for instance, sovereigns have a right to 
exact punishment, but the criminal is under no obligation to undergo it” . He goes on to say that 
correlativity can be achieved if we understand “right” in a certain way; he does not, however, argue 
that we need, or should prefer, to so understand the term.
DNozick opens Anarchy, State, and Utopia with a strong statement of the natural rights of 
individuals, and then goes on to pose the question whether these rights preclude the possibility of a 
just political authority. See p.ix: “How much room do individual rights leave for the state?”
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to human society.10'
The right to property is natural, then, because it arises necessarily in human social life. 
The great advantages it provides in the peaceful management of tha t  life make its 
introduction - tha t  is, the agreement to introduce it - unavoidable.
By showing the naturalness of the right of property, however, Pufendorf does not mean 
either to justify unlimited private property, or to deny the rectitude of common 
possessions. He clearly believes tha t  some things must become “proper” to individuals, a 
view which reflects his insistence tha t  self-preservation is indeed rightly understood as 
se//-preservation. Beyond this, however, he requires only that distinctions of possessions 
in particular societies must be clearly settled. The precise nature and extent of property 
rights is settled differently in different societies:
it was left to men themselves, to determine by the forethought of sane reason 
what measures must be taken to prevent discord from arising among mankind 
from the use of tha t  right ... the manner, intensity, and extent of this power 
over things] were left to the judgement and disposition of men; whether, in 
other words, they would confine it within certain limits, or within none at all, 
and whether they wanted every man to have a right to everything, o r  only to a 
certain and fixed part of things, or to be assigned his definite portion with which 
he should rest content and claim no right to anything else. 108
Recognizing a natural right to property, or, in like manner, any other right which is 
natural in this sense, does not prescribe a particular form of society or polity. It does 
prescribe some necessary conditions, but these are rather weak. Slavery is a case in point. 
Pufendorfs  doctrine of natural right does not remove the possibility of slavery - it only 
places limitations on how slavery can legitimately arise, and the am ount of power 
legitimately exercised over a slave. The former of these limitations presupposes that there 
are no “slaves by na tu re” , as the Greeks had held, because slavery arises only through 
“the intervention of some act of men” .100 In this sense, slavery is not a natural but an 
adven titious  s ta te .110 The view “handed down from the Greeks” , tha t  there are “slaves
i r r' DJNG,  IV.iv.4. (In discussing this passage I have spoken of “agreements” rather 
“conventions” - as does the translation - in order to avoid begging any questions about Pufendorfs 
relation to Hume’s notion of convention.)
108ibid.
109DJNG,  VI.iii.2.
110See DJNG , I.i.7: “That is an adventitious state which comes to men ... by virtue of some 
human deed”.
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by nature’’ , is unacceptable because, “if taken in so crude a form, it] is directly at odds 
with the natural equality of men” 111; and such equality is a precept of na tu ra l  law . 112 
Rather, slavery originates in consent, later being extended - justly or otherwise - through 
war. ° Pufendorf does not provide any historical support for this account of the origin of 
slavery, so perhaps he is considering only the origin of legi timate  slavery, which, because 
it is the creation of a right over another person, must  have originated in an act of will. 1*4
The second limitation, the power legitimately exercised over a slave, depends on 
Pufendorf”s view (presumably based on the doctrine of the natural equality of human 
beings) tha t  the slave is not to be regarded as akin to a material object. Rather, the right 
to rule over slaves needs to be understood as akin to the rights of sovereigns over their 
subjects. Therefore “it cannot properly be said tha t  the men themselves are alienated, but 
only the right to rule over them ” . It is not a precept of the law of nature, but because 
“the brutality  of many nations has gone to such lengths” , that typically slaves “are 
numbered among ... material possessions, and are treated not as subjects for their 
m aste r’s sovereignty, but as objects for his violence.” 115 In the same spirit Pufendorf 
denies the common doctrine that the slave, because his or her rights have been alienated, 
can be done no injury . 116 In these ways, then, Pufendorf spells out the legitimate 
boundaries of the institution of slavery; tha t  is, the extent to which it does not conflict 
with the law of nature. In identifying such limitations, he differs significantly from 
Grotius, who. despite regarding slavery as a base condition, nonetheless failed to provide 
any account of the “natural limits” of slavery. In contrast to Locke, however, he does not
1U DJNG,  III.ii.8.
112DJNG , III.ii.1.
1 1 9
° DJNG,  VI.iii.5-6. Pufendorfs reasoning in VI.iii.5, which concludes “Therefore, the origin of 
slavery was due to willing consent and not to war” , is extremely difficult to follow. Most of VI.iii.5 
appears rather to be evidence for the contrary view.
114This question, of the legitimacy of slavery, will be considered in section V below.
U 5DJNG,  VI.iii.7.
116DJNG,  VI.iii.8.
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hold tha t  slavery is incompatible with the natural liberty or equality of human beings.11" 
The important question of whether consent to slavery is ever necessary - agreement, it 
must be remembered, presupposes the use of reason* 1*® - will be considered in section V, 
when we consider the impact of the right of necessity.
For Pufendorf, rights are best understood as a secondary  phenomenon. Unlike many 
modern theories which accord rights a pre-eminent position by treating duties as 
phenomena generated by rights, for Pufendorf rights are generated by agreements because 
such agreements are necessary for society, and thus reflect the fundamental duties of 
sociableness. It is therefore important to ask, how do such duties arise? In order to 
answer this question, it is first necessary to remember that, being a fundamental part of 
the law of nature, duties have both a formal and a material element. Pufendorfs short 
definition of a duty in De O f f i c io  reflects this requirement:
duty is here defined by me as m an’s action, duly conformed to the ordinances of
the law, and in virtue of obligation.11^
In being conformed to “the ordinances of the law” , duty is conformed to the will of a 
superior, so this part of the definition shows us the formal element from which duty is 
generated. The material element must therefore be sought in the obligation, which is 
distinct from the duty itself. (For Pufendorf, the difference appears to be tha t  our duty is 
what we must do, whereas obligation is what binds the will, i.e. what compels us to do 
our duty.) The m atter  is complicated further by the fact tha t  Pufendorf divides 
obligations into ^intrinsic” and ■‘extrinsic” . Extrinsic obligation is, however, the formal 
element of obligation, the external law, so for the material element we need to fill out our 
understanding of duty we must examine the nature  of intrinsic obligation. This, the 
material element of obligation, is tha t  part of obligation which affects the conscience. It
i o n
can even be described as a natural feeling of obligation.
^"Locke does, of course, allow household servants - presumably these are not lifelong servants, 
but wage-labourers. If not, his position would not differ markedly from Pufendorf’s. The form of 
slavery Locke has in mind, however, is not a slavery kept within specific limits, but the more 
thoroughgoing form of subjection he sees to be implicit in Filmer’s defence of absolutism and denial 
of natural liberty in Patriarcha.
U S DJNC,  III.vi.3.
De Off icio , I.i.l. (Translation slightly amended.)
1 9f)1-uThe Humean overtones here are deliberate. As chapter V will argue, Hume is greatly 
concerned with intrinsic obligation and motivation (although he does not use the term itself).
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W hat is the source of such feelings? Pufendorf provides the answer in his account of 
sociability: “we called man a sociable creature because men are so constituted as to 
render mutual help more than any other creature.“ In the same vein he approvingly 
quotes Seneca: Nature “has implanted in our breasts mutual affection, and made us apt
i o n
for social intercourse. This constitution, our natural mutual affection, is the source of 
the feeling we seek; hence Pufendorf is able to conclude tha t  social life engenders “a 
mutual obligation.” ° The point is tha t  we are so constituted that we seek to assist, and 
be assisted by, other human beings, even in aiming only at our own preservation. This 
mutual help produces the recognition of mutual dependence, and therefore the recognition, 
in specific circumstances, tha t  particular actions are required for the maintenance of a 
rational social order or harmony. This recognition, the experience of conscience, is the 
material element of obligation and also of duty, making duty more than  the mere 
following of a rule.
Duties arise, then, through the natural m utuality of human life, sanctioned by law. The 
fundamental role of duties in Pufendorfs scheme - most visibly perceived in the structure 
of De O f f i c i o , which is divided up according to the various duties of hum an beings - 
reflects his stronger account of sociability. Duties are fundamental not merely because 
human beings live in groups, and need to do so, but because they have a social nature 
which ordains mutual intercourse.
The mutuality of social life is not, however, all of a piece. Although the sociable 
a tt i tude  is a general duty of humanity, the requirements of sociability fall into two 
distinct groups. This division reflects an im portant distinction in social life:
if a man does me no good turn, and does not join with me even in the ordinary 
duties, I can still live in all tranquillity with him, provided he hurts me in no 
way. Nay, we desire nothing more than this from most of mankind, mutual 
assistance being rendered only within a limited circle. But how can I live at 
peace with him who does me injury ... ?424
Those general duties of humanity which are necessary for social peace are obviously vital, 
whereas those which enrich social life but are not absolutely necessary for social harmony
121DJNG , II.iii.16. 
i22DJNG,  III.iii.1. 
l2ZDJNG,  II.iii.15 
124DJNG,  III.i.1.
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are less important. Failure to perform some duties threatens social life itself, while failure 
to perform others impoverishes society but does not threaten it. The difference here can be 
put in terms of the necessity of protecting the suum.  Because the suum  must be protected 
for there to be social life at all, those duties which are concerned with protecting the 
s u u m  are enforceable, i.e. they are appropriately enforced. Thus the appropriateness of 
enforcement can be used to distinguish between the two kinds of' obligation: those 
requirements of sociability which reflect the primary necessity of protecting the suum  
differ from those which do not, in th a t  the former can be legitimately enforced whereas 
the latter  cannot. Pufendorf calls these requirements, respectively, perfect and imperfect 
obligations:
a thing may be owed us in two ways, either by a perfect, or by an imperfect 
obligation, to which a perfect and an imperfect right correspond respectively, 
differing in that] damage which another is bound to restore can be done us only 
in things owed us under the First category, but not in things owed us under the 
second c a t e g o r y .^
It is noteworthy tha t  Pufendorf also speaks here of perfect and imperfect rights. The 
distinction, and the terminology, is obviously adapted from Grotius, who, as we have 
seen, distinguishes perfect moral qualities (rights) from imperfect moral qualities 
(aptitudes). Grotius does not, however, speak of ‘■‘imperfect rights” ; tha t  Pufendorf is 
prepared to speak this way shows his willingness to broaden the notion of a right, by 
detaching it from its legal foundation. This is a tendency reflected also in Locke and, 
especially, Hutcheson.) Neither does Grotius speak of obligations as perfect or imperfect. 
Pufendorfs  distinction here can be seen to lead to modern distinctions between law and 
morals; between what we can be compelled to do by others, on the one hand, and, on the 
other, what our own humanity should compel us to do, without external enforcement.
Pu tting  the distinction this way is revealing, because it indicates that perfect obligations 
differ from imperfect in that ,  while the former have both an extrinsic and an intrinsic 
component (both a formal and a material element), the latter have only the intrinsic 
element. Imperfect obligation arises only within  the agent, unaccompanied by any 
external power to compel action. As Pufendorf puts it:
these last duties ought to be performed upon a kind of voluntary impulse arising 
from a m an’s good nature, and there is] no faculty to force him to perform 
them .1“®
125DJNG , III.i.3. 
l2Qibid.
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The “voluntary impulse“1 here is the operation of the conscience, which we have already 
seen to be the source of intrinsic obligation. Imperfect obligation is centrally a m atter  of 
conscience, and this is shown by the appearance, in the quotation above, of tha t  most 
distinctive of conscience-affecting words: the word “ought“ . Pufendorf explicitly identifies 
this word as capturing the essential quality of imperfect obligation; its capacity to 
inwardly bind the otherwise free (undirected) will of the human mind:
what the people ought to do is contrasted with what it could do, the word 
‘ought’ being used for tha t  less perfect obligation, whereby we are supposed to
1 9 7undertake the exercise of every virtue.
For Pufendorf, then, the word “ought” pre-eminently expresses the nature of imperfect 
obligation. When we come to deal with Hume and Hutcheson, we shall see tha t  the word 
“ought” , and the notion of obligation, are best understood in the light of this account of 
imperfect obligation, tha t  is, as in tr in sic  obligation. Recognizing this is an im portant aid 
to understanding Hume’s trea tm ent of our obligation to justice.
I ll: K inds of N atural and N on-natural States
Before proceeding further, it is important to clarify some potential sources of confusion. 
Pufendorf makes an im portant distinction between natural and adventitious states. “The 
state  of men,” he says, “is either natural or adventitious," “ where an adventitious state  
is, as we have seen, a state which arises “by virtue of some human deed.” “ This appears 
to raise a problem. It has been argued tha t  some kinds of human actions, because 
necessary for the harmony of society, are properly understood as natural, and so give rise 
to natural states of affairs. But these states of affairs arise by the actions of human 
beings, so they must be classed as adventitious states. The problem is tha t  Pufendorfs 
division of states into either  natural or adventitious, if it is to be taken at face value, 
precludes this possibility. These states, of which property is one, cannot be both natural 
and  adventitious, unless Pufendorf uses “na tu ra l” in more than one way.
This is in fact what he does, and he is well aware of the fact. He distinguishes three 
senses of “natu ra l” : “the natural s ta te  can be considered ... either in relation to God the 
Creator, or in relation to individual men, as regards themselves, or as regards other
127 ibid.
De Off icio . II.i.2.
l29D JN G , I.i.7; cf. De Off ic io , Il.ii.l.
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men." °  As this remark suggests, the second and third senses can be regarded as 
variations on a common theme, so the economical course is to group them  together in 
contrast to the first sense.
Pufendorf describes the first sense thus:
Viewed in the first way, the natural state  of man is tha t  condition in which he 
was placed by the Creator, when He willed tha t  man should be an animal 
superior to all the rest. From this s tate  it follows that man should recognize and 
worship his Author, and marvel at all His works; and also pass his l i f e  in a very 
d i f f eren t  manner f rom  the brutes. Hence this state is contrasted with the life 
and condition of the brutes.
In this sense, what is natural to human beings is what marks them off as creatures of a 
special kind. The idea is of what is properly appropriate to human beings, or human 
societies. In this sense of “na tu ra l” , then, any course of action which is a necessary 
response to the requirements of human sociability will be a natural course of action, and 
will produce natural states of affairs. It has been shown that ,  for Pufendorf as for Grotius, 
the development of property is just such a natural development. Therefore, in this first 
sense, property is indeed natural. It is also clear that, in this first sense, the opposite to a 
natural state is not an adventitious state  (since many such natural states will also be 
adventitious), but an unnatural  (in some senses, a “brutish” ) state. To fail to be natural 
in this sense is to fail to be fully human, or fully appropriate to human life. Alternatively, 
it might be said tha t ,  since the natural s tate  of human beings is a rational s tate , to fail to 
be natural in this sense would be to fail in rationality, and hence to be arbitrary. In this 
sense, then, the opposite of a natural s ta te  is an unnatural or an arbitrary state.
It is the second and third senses of “na tu ra l” which are appropriately contrasted to 
adventitious states of affairs. In the second sense, “natu ra l” is understood in this way:
we can consider the natural state  of man. if we imagine what his condition would 
be, if one were left entirely to himself, without any added support from other 
men, assuming indeed tha t  condition of human nature which is found at present 
.... in this sense the natural state is opposed to a life improved by the industry of 
m en.lu“
Such a state, Pufendorf notes, is one “more wretched than tha t  of any wild 
beast” , because of the weakness and vulnerability of human individuals, without 
the power of collective action. In this sense, property is clearly not natural, since
130£>e Officio , II.i.2.
^°^De Officio , II.i.3 (emphasis added). 
132De Officio. II.i.4.
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it is generated by the appropriative acts of human beings, and is maintained by 
their mutual agreement (even if tacit). In its more sophisticated forms, it 
reflects the variety and extent of “the industry of men” .
In this sense, then, property is not a natural, but an adventitious state. It is not, 
however, an unnatural or an arbitrary state  of affairs.
The same is true of the third sense. In this sense,
we consider the natural state  of man according as men are understood to be 
related to each other, merely from that  common kinship which results from 
similarity of nature, before any agreement or act of man, by which one came to 
be particularly bound to another ... In this sense the natural s tate  is opposed to 
the civil s ta te . lo3
In this sense, the natural s ta te  is the state  of natural liberty, where “all men and 
individual men” are “bound to other men by nothing but the bond of a common 
hum anity” .104 Since property binds, or obligates, by an agreement of human beings, it is 
not merely the bond of a common humanity. Property is, rather, part of a civil state, a 
specifically social institution characteristic of civil society. So, in the third sense as in the 
second, property is not natural but adventitious. And, as also in the second, in this third 
sense it is equally misguided to conclude that ,  because it is not natural, it is therefore 
unnatural or arbitrary. The distinction of possessions is rather a necessary feature of the 
social life of civil societies, being an integral part of “a suitable order [fori m ankind’s 
existence” . 135
Because of the various senses of the word “na tu ra l” , then, property can be regarded as 
either natural or adventitious, depending on the sense of “natura l” being employed. This 
is im portant for understanding Pufendorf, and also for understanding other philosophers 
who employ his distinctions for their own ends. Most notable among these is David Hume. 
In A Treatise o f  H um an  Nature , Hume concludes tha t  justice is not a natural, but an 
arti ficial  virtue. This is because it is among those virtues which “produce pleasure and 
approbation by means of an artifice or contrivance, .which arises from the circumstances 
and necessities of manki nd” . T h e s e  artificial virtues, being the result of artifice and 
contrivance, reflect both the “industry of men” and the agreements (or conventions)
De Off ic io , II.i.5. 
1Z4DJNG , Il.ii.l.
lZ5ibid.
136Hume, Treatise, p. 477.
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which are necessary to the social life. Hume's notion of an artificial virtue is thus tha t  of 
a virtue characteristic of, in Pufendorfs terms, an adventitious state. Hume’s distinction 
between the natural and the artificial is, in outline, the same as Pufendorfs distinction 
between the natural and the adventitious.
This can be supported by showing tha t  Hume, in distinguishing the artificial from the 
natural, is careful to note tha t  this is connected to only one sense of “natura l” , a sense 
which corresponds to Pufendorfs second and third senses. He is careful to point out that 
there is another sense in which justice is indeed natural. For this reason he insists that, 
although artificial, justice is not unna tura l,13' nor is it a rb itra ry . lo8 Justice, he says in 
another place, is artificial as opposed to natural “in the same Sense” as “Sucking is an 
Action natural to Man, and Speech is artificial” . y The other sense is shown when, in 
denying an innate basis to natural law, Pufendorf says tha t  natural law is natural in much 
the way tha t  language is.14(1 Hume agrees th a t  in this  sense, justice, like language, is 
natural:
Justice, in another Sense of the word, is so natural to Man, tha t  no Society of 
Men, and even no individual Member of any Society, was ever entirely devoid of 
all Sense of i t .* 1*1
This is because the sense of justice necessarily arises in the development of human society, 
and
In so sagacious an animal, what necessarily arises from the exertion of his
1 37In his letter to Francis Hutcheson of 17th September, 1739, Hume stresses that he has “never 
called justice unnatural, but only artificial”. His aim in this part of the letter is to resist 
Hutcheson’s teleological notion of “natural” - it is, he says, “founded on final causes”, which are 
“pretty uncertain and unphilosophical”. He illustrates his preferred notion of “natural” with a 
quotation from Horace ('Satiresi, I.iii.98) which stresses the role of utility in distinguishing the 
naturally good, concluding significantly that “Grotius and Pufendorf. to be consistent, must assert 
the same”. See letter no.13 in J.Y.T. Greig (ed.) The Letters of David Hume (2 vols.), Oxford: 
Clarendon Press (1932). The letter is also printed in D.D. Raphael (ed.) British Moralists 
1650-1800, Oxford: Clarendon Press (1969), vol. 2, pp. 109-10.
^°^Treatise, p. 484.
1 9 QXtJ^ David Hume, A Letter from a Gentleman to his friend in Edinburgh, edited by E C 
Mossner and J.V. Price, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press (1967), p.31.
Officio,  I.iii. 12.
141 Hume, Letter, op.cit.
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intellectual faculties may justly be esteemed natural.
This sense of “natural" is clearly Pufendorfs first sense, since the sense in which justice 
is artificial rather than natural is the sense which Pufendorf employs in showing tha t  
property is adventitious rather than natural. Rather then indicating a decisive break 
from the tradition of natural law, then, Hume’s distinctions build on distinctions already 
established by Pufendorf. To underscore the connection, we need only consider Hume’s 
concluding remarks to his first account of the artificiality of justice:
To avoid giving offence, I must here observe, tha t  when I deny justice to be a 
natural virtue, I make use of the word natural , only as oppos’d to arti ficial .  In 
another sense of the word ... no virtue is more natural than justice. Mankind is 
an inventive species; and where an invention is obvious and absolutely necessary, 
it may as properly be said to be natural as any thing that proceeds immediately 
from original principles, without the intervention of thought or reflexion.
He then allows tha t  it is not improper to describe the rules of justice as natural laws, 
provided this expression is understood in a particular way;
T ho ’ the rules of justice be arti ficial .  they are not arbitrary. Nor is the 
expression improper to call them Laws o f  Nature ; if by natural we understand 
what is common to any species, or even if we confine it to mean what is 
inseparable from the species. * 1^0
Pufendorfs account of the senses of “natu ra l” shows such Humean remarks to be fairly 
orthodox, and not implicit criticism of established notions of the naturalness of natural 
law. We can also note in passing that ,  contrary to those interpretations of Hume which 
detect in his writings a scepticism which touches all human thought and practice, his 
discussion of, and distinctions concerning, the varieties of the natural and their opposites 
provides good reason for accepting tha t  he has indeed a genuine desire “to avoid giving 
offence” . There is no need or justification for looking for the sceptic’s irony in such 
passages; they are most happily understood as the reiteration of concepts and distinctions 
already established in the intellectual world. In a later chapter, the nature of Hume’s 
relationship to natural law will be considered more fully. This particular matter can be
i  a <y
'‘Hume, Enquiries, p.307; cf. DJNG, II.ii.2, where Pufendorf ascribes the improvements 
generated in adventitious states to “the sagacity of men”.
1 i O
°Treatise, p. 484. Cf. also the concern in the second Enquiry to play down the whole question 
(almost certainly evidence of Hume’s frustrations over the misinterpretation of the Treatise): “The 
word natural is commonly taken in so many senses and is of so loose a signification, that it seems 
vain to dispute whether justice be natural or not” (Enquiries. p. 307). The preceding discussion 
shows that such remarks are not Hume’s attempt to remove the facade of natural law from a 
basically utilitarian theory, as Macpherson claims. See The Political Theory of Possessive 
Individualism, op.cit., p. 270.
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summed up by observing tha t ,  by distinguishing between several senses of ‘‘natural” , and 
thus allowing that, in different respects, property can be said to be both natural and 
adventitious, Pufendorf establishes a distinction with important subsequent employments. 
We can now turn to consider the character of the circumstances and actions which 
conspire to generate complex property relations from more simple antecedents.
IV : T he N a tu r a l N e c e ss ity  o f P ro p er ty
The vulnerability of human life requires the specification of the personal realm, the 
realm capable of suffering injury. This realm is called the suum.  The necessity of using 
material things in order to preserve oneself, and the transferable nature of these things 
(they can be removed from one’s possession by the action of others, without being 
destroyed in the process144), requires tha t  the s u u m  be extended to include these things. 
The things thereby become proper to oneself, one’s property. Such extension of the su u m  
is necessary for the maintenance of peaceful social life, so in this sense the development of 
property is a natural process. Property is natural to human life.
In outline, this is Pufendorfs  position. A more detailed exposition of his views thus 
appropriately begins by observing the nature and implications of human vulnerability:
Such is the constitution of m an’s body tha t  it cannot live from its own 
substance, but has need of substances gathered from outside, by which it is
nourished and fortified against those things which would destroy its 
1structure.
For this reason God has willed tha t  human beings have a general power to use things. 
This power is unproblematic in so far as it concerns plants and other insensate things, 
since they are unable to •‘suffer any ill” .146 The use of animals is admittedly a more 
delicate m atter, but Pufendorf holds tha t  human beings can without injustice use animals 
for their own ends since there is no moral community between human beings and animals. 
There is “no right of obligation ... between men and beasts” , but a "practical s ta te  of
144Cf. Hume. Treatise, pp. 487-8.
145DJNG,  IV.iii.l.
146DJNG, IV.iii.3.
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T5 147war"7. Nevertheless there are limits on how this power is to be used: cruelty is to be 
rejected (but not for the sake of the animals148).
It has already been shown that the original power to use things is not to be understood 
as a right. Nevertheless it is a moral power, since it produces a moral effect, an effect on 
the legitimate actions of other human beings. Unlike most moral effects, however, which 
arise only as the result of an agreement, this effect arises directly from the original su u m : 
since to take or destroy ano ther’s food, or even to prevent the other from gathering food, 
is to interfere with the fundamental necessity of self-preservation, and thereby to cause 
injury. However, if there is an original moral effect which precedes human agreements, 
then this must be expressible as an original moral relation between human beings, with 
respect to the physical world. Pufendorf recognizes this implication, and expresses it by 
saying tha t  human beings had an original community of possession of all things. He is 
anxious tha t  the nature of this original community not be misunderstood. He joins with 
Grotius in holding tha t  the original community differed markedly from modern notions of 
common possession. This difference can be caught by distinguishing two kinds of 
community of possession, negative and positive.
Positive community is the developed notion of common ownership:
Common things, by the ... positive meaning, differ from things owned, only in 
the respect tha t  the latter belong to one person while the former belong to 
several in the same m anner.14^
For positive community, there is no difference “in the manner and force of dominion” , 
only in “the subject in which it terminates” . Private dominion, or property, “term inates” 
in one man, while common dominion, or positive community, terminates in several. 
Positive community thus has two important features. In the first place it cannot be 
changed without agreements. Since none of the co-owners
has a right extending, as it were, over the whole thing, but having power only
1 H 71 DJNG, IV.iii.5. This implies, incidentally, that animals can use human beings for their ends 
without injustice as well. Pufendorf recognizes this implication. He does not hold that the beasts 
were created for human beings, a view not uncommon in the seventeenth century. On the general 
question of the relationship between human beings and animals in the thought of the period, see in 
particular Keith Thomas, Man and the Natural World: Changing Attitudes in England 
1500-1800, Harmondsworth: Penguin (1984).
1 J o
° DJNG, IV.iii.6: “a useless and wanton destruction of animals tends to the hurt of all human 
society, and to the dishonour of the Creator and Author of such a gift”.
149DJNG , IV.iv.2.
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over a part of the thing, such part still remaining undivided, it is obvious tha t  
one person cannot of his own right dispose of the entire thing, but only of his 
share; and tha t  if any decision is to be reached in the whole thing, the consent 
and authority of each person concerned in it must be secured.15®
So, while individuals can renounce their shares in a positive common possession, positive 
community of possession cannot itself be abandoned without agreement. Changing to a 
system of private property in parts of the whole, for example, cannot occur without the 
consent of “each person concerned” . (It should be noted tha t  Pufendorf does not tell us 
whether, in such cases, tacit consent is possible.)
The second feature of positive community is that, like proprietorship, it presupposes the 
exclusion of others:
Positive community as well as proprietorship imply an exclusion of others from 
the thing which is said to be common or proper, and therefore presupposes more 
men than one in the world .151
Positive community is, in other words, a right shared by a group of human beings who are 
only a part of the entire population, the remaining portion being excluded from the 
possessions in question. Obviously, this means tha t  positive community is not the original 
community of possession shared by all human beings in the earliest days of the Creation. 
The original community must therefore have been negative community:
Therefore, just as things could not be said to be proper to a man, if he were the 
only being in the world, so the things from the use of which no man is excluded, 
or which, in other words, belong to one man no more than to ’another, should be 
called common in the [negative! and not in the 'positive! meaning of the te rm .15^
The original community of possession, then, was negative community. Positive 
community, like private property, is a later development:
things were created neither proper nor common (in positive community) by any 
express command of God, but these distinctions were later created by men as the 
peace of human society demanded. °
To understand the nature of the original community of possession, we therefore need to
150^ d .
15l DJNG,  IV.iv.3.
152ibid.
153DJNG,  IV.iv.4.
91
explain Pufendorfs concept of negative community. He describes it briefly in one passage 
as a s tate  in which “all things lay open to all men, and belonged no more to one than  to 
another” . ^ “* He treats the m atter  rather more fully in another passage. In a s ta te  of 
negative community, he says,
things are said to. be common, according as they are considered before the 
interposition of any human act, as a result of which acts] they are held to belong 
in a special way to this man rather than that. In the same sense such things are 
said to be nobody's, more in a negative than a positive sense; that is, th a t  they  
are not yet assigned to a particular person . not that they cannot be assigned to 
a particular person. They are, furthermore, called ‘things tha t  lie open to any 
and every person’.15^
Negative community is thus a thoroughly inclusive  state. Unlike positive community, 
which presupposes the exclusion of some group of others, negative community necessarily 
excludes none. It is also necessary to see the import of Pufendorfs  sta tem ent th a t  in 
negative community things are not yet assigned to particular individuals. This is not 
merely to say tha t  , as a m atte r  of fact, there are no private owners. Rather, the “not yet” 
is the key to understanding negative community as com m unity ,  and not merely as a state  
where there is no private property. A state  without private property is not a s ta te  in 
which private property does not yet exist unless it contains within it the germ from which 
such property arises. This is just what negative community must contain, since it must 
reflect the fact that human beings can legitimately use things for their own preservation. 
Negative community is thus the state  of the openness of the world to use and 
appropriation; there is an original negative community of things not because there is a 
mere possibility  of using things (because they are not already owned), but because there is 
a moral necessity  of such use. Negative community expresses the nature  of the 
relationship between human beings and the world. It reflects the fact tha t ,  in an 
im portant sense, the world is for the use of human beings: in using the world for their own 
ends, human beings are not strangers (or trespassers) on a foreign soil. They are at 
home.* 1^  (The world is not for them in any stronger sense, however, especially not in the
154DJNG, IV.iv.5.
DJNG , IV.iv.2 (emphasis added).
1 sA°It is important to recognize this feature of negative community, since it shows a difficulty in 
secularizing such a theory. The relation is not simply one of confronting a world of things. 
Therefore the question of appropriation of what is negatively common is not simply a matter of 
how unheld things come to be held, of how an unowned thing comes to be owned. This is ignored 
in, for example, Nozick’s treatment of Locke’s theory of appropriation in Anarchy, State, and 
Utopia, pp. 174 ff. (The character of Locke’s original community will be discussed in the next 
chapter.)
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sense th a t  it is in any way under an obligation to subm it. This is im portant for the proper 
understanding of the status of animals.)
The negative community that human beings originally had in the physical world can 
best be understood by analogy with the situation of invited guests at a buffet banquet.^5' 
The food is for the guests, but no particular item is for any particular guest. Nor is the 
food as a whole only for the guests as a whole, since the guests do not first have to come 
to agree about who should get what. The guests do not each have a right, shared with 
others, to all the food provided. Rather, the food is just there for the tak ing : each guest 
is free to take what he or she wishes, and wrongs nobody by so doing, provided what is 
taken has not already been claimed by someone else, and provided the taking itself 
involves no violence or injury. In such a situation, it is of utmost importance to have a 
clear understanding of what is necessary in order to have successfully removed some of the 
available food from its initial common status. Such successful removal must be publicly 
recognizable, in order to maintain peace, especially by preventing unintended violations of 
what is no longer common. At such a banquet, these matters are usually solved rather 
easily: placing food on a plate, and drink in a glass, are usually recognized as acts of
removal. Whether the act is successful just because of the act itself, or because of the 
acceptance of the act as appropriate, is another m atter. On the former understanding, the 
act is successful just because of its quality as an act. Successful removal, on this 
understanding, could be described as being due to the exercise of labour. On the latter 
understanding, the act is successful because it is seen to be an appropriate solution to the 
problem, and so is not interfered with. On this understanding, successful removal could 
be described as being due to (tacit) agreement. These alternatives rarely trouble the 
guests at such functions, but the issue is an important one for those philosophers who, like 
Pufendorf, understand the original condition of human beings with respect to things to be 
a negative community. In fact, this problem of how to remove anything from the original 
common, so tha t  it can become the private property of individuals, is the central problem 
of an account based on negative community. The origin of private property is a question 
tha t  can be raised no m atter  what the original relation of human beings to the world 
happened to be, but the question takes different forms according to the understanding of 
the original relation. If the original relation was one of no community whatsoever, but 
merely a number of human beings confronting a mass of things, then there is no question 
of how to remove from a com m on. Instead there is the question of how to make  property 
out of nothing, as it were; how to make a moral relation out of an initially merely physical
number of natural law writers employ this example. One possible source is the parable of 
the banquet in St. Luke 14:16-24.
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relation. (It may even be asked: Is such a development possible?16® ) If the original 
relation was of a positive community - a relation which is best understood as akin to a 
legal partnership, where each partner has specific rights - then there is no way to remove 
from the common but by agreement .169 There is in such a case no issue about how to 
remove from the common. The important issue, if positive community is assumed, is, 
rather, how legi timate use is to be made, by individuals, of what is owned in common, 
without recourse to agreements . 169
For Pufendorf the original community of possession is negative. The important issue in 
explaining the origin of property, then, is to explain the nature of “the steps of
i  /> I
departure” from negative community. So we will now consider some important 
elements of this departure.
It is first of all im portant to note tha t  “the steps of departure” from primitive 
community are indeed steps , and tha t  these steps are not unnatural. They are steps 
because:
men left this original negative community of things ... not, indeed, all at once, 
and for all time, but successively, and as the sta te  of things, or the nature and 
number of men, seemed to require. z
In so doing, they were not acting unnaturally, or contrary to natural law, for two distinct 
reasons. Firstly, the naturalness of negative community does not imply the necessity of 
preserving negative community:
1 The denial of community amounts to denying that the world can be regarded as, even in a 
weak sense, for us. Instead of being related to a world as guests at a banquet, we instead confront 
a world' of things as strangers. From such a premise, it could then be argued that the rise of 
property reflects only the exercise of force over the world, and not the sophistication of an original 
moral relation. Thus the more pronounced forms of “environmental philosophy” could be seen as 
springing from a denial of any original community of possession.
159DJ.VG, IV.iv.2.
i
uThat Locke sees the problem of how property in things arises as the problem of how to 
remove things from their original community I take as evidence for Locke’s assuming an original 
negative community. But the matter will be discussed fully in the next chapter, where James 
Tully’s view that Locke’s theory is built on an original positive community will be considered. 
Locke speaks of removing from the common at Two Treatises, 11.27,28,30.
161£>JVG, IV.iv.6, heading.
162DJVG, IV.iv.6.
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when we assert tha t  by nature all things were negatively common, we do not 
mean that the law of nature commands us to maintain tha t  state  of things for all 
time, but only tha t  things considered without any previous act of men were of
i  z ' O
such a nature tha t  they belonged no more to one man than to ano ther .1
Negative community is thus natural in the sense tha t  it is not adventitious. As we have 
seen, there is another sense of ■‘natura l” , in which some social institution or s tate  of affairs 
can be natural even if adventitious. In this sense, an institution is a part  of natural law 
because “sane reason, upon a consideration of the general s tate  of social life, advises that 
this be set up and established among men” . * It is this sense of “na tu ra l” which is 
invoked to provide the second reason for the naturalness of the departure from negative 
community. The departure from negative community is natural because it is 
recommended by sane reason. In fact, sane reason recommends not only tha t  negative 
community be left behind, but that it be left behind only in a series of steps, and not all 
at once. It recommends th a t  negative community be left behind, and systems of property 
generated, in order to prevent rivalry and preserve peace among human beings:
And truly the peace and tranquillity of mankind, the maintenance of which is 
the first concern of the law of nature, made no uncertain suggestion as to what 
might be the most salutary arrangement by men in this regard. For after the 
human race had multiplied and acquired a cultural mode of life, the peace of men 
did not suffer th a t  there should remain for every man an equal power over all 
things, tha t  is, th a t  all things should be open to all for the promiscuous use of 
every man ... Since innumerable conflicts could not avoid arising from the rivalry 
of many persons over the same thing, which could not suffice for all of them at 
one time, especially in view of the fact tha t  such is the nature of the vast 
majority of things, tha t  they can be of service to but one person at one t im e .* ^
The development of property was thus necessary in order to avoid quarrels and preserve 
peace. But this is not to suggest tha t  the preservation of peace requires the total 
abandonment of all negative community at tha t  time when it is necessary to abandon it 
with respect to some things. Rather, such a total abandonment would be pointless and 
arbitrary. Among other things, it would involve the appropriation of some things which, 
either by their natural abundance or because of some other features, ought not at any 
time to be appropriated. In particular, this is true of the air and the open sea.1 (In
™ZDJNG,  IV.iv.13. 
1Q4DJNG,  IV.iv.14. 
lQ5DJNG,  IV.iv.6. 
166DJ7VG, IV.v.2,9.
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respect of the latter, of course, Pufendorf accepts the central doctrine of Grotius in Mare 
Liberum , a doctrine maintained also in De Jure Belli ac Paczs.16')  So, negative 
community is to be abandoned progressively, as the need to maintain peace in the face of 
particular social developments dictates:
■ when we say th a t  reason suggested the departure from the community, we do 
not mean to imply tha t  it was necessary for all things to pass under 
proprietorship at one moment, but only as considerations of men, of things, and 
of places required, and as the best means were found to remove causes of 
dispute . 168
Therefore natural law does not enjoin that everything should be made proper to 
individuals. Rather, it “enjoins the observance of whatever things work to the end of the 
dominion institu ted” . Natural law enjoins proprietorship, but proprietorship is not 
thereby uniformly nor universally required across all human societies; rather,
•I £ > Q
“proprietorship .... has been introduced as the peace of men seemed to require it .
By holding tha t  property arises in a series of steps which reflect prevailing 
circumstances in particular social situations, Pufendorf allows tha t  the history of property 
is not everywhere the same. The nature and number of the steps from primitive negative 
community must vary according to the different circumstances of different human groups. 
Pufendorf does not draw back from this conclusion. The nature and extent of property is 
a m atter  for human beings to settle, by the use of sane reason to determine what is 
necessary for social peace:
the law of nature approves all conventions which have been introduced about 
things by men, provided they involve no contradiction or do not overturn 
society.
Therefore, although natural law advises the introduction of property, it does so
on the condition tha t  it would rest with the judgement of men, whether they
wanted all things to be proper or only some, or would hold some things
indivisible and leave the rest open to all, yet in such a way that no one might
1 70claim them for himself alone.
1 7‘Pufendorf says, among other things, that “peaceful navigation of the ocean extends to all men 
and is free”, a principle which allows peaceful navigation for the purposes of trade (D J N G , 
IV.v.10); cf. also DJBP , II.II.iii, II.Il.xiii.5, and of course Mare Liberum.
i6SDJNG,  IV.iv.13. 
lQ9DJNG,  IV.iv.14. 
170DJNG,  IV.iv.4.
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Having spelt out the importance of the fact that property arises in a series of steps, we 
need now to consider the factors which either require steps to be taken, or determine the 
order or character of the steps to be taken. The first of these factors Pufendorf adjudges 
to be the relative scarcity of necessary goods in the natural (i.e. primitive) state:
Most things which are of use to men immediately and are employed to nourish 
them  and protect their bodies, are not produced everywhere by nature and 
without cultivation in such abundance that they fully suffice for everyone. 
Therefore, an occasion for quarrels and wars lay ready at hand, if two or more 
men needed the same thing, and individuals tried to appropriate for themselves 
the same thing, when it was not enough for all.
Property is then a solution to the quarrels and conflicts which arise over the allocation of 
relatively scarce goods. It is an institution which functions to preserve peace. This 
factor, says Pufendorf,
also shows the falsity of the old saying: ‘Mine and thine are the causes of all 
wars'. Rather it is tha t  ‘mine and th ine’ were introduced to avoid wars . 1' 1
Further, if it was a primitive relative scarcity which caused the introduction of 
property, this puts the lie to the common view that there was an original Golden Age. 
The belief in such a time arises from nostalgia for the simple life. Pufendorf observes that 
the old have a tendency to praise the past, particularly the time of their own youth. So 
those who were forced by circumstances to abandon primitive simplicity for the more 
industrious life, with its property and developing refinement, “took such a change of 
habits very hard, and many a time longed for their nuts and idleness” . Later generations, 
remembering “this complaint of their forbears” (and not untouched by nostalgia 
themselves) thereby came to construct “those dreams about a Golden Age” .  ^ Pufendorf 
thus adopts a position quite distinct from Grotius’s: for the latter, the idea of the Golden 
Age is employed uncritically in Mare Liberum  (although this could perhaps be regarded 
as a heuristic device), and the transition to property relations in De Jure Belli ac P ads  is 
a response not to scarcity but to the inconveniences and quarrels which are seen as an 
unavoidable part of the collection and distribution of a product which is physically 
scattered, heterogeneous (and so not readily commensurable), and the fruit of unequal 
contributions .173 Pufendorf does, however, recognize the role of this last factor, the
171DJNG,  IV.iv.6. 
l 72DJNG,  IV.iv.8.
173See ML, p. 23 {DJPC, p. 227); DJBP , II.II.ii.2-4.
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inequality of contribution of individuals to the creation of the consumable products. It is 
the second factor he recognizes in the development of property.
The physical necessities of life, even in the simplest of human societies, have to be 
collected; and, in more complex social orders, they have to be produced. So, to possess 
even the basic necessities of life, a society depends on the contributions of its members. 
This contribution is, of course, their labour. Social peace is not likely to be maintained if 
unequal expenditure of labour on the part of individuals is not reflected in some way in 
the allocation of resources. But the simplest way to maintain a rough parity between 
amount of labour expended and amount of returns - at least, one which avoids quarrels - 
is to institute a system of private property. This is especially so either for those things 
which are consumed by use (such as food), or for those exhaustible resources readily 
a ttr ibu tab le  to individuals (such as most mobile goods, and some kinds of immobile 
goods, for example, permanent dwellings). Pufendorf sums up the basic requirements of 
this factor thus:
most things require labour and cultivation by men to produce them and make 
them fit for use. But in such cases it was improper that a man who had 
contributed no labour should have right to things equal to his by whose industry 
a thing had been raised or rendered fit for service. Therefore, it was 
advantageous to peace among men that, as soon as men multiplied, there should 
be introduced dominion of mobile things, especially such as require labour and 
cultivation by men, and, among immobile things, dominion of those which are of 
immediate use to men, such as places for dwelling. 1' 4
In another passage, he points out the role of labour in the original acquistion of things. In 
the original negative community, he says,
the bodies of things belong to no one, but their fruits after gathering are proper 
.... An oak tree belonged to no man, but the acorns tha t  fell to the ground were 
his who had gathered them .175
In providing an im portant role for labour, Pufendorf is advancing no new doctrine. 
Similar views are expressed by Grotius in Mare Liberum. He observes there that nature 
has willed that some things “through the industry and labour of each man became his 
own” .17® Nonetheless, it is not true for either tha t  labour makes  property. We have 
already seen the crucial role played by agreement in their theories. For Pufendorf,
l 7i DJNG, IV.iv.6. 
l75DJNG , IV.iv. 13.
176 ML, p. 2.
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although labour may be a necessary part of the process in which property is generated, 
property is a moral quality which can only be brought into existence by those actions 
which can have a moral effect.* 1' ' Property does not come into being as a result of labour 
pure and simple, as Locke and Hutcheson later contend.1'^ Rather, it depends on 
agreements, whether express or tacit:
although there appears to be some reason why ... things should belong to some 
men rather than to others i.e. because of labour expended , yet the dominion of 
the one group, involving, as it does, the exclusion of the next, had to be 
confirmed at least by a tacit pact, which contained a t  the same time a tacit 
renunciation on the part of the rest; because, when things have been assigned one 
person, the rest of mankind do not care to advance any claim to them on the 
alleged ground that the earth, as the common home of men, has contributed to 
those same things their substance and nourishment.1' y
So, should men fail to protest at particular acts of seizure or other forms of labour, they 
can be held to have tacitly renounced any claim to goods thus acquired, and have tacitly 
consented to the acquisition.
For “immobile things produced by nature without the labour of man, such as fields” , the 
situation differs in one im portant respect: unlike those things already considered, these
are not scarce, but abundant. For this reason they come to be appropriated by 
individuals not all a t once, but progressively. They become proper by occupation, and 
occupation is limited in extent because it is a m atter  of what can be used. In the case 
under consideration, tha t  of fields, this limit is expressed in the equation of the extent of 
occupation with the extent of cultivation:
' DJNG, IY.iv.l: “proprietorship and community are moral qualities which have no physical 
or intrinsic effect upon things themselves, but only produce a moral effect in relation to other men1. 
In A System of Moral Philosophy, Hutcheson stresses that “the difficulties of dealing with this 
subject” , tha t  is, of understanding the genesis of property, “arise from some confused imagination 
th a t  property is some physical quality or relation produced by some action of men” , whereas it is in 
fact a moral relation (System, Collected Works, vol.V, p.318; Emphasis added). Among his targets 
he may include Locke, who at one point in his treatm ent of the origin of property, considering the 
very example of the gathering of acorns employed above by Pufendorf. argues that the acorns must 
belong to the person nourished by them because “No Body can deny but the nourishment is his” 
(Two Treatises, 11.28). The nourishment is undoubtedly a physical effect, but it is extremely hard, 
if not impossible, to see it as a moral effect - especially when it is remembered that not only honest 
gatherers, but also thieves, are equally well nourished by the acorns they come to consume.
1 78 Hutcheson argues tha t,  if there is an original negative community, consumable goods can be 
appropriated “without consulting the rest of mankind ... Thus we need not have recourse to any 
old conventions or compacts, as with Grotius or Puffendorf, in explaining the original of property” 
(System , Collected Works, vol. V, p. 331).
179 DJNG, IV.iv.6.
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regarding the immobile things produced by nature without the labour of man, 
such as fields, they were so extensive that they abundantly provided for the 
small number of early men, and for that reason at first only so much of them 
was occupied as men judged to be suitable for their uses, while the rest was left 
in a state of original negative community, so that every man who wished to was 
free in the future to take it ... fields should belong to those who cultivated 
them .18^
Here we can see in embryo Locke’s requirement that appropriation from the original 
community be limited by the capacity to use the things appropriated. For Locke, a man 
may appropriate anything as long as it stays “within the bounds , set by reason of what 
might serve for his use '1. In this way also peace is preserved (as the natural law requires): 
“there could then be little room for Quarrels or contentions about Property so
101
established” . Applied to the land itself, the use-criterion limits appropriation, as it 
does for Pufendorf, to what is cultivated: “As much Land  as a Man Tills, Plants,
i  o o
Improves, Cultivates, and can use the Product of, so much is his Property”. OL Unlike 
Pufendorf, Locke provides an explicit test for unsuccessful usage - the “spoilage 
condition” . However, although Pufendorf affirms what Locke denies by requiring a pact 
to generate the necessary moral effect, his pact has a similar effect to Locke’s spoilage 
condition because it has a necessary content. It affirms occupation by use, restricts 
occupation to what is used, and so leaves unclaimed land for future occupation:
hence it is understood that a pact was agreed upon, to the effect tha t  such fields 
as had been assigned to one person by the express convention of the rest of men, 
or such as the rest could be held tacitly to have withdrawn from, in view of the 
fact tha t  one man alone had been allowed to enjoy them in peace, while they had 
claimed for themselves other fields on the same basis - tha t  such fields should 
belong to those who had cultivated them. And finallv, tha t  what was left should 
pass to those who would hereafter occupy the fields. °
These passages show us the extent to which Pufendorf provides a foundation on which 
Locke builds his own theory of appropriation.
We can now also consider Pufendorfs relationship to Grotius. Pufendorf affirms that, 
apart from “what he i.e. Grotiusi adds against the accepted doctrines of our churches,
180,m
181Two Treatises , 11.31. 
^8^Two Treatises, 11.32. 
18ZDJNG,  IV.iv.6.
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which have been already censured enough by others” ,*^4 he is in substantial agreement 
with Grotius. He understands himself to be refining and clarifying Grotius's views, 
thereby avoiding some of the la t te r ’s confusions. He sees his main contributions to be, 
firstly, establishing a clear distinction between negative and positive community, and 
secondly, providing an improved account of the necessity of a pact to establish property. 
We shall consider some of his observations on these matters, since they serve to clarify 
some aspects of his theory.
Commenting on Grotius’s account of the original divine donation of the earth to human 
beings, Pufendorf remarks as follows:
He says: ‘Soon after the creation of the world, and a second time after the
Flood, God conferred upon the human race a general right over things of a lower 
na tu re ’. This we accept in the sense tha t  God allowed men a right to use the 
things of this earth ;in a general way’, that is, He did not determine a t  that same 
time what things should be held individually, and what in common, but this He 
left to the judgment of men, tha t  they should dispose of the m atter  according as 
it seemed to work for peace. But no credit should be given to any such idea as 
tha t  God at the beginning instituted a positive community, from which men 
later withdrew on their own initiative, but rather, so far as it concerned God,1 or
such things were left open to the uses of men.
This passage raises two im portant matters. Firstly, Pufendorfs interpretive strictures 
here - th a t  original community, established by divine donation, be understood negatively 
rather than  positively - should not be taken to signal a disagreement with Grotius. 
Pufendorf makes it clear tha t  Grotius’s view implies negative community, but tha t  his 
predecesser’s failure to make clear the difference between the two types of community 
sometimes leads him into confusion. Thus he commends Grotius for recognizing tha t  the 
original community required human beings to live a simple life, to be “content to live 
upon simple fruits” , etc, whereas refinement required the introduction of property. 
Negative community implies this, whereas positive community does not, since the former 
precludes the accumulation and division of a social product. Under negative community, 
each person simply takes what he or she needs, whereas under positive community a 
system of accumulation and distribution may be established by an express pact. Since 
only such positive community depends on mutual affection. Pufendorf criticises Grotius 
for thinking tha t  the original community depended in any way on affection:
1S4DJNG, IV.iv.9. 
l85ibid.
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But when he adds that community could have endured ‘if men had lived on 
terms of mutual affection such as rarely appears’, he confuses negative 
community with positive . 1®6
The second im portant m atter  is indicated by the denial of any original positive 
community, ‘‘from which men later withdrew on their own initiative” . There is something 
a little odd about this remark, and attending to it will help to bring into clearer focus a 
feature of natural law theory. The oddity of the remark depends on the fact tha t  positive 
community can only be withdrawn from by agreement: “if any decision is to be reached 
on the whole thing, the consent and authority of each person concerned in it must be 
secured” . 1 As we shall see below, this consent must be expressly given. So positive 
community can only be successfully withdrawn from in the earliest ages of human society, 
before the number and geographical extent of human beings made an express agreement of 
the entire human population impossible. Unless such an express agreement took place, 
then, contrary to the fact of positive laws concerning property, an original positive 
community of things (if such there was) would still be in force. To suppose an original 
positive community is thus to raise the possibility tha t  distinctions of ownership by 
positive law are in fact not justified. And, given tha t  this possibility can only be removed 
by supposing a primitive express agreement of which there is no apparent record, to 
suppose an original positive community calls sharply into question the entire edifice of the 
positive law of property. This would be, for Pufendorf, such a profoundly disturbing 
possibility tha t  it may seem astonishing tha t  he does not consider it. Rather, he appears 
simply to take it for granted that, i f  there was an original positive community, it no 
longer exists, it was withdrawn from successfully. Why does he accept this?
The answer, I suggest, lies right at the heart of the natural law enterprise, and is neatly 
caught in the seventeenth century conception of natural law as moral science. As was 
pointed out in section I, the idea of moral science is the idea of a systematic body of 
knowledge of the relations between moral phenomena, in just the way tha t  physical 
science is a systematic body of knowledge of the relations between physical phenomena. 
As such, moral science depends, like physical science, on the reality of its phenomena. 
Natural law, as moral science, thus has the task of explaining the moral phenomena we in 
fact have. It is, in this way, a rather conservative enterprise. It does not ask: W hat sort 
of moral world ought there to be? It asks instead: W hat is the origin of the moral world
i m ibid. 
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(we have)? This is what is at issue in the question concerning the origin of property. A 
natural law explanation of the origin of property is an explanation both of how property 
begins out of a state  without property, and how the history of property is a natural 
(rational) process which leads to the distinctions of property we recognize. Pufendorf 
thus rules out the revolutionary possibility tha t  there is in fact no private property, but a 
positive community, at the very beginning of his enterprise. By accepting the naturalness 
of law he thereby rejects the “sceptical” theories. Provided tha t  we do not press the term 
too hard, we can say tha t  a natural law theory is a “common sense” theory, in that it 
does not undermine the views widely established in a society.
Pufendorf sees his second main advance on Grotius's views to be the clarification of the 
nature and role of pacts in establishing property. He agrees with Grotius tha t  a pact, 
whether express or tacit, is necessary to establish a moral relation between human beings, 
because moral effects depend on public acts. If there is no public act, there can be no 
moral effect, since in such cases “others were not able to know what a man wished to be 
his own, tha t  they might refrain from it” . Therefore, as Grotius puts it, “things at the 
first passed into proprietorship not by a mere act of will” . An act of seizure is thus a 
necesssary part of staking a claim to some unpossessed thing, but a pact is also necessary, 
in th a t  the act of seizure is not of itself sufficient to create a moral effect, but does so 
when it is not resisted by others, or is expressly consented to by them. In explaining this, 
Pufendorf shows tha t ,  while a tacit pact is adequate for establishing property from 
negative community, positive community can not be generated without express consent. 
To establish property, he says:
there was need of an external act or seizure, and for this to produce a moral 
effect, tha t  is, an obligation on the part of others to refrain from a thing already 
seized by some one else, an antecedent pact was required and an express pact, 
indeed, when several men divided among themselves things open to all; but a 
tacit pact sufficed when the things occupied at that time had been left 
unpossessed by the first dividers of things. For it is understood th a t  these men 
agreed tha t  those things which in the first division had not been assigned to a 
definite individual should pass to him who was the first to take possession of 
them .188
Property for immediate use arises out of negative community by a tacit pact of non­
interference with acts of seizure, but more extensive and sophisticated forms of property 
(including, most importantly, positive community) arise out of a d iv is ion , and this 
cannot occur without an express pact.
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Pufendorf thus differs from the rather relaxed approach to explicit agreements exhibited 
by Grotius, an approach which reflects the la t te r ’s heavy reliance on sacred history. 
Pufendorf has no quarrel with sacred history, but he is led to his conclusions more by 
considerations of theoretical necessity than by the patriarchal narratives of the book of 
Genesis. This is not to say tha t  he does not accord history an im portant place. We see 
th a t  he does in his insistence that the character and extent of a system of property is 
entirely a m atter  for the human actors who produce it, as long as in producing it they act 
according to the rational necessities of the situation, rather than violently going against 
nature. His insistence th a t  property arises not all at once, but in steps, is part of this 
requirement. PufendorPs account of property, like tha t  of Grotius before him, can be 
called natural (in tha t  it arises necessarily according to the requirements of human 
sociableness) and historical (in being the product of human actions over time). Like 
Grotius, Pufendorf aims at producing a natural history of property.
V: N ecessity , S lavery, and Industry
We can now turn to PufendorPs treatm ent of the important question of the right of 
necessity. The task here ~is to inquire what force the necessity of safety has to free some 
act from the obligation of general laws” ,10 in particular, of general laws of property. 
T ha t necessity has such a force is widely acknowledged:
The power of necessity is a phrase upon the lips of all men, because it lacks the 
restra in t of law, and is understood to form an exception in all the rules of men, 
while it carries the right to do many things which, apart from it, were held to be 
forbidden.190
Pufendorf accepts tha t  there is such a right, but stresses that it cannot be taken for 
g ran ted .191 It does not apply to all things, since the creation depends for its order on its 
laws. Exceptions may threaten or endanger this order, so they can only be allowed within 
speciPic limits. The nature of the limits which concern the property of others will be 
explained below.
Because the question at issue is whether there is a right of necessity which overrules 
positive laws of property, Pufendorf frames his discussion in terms of positive law. He
1®9DJArG, H.vi.1. For Pufendorf, it should be noted, necessity affects not only safety but also 
honour. The complications caused by consideration of honour are, however, considered only in 
passing. They do not affect the matters to be discussed here, so can be safely left undiscussed.
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holds that positive laws must be understood to make an exception in the case of necessity. 
This is because the legislators’ positive actions must be understood in a particular way: 
these legislators.
since they had as their purpose the promotion through these laws and 
institutions of men's safety or convenience, are supposed always to have had 
before their eyes the weakness of human nature, and how man cannot help 
avoiding and repelling whatever tends to his destruction.
Extreme necessity is of course a paradigm case, so
most laws, and especially positive laws, are understood to make an exception of 
a case of necessity, or to lay no obligation, when such an obligation will be 
attended by some evil, destructive of human nature, or too great for the common
1 Q O
constancy of mankind. ^
Why does Pufendorf hold that positive law must, in the general run of things, “make an 
exception of a case of necessity” ? To explain his position, he focuses a tten tion  on the 
mind of the legislator(s): the legislators “had as their purpose the promotion ... of m en’s 
safety or convenience” . If we ask, Why did the legislators have this purpose? (or, How do 
we know that  they had this purpose?), Pufendorfs answer appears to be, Because we 
must believe tha t  they did. T ha t is, he seems to appeal to “interpretive charity” . This is 
a somewhat disturbing solution, in tha t  it requires us to believe of the original legislators 
what may well not be true: law, in such an eventuality, is propped up by a convenient
fiction, or noble lie. It is therefore worth looking at the m atter  a little more closely.
The strongest evidence for undersanding Pufendorf to be employing a principle of 
interpretive charity is the following remark. He says:
it is presumed from the benevolent mind of the legislator, and from the 
consideration of human nature, th a t  a case of necessity is not included under a
1 Q 9law which has been conceived with a general scope. 1
This concern for “the benevolent mind of the legislator” does indeed look like interpretive 
charity. However, I shall argue that, in the first place, it is not, and, in the second, that, 
even if it were, nothing relevant hinges on the m atter , because exceptions in the case of 
necessity can be established independently.
1Q2 .ibid. Pufendorf adds “unless such a case is included expressly, or in the nature of the matter” . 
It is not clear why such exceptions are permissible. Given that such laws ignore the “weakness of 
human nature” , do they not do violence to that nature? Pufendorf does not discuss the matter 
further: perhaps that is the best course here as well.
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Firstly, in the above quotation Pufendorf is not relying on a principle of interpretive 
charity because it is not the benevolence of the legislator’s mind which is being presumed. 
Rather, this is (for reasons which will be given below) taken to be a simple fact. W hat is 
being presumed is that, given  the legislator’s benevolent mind, and given also human 
nature, a particular conclusion follows - that necessity constitutes an exception to a law 
“which has been conceived with a general scope” . The presumption, in other words, 
concerns the validity of a particular deduction from a set of premises which include a 
factual claim about the legislator’s mind. The presumption is not about th a t  mind (or 
state  of mind). It is not, therefore, an instance of interpretive charity.
W hat of Pufendorfs other claim - that the legislator’s purpose is “the promotion ... of 
men’s safety or convenience” ? This view can be treated in the same way as the one 
discussed above. It might appear at first sight to be a charitable presumption about the 
legislator’s purposes. But once again there is no textual evidence to support this reading. 
Rather, the case is the same as the above - Pufendorf simply asserts th a t  this is  the 
legislator’s purpose. It is clearly important to understand why Pufendorf makes this bold 
claim.
Why should the legislator’s purpose be the promotion of safety and convenience? The 
short answer is that it is so because it m ust be; it cannot be otherwise. The legislator’s 
purpose must be so because it follows “from the consideration of human nature” . How 
can the consideration of human nature demonstrate the nature of the legislator’s 
purposes? Before showing how this can be so, it should be noted that ,  if this can be 
successfully demonstrated, then we have established tha t  the exceptions to general laws 
generated in cases of necessity can be derived directly “from the consideration of human 
nature” . No special recourse to the legislator’s mind is necessary, so it does not m atte r  
what we a ttr ibu te , charitably or otherwise, to tha t  mind. Pufendorfs view tha t  the 
legislator’s purpose is to promote safety and convenience is simply the view that  law has 
this function - tha t  is, tha t  it in  fact has this function, not merely that it ought to (but 
may not). It has this function because it does promote safety and convenience. The rule 
of law, while it does not guarantee the peace and safety of human society, nonetheless 
promotes such peace and safety. Of course, particular laws - especially those tha t  proceed 
from despotism or tyranny - are quite able to destroy social peace and safety. So what 
reason is there to be confident tha t  the rule of law in general has a peaceful tendency?
This question can be answered in two distinct but complementary ways. Firstly, laws 
(and indeed societies) are subject to the forces of natural selection. (Pufendorf would not 
have put it this way, of course, but his extensive knowledge of ancient history would
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provide him with ample reasons for accepting the principle in question.) That is, laws are 
tested both internally by their subjects and externally by neighbouring societies. Laws 
which fail to adequately unify and organize the members of a society make that society 
easy prey when it comes into conflict with a society which, through more effective laws, 
has solved such problems. And laws which fail to gain the acceptance of the subjects of 
the laws are constantly subject to pressure for change through the non-compliance or 
otherwise dissenting activities of the subjects. In other words, those positively 
promulgated laws which have the highest survival value are just those laws which do 
promote the peace and safety of the members of the society. Laws with a high survival 
vaiue, then, are those laws which so harmonize with human nature that uthe human race 
can have no wholesome and peaceful social organization” 194 without them. T hat is, laws 
with a high survival value are, or approximate to, natural laws. So, although we are here 
dealing with positive laws, which need not be natural, we see th a t  the social forces which 
produce such laws also provide a reason for believing tha t  positive law will, in the main, 
conform to the patterns of natural law.
The second reason for holding tha t  the rule of law has a peaceful tendency springs more 
directly from a consideration of the classical conception of human nature on which 
Pufendorf, like so many of his predecessors, relies. This conception is indicated by his 
stress on the social tendencies of human beings, and more specifically in his understanding 
of societies, and their laws, as the fruit of agreement between rational social beings. On 
this conception, apart from those (tacit) agreements which may be necessary to establish 
social institutions, institutions are maintained or revised as the result of rational politics. 
Such politics is
the science of freedom, the public activity of free men, who come to agreement 
through discussion, compromise, conciliation and bargaining, through reconciling 
diverse interests and defining particular common interests.190
This process has a peaceful tendency because it reconciles diverse interests and serves to 
establish common interests. So, by understanding the social processes of law-making in 
this light, Pufendorf readily comes to accept the peaceful tendencies of the rule of law. 
These are the peaceful purposes of the legislator.
(It might be thought tha t ,  if the account of the legislator's mind is translatable without
l94DJNG, I.vi.18.
1 "^Eugene Kamenka, “Marxism and Politics” , Bulletin o f the Australian Society of Legal 
Philosophy, vol. 10 (no. 36, March 1986), p. 20. In this passage, Kamenka is offering an account of 
that “older tradition, deriving from Aristotle and revived in recent years by Bernard Crick” (ibid.).
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distortion into an account of law itself, why does Pufendorf complicate - or apparently 
complicate - m atters by this talk of the legislator’s mind? A plausible answer to this is, I 
suggest, his concern to capture the (for him) necessary formal element of law - tha t  it 
arises from the will of a superior. By speaking of the legislator, the superior will, 
Pufendorf is able to underline his view that  laws are not merely eternal rational 
principles, but require the superior’s coercive power to establish their obligatory 
character.)
The above brief account of the process of agreement through discussion, compromise, 
and so on, of rational beings is an im portant key to understanding Pufendorfs account of 
necessity, and the difference it makes. This is because, if law is the fruit of such a process, 
it is shaped by what such rational beings could be imagined to assent to. Thus we can 
understand not only why an exception is recognized in the case of necessity, since a 
rational view of human nature will include the awareness of its vulnerability to a wide 
range of possible misfortunes, not excluding those of human origin, we can also 
understand why necessity establishes a right; why the right has, in Pufendorfs account, 
what may otherwise appear to be a rather curious collection of limitations; and why 
Pufendorf is able to insist tha t  even positive law, if it is to generate obligations, 
presupposes an important general principle. This principle is a further indication of a 
close link between positive law and natural law, so it should be considered before turning 
to Pufendorfs account of the right of necessity and its specific limitations.
The general principle presupposed by positive laws is this:
the nature of affirmative commands requires that, in order for a man to be 
obligated here and now to the performance of some act. they presuppose the 
opportunity, m atter, and ability necessary for an action.19^
This principle can be summed up as: obligation presupposes capacity. It is the same
principle as tha t  expressed in the Kantian dictum “ought implies can” . Pufendorf puts it 
in another passage thus:
to obligate ourselves it is required that we have the moral and physical faculty 
to perform some thing or action, in other words, that the performance is not
9^^See, for example, De Officio, I.iii.7: “man is indeed an animal most bent upon self-
preservation, helpless in himself, unable to save himself without the aid of his fellows, highly 
adapted to promote mutual interests; but on the other hand no less malicious, insolent, and easily 
provoked, also as able as he is prone to inflict injury upon another-7.
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beyond our strength and no law forbids i t . 19®
It is the nature of affirmative commands to presuppose the moral and physical capacity to 
comply because it is in the nature of affirmative commands to obligate. Affirmative 
commands are thus not merely imperatives, but are expressions of the will of a rational 
superior, in that they arise through the ra t ional199 agreement of rational beings to 
establish legislative power. Obligation itself requires the capacity to comply because 
rational beings would not freely agree to subject themselves to laws they could not be 
capable of keeping. The most obvious example of such law is, of course, that which 
endangers or denies one’s preservation, or, more commonly, those cases where, because of 
the specific circumstances, keeping or endeavouring to keep an otherwise acceptable law 
endangers one’s preservation. Thus the various kinds of capacities (“opportunity, matter, 
and ability” ) necessary for obligation
are always understood to be wanting, when something cannot be done unless I 
perish in the doing, for the casting away of love and care for oneself is classed 
among things which are impossible, and which surpass the ordinary constancy of 
men. ^
This passage helps to illustrate an im portant connection: to make an exception of 
necessity is to affirm the fundamental importance of self-preservation. Thus the principle 
necessary for positive laws to be obligating, tha t  obligation presupposes capacity, is at 
bottom a commitment to the fundamental importance of self-preservation. The 
obligation of positive laws is therefore tied to their recognition of the fundamental 
importance of self-preservation. But the recognition of the fundamental importance of 
self-preservation is, as we have seen, one of the distinguishing marks of natural law. 
Therefore, to be obligating, positive law must not conflict with this most important 
feature of natural law. For at least all those natural laws which govern adventitious 
states, the same is true. (Such laws, since they concern only the social, not the cosmic, 
order, can be limited to human capabilites without threatening to undermine the order of 
creation.) This means tha t  such natural laws likewise allow exceptions in the case of 
necessity:
But it should be observed, in connexion with those laws which cover the mutual 
duties of men, th a t  there are certain precepts of natural law which presuppose
l98DJNG , III.vii.1. 
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some human deed or institution, that, as any one clearly recognizes upon a 
consideration of its end, should not be extended to a case of extreme necessity; 
and therefore the same exception also is in the law. 1
The law of property, being a precept of natural law which presupposes “some human deed 
or institution,” must therefore recognize exceptions in cases of extreme necessity. That is, 
it must be recognized that there is a right, arising out of necessity, to take from the 
property of others what is required for one's preservation. Pufendorfs account of the 
nature and extent of such rights can now be examined.
It was said above that ,  by recognizing th a t  laws arise out of the free agreements of 
rational beings, we can understand both tha t  necessity generates a right, and what the 
extent and limitations of this right are, especially in so far as it affects the property of 
others. First of all, the exception of the case of necessity can properly be said to generate 
a right of necessity because it is a definite moral effect generated by rational agreement. 
This right has one general limit, a limit which reflects the primacy of self-love: it does not 
require tha t  the situation of the necessitous be relieved if by so doing the giver is reduced 
to like necessity. As Pufendorf puts it,
I am not expected to give bread to a drowning person, if I myself need it ... Nor, 
if another is in danger of drowning, am I bound to draw him out, if I must perish 
in his place.
In the case of rights over the property of others, Pufendorf recognizes a range of special 
restrictions. These exceptions are a rather heterogeneous lot, but reflect the limitations it 
is presumed that  rational agents require in order to arrive at agreement. The most 
im portant constraint on what can be agreed upon in the case of necessity, with respect to 
the property of others, is tha t  imposed by the reasons for establishing property in the first 
place. The exceptions to be allowed in the case of necessity must not be such th a t  they 
frustrate the original point of property relations. The sorts of exceptions which can be 
generated by necessity can thus be determined only by keeping in mind the reasons for the 
introduction of ownership. Pufendorf therefore summarises the main reasons for property 
at this point. He says:
The most im portant advanced are, [1| tha t  thereby the quarrels arising from the 
original community of ownership are avoided, and 2] tha t  the industry of men is
201 ibid.
202 ibid.
110
increased, in that each man has to secure his possession by his own efforts.
Rights of necessity over the property of others must thus be limited by the necessity to 
avoid quarrels (and, more generally, to preserve peace), and by the necessity to secure the 
fruits of industry in the hands of the industrious.
The first reason for property is reflected in the fact that the right of necessity must be 
constrained by due process. The right does not, in the first instance, empower the 
necessitous simply to take from the goods of another. Rather, a man in need must first 
make a formal demand of the owner, and only if this is refused can he resort to more 
direct means. But even in this case he cannot simply take what he needs: he must,
wherever possible, seek a court ruling in his favour. (This is not, of course, always 
possible: as Pufendorf observes, quoting an ancient proverb: “Necessity keeps no
holidays’1.204) Only if a court ruling cannot be gained, or if the relevant institutions 
refuse to recognize his case, can he resort to directly taking what he needs. In this 
situation, the right of necessity allows him to take what he needs from what is another’s, 
without thereby committing a crime. Pufendorf spells out the implications of the right as 
follows:
a person may not himself lay hands at once on property owed him by another, 
but should demand of the owner that he hand it over to him of his own accord.
If, however, the owner refuses of his own accord to meet his obligation, the 
power of ownership is by no means so great tha t  property owed another may not 
be taken from an unwilling owner, through the authority of a judge in 
commonwealths, or, in a state of natural liberty, by the might of war ... But if 
such a precaution is not taken for the poor in some particular commonwealths ... 
would you have him die of hunger? Can any human institution have such power 
tha t ,  if another neglects to do his duty toward me, I must perish rather than 
depart from the customary and usual manner of procedure? I should not feel, 
therefore, tha t  a man has made himself guilty of the crime of theft if when he 
has, through no fault of his own, fallen into extreme want jof the necessities of 
life: ... he should make away with them by violence or by stealth; and especially 
so if he intends to make good their value whenever a kindlier fortune may smile 
upon him .205
This passage also indicates two other limitations on the right of necessity, limitations 
which reflect the constraint imposed by the second reason for property. These limitations
“ °D JNG , II.vi.5. As we shall see, with the increasing sophistication and productive power of 
modern societies, the second of these factors comes to be stressed, while the first diminishes in 
importance.
20iDJNG , II.vi.2.
205 DJNG,  II.vi.5.
I l l
are. firstly, that the want should have arisen “through no fault of his own” , and, secondly, 
tha t  the case for taking what is needed is considerably strengthened if the taker intends to 
restore what has been taken “whenever a kindlier fortune may smile upon him” . In a later 
passage Pufendorf adopts a stronger version of this second requirement, holding that 
“restitution m ust be made” , and castigates Grotius on the. ground tha t  the la t te r s  
account of necessity implies tha t  restitution need not be made (even though Grotius 
asserts tha t  it must - i.e., his account is both inadequate and inconsistent). Pufendorf 
then proceeds to weaken this claim (presumably thinking of those who cannot - and 
therefore ought not - make actual restitution), by concluding tha t  the seizer of ano thers  
goods is thereby put under an obligation, but this obligation is “either of gratitude, or of 
making good the value of the object involved.” u Clearly, this requirement serves to 
protect the industrious. It does so in two ways: by helping to prevent frivolous claims on 
the goods of another, since the obligation to repay where possible removes the incentive to 
make claims where there is no pressing need; and by minimising the extent to which 
claims on the goods of the industrious constitute permanent losses of their possessions, 
thereby minimising any disincentive to accumulate a surplus,a disincentive which would 
arise on a too-liberal interpretation of the right of necessity.
Similarly, the “no fault” limitation is designed to protect the industrious from the 
reckless and, especially, the idle. In this case the reason does not have to be inferred, 
since Pufendorf explicitly makes the connection:
A distinction should be made between the case in which a man fell under such 
necessity through no fault of his, and tha t  in which his own sluggishness and 
negligence are to blame. Unless such a distinction is drawn, a right is apparently 
given to lazy scoundrels who have fallen upon want through idleness, whereby 
they may appropriate to themselves by force what has been secured by the 
labour of others; and so, since their idleness maintains their want, they put the 
industrious under the necessity of maintaining against their will such a useless 
herd.207
This possibility is clearly intolerable. It would allow the incentive to industry to be 
completely destroyed. To allow such a possibility would transform the right of necessity 
from a safety-net for the victims of misfortune to a manacle on social development. 
Moreover, in this passage Pufendorf shows tha t  there is no right of necessity of such an 
unrestricted scope: for rights depend on agreements, and. to be binding, agreements must
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be rationally consented to. But in this case any such consent is clearly lacking, since 
Pufendorf is only stating the obvious when he says tha t ,  in such a s tate  of affairs, the 
industrious maintain the “useless herd "1 against their will. The consent of rational beings 
to maintain such a state  of affairs is clearly unimaginable. So, by keeping in mind tha t  the 
right of necessity, like all rights, depends on the agreement of rational agents, we see that 
Pufendorfs  conclusion (which may otherwise seem damagingly ad hoc) faithfully reflects 
his commitments. He concludes: “the proper reply to lazy drones is tha t  which the ant, as 
the fable has it, gave in the winter to the lazy grasshopper” .^®
In order to maintain the purpose of having property relations at all, then, these 
limitations on the right of necessity are unavoidable. That such, and perhaps other 
limitations are required also shows why Pufendorf must reject G rotius’s view that in the 
case of necessity the original use-right revives. This is because, even though on such an 
interpretation it may be possible to exclude the claims of the lazy (although reasons 
would have to be provided), the other protective limitations Pufendorf requires could not 
be maintained. To allow the revival of the original use-right is to hold tha t  in such cases 
there exist no longer any property holders at all. Since the other limitations presuppose 
that there are property holders, Grotius’s interpretation makes them impossible. There 
could be no way of applying a method of due process, there is no owner to whom 
restitution need be made (or even gratitude owed), and there is no longer any way of 
applying the principle of the primacy of self-preservation, which allows th a t  an owner is 
entitled not to give to another if tha t  owner will thereby fall into necessity. Such a 
drastic cure will in many cases be worse than the disease. The lack of safeguards for the 
efforts of the industrious, the capacity to produce not only quarrels but lingering 
resentments which would constitute a permanent threat to peace, show that G rotius’s 
attem pted solution is contrary to natural law: it could not be accepted by rational beings 
reflecting on these possibilities. Despite its apparently ad hoc features., Pufendorfs 
account of the right of necessity is in fact more conformable to the requirements of 
natural law.
Having spelled out the nature and the extent of the right of necessity, we are now in a 
position to answer the im portant question: Does extreme necessity ever require self­
enslavement? That is, are there any cases of dire necessity for which the only solution is 
self-enslavement, or does the right of necessity prevent such cases arising? Pufendorf, we 
have seen already, holds tha t  slavery first arose through contract, th a t  is, through
208ibid. (The reference is, of course, to Aesop.)
113
instances of s e l f - e n s l a v e m e n t . W e r e  such acts necessary? He clearly envisages one 
kind of case where he believes they were, for, in a passage where he refers to some Biblical 
cases of necessity, he remarks that '‘the man who had no further means of maintaining 
himself was supposed to sell himself into slavery” . u We have seen, however, th a t  the 
man w'ho has no further means of maintaining himself has, through the right generated by 
necessity, no need to sell himself into slavery, provided the necessary limitations of that 
right are observed. Of these limitations, the only one which appears to be im portan t here 
is tha t  which requires tha t  the man's condition be no fault of his own. If the man is in 
need because he is lazy he is clearly not protected by the right of necessity. For such 
individuals, then, self-enslavement is indeed necessary, and therefore in this sense slavery 
has a natural origin. (It is not natural, however, in the sense that anyone could be a slave 
independently of human a c t io n s /11 In this sense of “na tu ra l” , human beings are all 
naturally free.)
There is, however, something curious about this conclusion. For it appears th a t  the 
only cases where individuals are not protected by the right of necessity from having to 
enslave themselves are precisely those cases where the act of enslavement is least likely to 
be successful. If only the lazy must enslave themselves, only the lazy are available as 
slaves. What incentive is there, then, for anyone to take on a slave? Pufendorf  s answer 
would probably be as follows: Granted tha t  only the lazy or incompetent are available as 
slaves, nonetheless under the proper direction - including a discipline “more rigorous” 
than tha t  applied to a son“1" - the slave can be made productive. He must say something 
of this sort, because he accepts that slaves arise from the ranks of the least industrious:
Our idea on the origin of slavery is as follows. When in early days men departed 
from their original simple manner of living and began to devote more efforts to 
the elaboration of life ... it is highly probable that the more sagacious and more 
wealthy invited the more sluggish and the poorer sort to hire themselves out to 
them.
Then, “when both parties came to realize the advantage of this” , there was established a 
permanent system of “goods for work” :
209DJNG , VI.iii.4. 
210DJNG,  II.vi.5. 
2 n DJNG,  VI.iii.2. 
212DJNG, Vl.iii.l.
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And so the first beginnings of slavery followed upon the willing consent of men of 
poorer condition; and a contract of the form of “goods for work” : I will always
o  i o
provide for you, if you will always work for me .“10
Significantly, what is here explained is the origin of a particular form of the division of 
labour, including an uneven division of responsibility. W hat is not explained in this 
passage is the origin of a rightless state. This is not merely accidental. If Pufendorf is to 
account for the origin of slavery by contract, then what is contracted must be capable of 
rational consent, otherwise the contract would not be binding. A rightless state, subject 
to the arbitrary, including brutal, acts of a master is clearly not within the bounds pf 
rational consent. (No rational being could consent to being made morally powerless, any 
more than being made physically powerless.) So Pufendorf must hold tha t  slavery is not 
properly regarded as a state where one is denied the status of a moral being. This he 
does. As we have already seen, he insists that slaves are not owned by their masters as if 
they are merely physical objects: the relation of master to slave is rather that of
sovereign to subject. Slaves alienate only the right to rule over them .“1 They remain 
beings capable of receiving an injury, and so masters do not escape duties towards their 
slaves.“15
The fact of the m atter  is, of course, frequently worse than this, as Pufendorf 
acknowledges. The Ubrutality of many nations” leads to slaves being '‘numbered among 
... material possessions” .216 T ha t  is, the power of the master becomes “extended to the 
point that not only the labour but also the body of the slave is understood to belong to 
his master”.“11 Pufendorf is quite critical of such developments, but he is not so critical 
as to see these developments as a violation of what is natural (of what could rationally be 
agreed to). As a result, he ends up accepting that ,  even in the most severe versions of 
slavery, the children of slaves (who certainly are not guilty of laziness or incompetence, 
having had no opportunity to be either) are required, by the effectively necessitous 
condition of the mother (having nothing of her own with which to sustain them), to be 
enslaved as well.
21° DJNG, VI.iii.4. (emphasis added). 
21iDJNG, VI.iii.7.
2l5DJNG, VI.iii.8.
216DJ.VG, VI.iii.7.
217 DJNG, VI.iii.9.
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This case shows us how far from the original agreement the institution of slavery has 
strayed. The original agreement of ugoods for work’’ , was an arrangement advantageous 
to both parties. But the case under consideration gives no indication tha t  the goods 
received by the slave mother are at all apportioned to her work-value, or even that she 
receives anything other than subsistence, goods, since she is unable to accrue even that 
small surplus of goods necessary to support her child. The mother is kept in necessity, 
with no hope to provide for her children the opportunity of a better or even an alternative 
life. W ithout hope for something better, even for later generations, slavery becomes no 
longer a system of mutual advantage, but an avenue to despair for the enslaved. It is 
utterly implausible to imagine that such a one-way street could be agreed to by rational 
beings.
Nor is this surprising. For Pufendorf himself has to concede tha t  his a t tem p t to give 
slavery something of a human face is not successful. After comparing the master/slave 
relation to the sovereign/subject relation, he is forced to concede tha t  there is a 
fundamental difference: the subject’s subjection to the sovereign is, properly conceived, a 
subjection to general laws; the slave, on the other hand, is subject simply to the m aster’s 
arbitrary  will. The great disadvantage of slavery, he says, is that
free men need obey only the sta te  and its general laws, and need fear no 
punishment but what is defined in them, while in all else they hold it their 
special delight to suit their own will. But slaves serve one who is even a fellow 
citizen, are subject to his special orders, penalties, and restraints, and are forced 
to bear his harshness; which is all the more irksome the more frequent and 
intimate the contact between them. And this is all the harder because the laws 
of the sta te  rarely come to the assistance of servants against their masters, save
Ol  Q
when their harshness comes to a head in some outrageous savagery.“10
This makes it quite clear tha t ,  except in the most extreme circumstances, the slave’s state  
is one not governed by law, but by the arbitrary will of the master. Therefore it is not 
comparable to the state of the subject under the sovereign, nor can it be understood as an 
agreement in which some rational advantage is embodied. Rather, the brutality which has 
been such a feature of the history of slavery must be seen as a permanent possibility, 
inherent in the nature of the master/slave relation itself. Pufendorf thus effectively shows 
th a t  the institution of slavery is an institution of violence, not a law-governed condition. 
It therefore cannot be recognized by natural law.
So, not only are most forms of self-enslavement unnecessary, in tha t  they arise from 
situations already protected by the right of necessity, but even those forms which are not
218 DJNG , VI.iii.10.
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thus protected must also be rejected, since the state  of slavery is a s tate  contrary to 
natural law. This does not mean, of course, tha t  the lazy and incompetent are spared any 
penalty, or that the right of necessity over the goods of others must be extended to 
include them. The latter cannot be, since, as we have seen, to do so would be to 
undermine the whole purpose of property relations. It has been shown tha t  they cannot 
be compelled to enter slavery, willingly or otherwise, but it has not been shown that  they 
cannot be compelled to enter some law-governed form of compulsory servitude. Such 
servitude, provided it is constrained within limits tha t  prevent the violence of slavery, and 
avoid its perpetuity, may well be the only solution some societies can provide to  overcome 
this problem. A controlled form of compulsory labour is undoubtedly better than simply 
outlawing the lazy or the economically incompetent, and would provide them with a 
stable status. Where no other solution is possible, such a system would not, unlike 
slavery, be contrary to natural law.
Of course, a far better solution would be to engineer a society in which laziness and 
incompetence could be avoided. The most obvious path  to such an end would be to 
provide strong positive incentives to industry. Of course, a secure system of property is a 
necessary part of such incentives, as Pufendorf recognizes. But a rational science of 
domestic management and wealth creation, including a sensitive measure of the values of 
goods to facilitate commercial exchanges, is crucially important. The development of 
such a science could thus pave the way to overcoming  the problem of necessity. 
Recognition of this possibility is an im portant feature of the social theories th a t  arise after 
Pufendorf: as they develop an increasingly sophisticated appreciation of the productive
powers of human labour and of commercial exchanges - an appreciation which leads to the 
new science of political economy - so the concern with the state  of necessity, and of its 
rights, steadily diminishes. For this reason, the decline of special concern with the right 
of necessity in subsequent theories does not indicate a weakened concern for the well-being 
of the necessitous. Rather, it is the natural outcome of a strategy which was believed to 
provide a powerful - albeit indirect - solution to problems like poverty, and its presumed 
causes in laziness and carelessness. Commercial society has, for such theories, a built-in 
“m aximin” tendency - it steadily improves the lot of the worst off/ 1 This view is 
strongly defended by Locke in a famous passage, where he says that ,  in America, “a King 
of a large and fruitful Territory there feeds, lodges, and is clad worse than a day Labourer
9 1 Q"iy For the “maximin” rule of measuring the justice of outcomes, see John Rawls. A Theory of  
Justice, Oxford: O.U.P. (1972), pp. 152-3.
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in E ngland” 22® Hume admits that commercial society must encourage avarice,22* but 
nonetheless holds that '‘the ages of refinement are both the happiest and the most 
virtuous” . L One reason for holding this to be so would be to see avarice as the cure for 
the vices tha t  cause poverty, and so a small price to pay for a general improvement in the 
lot of mankind.
We can see in Pufendorfs work an awareness of some of these matters, especially his 
chapter on prices and money. He recognizes th a t  there is a strong empirical connection 
between the absence of a money economy and the absence of civilization:.
It is perfectly plain tha t  those nations which are unacquainted with the use of 
currency have no part in the advances of civilization. 0
This connection reflects the fact that in sophisticated societies simple ways of measuring 
the values of things no longer suffice. The “ordinary price” of a thing or action is
the aptitude of a thing or action, by which it can either mediately or 
immediately contribute something to the necessity of human life, or to making it
9  o  4
more advantageous or pleasant.“
The ordinary price of a thing is thus its use-value. This way of measuring value did not 
long suffice for human life, however, since the division of labour made the different use- 
values of things, practically speaking, incommensurable. Therefore it became necessary 
for human beings to establish  a means of measuring values:
In view of the fact tha t  things subject to proprietorship differed in nature and 
did not afford the same service to human necessities ... therefore, by the 
agreement of men some measure had to be set upon things, according to which 
measure things of different nature could be compared to and made equal with 
each o ther.22^
22^Locke, Two Treatises, 11.41.
9 9  1
““ raume, “Of Commerce”, in Essays Moral, Political, and Literary, ed. T. H. Green and 
T. H. Grose, London (1882), vol. 1, p. 295: “it is requisite to ... animate menj with a spirit of 
avarice and industry, art and luxury”.
222Hume, “Of Refinement in the Arts”, op.cit., vol. 1, p. 300.
22ZDJNG,  V .i.ll.
22ADJNG,  V.i.4.
225DJNG,  V .i.l.
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This measure of the value of things, because it is both established by agreement and the 
measure of the proper prices of other things, Pufendorf calls the em inen t  price. The 
eminent price needs a sensitive system of measurements of value, so to this end money is 
introduced. Because money measures the value of all goods, it has a stable value which 
does not decay with the spoiling or wearing out of particular goods. Money is thus “a sort 
of .... sponsor or surety” of value.
In order to fulfil its function as a convenient medium of exchange, money must possess 
certain qualities: it must be durable, easily transportable, and scarce. (The last is
necessary because scarcity allows “the values of many things” to .be  “compressed” into 
something of manageable size.) For these reasons the rare metals were established as the 
most appropriate forms of money: “it seemed the most convenient thing to the majority 
of nations to take the more noble and comparatively rare metals, such as gold ... , silver, 
and bronze” . Thus the needs of sophisticated society generate a system of metal 
money, a system established by agreement, and which provides a stable measure of value.
This view of money is accepted by Locke in the Second Treatise , where he explicitly 
connects the invention of money to the sophistication of society. 0 The two also agree 
on the nature of the just price. This is not a price which can be established independently 
of market forces; but neither is it simply the market price, irrespective of the factors 
which produce it. Rather,
it is a just price which is commonly set by those who are sufficiently acquainted
with both the merchandise and the m arket .22^
The just price thus admits of a certain “latitude” , or variation; what it most importantly 
excludes is any price variations established by deception or extortion. Locke’s treatm ent 
of the just price likewise treats it as a product of fair and informed market forces. Markets 
are neither essentially just  nor essentially unjust. Fair markets, however, establish just
226DJNG , V.i.12. 
227DJNG , v .i .is .
22*Two Treatises, 11. 37. 
229 DJNG , V.1.9.
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prices."*^
Pufendorfs observations on price and money reflect his awareness of the importance of 
industry in human society. By securing the fruits of industry to the industrious 
themselves, a source of conflict is avoided. Such security is likewise a spur to increased 
industry, and thus a ’means by which the problems of necessity (including a major cause of 
slavery) can be overcome. His inheritors develop this increased concern with the fledgling 
study of political economy. They also show an accompanying decreased concern with the 
question of necessity and its rights, and thus also of self-enslavement, especially in the 
stable political climate of mid-eighteenth century Britain. At the end of the seventeenth 
century in England, however, political questions quite distinct from the problem of 
necessity bring the issue of slavery to the fore. And, whereas the Natural Lawyers 
hesitated from directly attacking slavery, even when, as I have argued, some of their 
fundamental principles required nothing less, the sharply different political climate in late- 
seventeenth century England encouraged a different tone altogether. The desire to avoid 
the perceived threat of political slavery ends vacillation about the acceptability of 
enslavement of all forms, including those forms generated by necessity. Locke holds 
unequivocally tha t  the right of necessity, which he describes in terms of (a right of) 
charity, shows enslavement to be always unnecessary as well as unacceptable:
Charity  gives every Man a Title to so much out of another’s Plenty, as will keep 
him from extreme want, where he has no means to subsist otherwise; and a Man 
can no more justly make use of another’s necessity, to force him to become his 
vassal, by with-holding tha t  Relief, God requires him to afford to the wants of 
his Brother, than he that has more strength can seize upon a weaker, master him 
to his Obedience, and with a Dagger at his Throat offer him death or Slavery.
In the next chapter, we shall see how Locke is able to reject slavery in all its forms by 
arguing tha t  the obligation to preserve oneself requires tha t  the suum  be inalienable. 
This has some significant consequences for the account of property, but slavery does not 
loom large as an economic (rather than political) problem. For Locke, the problem of 
necessity is solved by rational industry.
9°0" Locke’s treatment of just price is contained in Venditio.95, published as an appendix to John 
Dunn’s “Justice and the Interpretation of Locke’s Political Theory”, in Political Studies, vol. 16 
(1968), pp. 68-87. (This fragment also refers to the fact that charity places on us more far-reaching 
demands than does justice.)
231 Two Treatises, 1.42.
C h apter T hree
J O H N  L O C K E
I: T he F o u n d a tio n  o f N a tu r a l Law
In the Two Treatises o f  G overnm ent, with which we shall be mainly concerned in this 
chapter, Locke frequently appeals to the law of nature as the foundation from which his 
principles are drawn, and with which his arguments accord. There is, it seems, no 
problem about our knowledge of this law: thus we are told tha t  “the Law of Nature isj 
plain and intelligible to all rational Creatures.” Although it is an unwritten law, “and so 
no where to be found but in the minds of Men” , it can nevertheless be plain to all because 
a m an ’s knowledge of it “is grounded on his having Reason , which is able to instruct him 
in th a t  Law he is to govern himself by” . This relation is summed up in the statement 
tha t  “the Law of Nature ... is the Law of Reason .” 1 As such, the Law of Nature is a 
source of knowledge of the human condition which is distinct from, but in accord with, 
divine revelation. Thus Locke holds, in the Second T reatise , th a t  natural reason and 
revelation provide alternative, independent justifications of the right of self-preservation:
Whether we consider natural Reason , which tells us, tha t  Men, being once born, 
have a right to their Preservation, and consequently to Meat and Drink, and 
such other things, as Nature affords for their Subsistence: Or Revelation , which 
gives us an account of those Grants God made of the World to Adam, and to 
N oah , and his Sons, ‘tis very clear, tha t  God, as King David says, Psal. 
CVX.xvj. has given the Earth to the C hildren o f  M en. given it to Mankind in 
common.^
The precise nature of this grant in common to all mankind will be considered below. The 
im portant point here is th a t  natural reason, and so natural law, enables us to arrive at 
conclusions concerning the human condition which are both plain to all who seek them 
out, and which are fully independent of divine revelation. Natural law is a system of 
natural knowledge which is the yardstick for assessing human actions and institutions and 
it is to this system that  Locke appeals in formulating the doctrines of the Two Treatises. 
The frequent references to natural law in this work reflect, in both content and frequency, 
the fundamental position it allots to natural law.
1John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. P. Laslett, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, second edition (1967). The quotations are from II. 124, II. 136, 11.63, and 1.101.
“Two Treatises, 11.25.
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When we turn to Locke's most famous work, An Essay  concerning H um an  
Understanding , published in the same year as the Two Treatises , we encounter a rather 
different s ta te  of affairs. References to the law of nature are extremely scarce - it is 
mentioned only three times in a work of considerable length. This is not to say tha t  in 
this work:, Locke denies any of the assertions concerning the nature or importance of 
natural law, but his remarks are not merely very few, they are also considerably more 
circumspect than the bold assertions of the Two Treatises. In the Essay  only three claims 
are made about natural law. Firstly, we are told th a t  such a law is generally 
acknowledged, because it follows from the knowledge of G od’s existence:
the existence of God, is so many ways manifest, and the Obedience we owe him, 
so congruous to the Light of Reason, tha t  the great part  of Mankind give 
Testimony to the Law of Nature .0
The Natural Law is thus not natural in the sense of being independent of any theological 
commitments; rather, it is what is known  by natural methods, methods which likewise 
generate theological beliefs. Secondly, we are told that ,  by his attack on innate ideas, 
Locke is not thereby rejecting natural law. This is because
there is a great deal of difference between an innate Law, and a law of Nature; 
between something imprinted on our Minds in their very original, and something 
th a t  we being ignorant of may atta in  to the knowledge of, by the use and due 
application of our natural Faculties .* 4
This second remark tells us rather more than the first. It not only affirms tha t  the law of 
nature is the law of natural reason, as maintained in the Two Treatises , but draws out the 
implication tha t  such laws are not innate: they are discovered.
The third remark concerning natural law is this: it belongs to one of three sorts of moral 
rule “to which Men generally refer, and by which they judge of the Rectitude or Pravity of 
their Actions.” These three sorts of moral rule are the Divine Law, the Civil Law, and 
“The Law of Opinion  or Reputation, if I may so call it” (which, in the first edition of the 
E ssa y , he had called the '‘‘philosophical Law” ) .5 Natural law is part of the Divine Law. 
because this latter category refers to
9
°John Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding, ed Peter H. Nidditch, Oxford:
Clarendon Press (1975), I.iii.6.
4Essay, I.iii. 13
5Essay, II.xxviii.6-7.
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that Law which God has set to the actions of Men, whether promulgated to 
them by the light of Nature, or the voice of Revelation.®
The law promulgated by “the voice of Revelation” is divine positive law; but the law 
promulgated by “the light of Nature” is the Law of Nature. Both these laws are properly 
regarded as Divine Law, because both are given by God, and rigthfully given:
That God has given a Rule whereby Men should govern themselves, I think there 
is no body so brutish as to deny. He has a Right to do it, we are his Creatures:
He has Goodness and Wisdom to direct our Actions to tha t  which is best: and he 
has Power to enforce it by Rewards and Punishments, of infinite weight and 
duration, in another Life: for no body can take us out of his hands.^
It is important to notice tha t  in this passage two quite distinct reasons are given to show 
that  God’s rule over us is rightful: tha t  he has the power to enforce it, and  that he has 
“Goodness and Wisdom to direct our Actions to that which is best.” These two elements 
of God’s rule are, respectively, its formal and material elements. Locke is sometimes 
guilty of leading us astray by forgetting, or downplaying, the material element of the law. 
This passage shows him to have recognized the importance of the material element, and it 
is not the only one in which he does so. We shall return to this m atter  below: here it is 
im portant simply to note tha t  both elements are invoked.
The markedly theological language Locke employs here (and, of course, through his 
work) may help to explain why a careful Lockean scholar should have made an elementary 
factual error concerning the scope of Locke’s “Divine Law'” . In the editorial introduction 
to his critical edition of the Two Treatises , Peter Laslett makes the erroneous claim that, 
for Locke, “when it comes (II.xxviii.7-) to the description of the laws or rules which men 
actually refer their actions to, no natural law is mentioned.” Because all actions are 
measured only by divine law, civil law, or the law of “opinion or reputation” , Laslett
Q
concludes that “The Essay  has no room for natural law.” 0 But, as we have seen, the 
“Divine Law” includes both divine positive law and natural law, so Laslett is quite 
mistaken. (The survival of such a straightforward factual error in the second edition of 
this work is very surprising.) Natural law is regarded by Locke as a part  of divine law 
apparently because the obligation to obey such law depends directly on God. As Locke’s 
first remark on natural law in the Essay  shows, it is the manner in which it is known
DEssay, Il.xxviii.S
7 ibid.
8Peter Laslett, Introduction to Two Treatises, p. 81.
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which distinguishes natural law. It is known by •‘the Light of Reason’’ , but this does not 
imply tha t  the obligation to obey it proceeds independently of the divine will. Rather, the 
formal and material elements of the divine will are the source of the obligation to obey 
natural law, and it is only because such knowledge of God is i t se l f  accessible to ” the 
’Light of Reason"* tha t  natural law is an independent ( that is, independent of divine 
positive law) rule for human actions. Presumably Laslett has fallen into error by failing 
to keep in mind that ,  for Locke, natural law does not bind independently of knowledge of 
God's existence. Like Pufendorf, Locke rejects the “rationalistic” et iams i  daremus  clause 
of Grotius; like Pufendorf, he bases the obligation to obey the natural law on formal and 
material elements of the divine will.
In the Essay , then, we see tha t  Locke holds tha t  natural law is part of the divine law; it 
is knowable by the use of our natural faculties, th a t  is by reason, and so is not dependent 
on a doctrine of innate ideas; and we are obligated to obey this law because of the 
(naturally knowable) twin elements of the divine will. This is by no means a substantial 
harvest from a field as extensive as the Essay,  expecially when it is remembered tha t  the 
original aim of the Essay  was, apparently, to settle matters concerning “the Principles of 
morality and reveal'd Religion.”  ^ Nevertheless, this much is sufficient to show that, as a 
m atter  of fac t , the Essay  does indeed accord a place to natural law.
It might be the case, however, tha t  the Essay  cannot consis tent ly  allow any room for 
natural law. A number of commentators have held tha t  it cannot - most notably von 
Leyden in his editorial introduction to Locke’s Essay  on the Law o f  Nature  - and he has
^From a marginal note by James Tyrrell to his copy of the Essay , quoted by R.S. Woolhouse, 
Locke, Brighton: Harvester Press (1983), p. 7. Locke himself remarks, in “The Epistle to the
Reader’ , that the Essay had its beginnings when “five or six Friends meeting at my Chamber, and 
discoursing on a subject very remote from this [i.e. from the workings and extent of the human 
understanding], found themselves quickly at a stand, by the Difficulties that rose on every side.” 
To resolve this, it was agreed that “before we set our selves upon Enquiries of that Nature, it was 
necessary to examine our own Abilities, and see, what Objects our Understandings were, or were 
not fitted to deal with” [Essay, p.7). The point of the Essay was therefore to determine whether 
or not the limited capacities and operations of the understanding were capable of generating, or 
discovering, moral and religious knowledge. The passages already quoted on natural law show that 
Locke’s conclusion was in the affirmative. It is thus not inappropriate to complain that the Essay 
says so little on the matter. Locke’s intentions appear to have been to conclude the Essay with an 
account of the principles of morality, but he abandoned the attempt - it remained in an unfinished 
and unpublished form in a paper entitled “Of Ethick in General”. On this matter, see Wolfgang 
von Leyden’s editorial introduction to John Locke, Essays on the Law of Nature, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press (1954), pp. 69-71. (The Essays will hereafter be cited as ELN.)
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been followed in this conclusion by Laslett and John Dunn.1(1 Laslett and Dunn, however, 
do little more than reiterate von Leyden’s conclusion, with a general approving reference 
to his discussion of the m atter. So, although a detailed consideration of these issues 
would not be appropriate here, it will be useful to discuss briefly some of von Leyden’s 
views. Specifically, von Leyden claims that two of the Essay's  doctrines are stumbling 
blocks to consistently accepting the existence of natural law, and these "explain why 
Locke did not more fully discuss natural law in the Essay. They are “his growing belief in 
hedonism, and his scepticism about language.” 11 The problem about language is clear 
enough: it is certainly not easy to see how the law of nature can be, as he says in the 
Second Treatise , “plain and intelligible to all rational Creatures” , when he holds, in the 
E ssa y , th a t  because of the “imperfection” and “abuse” of words, “in the interpretation of 
Laws, whether Divine, or Humane, there is no end,” and tha t  therefore even “in Discourse 
of Religion, Law, and Morality, ... there will be the greatest difficulty.” 1^
The other m atter, concerning hedonism, is not, however, such an obvious problem. It 
has been recently argued by John Colman, for example, tha t  Locke’s hedonism is not at 
odds with his account of natural law. This is because, for Locke, moral qualities are not 
intuited by reason, even though justified by reason. Rather, “it is discursive reason 
working with da ta  given in experience which finds out what the moral law demands” .1  ^
(As we shall see, Locke emphasises this in the fourth of his essays on natural law.) In 
Locke's account it is pleasure and pain, or the prospect of such, which is the mainspring of 
human action, and moral behaviour depends on rational reflection on how this pleasure is 
achieved, or pain avoided. There is no natural harmony of this-worldly interests, 
however; and so human beings sometimes show a lack of conviction in moral matters. 
Moral practices do not always measure up to moral professions. As Locke puts it,
if we will not in Civility allow too much Sincerity to the Professions of most
M en , but think their Actions to be the Interpreters of their Thoughts, we shall
find, th a t  they have no such internal Veneration for these Rules, nor so full a
^See von Leyden, op. cit., pp. 71-82; Laslett, op. cit., pp. 79-83; John Dunn, The Political 
Thought of John Locke, Cambridge: C.U.P. (1969), pp. 187-8.
11Von Leyden, op. cit., p. 75.
12“Two Treatises, 11.124; Essay, III.ix.9 and III.ix.22. Cf. von Leyden’s discussion of this point, 
op. cit., p. 73.
1 9
°John Colman, John Locke’s Moral Philosophy, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press
(1983), p. 236.
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Perswasion o f  their Certainty  and Obligation. The great Principle of Morality,
To do as one would be done to, is more commended, than practised.*4
Such a lack of '‘internal Veneration” for moral rules would destroy morality itself, were it 
not for the other-worldly pleasures and pains of divine rewards and punishments. 
Hedonistic motivations to action are not inconsistent with natural law because “the true 
ground of M orality” is
the Will and Law of a God, who sees Men in the dark, has in his Hand Rewards 
and Punishments, and Power enough to call to account the Proudest Offender.*®
Von Leyden’s view, tha t  (if not an outright contradiction*® ) there is a tension between 
the hedonism of the Essay  and the natural law doctrines scattered throughout Locke’s 
work, discussed in most detail in the 1664 essays on natural law (not published by Locke), 
reflects his particular understanding of Locke’s natural law doctrines. This view is 
summed up in his editorial introduction to the early essays. He says:
From what Locke has to say in his sixth essay it appears that he regards natural 
law as a set of commmands proceeding from the will of God and that it is on this 
account tha t  this law is righteous and binding. The position he adopts in that 
deep-reaching question of scholastic controversy concerning the essence of law is 
th a t  of the Nominalists, represented by the so-called “voluntarist” theory, i.e. he 
adopts a legislative ethics. Yet ... his position shifts and inclines towards the 
“intellectualist” theory of the Realists, according to which law has its foundation 
in a dictate of Right Reason, in the essential nature of things, and is thus 
independent of will.*'
Dunn’s understanding of the Essays on the Law o f  Nature  appears to be strongly 
influenced by von Leyden (he certainly does not dispute the la t te r ’s interpretation), so, in 
like spirits, he remarks tha t  the Essays  “present the mind at work and not merely the
*4Essay , I.iii.7.
*®Essay, I.iii.6.
1 “To hold a belief in an ultimate moral law, or law of nature, and to maintain that ‘good and 
bad, being relative terms, do not denote anything in the nature of the thing, but only the relation it 
bears to another, in its aptness and tendency to produce in it pleasure or pain’, is to express two 
doctrines which, if not altogether incompatible, are bound to produce vacillation and vagueness in 
the mind of him who holds them.” Von Leyden, op. cit., p. 72. The internal quotation is from 
Locke’s unpublished manuscript, “Of Ethick in General” , section 7.
17Von Leyden, op. cit., p. 51.
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finished results of such work.” 1^
Such views are, I believe, mistaken. Locke does not shift from a voluntarist to a 
rationalist (or “intellectualist” ) account of natural law. Rather, he consistently maintains 
a voluntarist position (although he does not consistently maintain the same  voluntarist 
position throughout). We can approach a proper understanding of Locke by considering 
John Colman's reply to von Leyden. Colman holds von Leyden to be mistaken, because 
Locke
does not waver between a voluntarist and an intellectualist theory of law, but 
consistently maintains the former. Nevertheless, it is true that Locke is not a 
voluntarist with respect to the content of the moral law. His voluntarism is 
strictly a theory of moral obligation . 19
Colman is, I think, half right. But his distinction between moral obligation and the 
content of the moral law overdraws a distinction between two things which, if we are to 
understand Locke correctly, are best understood as different sides of the one coin. The 
distinction is best described as the distinction between the nature  of obligation, and its 
extent. W hat Colman calls the theory of moral obligation is best described as the theory 
of the nature of obligation. The content of the moral law is how far this obligation 
extends - what things we are obligated to do, or to refrain from. Taken together, these 
two aspects of obligation constitute the law of nature. Although Locke devotes little 
a ttention to clarifying his views at this point, what he does say shows him to understand 
these two aspects of obligation in similar manner to Pufendorf - as the formal and 
material elements which jointly constitute obligation. The following discussion will spell 
out Locke’s conception of these elements.
Our obligation to conform to the requirements of natural law derives from the will of 
God. This obligation has two aspects - its nature and its extent - and these correspond to 
the two elements of the divine will, the formal element and the material element. We 
have already met with these two elements in a passage from the Essay. The formal 
element, which determines the nature of obligation, is God’s power over his creatures. As 
Locke puts it in the E ssa y s , “it is the decree of a superior will, wherein the formal cause 
of a law appears to consist.” But the formal element is not itself sufficient to constitute
1 8Dunn, op. cit., p. 21.
19Colman, op. cit., p. 32. 
20Locke, ELN, Essay I, pp. 111-3.
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an obligation. We have to include an account of “what is and what is not to be done, 
which is the proper function of a law” . Because of these two elements, the law constitutes 
“all th a t  is requisite to create an obligation.” ^1
The second of these elements is the material element of the divine will. It is no easy 
m atte r  to properly describe this element. The material element of the divine will is the 
content of the divine will, tha t  is the creation itself. Not just the creation as a set of 
brute facts, however, because this would leave the divine purpose (part of the content of 
the will) out of account. So, the material element of the divine will can be called the 
teleology of the creation. With respect to natural law, the material element of the divine 
will is shown in a teleological understanding of human nature, which is tha t  part of the 
creation to which natural law applies. (There is a natural law only in so far as there is 
human nature: “human nature must needs be changed before this law can be either
altered or annulled ... natural law stands and falls together with the nature of man as it is 
at present.” ““) So the material element of the divine will is not a coercive will standing 
over and against the natural world; it is, rather, the natural world i tself .  Thus a 
voluntarist account of natural law which includes both formal and material elements in its 
account of the divine will is an a ttem pt to subsume  rationalism, not an a ttem p t to deny 
it. It is for this reason tha t  Locke can talk of natural law in terms strongly reminiscent of 
Cudworth: natural law “does not depend on an unstable and changeable will, but on the 
eternal order of things ... certain essential features of things are immutable, and ... certain 
duties arise out of necessity and cannot be other than they are.” The law of nature is “a 
fixed and permanent rule of morals, which reason itself pronounces, and which persists,
O O
being a fact so firmly rooted in the soil of human nature .”
Locke’s employment of such language makes it unsurprising that von Leyden and others 
should, have been led into thinking tha t  he here abandons his voluntarist beginnings. But 
Locke’s meaning becomes a little clearer when we consider a subsequent passage in the 
same essay. Although “certain essential features of things are immutable,”
this is not because nature or God (as I should say more correctly) could not have 
created man differently. Rather, the cause is that, since man has been made as
^1ibid ., p. 113
^ E L N , Essay VII, pp. 199, 201. Cf. von Leyden’s introduction (p. 51): “the bonds of natural 
law are coeval with the human race.”
23ELN,  Essay VII, p. 199.
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he is, equipped with reason and his other faculties and destined for this mode of 
life, there necessarily result from his inborn constitution some definite duties for 
him, which cannot be other than they are .^4
So, humankind was not necessarily  made in a certain way (the divine will was 
unconstrained), but having been made has been made in a certain way. This is the 
material element of the the divine will manifested in the world. G od’s formal will is 
necessary for there to be a created world at all; God’s material will makes the world the 
kind of world it is. So, with respect to the law of nature, the formal foundation of the law 
is G od’s power over us. In this respect natural law depends on God’s existence. This 
Locke stresses, as we have already seen in a number of passages. The material foundation 
of this law is hum an nature itself, tha t  is, a nature “equipped with reason and his other 
faculties and destined for this mode of life.” By keeping in mind that the divine will has 
both formal and material elements, then, we are able to see tha t  Locke is consistently a 
voluntarist about natural law, and tha t  this voluntarism covers, pace Colman, not only 
the nature of obligation, but also the content of the moral law (of obligation).
It was said above tha t ,  while Locke is consistently a voluntarist, his voluntarism is not 
itself always consistent. This is because he sometimes forgets the necessity of the material 
element. One passage where this appears to be the case is the passage in the Second 
Treatise  where Locke holds that human beings are unreservedly subject to the divine will, 
because “they are his Property, whose Workmanship they are, made to last during his,
or
not one anothers Pleasure.” “0 Having clarified the nature of the material element, we can 
now deal with this remark quite briefly. Since God is in control of his own creation, of 
course we are in his power, and in this sense can be said to last during his pleasure. But 
this in no way justifies arbitrary (“wilful” ) interventions in the course of the world; it 
merely emphasises our impotence before the divine will (whether manifested in miraculous 
interventions, or in the face of natural - created - forces). When we remember tha t  the 
divine will is said by Locke to be not unstable and changeable, but manifest in “the 
eternal order of things” , an order of things which necessitates certain duties because of the 
material constitution of the world , we are quite entitled to conclude that God’s 
“pleasure” is quite unlike our own, and does not extend to arbitrary (to “wilful” ) actions. 
It is not distinct from the divine purpose for the creation. So, while we can quite well
U ibid.
Two Treatises,  II.6.
26 ELN, op. cit.
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agree that we are made to last during God’s pleasure, we are not entitled to conclude 
from this (as Locke seems tempted to do) tha t  we can have no complaint if God should 
choose to dispose of us as we might choose to dispose of some unvalued possession. 
(Neither are we entitled to conclude that a divine action of such a kind would be wrong. 
If we hold the moral law to apply only to human beings - which, as we have seen, Locke 
does - such an ascription of wrongdoing would just be misapplied. But we can hold the 
moral law to apply only to human beings without abandoning grounds for complaint. 
Such complaints could be of the form uIf God were human, his actions would be wrong” , 
or “God does not treat us as well as he requires us to treat each other.” )
A second, and more complete, example of Locke forgetting the difference the material 
element makes occurs in the seventh of the Essays on the Law o f  Nature. In countering 
objections to his view that  the binding force of natural law is eternal, Locke discusses an 
attem pted refutation of his view in the following way:
A proof tha t  the binding force of the law of nature is not everlasting and 
universal can be given in this way: namely be showing that, though by general 
agreement it is a law of nature that every man should be allowed to keep his own 
property, or, if you like, tha t  no one may take away and keep for himself what is 
another’s property, yet at God’s command the binding force of this law can 
lapse, for this actually happened, as we read, in the case of the Israelites when 
they departed from Egypt and journeyed to Palestine. To this we reply by 
denying the minor premiss: for if God should order someone not to restore
something he has received on loan, the ownership of the thing itself, but not the 
binding force of natural law, would cease; the law is not violated, but the owner 
is changed, for the previous owner loses together with the possession of the thing 
his right to it. In fact, the goods of fortune are never so much ours that they 
cease to be God's: tha t  supreme Lord of all things can, without doing wrong,
give of His property to anyone as He pleases by His sovereign will.“ '
This will not do. Of course God can do whatever he pleases, without doing wrong, since 
Locke has told us tha t  the law of nature applies only to human actions. But from this it 
follows that, in sharp contrast to the case with human beings, the assertion that God does 
no wrong in performing a particular action is not any kind of moral judgement. In fact, it 
is not a judgement of the relevant action at all, a fact which can readily be seen by 
recognizing th a t  it would be equally true to say of the action that, by doing it, neither did 
God act rightly. Therefore, if Locke’s ambition here is to justify the ways of God to 
human beings, the a ttem pt fails because the justificatory work in the argument is being 
done by an equivocation on ^without doing wrong” . If Locke’s aim here is not 
justificatory, the remark th a t  God does no wrong is no more than a reminder tha t  certain
27ELN , Essay VII, p. 201-3.
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kinds of objects cannot possess certain kinds of qualities - best exemplified by the kinds of 
cases so beloved of a past generation of analytical philosophers, e.g. that numbers cannot 
be coloured.
The basic problem with the passage is, as previously, that Locke has forgotten the 
material element. It cannot be true tha t  “the ownership of the thing itself, but not the 
binding force of natural law, would cease7’. The binding force of natural law is not simply 
a reflection of God’s formal act of willing, but also of the m atter of that will, manifested 
concretely in the world itself. The law “does not depend on an unstable and changeable 
will, but on the eternal order of things” 28; it is, in fact, “a rational apprehension of what 
is right .that; puts us under an obligation .” 29
Locke fails to recognize the importance of the material element in a number of other 
passages, but characteristically the passages are themselves sufficient to show the 
unacceptability of the oversight. He says, in one place, that
God has created us out of nothing and, if He pleases, will reduce us again to 
nothing: we are, therefore, subject to Him in perfect justice and by utmost
necessity .30
Because of G od’s power over us, it is indeed true tha t  we are subject to him by utmost 
necessity, but if the natural law does not apply to God, what can it mean to say th a t  we 
are subject to him in perfect justice? W ithout stressing the material element of the divine 
will, this can amount to no more than a reiteration of God’s power over us. Locke 
obviously wants to say more than this and we can clearly see as much from another 
passage in the same essay. He says:
since nothing else is required to impose an obligation but the authority and 
rightful power of the one who commands and the disclosure of his will, no one
9 -I
can doubt tha t  the law of nature is binding on men / 1
Obligation requires, then, not merely power but “authority and rightful power” . (This is 
a somewhat curious construction, since on at least some accounts “authority” means  
rightful power.) It also requires disclosure of the will of the authority , since without this
28i’6zd., p. 199.
29ELN, Essay VI, p. 185. 
30{&zd., p. 187.
Z1ibid.
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we could not know either the fact or the extent of the obligation. (In recognizing this 
requirement, Locke is showing that he too sees tha t  obligation fails where capacity fails: 
tha t  “ought” implies “can” .) In the case of natural law, this disclosure of the will must be 
naturally knowable, which means that it must be discernable by “the light and principles 
of na ture” , the light of reason. But a mere disclosure of will is not sufficient: the will
disclosed must be of a kind which can be naturally recognized as one of rightful power, of 
perfect justice. This cannot be provided unless the material element of the divine will is 
kept in view.
At this point, however, we encounter a problem: how can the material element of the 
divine will, manifested in the structure and purposes of the creation, allow us to speak of 
God’s power as rightful, of his activity as perfectly just, when it has been stressed that the 
natural law applies only to human beings? Through the material element of the divine 
will - through the features of the world, including our own most important capacity of 
rational reflection on the world and our own place in it - we can come to an understanding 
of what is rightful power, and perfect justice, as regards ourselves. To do so is to come to 
an understanding of what the natural law requires. But the natural law regards only 
ourselves, So, even though notions such as rightful power and perfect justice indeed 
depend on the material element of the divine will, they do not in any way apply to the 
divine will. They cannot be employed to describe divine actions. On Locke’s own terms, 
such a conclusion seems irresistible. Is there any way around it?
Strictly speaking, I think there is not. The best approach, if we are to make any sense 
of Locke’s restriction of natural law to human beings, and his ascription of moral 
capacities, such as justice, to God, is to analyse such language as analogical. Divine 
volitions or actions display specific features which correspond more or less closely to 
features of human volitions or actions. The latter  are subject to natural law, and so can 
be accounted just or unjust, right or wrong, etc. The former, although not subject to 
natural law, nevertheless by corresponding to actions tha t  are so subject therefore 
correspond to acts which are just or unjust, right or wrong, etc. And the actions of the 
stable and unchanging divine will can be seen, by the light of reason, to correspond to 
those actions which, among human beings, are recogized as just and right. In this way it 
is possible to speak of divine volition and actions as i f  they were subject to natural law, 
even though they are not. So, despite the fact tha t  God is not subject to the obligations 
imposed by natural law (he could not be, since he is subject to no superior will), the 
correspondence of divine volitions or actions with the goods apprehended by the light of 
reason enable us to speak of God’s justice, goodness, and so on. The necessary part 
played by the material element requires that we be able to speak this way, tha t  our
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judgem ents of divine actions, however poorly understood, show these actions not to be 
contrary to the principles embodied in the natural law. We have already seen that Locke 
does invoke considerations of divine goodness when filling out the ground of our natural 
obligations, even though he sometimes forgets them or mistakenly plays down their 
importance. We can conclude our trea tm ent of this issue by showing some passages where 
he brings this feature to the fore, as (it has been argued) he needs to do.
It has already been noted tha t ,  in the Essay concerning H um an  Understanding , Locke 
justifies God’s right over us not merely by reminding us of the extent of our dependence 
on divine power, but also by pointing out th a t  God “has Goodness and Wisdom to direct 
our Actions to tha t  which is best"’. A number of similar passages occur in the Essays on 
the Law o f  Nature. In the first essay, he speaks of the law of nature as not only the 
enactment of a superior power, but also “implanted in our hearts.” 0"* It is thus something 
we acknowledge as just, not merely a requirement of prudence. (In what manner this law 
is “im planted” shall be considered below.) Later on in the same essay, Locke defends the 
existence of the law of nature  in two ways. Firstly, by appealing to Aristotle’s account , 
in the Nicomachean E th ic s , of the function of human beings as “the active exercise of the 
m ind’s faculties in accordance with rational principle” , he concludes that “man must of 
necessity perform what reason prescribes . ” 0 0  Secondly, the existence of the law of nature 
“can be derived from m en’s consciences.” Locke illustrates this by quoting Juvenal: “no 
one who commits a wicked action is acquitted in his own judgem ent.” ^  Both these 
arguments show the law of nature to be part of , or testified to by, our own nature as 
beings of a determinate kind. This nature is part of the manifestation of the material 
element of the divine will, and shows us to be judges of what is, and what is not, in 
accordance with the law of nature. We are not simply to be regarded as objects at the 
free disposal of an inscrutable omnipotence.
Most of the other passages where Locke invokes the material element of obligation occur 
in the sixth essay. This is not surprising, since the sixth essay is the one which directly 
addresses the question of our obligation to obey natural law. Several of these passages 
have already been quoted, so at this stage it will suffice if we settle for one more example.
°^ELN, Essay I, p. 111.
o6ibid., p. 113. The quotation from Aristotle [E.N. 
(1943), p. 20. (Editorial footnote, p. 113.)
1.7) is from the translation of H. Rackham
Z4ibid., p. 117. 
Satires, xiii.2-3.
The quotation (translated, apparently, directly by the editor) is from Juvenal’s
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Not only is it the case, says Locke, tha t  God’s absolute power over us means that “we are 
bound to observe the limits He prescribes", but also “it is reasonable tha t  we should do 
what shall please Him who is omniscient and most wise.”^5 The second part he seems to 
have added as something of an afterthought, but even if we treat it so, it nevertheless 
draws our attention to the material element of the divine will. God is “omniscient and 
most wise” , and so when Locke appears to be invoking divine power alone as the source of 
obligation, this is not because power itself constitutes obligation, but because the power of 
“Him who is omniscient and most wise” is always r ightfu l  power (because it is always 
directed to what is best). Thus,
no one can oblige or bind us to do anything, unless he has right and  power over 
us; and indeed, when he commands what he wishes should be done and what 
should not be done, he only makes use o f  his right.
Right is not power simpliciter. The formal command of a superior is not itself sufficient 
to constitute obligation. (Without such commands, there can be no obligation - only 
reasons for action.) Rather, obligation requires both the superior’s will, and the superior’s 
right to command obedience through the justice and goodness of his (material) will. For 
Locke, both these are true of God, therefore God’s rule over us is rightful. This rule is the 
“D iv ine  Law” referred to in the E ssay ; and tha t  part of the divine law which is knowable 
by the “light of Nature” (which, as we shall see, is the light of reason) is the law of
O '?
nature. ‘ We are now in a position to determine the characteristics of this law.
II: T h e C h aracteristic s  o f N a tu ra l Law
We have seen in the preceding section tha t ,  for Locke, natural law is ultimately 
grounded in the formal and material elements of the divine will. His view is thus of the 
same kind as Pufendorfs  (although not in fluenced  by Pufendorf - the Essays on the Law 
o f  Nature  predate the publication of De Jure Naturae et G en tium ).  The terms in which 
he speaks of natural law show this similarity to be no accident - his conception of what 
natural law is, and what it is not, places him comfortably within the tradition delineated 
in the first two chapters. This is not to say tha t  Locke makes no useful contribution to 
this tradition, merely recapitulating established doctrines. Quite the opposite is true: 
Locke makes a major contribution to spelling out the material foundation of natural law.
^ E L N , Essay VI, p. 183.
oui’6zd., pp. 181-3 (emphasis added). 
37 Essay, II.xxviii.7.
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He provides a general sketch of this in the early E ssays , but the Essay concerning
*y o
H um an  Understanding  is a major, albeit incomplete (perhaps even misconceived"' ) 
a ttem pt to specify the material grounds of natural obligations. It would lead us too far 
away from the main purposes of this study to examine the doctrines of the Essay  itself: 
we will rest content with the sketch offered in the Essays on the Law o f  Nature.
The orthodoxy of much of Locke’s treatm ent of natural law in the early Essays  can be 
shown by a brief summary. Firstly, as Grotius had done (and Pufendorf would shortly 
do), Locke identifies Carneades as the archetypal enemy of natural law. Carneades had 
held tha t  there is “no law of nature, for all men ... are driven by innate impulse to seek 
their own interests” , and in particular tha t  there is no natural justice, “or, if it exists, it is 
the height of folly, inasmuch as to be mindful of the advantages of others is to do harm to 
oneself.” 40 However, “this most harmful opinion” of Carneades and his followers
has ... always been opposed by the more rational part of men, in whom there was 
some sense of a common humanity, some concern for fellowship.41
This reply is an im portan t one, for it identifies three typical features of natural law. The 
defenders of natural law against the sceptics are “more rational” , have a sense of 
“common hum anity” , and a concern for “fellowship” . In more characteristic terminology, 
this is to say tha t  natural law is a “law of reason” , or a “dictate of right reason” ; it is 
founded in human nature; and this foundation implies, in some way, the necessity of social 
life, of “sociableness” . We shall say something about each of these characteristics.
The law of nature is a dictate of right reason. Locke approvingly refers to this 
description of natural law in the second essay: “the law of nature is most often called
9 Q  ,
"'“This has been a commonplace amongst Locke scholars. The work of Colman, op. cit., is an 
example of a more sympathetic treatment. For a firm (but not argued) opinion that the attempt 
“is not in principle possible” see John Dunn, op. cit. pp. 25, 187. In making this claim Dunn cites 
the support of Hume’s Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, and also von Leyden’s writings - 
both the editorial introduction already referred to (“his seminal introduction”, says Dunn (p. 
187n.)), and in the article “John Locke and Natural Law”, Philosophy, xxxi (1956), 23-35. Dunn’s 
more recent treatment of the issue - in Locke, Oxford: O.U.P. (1984), chapter 3 - remains critical, 
but is less dismissive.
"*0It was noted above (footnote 9 and text) that the aim of the Essay  was to examine the sources 
of knowledge in order to determine their extent and limits, not for their own sake, but in order to 
resolve problems of morality and religion.
40£XJV, Essay VIII, p. 205. Von Leyden suggests (p. 204n.) that Locke’s source is Grotius.
41i bid.
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right reason itself and the dictate of right reason.”4  ^ He is not entirely happy with the 
term, however, because it seems to reify reason and its dictates. Rather, reason is an 
activity which requires raw materials: “Nothing indeed is achieved by reason, tha t
powerful faculty of arguing, unless there is first something posited and taken for
A O
granted.” Therefore the description of natural law as a dictate of right reason can 
mislead, and so Locke expresses misgivings about such terminology. Natural law, he says,
appears to me less correctly termed by some people the dictate of reason, since 
reason does not so much establish and pronounce this law of nature as search for 
it and discover it as a law enacted by a superior power and implanted in our 
hearts. Neither is reason so much the maker of that law as its interpreter ... nor
indeed can reason give us laws, since it is only a faculty of our mind and part of
44us.
So, although the law is “in conformity with rational nature”4^, without which it would 
not be binding (and which also gives us a clue to what it is to be founded in human 
nature), nevertheless the role of reason is essentially to discover the law within us - to 
explicate and clarify what is in conformity with our nature as rational social beings. For 
this reason Locke tends to avoid speaking of natural law as a dictate of right reason. His 
position is similar to Pufendorfs, in that the requirements of natural law are worked out 
by human beings employing the process of reasoning. Unlike Pufendorf, however, he is 
gripped by a powerful metaphor, in which knowledge is an activity which brings objects 
out of darkness into light. Thus he speaks of reason as “the light of na ture” , and the fact 
tha t  reason can search out this law means tha t  the law is “discernable by the light of 
reason” . Pufendorf, in contrast, speaks rather colourlessly of “sound reason” ; terminology 
which, however, safely catches his meaning - tha t  the law of nature comes to be known as 
the result of a process of ratiocination in which logical or moral pitfalls are avoided. 
Locke’s metaphorical language invites the possibility that his understanding of the role of
4^E L N , Essay II, p. 125; cf. also Essay V. p. 161.
AZibid.
44E L N , Essay I, p. 111.
• j e
ibid. Cf. Essay VII, p. 191: violation of natural law is loathsome to “those who think rightly 
and live according to nature.” This - Stoic - formulation has already been met with in Grotius and 
Pufendorf.
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reason may be crucially influenced by the picture implicit in his language .^  Does this 
happen?
He is anxious to stress tha t  it does not. He says:
while we assert that the light of nature points to this law, we should not wish 
this to be understood in the sense that some inward light is by nature implanted 
in man, which perpetually reminds him of his duty and leads him straight and 
without fail whither he has to go. We do not maintain tha t  this law of nature, 
written as it were on tablets, lies open in our hearts, and tha t ,  as soon as some 
inward light comes near it (like a torch approaching a notice board hung up in 
darkness), it is at length read, perceived, and noted by the rays of that light. ~
Rather, to hold that something is known by the light of nature is, he says, to hold only 
tha t  it is known by the exercise of our own faculties:
we mean nothing else but tha t  there is some sort of tru th  to the knowledge of 
which a man can a tta in  by himself and without the help of another, if he makes 
proper use of the faculties he is endowed with by nature .“1®
Despite his emphasis on this point, however, I suggest tha t  there is some evidence tha t  
Locke is influenced by the implications of his metaphor. The influence is shown by his 
belief tha t  what is investigated by reason must be within us - “implanted in our hearts” ; 
“not written, but innate, i.e. na tu ra l” ; “an inborn, i.e. natural, law.”4^ The metaphor 
invites such conclusions because, if knowledge is pictured as a process of casting light on 
objects th a t  are indistinct or hidden in darkness, then knowing must be an activity of 
discovering what is already physically present. The metaphor thus encourages thinking of 
natural law as something within us. There is no need to think this way. One can hold 
tha t  natural law is founded in human nature, or is in conformity with our nature, w ithout 
holding tha t  it is actually within us. If we think of natural law as the conclusion of sound 
reason, in much the way Pufendorf does, natural law is founded in, or is in conformity
*40uThe impact of language on the nature of our understanding is a theme powerfully developed by 
Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigations, and which produced some of his most striking 
aphorisms: “Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of
language” (I, 109); “A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our 
language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably” (I, 115). Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Oxford: Basil Blackwell (1958).
^  ELN, Essay II, p. 123.
^ibid.
^ E L N , Essay I, pp. I l l ,  117; Essay II, p. 131.
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with, our nature (which is a rational nature), without necessarily being already within us. 
This can easily be illustrated. Our obligation to observe natural law depends on 
recognizing the existence of God. But the knowledge of God’s existence is not implanted 
within us, but arises (for Locke) from a rational apprehension of the order and design of 
the created universe. We are ourselves a part of this order, but this obligation is in 
conformity with our nature because our nature is rational, and because the obligation is 
rationally perceived. So the binding force of natural law, without which it is not a law at 
all ,50 is not within us, but the result of reflection on the nature of the world and our 
position in it. Locke’s tendency to think of the law as, in some way, within us can be seen 
to be at least reinforced  by his choice of metaphor.
By reinforcing the tendency to speak of natural law as “implanted” , Locke’s metaphor 
generates difficulties in his account of natural law. This is because he is at pains to 
establish th a t  natural law is not a set of innate ideas in the mind: it is not “inscribed in 
the minds of men” ; there are “no principles either practical or speculative, ... written in 
the minds of men by nature” .51 We might be tempted, given these remarks, to conclude 
tha t ,  for Locke, the law of nature is implanted in our hearts , but not in our minds. One 
problem with taking this course is that Locke himself blocks it off. He does not maintain 
a clear distinction between hearts and minds: he introduces his arguments against the 
“inscription” (in our minds) thesis by stating th a t  the arguments “show that there exists 
no ... imprint of the law of nature in our hearts.” 5  ^ It is unlikely tha t  there is any simple 
solution to the problem. We need not be overly preoccupied with it, however, since at 
least part of the problem arise through the obscurities of his metaphorical language. 
Clearly, he wants to deny tha t  our knowledge of natural law is innate, a set of ideas 
“inscribed in the minds of men” . Rather, knowledge of natural law arises through the
-  o
employment of our own rational faculty, reflecting on our sense-experience.00 This 
depends on our having the kind of constitution we have (which could be said to be 
“im planted” in us), so knowledge of natural law at least depends on what is implanted in 
us. In this way at least it is founded in our human nature. But natural law itself is only 
very misleadingly described as being within our hearts - it depends on what is within our
50£’LiV, Essay I, pp. 111-3. 
o l£’LAr, Essay III, pp. 137, 145.
52ihid., p. 137.
53 ELN, Essay IV.
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hearts, but is not itself within us. When he avoids metaphor Locke recognizes this. He 
acknowledges, for example, that natural law depends on reflection which regards both our 
own inner constitution, and also the purpose of the whole created order:
what it is that is to be done by us can be partly gathered by the end in view for 
all things ... Partly also we can infer the principle and a definite rule of our duty 
from m an’s own constitution and the faculties with which he is equipped.54
Here there is no talk of anything implanted within us. The law of nature is discovered by 
rational reflection, and in this sense can be called a dictate of right reason. In addition, 
the object of reflection includes our own constitution, and in this sense it is (partly) 
founded in human nature. Locke draws back from the view that our natural instincts are 
an accurate guide to the content of the law, however. It is mistaken, he says, to “seek the 
principles of moral action and a rule to live by in men’s appetites and natural instincts” , 
because such an approach cannot provide “the binding force of a law” ; it is an approach 
which mistakenly holds tha t  “tha t  was morally best which most people desired.” 55 We 
have seen tha t  Grotius is prepared to follow the Stoics on this matter, and hold that 
reason shows the essential rectitude of the most fundamental instincts. For Locke reason 
has a more critical role, so the foundation in human nature which is enjoyed by natural 
law is for him less a m atter  of instincts, and more strongly a m atter  of reflection on our 
situation in the universe.
For this reason Locke is not, in the Essays  on the Law o f  Nature , entirely happy with 
the common doctrine tha t  the natural law has its foundation in the necessity of self- 
preservation. He says, for example, that
if the source and origin of this law is the care and preservation of oneself, virtue 
would seem to be not so much m an’s duty as his convenience, nor will anything 
be good except what is useful to him.
This is, he goes on, to found natural law in expediency - which is impossible, since such a 
“law” has no binding force:
whenever it pleases us to claim our right and give way to our own inclinations, 
we can certainly disregard and transgress this law without blame, though
54ibid., p. 157.
55ELN,  Essay VIII, p. 213. 
5&E L N , Essay VI, p. 201.
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perhaps not without disadvantage.5 '
However, if we take a larger view, thinking not merely of our private advantage and 
preservation, but considering both our constitution and its place within the divinely 
created order of things, we can see tha t  self-preservation has a fundamental role because 
we come to recognize tha t  we are under an obligation to preserve ourselves. (This 
doctrine is, of course, a lynch-pin of the argument of the Second T re a tise .^ )  The 
obligation to preserve ourselves does not justify all our instinctive forms of self-preserving 
behaviour; but it most notably affirms tha t  self-preserving instinct which contributes to 
sociableness: a man “feels himself ... to be impelled by life’s experience and pressing
needs to procure and preserve a life in society with other men .” 50
This section began by noting tha t  Locke recognized sociableness as one of the 
fundamental principles of natural law. The passage above shows him to recognize that 
society is necessary for individual survival. However, like Grotius and Pufendorf, he sees 
th a t  society is not simply something entered into by human beings for purely pragmatic 
or self-interested considerations. On the contrary: human beings are peculiarly fitted for 
social life. Sociableness is a part of human nature itself: a man is
urged to enter into society by a certain propensity of nature, and to be prepared 
for the maintenance of society by the gift of speech and through the intercourse 
of language, in fact as much as he is obliged to preserve himself.60
W hether his use of “urged” in this passage refers to an obligation or merely to natural 
instinct, it is clear tha t  Locke sees sociable instincts as in accord with the dictates of 
natural law. This is indicated by the conclusion of the quotation: we are urged to enter 
into society as much as we are obliged to preserve ourselves. This is only slightly stronger 
than  the doctrine of the Second Treatise , which holds tha t  we are bound to preserve 
others as long as by so doing we do not impair our own preservation:
57 ibid.
58 Two Treatises, II.6: “Every one ... is bound to preserve himself” . Locke also affirms a right of 
preservation (11.25), but, unlike the Essays , where right is sharply disntinguished from law in a 
Hobbesian manner [ELN,  Essay I, p. I l l ;  cf. Leviathan, chap. XIV.), in the Two Treatises the 
right of preservation appears to mean the freedom to do what the obligation implies. Cf. Thomas 
Mautner, “Natural Rights in Locke”, Philosophical Topics, vol. 12 (1982), pp. 73-7.
50ELN,  Essay IV, p. 157.
60 ibid., pp. 157-8. Cf., for example, DJBP , Prol. 6-7.
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Every one as he is bound to preserve h im se l /, and not to quit his Station 
wilfully; so by the like reason when his own Preservation comes not in 
competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest o f  M a n k in d .6^
Although weaker than  the above remark from the E ssays , this passage from the Second 
Treatise  indicates a stronger commitment to the social life than is found in Grotius, as we 
have seen. But however Locke orders the relationship between caring for oneself and 
caring for others, he is confident th a t  the two obligations do not conflict: “the duties of 
life are not at variance with one another, nor do they arm  men one against another.” 
Stated more fully,
virtuous actions themselves do not clash nor do they engage men in conflict: 
they kindle and cherish one another. Justice in me does not take away equity in 
another, nor does the liberality of a prince thwart the generosity of his subjects.
The moral purity of a parent does not corrupt his children, nor can the 
moderation of a Cato lessen the austerity of a Cicero.65
Abiding by natural law is thus the guarantee of social peace, the provision of a social 
environment in which the virtuous life can flourish. At least partly for this reason, Locke 
connects the observance of natural law to happiness: the law is about how to reach
happiness.64 On such a view, the law is without point if a modicum of happiness is not 
possible. The nature of this modicum he outlines in the E ssa y , when he says that “the 
lowest degree of what can be called H appiness , is so much ease from all Pain, and so 
much present Pleasure, as without which any one cannot be content.”65 The possibility 
of such contentment - even if not its durability - is obvious, since such contentment can, 
at least on occasions, be observed. Locke does not say this, of course, but his discussion of 
the question of happiness seems to take for granted some such common-sense approach. 
He is not interested in arguing for the pessimistic classical thesis that happiness does not
^^Two Treatises, II.6.
Q2DJBP, I.II.i.6.
QZELN, Essay VIII, p. 213.
ELN,  Essay V, p. 175: about how to reach happiness, that is, about the law of nature.”
Cf. Essay IV, p. 147: “that height of virtue and felicity whereto the gods invite and nature also 
tends.”
65Essay, II.xxi.42.
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exist .66
If natural law is concerned with how to reach happiness, as Locke holds, then clearly it 
promotes utility. Locke holds tha t  it does, but, as do Grotius and Pufendorf, he rejects 
the idea tha t  the law is grounded in utility: “Utility is not the basis of the law or the 
ground of obligation.“ Rather, utility is “the consequence of obedience to it.” Therefore
the rightness of an action does not depend on its utility; on the contrary, its
utility is a result of its rightness .67
As we have seen, Pufendorf holds that there is therefore a particular kind of utility, what 
we have called a “rational utility” , on which the law can be said to be grounded. Locke 
makes no such move, for the simple reason tha t  he typically thinks of utility in terms of 
private interest. P a r t  of his argument against founding law in utility is tha t  to do so 
would be to destroy the benefits of society.66 Locke does not see this result, as we would 
be inclined to do, as a conflict between narrow and wider conceptions of utility. Rather, 
he simply concludes tha t  utility, as a possible foundation for law, is thereby discredited.
In summary, then, we can see tha t  Locke acknowledges the descriptions of natural law 
encountered in Grotius and Pufendorf, if in some respects his position tends to be rather 
more cautious and reserve. He affirms, against the Carneadean sceptic, tha t  there is a 
natural law, a non-arbitrary law grounded (although not ultimately) in human nature. 
Since this nature is a rational nature, the law can also be said to be a dictate of right 
reason, as long as this is understood to mean th a t  reason searches out or interprets the 
law, rather than invents it or dictates what it must be. And, since human beings are 
sociable creatures, by both nature and necessity, the natural law is also a law of 
sociability. It is not a law based on “util ity” (on private interest), but it nonetheless 
serves the interests of all individuals. Similarly, it is not a law founded on private 
instincts of self-preservation, but there is a duty of self-preservation nonetheless, and a 
duty to preserve others wherever possible. (The relative importance of self-preservation is
°In his Censor’s Valedictory Speech, delivered in Oxford in 1664, Locke treats this classical 
doctrine (particularly common among the tragedians) respectfully but not seriously, by giving a 
funeral oration which holds that, since life is nothing but a miserable prison, a man “is best advised 
to make an end of himself” (as von Leyden puts it in his editorial summary, ELN,  p. 218). 
Needless to say, this is not a doctrine we find in any of Locke’s serious works!
67ELN,  Essay VIII, p. 215.
68'ibid., p. 213.
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greater in the Two Treatises  than in the early Essays. Or so it seems - an accurate 
judgment of the m atter  is not easy, since explicit remarks are few and scattered.)
He sides with Pufendorf in rejecting two Grotian doctrines. Firstly, he rejects Grotius’s 
a posteriori defence of natural law. The general consent of men (even of the best of men) 
is no guide to the content of natural law. Secondly, he rejects Grotius’s account of 
obligation, summed up in the etiamsi daremus  passage. It is not the case that the 
natural law could have any degree of validity if God does not exist. The obligation to 
conform to the dictates of natural law depends on the divine will. It does not, however, 
depend on an arbitrary  divine command, in the sense of a command (or commands) 
simply set over against the nature of the created world. Rather, as with Pufendorf, 
Locke’s account of obligation, although not entirely consistent, depends on both formal 
and material elements of the divine will. Finally, although natural law can be said to be, 
in some sense, implanted in our hearts, it is not inscribed in our minds. The natural law 
is not a cluster of innate ideas, but is discovered by rational reflection on sense-experience.
This last point allows us to raise the problem of natural law and history. It will be 
argued in the next section tha t ,  in his account of property, Locke shows a historical 
conception of the development, or progressive uncovering, of natural law. Like both 
Grotius and Pufendorf, he has an essentially “two stages” conception of human social 
history: of primitive simplicity followed by developed society (the latter distinguished by 
a money economy). This is not to say th a t  history has only two steps, because 
development and change is possible within each stage - especially, of course, in the latter. 
Before considering these m atters  directly in the next section, however, it is important to 
recognize tha t ,  by holding the knowledge of natural law to be the result of rational 
reflection on sense-experience, Locke has made the necessary space for a natural law 
account of society and social institutions in which historical development is an integral 
part. This is simply because sense-experience occurs over time: not merely in the
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lifetimes of individuals®^, but also in the much larger time span of the history of human 
society. In the Essays on the Law o f  N ature , Locke is not particularly concerned with 
the latter , so it is not considered directly. Indeed, he may well not have thought of the 
m atte r  in these terms. But the two stages of social history which are so essential to the 
argum ent of the fifth chapter of the Second Treatise  clearly imply tha t  significant changes 
in such circumstances - which means, significant changes in the content of sense- 
experience for whole societies in historical time - require tha t  social rules undergo changes 
as a result of rational reflection on the implication of the new circumstances. Natural 
law, because discovered by reasoning about sense-experience, is thereby sensitive to 
historical epochs. Whether we conceive of natural law as a timeless law hidden in the 
nature of things (in the nature of the created order), as Locke does in the Essays^® , or 
more simply as what reason determines  as a result of its reflection on sense-experience, as 
he m ay  he doing in the Two Treatises , the requirements of natural law are context- 
sensitive. In this sense, natural law is, for Locke as for Grotius and Pufendorf, a historical 
law, specifying different rules in different circumstances - especially, of course, in the 
different historical epochs.
Finally, rational reflection on sense-experience is, for Locke as for his contemporaries, 
something which can be done either rightly or wrongly. Reason does not merely construct 
plausible arguments for holding various beliefs, nor does it admit of antinomies. Reason is 
a chain which leads the mind from things known to things previously unknown, but now 
recognized:
reason is ... the discursive faculty of the mind, which advances from things
69^Locke is particularly aware of the influence of early childhood learning, and, like Pufendorf, 
sees the very earliness of the learning as the source of the mistaken belief that our knowledge of 
natural law is innate. He says: “opinions about moral rightness and goodness which we embrace so 
firmly are for the most part such as, in a still tender age, before we can as yet determine anything 
about them or observe how they insinuate themselves, stream into our unguarded minds and are 
inculcated by our parents or teachers or others with whom we live ... And at last, because in this 
way and without our notice these opinions have crept into our minds with but little a ttention on 
our part, striking roots in our breasts while we are unaware either of the manner or the time, and 
also because they assert their authority  by the general consent and approval of men with whom we 
have social intercourse, we immedately think we must conclude that they are inscribed in our hearts 
by God and by nature, since we observe no other origin of them .” ELN, Essay III, pp. 141-3.
This shows, incidentally, th a t  natural law is not necessarily learnt by ra tional processes. This 
need not disturb us: the im portan t  m atter  is th a t  justification is achieved by rational reflection; 
tha t what we learn, however we learn it, is in accord with right reason.
/uThis is shown most clearly in ELN, Essay IV, pp. 149ff., where reason and sense-experience 
discover the design and purpose of the world created by God.
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known to things unknown and argues from one thing to another in a definite and 
fixed order of propositions . ' 1
Alternatively, we have seen Locke think of reason as a light which dispels the darkness, 
which brings things previously hidden “to light” . On such an understanding, reason leads 
to the tru th . Reason is right reason as long as it is not false reason - i.e. as long as there 
are no logical or factual errors (whether admitted innocently or through corrupting special 
interests). So, to hold th a t  natural law is known by reason and sense-experience, and that 
it is therefore a historically sensitive law, is not at all to cast doubt on what natural law 
requires (in any given time or place), nor on our capacity to know it. If we possess the 
facts, and make no fallacious inferences, we arrive at a clear and certain knowledge of 
what the natural law requires. The immediate task is to determine what this law requries 
with respect to property.
I ll:  P roperty: Origins and D evelopm ent
By approaching Locke’s treatm ent of property in the Second Treatise  through an 
examination of his views on natural law, one feature stands out as of peculiar importance. 
In contrast to the Essays on the Law o f  Nature, the Two Treatises o f  Government  quite 
cheerfully accepts the legitimacy of self-interested self-preserving behaviour. Locke does 
not come to espouse an uncaring individualism - it remains our duty to preserve others, 
even though self-sacrifice is not to be commended - but self-preservation enjoys a priority 
which is denied it in the unpublished Essays. In the explanation and defence of private 
property, such a shift cannot but be of momentous import. Private property fits far more 
happily into a scheme of life based on the injunction to look after the basic concerns of 
others after one has looked after one's own such concerns, than on an alternative scheme 
based on the injunction to regard equally the concerns of oneself and others. To explain 
this shift in Locke's thought is to find the key to his account of property, and of its 
importance in political society; to understand why an author anxious for anonymity 
nevertheless could have held tha t  “property I have nowhere found more clearly explained, 
than in a book entitled, Two Treatises of Government.” 1 *
The key insight which distinguishes the Two Treatises  from the early Essays  is tha t  the 
productive capacity of human labour increases the supply of goods available for human 
life, and thereby improves human life. The a ttem pt to satisfy needs is not a competition
;1ELN , Essay IV, p. 149.
‘^Letter from Locke to his younger relative the Rev. Richard King, dated 25 August 1703. This 
letter is quoted and discussed by Laslett in his Introduction to the Two Treatises, pp. 3-7.
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for fixed resources, not a "zero-sum game" as the Essays  had perceived the matter:
Victuals, clothes, adornments, riches, and all other good things of this life are 
provided for common use. And so, when any man snatches for himself as much 
as he can, he takes away from another m an’s heap the amount he adds to his 
own, and it is impossible for anyone to grow rich except at the expense of 
someone else.74
In the Two Treatises  the picture could hardly be more different. Property arises, in 
accord with the dictates of natural law (which holds, among other things, that “Men, 
being once born, have a right to their Preservation” 7^), directly through the labour of 
individuals. ‘ ^ It does so, however, not because labour is an unpleasant activity which 
deserves compensation - although Locke was not unsympathetic to such considerations77 - 
but because labour is improvement. It is purposeful activity, directed to useful ends, 
which therefore adds to the value of resources by increasing their productivity. The fifth 
chapter of the Second Treatise  is full of such connections: “’tis Labour indeed that puts 
the di f ference o f  value on every thing” ; in fact, “labour makes the far greatest part o f  
the value of things, we enjoy in this World” ; a conservative estimate is that “of the 
Products of the Earth  useful to the Life of Man 9/10 are the ef f ect s  o f  labour” ,78 The 
appropriation of land by labour is an appropriation “by improving it” , to leave some land 
unclaimed is to leave it available for another, to leave it “for his Improvement” ; land 
already appropriated by another is not available to us because it is “already improved by 
ano ther’s Labour” ' , and so on. We misunderstand the doctrine of the origin of property 
through labour if we fail to recognize tha t ,  for Locke, labour is a rational (or purposeful), 
value-creating activity. Labour is not any exercise of energy on objects in the world - acts
/uFor this way of putting the matter I am indebted to I. Hont and M. Ignatieff, “Needs and 
justice in the ‘Wealth of Nations’: an introductory essay” , in Wealth and Virtue, p. 41n.
74ELN, Essay VIII, p. 211.
77>Two Treatises, 11.25.
76in contrast to Grotius and Pufendorf, Locke bypasses the question of consent altogether. This 
move is, of course, a crucial part of his critique of Filmer. This will be considered further below.
77See, for example, Two Treatises, 11.34, where one who seeks to benefit by the fruits of another’s 
labour thereby desires “the benefit of another’s Pains, which he had no right to.”
~^Two Treatises, 11.40, 42.
79ibid., 11.33, 34.
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of destruction or mere amusement certainly do not qualify - but those actions directed 
towards the preservation or comfort of our being. One passage from the Second Treatise 
makes the connection in some detail:
As much Land  as a Man Tills, Plants, Improves, Cultivates and can use the 
product of, so much is his Property ... God, when he gave the World in common 
to all Mankind, commanded Man also to labour, and the penury of his Condition 
required it of him. God and his Reason commanded him to subdue the Earth, 
i.e. improve it for the benefit of Life, and therein lay out something upon it that 
was his own, his labour.8 *^
So, for Locke, labour is the activity of improving for the benefit of life, an activity
o  1
commanded by God as the result of the Fall. Labour is the means whereby property is 
acquired, both because of the role human beings play in the larger purposes for the whole 
created order, and because labour is the improving, value-adding activity required by the 
duty to preserve oneself and others. These two aspects are neatly conjoined if we speak of 
labour as w orkm ansh ip , the human role in the divine scheme. For convenience, this 
conception of human activity (labour) will be referred to as the “workmanship model” . 
(It should be stressed, however, tha t  the account of workmanship offered here is rather 
different - weaker in some of its implications - from the views of Tully and Dunn. The 
difference arises through the greater importance a ttr ibu ted  to the material element of the 
divine will.)
By recognizing tha t ,  in his account of the origin of property through labour, Locke is 
invoking the workmanship model of human life, we can avoid a characteristic 
misunderstanding, and help to clarify a number of other features of Locke’s account. 
Firstly, many commentators on Locke fall into error by placing too much weight on 
Locke’s metaphor of appropriating things by m ixing  one’s labour with things. It is 
certainly true th a t  Locke treats the appropriative acts of individuals as a process by which 
things in common (things not yet private8**) become private property by being mixed 
with, or joined to, something which is private (the labour of the bodies of particular
80ibid., 11.32.
01See Genesis, 3:17-19 (God’s curse on Adam): “cursed is the ground for they sake ... in the
sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread” (KJV).
Q O
ö"“The workmanship model is stressed by James Tully, .4 Discourse on Property: John Locke 
and his adversaries, Cambridge: C.U.P. (1980), esp. chapters 1 and 3.
That is. an original negative community. We shall return to this below.
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individuals). But this whole picture depends on the workmanship model both by 
recognizing only improving activities as labour, and by presupposing an original 
community designed specially to meet the needs of the workmanship model. So it is a 
misconception to see Locke’s account of appropriation as simply a m atter  of mixing 
“held” things with “unheld” things to form a larger group of (inexplicably) “held” 
things .®4
Secondly, the workmanship model helps us to put in a proper perspective Locke’s 
im portant remarks about rationality and industry. The world is not to remain “common 
and uncultivated” , says Locke, because God gave the world
to the use of the Industrious and Rational, (and Labour was to be his Title  to
it;) not to the Fancy or Covetousness of the Quarrelsom and Contentious.®^
The connection between industry and rationality in this passage is not, pace Macpherson, 
to be understood as the “assumption tha t  unlimited accumulation is the essence of 
rationality” . While it is true tha t  Locke places no limits on how much can be 
accumulated once primitive simplicity has been abandoned, he is not therefore committed 
to defending unlimited accumulation. Quite apart from his denunciation of covetousness, 
the scattered remarks in his unpublished manuscripts in particular show him to be 
concerned to limit the extent of industry, in favour of education, for the general social 
benefits such change would bring.®''' But the workmanship model reminds us that Locke’s 
concern is not accumulation per se (unlimited or otherwise), but improvem ent. 
Accumulation and industry are rational in so far as they are improving activities. For 
Locke it is of course the case that ,  by and large, they are improving activities. But this is 
nonetheless a contingent m atter , and, where accumulation or industry do not improve 
(where they foster avarice or ignorance, for example), they are not defensible, not 
rational. We can see the positive side of this in the defence of private property itself.
84 i have in mind, of course, Nozick’s account in Anarchy, State and Utopia, pp. 174-5. It 
should be clear that the workmanship model precludes such examples as Nozick’s can of tomato 
juice spilt into the sea. Onora O’Neill has effectively stressed the importance of the notion of 
improvement for Locke in her criticism of Nozick. See “Nozick’s Entitlements”, Inquiry, vol.19 
(1976), pp. 476-9 in particular. It should be added that Nozick is of course not alone in failing to 
see the importance of the workmanship model.
®^Two Treatises, 11.34.
80DC.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke,
Oxford: O.U.P. (1962), p. 237.
87This matter is thoroughly dealt with by John Dunn, op. cit., chapter 17. See especially the 
Locke MSS quoted at p. 231n. and pp. 235-6n.
148
This can be shown by comparing some passages in the Second Treatise  with the passage 
quoted above from the Essays on the Law o f  Nature. In the Essays, to take for oneself 
was to reduce the stock available for others. In the Two Treatises  this is not so. 
Appropriating does no harm:
Nor was this appropriation  of any parcel of L a n d , by improving it, any prejudice 
to any other Man, since there was still enough, and as good left; and more than 
the yet unprovided could use. So tha t  in effect, there was never the less left for 
others because of his inclosure for himself. For he tha t  leaves as much as 
another can make use of, does as good as take nothing at all.^®
In this passage, appropriation does no harm because appropriation for use leaves the 
original bounty (available for others) intact. Some subsequent passages show that  the 
effect of improvement is, in certain important respects, to improve the situation of even 
the unpropertied.
First of all, the power of productive labour, the source of appropriation, has to be fully 
grasped, if the value of appropriation itself is to be properly understood:
Nor is it so strange, as perhaps before consideration it may appear, that the 
Property o f  labour should be able to over-ballance the Community of Land. For 
’tis Labour indeed tha t  puts the d ifference  o f  value on every thing ... I think it 
will be a very modest Com putation to say, tha t  of the Products of the Earth 
useful to the Life of Man 9/10 are the ef f ect s  o f  labour: say, if we will rightly 
estimate things as they come to our use, and cast up the several Expences about 
them, what in them is purely owing to Nature,  and what to labour, we shall 
fmd, th a t  in most of them 99/100 are wholly to be put on the account of 
labour.^9
Thus, the appropriation of the earth into private possessions in fact amounts to a 
productive act - an expansion  of the available social resources. Private appropriation in 
accord with the requirements of the workmanship model is the path  to a social bounty of 
goods. Of course, such a bounty cannot be effectively stored until there is a money 
economy, since property is limited to what is not spoiled. Only with the development of 
money, specifically gold - “a little piece o f  yellow Metal, which would keep without 
wasting or decay” 90 - could a bounty be preserved.
Locke is perfectly aware th a t  such a bounty, or social surplus, is not enjoyed equally,
Two Treatises, 11.33.
S9ibid., 11.40.
90'ibid., II.37.
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but goes principally to the propertied. Thus the establishment of a money economy by 
consent is to consent to inequality of goods:
since Gold and Silver, being little useful to the Life of Man in proportion to 
Food, Rayment, and Carriage, has its value only from the consent of Men, 
whereof Labour yet makes, in great part, the measure, it is plain, tha t  Men have 
agreed to disproportionate and unequal Possession of the Earth.
Nevertheless it is not the case tha t  the inequalities produced by labour and subsequently 
entrenched (perhaps even ex tended^)  in a money economy leave the unpropertied 
untouched. Locke does not go into the causes, but he clearly sees some sort of 
“trickle-down” effect to operate. The bounty produced by the propertied extends to the 
unpropertied, thereby improving the condition of the latter, so that they actually benefit 
from the appropriative acts of the propertied. He believes tha t  this is shown to be true by 
comparing the condition of the unpropertied in a money economy with tha t  of the 
wealthiest members of a society where primitive communty still reigns: among the 
“several Nations of the Am ericans  ... a King of a large and fruitful Territory there feeds, 
lodges, and is clad worse than a day Labourer in E n g l a n d Therefore, since “in the 
beginning all the World was A m enca,”^  the institution of private property, despite 
establishing, through a money economy, dramatic inequalities of wealth, is nonetheless 
advantageous to the worst off because of the productive power of labour such property 
establishes and protects .^ 5
This interpretation of Locke’s account of appropriation enables us to properly grasp the 
importance of the two conditions he places on appropriation - these are the “spoilage”
91ibid., 11.50.
92 Locke does not, nor does he see any need to, argue that “the inequality created by the 
emergence of money was a faithful reflection of natural differentials in human industry” (Hont and 
Ignatieff, “Needs and justice”, in Wealth and Virtue, p. 39). Locke’s concern is with the 
improvement of society, and with the fate of the poor as a result of such improvement. He has only 
minimally a conception of what Nozick has called a “patterned” conception of distributive justice 
(see Anarchy, State, and Utopia, pp. 155-60). For example, Two Treatises, 1.42, shows that he 
regards inheritance as a just process - but it is not a process that preserves differentials of industry.
Two Treatises, 11.41.
94ibid. 11.49.
^Locke thus defends private appropriation on what we would now call “maximin” grounds. The 
activity is just because it is advantageous to the worst off. See John Rawls, .4 Theory of Justice, 
Oxford: O.U.P. (1972), section 26.
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condition and the “enough, and as good left for others” condition. We shall consider 
spoilage first. Locke restricts the application of this condition to the stage of primitive 
simplicity (the pre-money economic stage), where it prevents excessive accumulation:
It will perhaps be objected ... T ha t if gathering the Acorn or other Fruits of the 
Earth , he.  makes a right to them, then any one may ingross as much as he will.
To which I Answer, Not so. The same Law of Nature, tha t  does by this means 
give us Property, does also bound th a t  Property too. God has given us all 
th ings richly, 1 Tim. vi.17 is the Voice of Reason confirmed by Inspiration. But 
how far has he given it to us? To enjoy. As much as any one can make use of to 
any advantage of life before it spoils; so much he may by his labour fix a 
Property in. W hatever is beyond this, is more than his share, and belongs to 
others. Nothing was made by God for Man to spoil or destroy.9^
This passage neatly brings out the connection between the spoilage condition and the 
overall workmanship model. In the age of primitive simplicity, the workmanship model 
implies tha t  accumulation be limited to what can be used without spoiling. The spoilage 
condition is not, then, an ad hoc condition simply added on by Locke in an effort to avoid 
undesirable consequences generated by a gap in the labour theory. Rather, the labour 
theory, properly understood (as workmanship), requires th a t  accumulation be limited in 
this way.
With the advent of a money economy, the spoilage condition no longer applies, since 
surpluses stored in the form of money do not spoil or decay. (It is worth noting at this 
point the impact th a t  Locke’s mercantilist views on money and wealth have on the 
account of property in the Two Treatises. From a mercantilist point of view, money - 
tha t  is, precious metal - just is stored-up wealth. As Adam Smith notes in one of his brief 
remarks on Locke’s writings on interest and money, “His notions were ... founded upon 
the idea tha t  public opulence consists in money, tho ’ he treats  the m atter  in a more 
philosophical light than the rest !of the mercantilists].”^" But if we hold, with Smith, 
tha t  “riches do not consist in money, but commodities” , and tha t  “the consumptibility ... 
of goods is the great cause of human industry” ,^8 then we must conclude that, on the 
workmanship model, storing up money is not storing up wealth but a form of waste, of 
preventing the accumulation of wealth. If, as Smith holds, money “may be compared to 
the high roads of a country, which bear neither corn nor grass themselves but circulate all
^®Two Treatises, 11.31.
^"Adam Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence, ed. R.L. Meek, D.D. Raphael, and P.G. Stein, 
Oxford: O.U.P. (1978), LJ(B), 254.
98ibid., LJ(B), 255.
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the corn and grass in the country” . then money is wasted unless it is used, and it is most 
useful - most efficient - where the proportion of money to goods is l o w If wealth lies in 
“the great abundance of the necessaries of life'1, and not in money, then to store up money 
is to misuse it, to fail to employ it in the creation and circulation of wealth: “every
unnecessary accumulation of money is a dead stock which might be employed in enriching 
the nation.” Therefore we can see tha t  the role played by money in Locke’s account of 
property in the Second Treatise  depends on both the workmanship model and a 
mercantilist theory of money and wealth. The employment of a more modern economic 
theory would shift the emphasis away from money to the question of the most efficient 
usage of productive goods. In this way the workmanship model, with its anti-spoilage, 
anti-wastage implications, would be more effectively implanted.)
Since, for Locke, the spoilage condition operates to restrict accumulation in the stage of 
primitive simplicity, but not thereafter, it has been thought by a number of commentators 
th a t  the same role is played, in the advanced money economy, by the “enough, and as 
good” clause. Robert Nozick, for example, speaks of this clause as “the Lockean 
proviso” . 1 1^1 Such views are, I believe, mistaken. The “enough, and as good” clause does 
not operate as a limit on appropriation; it is not a “proviso” . To see why this should not 
be so, we need to begin by examining those passages where this clause occurs. It is 
introduced in a passage dealing with original accumulation in the stage of primitive 
simplicity:
Labour being the unquestionable Property of the Labourer, no Man but he can 
have a right to what tha t  is once jovned to, at least where there is enough, and 
as good left in common for others. 1"
the “enough, and as good” clause here is not a proviso on legitimate appropriation 
because it is not a necessary condition for successful appropriation by labour, but a 
sufficient condition: wherever there is enough and as good left for others, there
appropriation of the fruits of the earth is legitimate. And we know from the Book of 
Genesis tha t  there was a bountiful provision for human needs in the original primitive 
state . Therefore appropriation in the state  of primitive simplicity is indeed legitimate. In
"ibid.,  LJ(B), 245. 
l00ibid., LJ(B), 245, 258.
^^Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, pp. 174-82. 
102 Two Treatises, 11.27.
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other words, Locke simply does not consider what might have been the case if, in the 
original primitive state , there was not ■‘enough and as good left” . He considers only the 
case where there was enough, since this is the relevant case for us: “in the beginning all
the World was A m e r ic a ” 400
We have also seen tha t  this bounty is not impaired by appropriation; and the “enough, 
and as good” clause is used again in just this context:
Nor was this appropriation of any parcel of L a n d , by improving it, any prejudice
to any other Man, since there was still enough, and as good left.404
Since, as we have seen, the institution of a money economy entrenches inequalities which 
are justified by the observable fact tha t  they are advantageous to the worst off , the 
appropriation of all available land by some to the exclusion of others is a m atter of no 
import in itself. Even in those “parts of the World, (where the Increase of People and 
Stock, with the Use o f  Money)  had made Land scarce” 406 there is still enough and as 
good available, because the day-labourer is better off than the King in America. In other 
words, “enough, and as good” continues to be satisfied after the introduction of the money 
economy not because some things remain unappropriated, but because the appropriation 
of land and other resources increases the social bounty, so tha t  even the day-labourer, the 
worst off, has enough and as good of those things necessary for his preservation - “Meat 
and Drink, and such other things as Nature affords for ... Subsistence.” 406 Therefore, 
although it is true tha t  no longer is there any land or goods left in comm on  for others, 
this is of no significance because the money economy is justified by its enhanced 
productivity, and this productivity guarantees tha t  there is enough and as good of the 
means of subsistence. The “enough, and as good” clause, in the passages quoted above, 
only regards either land or goods in common in so far as these are the means of 
subsistence - as they are in the pre-money economy. But in the money economy, no 
longer are these things necessary for subsistence. Rather, subsistence, even flourishing, for 
most people no longer depends on their being propertied, nor does it depend on the
t n o
1 My account of this passage, and of the subsequent remarks on charity, owe a great deal to 
Jeremy Waldron's article “Enough and as good left for others” , Philosophical Quarterly, vol.29 
(1979), pp. 319-28.
4047u;o Treatises, 11.33.
105i6i<L, 11.45.
106'ibid., 11.25.
153
existence of an unappropriated common, but on drawing wages sufficient for life’s 
purposes. So the “enough, and as good” clause, in the stage of the money economy, is 
satisfied if wages are sufficient for a reasonable living. And, even for the day-labourer, 
they are.
Properly understood, then, the “enough, and as good” clause is a sufficient condition in 
Locke’s account of property, and a sufficient condition which is itself sufficient for his 
purposes because it is always satisfied. From an initial bounty, the operations of a system 
of private appropriation through the improving acts of human labour thereby not only 
m aintain, but actually increase, the supply of goods useful for human life - even for the 
worst off.
Even the most productive and humane of economic systems, however, is not immune to 
disruptions, whether these be private misfortunes or more general social catastrophes such 
as famines. So, as did his predecessors, Locke offers a solution to the problem of the 
necessitous. This solution has nothing to do with the “enough, and as good” clause, 
however. The foregoing account of the role this clause plays in Locke’s theory implies as 
much. Rather, the solution to the problem of necessity is quite simply located in the right 
of charity which all men have against one another:
As Justice  give every Man a Title to the product of his honest Industry, and the 
fair Acquisitions of his Ancestors descended to him; so Charity  gives every Man 
a Title to so much out of ano ther’s Plenty, as will keep him from extream want,
i  r \* 7
where he has no means to subsist otherwise.
Locke’s choice of language here - charity, like justice, gives a title to another’s surplus - is 
not accidental. He does not conceive charity as a mere imperfect duty of humanity, but 
as “a Right to the Surplusage of ... Goods.” For the needy person, such goods “cannot 
justly be denyed him, when his pressing W ants call for it.” iUO It must also be the case, 
for such a right to have any application at all, tha t  charity must overrule justice. 
Otherwise considerations of justice could be employed to nullify every a ttem pt to enforce 
the right of charity. Locke’s own ranking of the virtues, which puts justice ahead of
107 ibid., 1.42. 
l08ibid.
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charity100, need not conflict with this. For justice is necessary for society to exist at all, 
whereas charity is necessary only in a limited number of cases. So there is no conflict in 
holding both tha t  charity is less important than justice, but tha t ,  when it applies, it 
overrides justice. Such a position would be short on plausibility if charity had to be 
invoked in a large number of cases in order to maintain the social fabric. But this is 
clearly not the case, since, in the first place, the high productivity of the system of private 
appropriation keeps cases of necessity rare, and, in the second, Locke restricts the 
operations of charity to “extream w ant” or “pressing W ants” , where no other means of 
survival is available . 110 The right of charity thus does not play a major role in Locke’s 
system of justice. It must not be overlooked, however, since it does provide a buffer 
against extreme necessity. Locke’s right of charity is, therefore, a version of the right of 
necessity acknowledged by Grotius and Pufendorf. Unlike, Grotius, Locke does not base 
this right on a revival of original community, nor, unlike Pufendorf, does he base it on 
what duties to the poor can be agreed upon by rational agents. Having resolved his 
earlier doubts about the legitimacy of self-preservation, Locke’s version of the right of 
necessity is founded directly on the natural inclination to self-preservation. The reliability 
of this inclination, as a guide to action, is sta ted  most forcefully in a passage in the 
Second Treatise:
For the desire, strong desire of Preserving his Life and Being having been 
Planted in him, as a Principle of Action by God himself, Reason, which was the 
Voice o f  God in  h im , could not but teach him and assure him, tha t  pursuing 
tha t  natural Inclination he had to preserve his Being, he followed the Will of his 
M aker .111
We are now in a position to sum up. The workmanship model, with its focus on human 
activity as a part  of the larger divine purposes of the created order, in which the central 
role is performed by the improving effects of human labour, driven by the strong, divinely
l00See Hont and Ignatieff, “Needs and justice ...”, op. cit., p. 38n, where Locke’s MS note on 
“Moralists” is quoted: “Justice the greatest and difficultest duty being thus established the rest will 
not be hard. The next sort of virtues are those which relate to society and so border on Justice ... 
such as are Civility, Charity, Liberality.”
110Cf. Locke’s position in ELN , Essay VII, p. 195: “we are not obliged to provide with shelter 
and to refresh with food any and every man, or at any time whatever, but only when a poor man’s 
misfortune calls for our alms and our property supplies means for charity.” Our property can, of 
course, only supply means for charity when it is Firmly secured by the rules of justice. (This 
passage from the Essays is (mis)quoted by Hont and Ignatieff, op. cit., p. 37.)
111Two Treatises, 1.86. (This passage, with its account of reason as “the Voice of God within”, 
brings out sharply the reliance on God’s material will in Locke’s theory.)
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implanted, desire for self-preservation, is the foundation on which Locke builds his 
account of property in the Two Treatises o f  Government. By overcoming the limitations 
imposed by the static, or ‘‘zero-sum” , picture of available resources found in the Essays  
on the Law o f  N ature , Locke is able to give a full and almost free rein to self-interested 
behaviour without generating pernicious consequences. In the stage of primitive 
simplicity, the spoilage condition implied by the workmanship model prevents the 
accumulation of those unusually large properties which generate waste. In the developed 
stage of a money economy, the productive capacity of labour guarantees tha t  the initial 
bounty of God’s provision for human beings is always maintained, so tha t  no m atter  how 
scarce usable land becomes, there is always “enough, and as good” of the means of 
subsistence for all - in fact, there is more for even the worst off. This harmonious system 
is not immune to natural disasters and the like, however, so Locke, in common with his 
natural law predecesors, provides a safety net in the form of the right of charity, his 
version of the right of necessity.
Considered thus, Locke’s theory of appropriation and prosperity is a significant 
achievement. But to portray it so is to overlook the central ideological achievement of 
the Two Treatises  account of property. This lies in the fact tha t  Locke’s account of 
appropriation entirely avoids the appeal to consent, tacit or express, which was a part of 
the theories of both Grotius and Pufendorf, and which was (on the part of Grotius at 
least) so roundly criticised by Filmer. By avoiding the appeal to consent, Locke removed 
a source of embarrassment for the theories of original community, thereby providing a 
Whig defence of property against the arbitrary encroachments of monarchical power. (To 
understand this last point, it is necessary to remember th a t  a theory of property 
premissed on an original community is a theory which takes seriously the claims of all 
human beings to the bounty of the earth. Unless a Hobbesian path is followed - in which 
an original common is voluntarily given up in order to provide for individual safety 
through the protective power of the sovereign - theories premissed on an original 
community provide a defence against such conclusions as monarchical possession of the 
earth, its fruits, and perhaps even subject human beings.)
Our concern here is not with seventeenth century English politics, but a consideration of 
Filmer’s a ttack on Grotius, and Locke’s response, will serve to clarify some important 
features of the Lockean theory. We will then be in a position to turn our a ttention to a 
much underrated feature of Locke's theory of appropriation: the “two stages” theory of
history he employs, and the difference it makes. (Some implications of this historical 
element have, of course, already been indicated above.)
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In his Observations Concerning the Original o f  G overnm ent , and again in Patriarcha 
(ua defence of the natural power of kings against the unnatural liberty of the people71)**“, 
Filmer brings two arguments against the Grotian assignment of a role for consent in the 
origin of private property. The first is tha t ,  to be binding on all, consent must be 
unanimous, but such unanimity is not historically credible. Filmer observes ironically:
Certainly it was a rare felicity, tha t  all the men in the world at one instant of 
time should agree together in one mind to change the natural community of all 
things into private dominion: for without such a unanimous consent it was not 
possible for community to be altered: for if but one man in the world had
dissented, the alteration had been unjust, because tha t  man by the law of nature 
had a right to the common use of all things in the world; so tha t  to have given a 
propriety of any one thing to any other, had been to have robbed him of his 
right to the common use of all things.**J
W hether or not unanimous consent is historically credible need not concern us greatly. 
This is partly because, as we saw in the opening chapter, Grotius’s account has a good 
deal less of a once-and-for-all character about it - being quite heavily dependent on the 
patriarchal narratives of the Book of Genesis - than is often supposed. Grotius’s account 
would work just as well if consent was achieved in and for different regions at different 
times. But we have also seen tha t  the very question of consent is treated in a rather free- 
and-easy fashion by Grotius. Following Genesis, he holds tha t  some innovations occurred 
as the result of agreement, others did not. Common ownership was abandoned, according 
to Grotius, because necessitated by changes in way of life. This abandonment gave rise to 
private property because such a system of property solved the problems at hand. But 
because private ownership is not merely a private relation, between an individual and a 
thing, but a social relation between individuals with respect to things, some public 
recognition of this relation is essential to its existence.**4 It is in this context that 
Grotius speaks of consent, but even here the consent need not be an express act: property 
is established “by a kind of agreement, either expressed, as by a division, or implied, as by 
occupation.” So consent is achieved even if no actual agreement is made between parties - 
all th a t  is needed is tha t  everybody respect each o ther’s acts of occupation. When 
Grotius goes on to add, then, tha t  when “as yet no division had been made, it is to be 
supposed tha t  all agreed, tha t  whatever each one had taken possession of should be his
11 re te r Laslett (ed.), Patriarcha and Other Political Works of Sir Robert Filmer, Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell (1949). The quotation is the sub-title to Patriarcha, given on p. 53.
I I 9  m
Observations, in Patriarcha, op. cit., p. 273.
114Grotius, DJBP , II.II.ii.4-5.
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property,” 115 he is not committed to holding tha t  some meeting occurred of all living 
(adult, male) human beings. He is saying only tha t  private property grew as the result of 
particular acts of occupation, which became established as a result of tacit acceptance by 
the other interested parties. He does not hold that ,  as Filmer puts it, all the men in the 
world agreed at one instant of time to change the original community of things. For 
Grotius, tacit agreement will do.
Why does Filmer fail to see this? The answer, I believe, lies in the fact tha t  Filmer 
misunderstands the nature of the original community Grotius supposes. For Grotius, the 
original comminity was a s tate  in which “each man could at once take whatever he wished 
for his own needs, and could consume whatever was capable of being consumed. 10 It 
was not a s tate  in which, as Filmer puts it, “man by the law of nature had a right to the 
common use of all things in the world.” Rather, the original common state  was one in 
which, by the law of nature, man had a common right (or, a right in common) to the use 
of all things in the world. The original community was, in other words, a community of 
equal right to things, not a state of positive community of things. The choice of 
expression here is of course not accidental. The community which Grotius imagines is 
th a t  community which Pufendorf subsequently terms negative  community. This is 
perhaps not too clearly indicated in De Jure Belli ac P a d s  (and Filmer’s writings predate 
Pufendorfs by some thirty  years), but Grotius makes the same point in \ ia r e  L iberum , as 
we have noted - the original meaning of common property, he says, was not a m atter of 
joint ownership but of absence of private property .11' If the original community is 
negative, then everything simply lays open for use. The im portant m atter, as far as 
maintaining harmony is concerned, is that appropriative acts be publicly recognized. As 
long as there is a public act, then, the onus is not on the appropriator to make good his 
claim, but on the other interested parties to show that  the appropriative act is, in some 
way, not successful. In such a scheme, agreement need only be tacit. For an original 
positive community, however, agreement is a much more im portant m atter , because the 
onus is not on the non-appropriators to resist specific acts of appropriation. All men are 
joint-owners, and so their explicit consent is needed before any part can be removed from 
the common. It is not enough to presume tha t  they have consented as long as they do not
n 5 DJBP . II.II.ii.5. 
n Q DJBP\ II.II.ii.1.
Mare Liberum, pp. 22-3.
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object. If the original community was positive, then allowing that this community could 
be departed from without express agreement would be to fail to take seriously the 
ownership rights of the joint owners. Because Filmer takes for granted that, original 
community means a positive community, he requires tha t  express consent is needed to 
justify departures from it. This assumption, with respect to the theory of Grotius, is 
mistaken, so his First criticism of the original community thesis, and the role consent plays 
in it, also misses the mark.
Before considering Filmer’s second criticism of Grotian consent, it is useful to leap 
ahead briefly and relate Filmer’s first criticism to some of Locke’s remarks, although it is 
not clear why he should have failed to do so, Locke makes no clear distinction between 
negative and positive community. Instead, he speaks rather carelessly of things belonging 
to all in common. He even a ttem pts  to illustrate original community by reference to
i i  o
uC om m ons , which remain so by Com pact” , w ithout considering carefully whether the 
two kinds of common are the same. He apparently fails to see the importance of 
Pufendorf s distinction between the two kinds of community. In fact, it seems that, in the 
passages where he rejects the claimed necessity of an original agreement - “if such a 
consent as that was necessary, Man had starved, notwithstanding the Plenty God had 
given him” 119 - it is Filmer’s conception of the original community thesis, not Grotius’s 
or Pufendorfs, tha t  he has in mind: and therefore these passages are to be understood as 
Locke’s assertion of an original negative community against that version (Filmer’s) which 
supposes that original community, if there was such a thing, was a positive common. 
Locke’s theory is to be regarded, that is, as a defence of the established natural law 
position against an attack on it which misunderstands it. Although this defence does of 
course require some revisions to the established theory, we misunderstand the m atter if we 
think Locke to be essentially engaged in reconstructing the theory in order to save it from 
a damaging attack. Filmer’s attack is not damaging because it is premissed on a 
misconception; and Locke's purpose is partially obscured because he has failed to avail 
himself of the conceptual tools, provided by Pufendorf (the negative/positive distinction), 
which facilitate the task. To hold tha t  Locke is a negative community theorist is not, 
however, uncontentious, so we will return to this m atter  below.
The second argument Filmer brings against Grotius is this: even if there was an original
Two Treatises, 11.28. 
119ibid.; and cf. also 11.29.
159
consent, why should it bind posterity? He sees no reason why subsequent generations 
should not possess the freedom to choose available to their early forebears:
If our first parents, or some other of our forefathers did voluntarily bring in 
propeity of goods, and subjection to governors, and it were in their power either 
to bring them in or not, or having brought them  in, to alter their minds, and 
restore them to their first condition of community and liberty; what reason can 
there be alleged that men that now live should not have the same power? So 
th a t  if any one man in the world, be he never so mean or base, will but alter his 
will, and say, he will resume his natural right to community, and be restored 
unto his natural liberty, and consequently take what he please and do what he 
list, who can say tha t  such a man doth more than  by right he may? And then it 
will be lawful for every man, when he please, to dissolve all government, and 
destroy all property.
This argument fails for much the sort of reasons tha t  applied to the first. Once again, 
Filmer sees agreement simply as a m atter  of express free choice, which can, apparently, be 
withdrawn from even by the initial agreeing party themselves, not to mention by any one 
of their descendents. Once again, the reason for this conception of agreement is Filmer’s 
assumption tha t  “original community” means positive community, with human beings as 
joint-owners of the earth. In fact, he must take it to be not simply an original 
community, but a permanent positive community of possession. He does not allow that 
the original common was simply given up by its joint-owners. (Given a Biblical 
perspective on such things, it is easy to see how such a view can arise - if the world was 
given in common to mankind by God, it is very inviting to understand such a gift not as a 
historical fact, but as timeless, as identifying a permanent condition of human life.*“1) 
But Grotius’s view, as we have seen, is tha t  an original negative community of possession 
was given up because of a change in social circumstances, because men no longer wished 
to live the simple life to which common possession was tied. It was rational reflection on 
experience which showed that  the original community no longer sufficed, and the 
agreement to abandon common property was no more than the (express or tacit) rational 
recognition of this fact. So it is not possible to withdraw from private property, once 
established, precisely because maintenance of a harmonious social order required such 
property. In other words, precisely because to withdraw from private property would be 
to endanger society at large, such withdrawal is contrary to the rational dictates of 
natural law. Filmer’s argument depends on a ttr ibu ting  to Grotius a doctrine of original
1 9 0  . . .  ^Observations, in Patriarcha, op. cit., p. 274, cf. also p. 65.
121 James Tully holds this to be true of Locke’s view: the common right of all mankind “is not 
tensed”. Certainly Locke’s language is untensed, but whether this is a significant clue to a doctrine 
of timeless common possession is not so easily settled. See Tully, op. cit., pp. 60-1.
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(and enduring) positive community which he just does not espouse. As James Tully 
points out, Filmer a ttr ibu tes  to Grotius a cluster of doctrines which are in fact 
Hobbesian
Locke does not directly consider this argument of Film ers. Since his critique of Filmer 
in the First Treatise is concerned almost in its entirety with Filmer’s treatm ent of 
A dam ’s title, this is not surprising. (Perhaps Locke moved on to such issues in the lost 
parts of the First Treatise.^“0) And, of course, his bypassing of the entire consent issue in 
his account of original appropriation makes a direct reply to the argument unnecessary. 
But there is one feature of this argument which is noteworthy: it is that Filmer
intimately connects the fate of government and property. The problem with allowing 
consent a role in the foundation of both government and property is, by the revocability 
of consent, to render both government and property unstable. If consent is the foundation 
of justice and politics, then “every man. when he please,” can “dissolve all government, 
and destroy all property” . This helps to bring into sharper relief Locke’s political 
achievement: by removing consent from the establishment of property, he is able to
secure property from such threats. And, although he allows th a t  governments depend 
crucially on consent, by arguing that the “great and ch ie f  end therefore, of Mens uniting 
into Commonwealths, and putting themselves under Government, is the Preservation o f  
their Property1' , 124 he is able to show tha t  for the propertied, at least (with whom Filmer 
is of course centrally concerned), there is no motive to render government insecure. Thus, 
against Filmer, Locke is able to connect the fates of government and property in such a 
way tha t  they are both made more secure.
To see the full extent of Locke’s political achievement here, we need to consider a 
possible objection: what motive have the unpropertied for the preservation of
government? Locke’s answer to this neatly synthesizes several previously disparate 
strands in the natural law tradition. The unpropertied may indeed have no motive to 
preserve government, he could say, but this is a m atter  of little import, since, in a society
*22Tully, op. cit.. p. 127.
123See Locke’s Preface to the Two Treatises,  p. 155: “Reader, Thou hast here the Beginning
and End of  a Discourse concerning Government; what Fate has otherwise disposed of  the Papers 
that  should have filled up the middle, and were more than all the rest, ’t is  not worth while to tell 
thee”.
12ATwo Treatises,  11.124; cf. 11.94: “Government has no other end but the preservation of
Property.”
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whose government conforms to the “True Original, Extent, and End of Civil 
Government , there simply are no unpropertied. This is implied by his dictum that
“every Man has a Property in his own P e r s o n By this dictum Locke is not only able
to show that, for all men alike, government is essential because it preserves property, but 
also able to conclude that, because this most fundamental of properties, like all property, 
does not depend on consent, neither can it be lost or even alienated. Under just 
government, then, men are neither enslaved by others, nor can they enslave themselves. 
That is to say, by natural law slavery is forbidden. So in one move Locke shows both that
all men have a strong interest in preserving government because their own self-
preservation enjoins it, and tha t  slavery can play no role in a society regulated by just 
principles. He therefore denies the possibility of even self-enslavement through necessity, 
an issue which, as we have seen, had proved such an awkward m atter  for Grotius and 
Pufendorf. He is turns the close connection between government and property which 
Filmer had employed against Filmer’s own conclusions; to show, among other things, that 
“Slavery is so vile and miserable an Estate of Man ... tha t  ?tis hardly to be conceived, that 
an E n g lishm an , much less a G entlem an , should plead for’t . ” 12/ Being himself both an 
Englishman and a Gentleman, Locke is well fitted to show why slavery is intolerable; 
his account of property enables him to carry out the task.
We have already seen tha t  Locke accounts for property without recourse to consent. In 
order to properly understand his position, two im portant factors need to be recognized. 
The first of these has been widely recognized: Locke uses the term “property” in a broad 
sense, to mean “Life, Liberty, and Estate” , and not merely material goods. Also, 
because life and liberty are inalienable, he does not understand property to be a right of
i9 r
“ From the title-page of the Second Treatise. See the Laslett edition, p. 283, and notes on the 
history of the titles of the work, p. 284.
“^^Two Treatises, 11.27.
127 ibid., 1.1.
1 28 See the title-page of the Essay, which shows the work to be “Written by JOHN LOCKE, 
Gent.” This was added to the second and subsequent editions. See the Nidditch edition, p. 1, and 
notes, p. 2.
i o q
This is stated most explicitly at Two Treatises, 11.87, but many other passages show a similar 
view. See Laslett’s editorial note to this paragraph. In terms of Locke’s political philosophy as a 
whole, the importance of this meaning of “property” has been most effectively stressed by Alan 
Ryan, “Locke and the Dictatorship of the Bourgeoisie”, Political Studies, XIII (June 1965), pp. 
210-30.
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absolute control over things. Property is neither reducible to things, nor are the objects 
of property the objects of control. This is certainly at odds with modern usage, and even 
with the use of Grotius and Pufendorf. 1"*0 But it is not, for all that, evidence of a 
conceptual break with the natural lawyers, even though it is a terminological variation. It 
is not a conceptual break because, like Grotius and Pufendorf, Locke thinks of property as 
a m atte r  of the suum  and its extensions. This is the second important factor, and the key 
to understanding Locke's otherwise curious doctrine th t every man has a property in his 
own person. It will be most appropriate, then, if we clarify this connection first. We will 
then be in a position to show more clearly how the different elements in Locke’s theory fit 
together.
Locke introduces the idea of property in one’s person as follows:
every Man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right to but 
himself. The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are 
properly his. 1**1
A man has property in his person because his person (including any action which proceeds 
from his person) is properly his. It is properly his because he has an exclusive right to it: 
“no Body has any right ... but himself.'1 This is exactly how Grotius speaks of the su u m , 
the realm of one’s own. As he says:
“own” implies tha t  a thing belongs to some one person in such a way tha t  it 
cannot belong to any other person.
In Grotian terms, then, Locke’s notion of a property in one’s person is simply tha t  we are 
each our own: we belong to ourselves in a way th a t  we cannot belong to others. If we 
ask, In what way do we thus belong to ourselves?, we are seeking an answer to the 
question, W hat is it th a t  is one’s own? Grotius’s answer is this:
By nature a m an’s life is his own, not indeed to destroy, but to safeguard; also
1 °0 This is noted by, among others, Hont and Ignatieff, “Needs and justice”, op. cit., p. 35. They 
also claim, with Tully (op. cit., pp. 60-1), that Locke uses “property” to mean also a “common 
right to use.” Certainly Locke sometimes uses the term this way, but I shall argue that his notion 
of property in one’s person will not do the political work it is obviously intended to do (in 
particular, to ban slavery) unless property is understood to be a right which excludes others. But it 
should also be mentioned that Tully is quite correct when he insists that for Locke property is not a 
right of “use, abuse and alienation” (op. cit. p. 61), although from this it does not follow that “it is 
a right of use only”. It is, rather, a right of exclusive possession.
Two Treatises, 11.27.
132Grotius, Mare Liberum, p. 24.
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his own are his body, limbs, reputation, honour, and the acts of his will.133
If we count body and limb as parts, or at least supports, of one’s life, and recognize that 
the acts of our will can be redescribed as the freedom to act according to our will, then we 
can see tha t ,  for Grotius, the suum  can be reasonably described as life, reputation, and 
liberty. When the su u m  is extended to include those things necessary for its survival, it 
becomes life, reputation, liberty, and estate. The strong similarity with Locke is evident. 
Provided we set aside the question of reputation (with which he seems little concerned), 
Locke’s extended notion of property parallels closely Grotius’s account of the suum .  We 
can now turn  to show that  the foundation of his account of property, the property in one’s 
own person, is simply the central natural law concept of the (unextended) suum: that
one’s life and liberty belong only to oneself, not to anyone else. This is not to say, 
however, th a t  one's life is simply at one’s free disposal. It is true for Locke, as for 
Grotius, th a t  one’s life is one’s own “not indeed to destroy, but to safeguard,” and that, 
consequently, one's liberty is not to be understood as negative liberty in the modern sense 
- the absence of any restraints - but as the freedom to pursue whatever courses of action 
are not in conflict with the safeguarding of one’s life. In Lockean terms, to say that our 
life is our own to safeguard is to say tha t  we have a duty to preserve ourselves: 
“Everyone ... is bound to preserve himself.” lu4 The natural liberty which is our own is 
the freedom to act in whatever ways do not conflict with this duty, or with the associated 
duties of natural law: “The Natural Liberty  of Man is ... to have only the Law of Nature
i  O r
for his Rule. But in so far as this liberty is  ruled by the law of nature (i.e. where the
liberties in question are to act in accordance with the dictates of natural law, rather than 
simply not being in conflict with the law), such liberty has the force of a right. This 
applies pre-eminently to the actions necessary for self-preservation: “Men, being once
born, have a right to their Preservation, and consequently to Meat and Drink, and such 
other things, as Nature affords for their Subsistence. 00 The property in one’s person is 
thus a dynamic relation, since its maintenance requires the acquisition of things necessary 
for its subsistence. The suum  must be extended - “mixed” with things - in order to be
133Grotius, D JBP , II.XVII.ii.1.
Treatises, II.6.
135.ibid., 11.22. The law of nature is sensitive to those acts of will in which we voluntarily bind 
ourselves. Thus, as long as a polity is consented to, all the laws of that polity are protected by the 
law of nature. Cf. 11.57.
136'ibid., 11.25.
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maintained. It is because Locke has, in the back of his mind at least, the picture of the 
necessity of extending the suum  th a t  he is so apt to employ the “mixing” metaphor. (It is 
not to our purposes here to determine the quality of Locke’s “mixing” arguments. Most 
of them are quite strange, if we think that he is trying to show how a cluster - or “bundle”
- of rights can be transferred from one object to another . 137 But to see him as doing this 
is to fail to take him at his word. He wants to know how things can become m ine , not 
through positive legal acts of human societies, but naturally. Some things do become 
mine naturally because there are natural processes by which things become a part of me - 
hence Locke’s remarks tha t  “The Fruit, or Venison, which nourishes the wild Indian  ... 
must be his, and so his, i.e. a part of him.” It must be his, has become a part of him, 
since “No Body can deny but the nourishment is his.” 138 Of course Locke is trying to 
show the origin of a legal relation, but his commitment to natural law is, like Grotius’s, a 
commitment th a t  legal relations arise by mirroring natural relations. As Grotius puts it, 
“ When property or ownership was invented, the law of property was established to 
imitate nature.” 1*^) It will be argued below tha t  Locke does not need to talk of 
“mixing” ; tha t  his argument works rather better if we consider directly the right to 
preserve oneself which arises from the property one has in one’s person.
At this point it is most appropriate to provide an independent line of support for the 
claim that Lockes’s notion of property in one’s person is equivalent to the natural law 
notion of the suum . This will also establish not only the conceptual continuity between 
the natural lawyers’ notion and the notion of property in one’s person, but also a high 
degree of terminological continuity between Locke’s expression and tha t  of his English 
predecessors.
Karl Olivecrona has shown, in an important article, both the equivalence of the suum  
and property in one’s person, and also tha t  the Latin “suum ” was typically translated 
into seventeenth century English as “propriety .” 14(1 For example, Hobbes discusses the 
Scholastic adage, that justice is suum  cuique tnbuere , in this way:
1 ° 7 Many modern readers of Locke simply take it for granted that this is what he is doing, since 
their own analyses of the concept of property show it to be a “bundle” of rights. See, for example, 
Lawrence Becker. Property Rights: Philosophic Foundations, London: RKP (1977).
1387 u;o Treatises, 11.26, 28.
Mare Liberum, p. 25; cf. DJPC, p. 229: “... this law was patterned after nature’s plan.”
1411Karl Olivecrona, “Appropriation in the State of Nature: Locke on the Origin of Property”, 
Journal of the History of Ideas, XXXV (1974), pp. 221-30.
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the ordinary definition of Justice in the Schooles [is! that Justice is the constant 
Will o f  gi ving to every m an  his own. And therefore where there is no O w n , that 
is, no Propriety, there is no Injustice . 141
So, for Hobbes, suum  is what is one’s own, which is, what is one’s propriety. (Hobbes’s 
list “of things held in propriety” reinforces this connection. Things held in propriety are 
layered, as we have already seen the suum  to be: “those that are dearest to a man are his 
own life, & limbs; and in the next degree, (in most men,) those tha t  concern conjugall 
affection; and after them riches and means of living.” This shows us also that Hobbes, 
like Grotius, includes social factors which Locke ignores.)
With exactly the same adage in mind, Locke affirms this connection between propriety 
and justice in the first edition of the Essay: “Where there is no Propriety, there is no
Injustice,  is a Proposition as certain as any Demonstration in Euclid” . 0 Both this 
passage and the one above support Olivecrona’s view that “propriety” was used as the 
English word for su u m . 144 When we note the further fact tha t ,  in seventeenth century 
usage, “propriety” and “property” tend to be used interchangeably, with “property” 
becoming Locke’s own preferred usage when revising his work,14  ^ the equivalence between 
“suum ” and “property” , in his own writings at least, is thereby clear. Thus in all editions 
of the Essay  subsequent to the first, the passage quoted above becomes “Where there is 
no Property, there is no In ju s t ice*, ° and in revising the Two Treatises  Locke replaced
“propriety” with “property” in some passages.14' Not in all, however: in the chapter on 
property in the Second Treatise , Locke says in one passage tha t  by labouring on things 
one comes to “acquire a Propriety in them . * 1 * 0  Even the actual expression “property in
141Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. XV (Macpherson edition, p. 202).
14 i^6t<£., ch. XXX (Macpherson edition, p. 383.)
14° Essay, IV.iii.18n.
14401ivecrona, op. cit., p. 219.
14^See Laslett’s editorial introduction to the Two Treatises, pp. 101-2 and notes, and note to 
chapter five of the First Treatise.
14^Essay, IV.iii.18 and note.
■I a ry
'See Laslett, op. cit.
» ■
14®Tioo Treatises, 11.37.
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one’s person“ is prefigured in a work of Richard Baxter, published in 1680. Baxter speaks 
of a propriety in oneself which can be legitimately extended:
Every man is born with a propriety in his own m em bers , and nature mveth him
a propriety in ... his food  and other just acquisitions  of his industry. ^
The equivalence between Locke’s notion of property in one’s person, and the natural 
lawyer’s notion of the suum  is thus not surprising. We have seen th a t  “suum ” was 
commonly rendered into English as “property” or “propriety” ; and tha t  the idea of 
generating property in things through property in one’s person, the established idea of the 
necessity of extending the suum  to include things requisite for its maintenance, is also 
observable in other political writers of the late seventeenth century, as we might 
reasonably expect. Locke’s doctrine of the property in one’s person is therefore something 
of a commonplace - an interpretation, shared by contemporaries, of a central doctrine of 
the modern natural lawyers.
It was suggested above tha t  Locke’s talk of “mixing” one’s labour with things is a 
reflection of the idea of extending the suum  to things - the suum  laps over its original 
boundaries and mixes with parts of the world - but tha t  Locke’s theory does not at all 
require (in fact can be better sta ted  without) resorting to this metaphor. This should not 
be surprising, since, although the idea of extending the suum  encourages thinking of it as 
a kind of physical realm, as some sort of special substance, it is in fact a moral realm - 
tha t  realm which cannot be encroached upon by others without doing an injury. Locke 
draws the conclusion that, because property in things is necessary for protecting property 
in one's person, the right to preserve oneself extends to an exclusive right to use things, as 
long as such uses conform to natural law, to the duties generated by what has been called 
the workmanship model.lo° And, since the workmanship model justifies self-preserving 
actions because they represent the minimum interpretation of the duty to improve the 
created order in accordance with divine purposes, the model also justifies more complete 
in terpretations of this general duty. Therefore, since, for Locke, an extensive system of 
unequal private property linked to a money economy is  in accord with a more complete 
interpreta tion of this general duty, limited rights of private property generated by the 
right of self-preservation can be extended to such extensive systems of property.
^^Baxter adds a propriety “in his Children” as well, but this is explicitly resisted by Locke in 
the Two Treatises. Cf. II.60-7, 170. This passage, from Baxter’s Holy Commonwealth, is quoted in 
Laslett’s editorial footnote to 11.27.
^^See, in particular, Two Treatises, 11.57.
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We can apply this general line of thought to the individual case in the state  of nature, 
thereby showing tha t  “mixing” metaphors are not necessary or even useful. A man who 
by his labour acquires those things necessary for his preservation (and, no doubt, for the 
preservation of his family) acts in accordance with the duties imposed by natural law. He 
has a right to act this way, and does no injury to any other by so doing. No other can 
take these necessary things from him without doing him an injury. He thus has an 
exclusive right to them: "no Body has any Right ... but himself.’1 Therefore, they are his 
property. T hat is all th a t  need be said. Locke’s “mixing” metaphor only complicates the 
issue; perhaps its principal achievement has been to lead astray so many of his readers.
We can now spell out Locke's fundamental doctrines on the right of preservation and its 
implications, and thereby show the intimate (and indeed ineluctable) connection between 
property and liberty (under natural law), and its implications for slavery in particular. 
To begin, it is necessary to consider Locke’s assertion of the right of self-preservation in 
its context. Locke says this:
Whether we consider natural Reason , which tells us, that Men, being once born,
have a right to their Preservation, and consequently to Meat and Drink, and
such other things, as Nature affords for their Subsistence: Or Revelation , which
gives us an account of those Grants God made of the World to Adam, and to
iVoa/i, and his Sons, 4tis very clear, tha t  God, as King David  says, Psal.
CXV.xvj. has given the Earth to the C hildren o f  M en . given it to Mankind in 
l Sicommon.
The world is given to mankind in common because it has been given to no one in  
particular  (Locke is, of course, most concerned to deny that it has been given only “to 
Adam, and his Heirs in Succession, exclusive of all the rest of his Posterity” ) even though 
it has been given “to the Children o f  M en” . It has already been pointed out tha t  to give 
the world in common to all, in the sense of to no one in particular, is the original meaning 
of “common” identified by Grotius, and defined as negative community by Pufendorf. 
Locke’s insistence on the world being in common is inseparable from his rejection of the 
Filmerian doctrine tha t  the world is the private property of Adam and his heirs. There is 
an original community because “no body has originally a private Dominion, exclusive of 
the rest of Mankind.” From such an original community, Locke is of course faced with 
the problem of how private property arises. It must arise because it is necessary - “there 
must of necessity be a means to appropriate ... before [things; can be of any use, or at all 
beneficial to any particular Man” - and, as we have seen, it arises through the improving 
acts of human labour and the beneficial effects of developed economies. Our concern at
151 Two Treatises , 11. 25 .
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this point, however, is to show the political implications of an original community “given 
to Men for the Support and Comfort of their being.” 15'*
We can best approach this by considering an important passage which appears to deny 
tha t  the world is given to men in common, but that it (and all human beings as well) 
belongs to God. The passage has been referred to in passing, and runs as follows:
For Men being all the Workmanship of one Omnipotent, and infinitely wise 
Maker; All the Servants of one Sovereign Master, sent into the World by his 
order and about his business, they are his Property, whose Workmanship they
1 - O
are, made to last during his, not one anothers Pleasure. °
It has already been pointed out that, because God’s will is not changeable, but is 
materially embodied in the world, including in our own selves,154 our being made to last 
during God’s pleasure must not be understood to mean tha t  the laws of nature can be 
changed. Nor is it the case that ,  by being God's property, human beings cannot belong to 
themselves , or cannot successfully appropriate the earth and its fruits. This would be to 
deny the characterisic doctrines of the Second Treatise. Rather, Locke’s point is this: we 
are God’s property because we belong to God. We belong because we are G od’s creation, 
and are therefore subject to divine purposes. In the first place, then, to be G od’s property 
is simply to be subject to natural law. In the second place, however, to recognize 
ourselves as God’s property is to recognize tha t  we are not the property o f  anyone else. 
Because God has an exclusive right over men, no human being can have any such right. 
So Locke’s concern here is not, despite the language of ownership, to enslave us, but to 
free them; to free them from each other through natural law. This is made clear by the 
views expressed both immediately before and immediately after the quoted 
“workmanship” passage:
The State o f  Nature  has a Law of Nature to govern it, which obliges every one: 
and Reason, which is th a t  Law, teaches all Mankind, who will but consult it, 
th a t  being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his Life, 
Health, Liberty, or Possessions ... And being furnished with like Faculties, 
sharing all in one Community of Nature, there cannot be supposed any such 
Subordination  among us, tha t  may Authorize us to destroy one another, as if we 
were made for one anothers uses, as the inferior ranks of Creatures are for
152ibid., 11.26. 
l52ibid., II.6.
154Especially in our “Reason”, which is in mankind uthe Voice of GocT, ibid., 1.86.
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ours.lo°
Therefore the state  tha t  “all Men are naturally in71 is a state  of subjection to natural law 
alone. It is
a State o f  perfect Freedom to order their Actions, and dispose of their 
Possessions, and Persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the Law of
I r c*
Nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the Will of any other Man.
Although a state of perfect freedom, however, the natural state  of men is not without its 
inconveniences. In particular, the lack of an independent authority to which to appeal in 
order to settle disputes mean that ,  although “the State o f  N ature , and the State o f  War 
... are as far distant, as a State of Peace, Good Will, Mutual Assistance, and Preservation, 
and a State of Enmity, Malice, Violence, and Mutual Destruction are one from 
another,” 15' there is always the possibility tha t  disputes will lead to the state of nature 
breaking down, and giving way to a s tate  of war. So, in order to prevent such a state  of 
war arising, men establish political society:
To avoid this State of War ... is one great reason o f  M ens putting themselves  
in to  Society , and quitting the State of Nature. For where there is an Authority, 
a Power on Earth, from which relief can be had by appeal, there the continuance 
of the State of War is excluded, and the Controversie is decided by that 
Pow er.108
This is all reasonable enough, but what of the state of perfect freedom? Is the liberty of 
the natural state  simply abandoned in favour of security in the political state? Locke’s 
answer is in the negative: the “Natural Liberty  of M an” is exchanged for the “Liberty o f  
M a n , in  Society” . He is able to argue this for the following reason: men do not give up 
their liberty when they enter society because society is founded on consent, and therefore 
on a legislature which passes laws “according to the Trust put in it.” Political society, 
rightly conceived, thus involves no subjection to “the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, 
Arbitrary Will of another M an.” It can be understood not so much as generating a
l55ibid., II.6.
lo6z'6zd., II.4. Cf. 11.22: “The Natural Liberty of Man is to be free from any Superior Power on 
Earth, and not to be under the Will or Legislative Authority of Man, but to have only the Law of 
Nature for his Rule.”
157 ibid., 11.19.
158ibid., 11.21.
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superior, as a com m on , power - and therefore involves no diminution of freedom. Rather, 
it produces “Freedom o f  Men under G overnment” , which is “to have a standing Rule to 
live by, common to every one of tha t  Society, and made by the Legislative Power erected 
in it,” and, outside the purview of such rules, “A Liberty to follow my own Will.” To 
satisfy these conditions is to guarantee the “Liberty o f  M a n , in Society”
It may be thought tha t  here Locke is playing rather fast and loose: tha t  the freedom of 
men under government, or the liberty of man in society, are simply terms which obscure 
the fact tha t  they refer to a condition which is a kind of unfreedom. If, by “liberty” , 
Locke means tha t  condition of being free from all restraints which Isaiah Berlin has called 
“negative liberty ” , then Locke is certainly engaged in obscurantism. But in an
im portant passage Locke shows himself to be aware of what has been called the “paradox
i /'i
of freedom” 101 - tha t ,  to be maintained, freedom must respect those restraints which 
preserve and foster it. Freedom, he says, depends on law:
For Law , in its true Notion, is not so much the Limitation as the direction o f  a 
free and intelligent Agent to his proper Interest, and prescribes no farther than 
is for the general good of those under that Law. Could they be happier without 
it, the Law , as an useless thing would of it self vanish; and tha t  ill deserves the 
Name of Confinement which hedges us in only from Bogs and Precipices. So 
that, however it may be mistaken, the end o f  Law  is not to abolish or restrain, 
but to preserve and enlarge Freedom: for in all the states of created beings
1 • 1 A 9capable of Laws, where there is no Law, there is no Freedom.
It is not law which is the enemy of freedom, but being “subject to the arbitrary will of 
another.” And, as we have seen, the consent on which legitimate political society is built 
precludes any such subjection. So the liberty of man in society is genuine liberty.
It is most im portant for Locke to be able to maintain this, because such liberty is crucial 
to the exercise of the right of self-preservation. W ithout liberty, self-preservation cannot 
be effectively pursued, so much so tha t  to lack, or give up, liberty is to lose the control 
necessary even for staying alive. Unfree men are simply at the mercy of others:
I have no reason to suppose, that he, who would take away m y Liberty, would
l59ibid., 11.22.
^^Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty”, in Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford: O.U.P. (1969).
^^See, in particular, Karl Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies , London: RKP (1945).
162 Two Treatises, 11.57.
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1 n  <y
not when he had me in his Power, take away everything else. °
From this it follows tha t
Freedom from Absolute, Arbitrary Power, is so necessary to, and closely joyned 
with a Man's Preservation, tha t  he cannot part with it, but by what forfeits his 
Preservation and Life together.1^
In addition, no man can “forfeit his Preservation” because no man has the power to forfeit 
his own life - the right of self-preservation is built upon the duty to preserve oneself 
prescribed by natural law. Every man “is bound to preserve h im s e l f , and not to quit his
i o r
Station wilfully.” AD0 The freedom under natural law therefore does not allow suicide, nor, 
most importantly for our purposes, does it permit self-enslavement. Locke is explicit on 
the matter:
A Man, not having the Power of his own Life cannot , by compact, or his own 
Consent, enslave h im s e l f  to any one, nor put himself under the Absolute, 
Arbitrary Power of another, to take away his Life, when he pleases. No body 
can give more Power than he has himself, and he tha t  cannot take away his own 
Life, cannot give another power over i t .1 D
Nor, it need hardly be said, can a man be forcibly enslaved by anyone else. Since liberty 
is necessary for self-preservation, to deprive another of liberty is to exercise power over 
the life of the other, a power which one does not legitimately possess, since each and every 
man has a property in his own person. So, because men have power over their own lives 
only in order to preserve it (and improve it for the benefit of life - “for the Support and 
Comfort of their being” 16^); and this power can be exercised only over their own lives 
(not of others), but m ust  be exercised over their own lives (i.e. cannot be given up); 
Locke's twin doctrines of the right of self-preservation and the property in one’s own 
person are able to preclude slavery altogether. According to Locke, no form of slavery can 
be tolerated in a political society which conforms to natural law. Slavery is, in its 
“perfect” form at least, “nothing else, but the State o f  War continued, between a lawful
lQZibid., 11.18. 
1Q4ibid., 11.23. 
lQ5ibid., II.6
16&ibid., 11.23. 
167ibid., 11.26.
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1 AftConquerour, and a Captive" ,1 and, since one great reason for entering political society 
is precisely to avoid the state of war, the justification for political society is lost if it 
allows slavery to exist. This is contained in Locke’s principle tha t  “the great and ch ie f  
end therefore, of Mens uniting into Commonwealths, and putting themselves under 
Government, is the Preservation o f  their Property", since “by the general name, 
Property" Locke means to include, as we have seen, “Lives, Liberties, and Estates.” loy 
To hold tha t  the task of government is to preserve property is, therefore, to hold that the 
task of government is, among other things, to prevent the existence of all forms of slavery.
Although not to our main purpose in this study, one other observation is worth making 
here. A number of modern philosophers, concerned with the contemporary political 
question of the justification or otherwise of modern systems of private property, begin 
their enquiries by examining “traditional” arguments for property. Typically, Locke’s 
“labour theory” is one of the theories thus considered. Such examinations of Locke from a 
modern perspective commonly go astray on two counts. One of these has been already 
indicated: the role labour occupies in Locke’s scheme is only properly understood if it is 
seen as an improving activity in accord with the general requirements of the workmanship 
model. Many modern accounts go astray by failing to see this connection, and the 
difference it makes . 1 ' 0 The second error is no less common, and is implicit in the 
preceding conclusion concerning property and slavery. It can be brought out thus: if
slavery is excluded because of the property tha t  all men have in their own persons, it can 
only be because this property cannot be alienated (voluntarily or otherwise) .171 Further, 
if our appropriation of what is necessary for our subsistence (that is, leaving aside the 
questions of surpluses, and also of traded goods) depends on our duty to preserve 
ourselves, then neither will these appropriations be alienable. Thus Locke accepts tha t  at 
least some property - in fact the fundamental form from which more extensive properties 
is derived - are not alienable. This is sufficient to set his concept of property apart from 
modern conceptions, the conceptions that the philosophers in question are concerned to 
assess. It is a mistake to assume, then, that Locke’s arguments for property are
l(58ibid., 11.24.
ie,9ibid., 11.124, 123.
170We have already seen Nozick’s treatment of property in Anarchy, State, and Utopia to be 
guilty of this error. But a more fitting example of this genre is Lawrence Becker’s Property Rights.
171 The question of the legitimacy of punishment will of course complicate the issue, but it need 
not be considered in this context. The discussion here can be safely limited to innocent parties.
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arguments for that d us te r  of rights which many modern philosophers regard as 
constituting property.
It is also, as we shall see, a mistake to believe tha t  Locke's arguments are all arguments 
for a phenomenon distinct from modern property. Locke’s account of property is a 
historical account in two senses: he deals not only with the advent of property, but with 
the elaboration and specification, over time, of the meaning of property relations 
themselves. Improving labour begins property in things in a historical sense - it s tarts a 
process of extension and elaboration (through rational reflection on sense experience) of 
an originally rather amorphous relation of exclusively belonging to1 * into a complex and 
sophisticated notion of positive law in which a cluster, or bundle, of rights come to be 
accepted as constituting property. Furthermore, although Locke is committed to a 
development in the nature of property relations (this is not to say that such a 
development is a smooth, continuing process - in fact, his “two stages” theory may imply 
only two forms of property), he is not committed to the particular concept of property 
implicit in modern British property law. This can be easily indicated. In order to show 
that property allows a wide range of powers over things, he points out tha t
Property, whose Original is from the Right a Man has to use any of the Inferior 
Creatures, for the Support and Comfort of his Life, is for the benefit and sole 
Advantage  of the Proprietor, so tha t  he may even destroy the thing, where need
1 7 9
requires.
This passage shows tha t  the workmanship model requires th a t  even the widest powers a 
man has over a thing are constrained (or, better, directed^1 “*) by considerations of need or 
advantage. Wilful destruction is not within the purview of property right. Property is 
not, for Locke, a m atter  of absolute control over a thing. This is most important since, 
for a wide range of modern philosophers, such absolute control is seen to be the very 
essence of property right. Lawrence Becker, following the influential analysis by A.M. 
Honore11 calls the right of absolute control over a thing the right to the capital. It is
■^"■"Locke does use “property” to mean forms of common ownership as well, but in the chapter on 
property it is this meaning he has in mind. Every man has a property in his own person because 
“this no Body has any Right to but himselF. Cf. also Pufendorf, DJNG,  IV.iv.2.
1 w n
l ‘6Two Treatises, 1.92 (emphasis added). 
l74ibid., 11.57.
1<5A.M. Honore, “Ownership”, in A.G. Guest (ed.) Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, Oxford: 
O.U.P. (1961).
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■‘the power to alienate the thing and to consume, waste, modify, or destroy i t . " 1'® This 
right is the essential right because, in any list of the “bundle” of rights which can be 
discerned in the complex notion of property, the holder of the right to the capital holds 
the “fundam ental” right:
One who has all the rights in the list save that of capital may own the thing in a 
derivative sense, but the one who has the right to the capital is “fundamentally” 
the owner.1' '
If this is “fundam entally” what ownership is - and for Becker ownership and property are 
1 ^ * 0
identical1' 0 - then it is no surprise tha t  Becker should later come to the conclusion that 
arguments of a Lockean type, although they might establish some kind of rights, do not 
establish property r ights.1'^  Locke’s arguments do not aim to establish the right Becker 
has “fundam entally” in mind. In fact, should we accept Becker’s conception of property, 
we would be forced to conclude that Locke is not really talking of property at all. There 
is no need for such a drastic solution, however. It suffices to insist that Becker and Locke 
employ different concepts of property, so tha t  the failure of Locke’s arguments to 
establish Becker’s concept of property is an unsurprising matter.
Making this difference clear is not without its uses. By focusing our attention on the 
nature of Locke’s concept of property, we become better equipped to consider an 
im portant recent interpretation of Locke’s thought. It has been argued above tha t  the 
central meaning which we find in Locke’s use of “property” is that of exclusive belonging. 
This allows “property” to have both a wide and a narrow meaning (as a number of 
commentators have noted regarding Locke's usage), depending simply on whether what is 
being referred to is all th a t  is mine, what exclusively belongs to me, or what th ings  (other 
than me) are mine. (This difference of scope can in its turn be related to the suum . The 
broad meaning identifies property with the suum  and its extension; the narrow meaning 
limits the reference of “property” to the extensions of the suum  only.) But the important 
m atte r  here is tha t  Locke m ust mean an exclusive right by his use of “property” because 
his arguments for political liberty and against slavery depend on it. The whole thrust of
^~^Becker, op.cit., p.19.
^' ‘ibid., p.20. It is not clear what Becker should intend by the scare quote here - does he intend 
to empty out the meaning?
178ibid., p.18.
^‘^ibid., pp.40-1.
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his account of the relation between government, property, and liberty is to guarantee that 
men belong only to themselves, that they can in no way be “subject to the inconstant, 
uncertain, unknown, Arbitrary Will of another Man. ou To prevent such subjection, 
Locke sees the exclusive rights inherent in private property to be crucial. The same point 
is made in the Essays on the Law o f  Nature. In arguing against personal interest as the 
foundation  of natural law, Locke is nonetheless anxious to stress that natural law aims 
precisely at protecting personal interest, in particular in protecting private property. He 
says:
We do not wish to be understood to say tha t  the common rules of human equity 
and each m an’s private interest are opposed to one another, for the strongest 
protection of each m an’s private property is the law of nature, without the 
observance of which it is impossible for anybody to be master of his property and 
to pursue his private advantage. Hence it will be clear to anyone who candidly 
considers for himself the human race and the practices of men, tha t  nothing 
contributes so much to the general welfare of each and so effectively keeps men’s 
possessions safe and secure as the observance of natural law . 181
In this passage we see exactly the same connections - between natural law, private 
property, individual liberty (in the necessity to pursue one’s own advantage), and the 
general welfare - as we have seen in the Two Treatises. For Locke, private property is a 
bulwark against slavery, the keystone of political freedom and the key to general material 
prosperity.
It is thus no small surprise to find a recent interpretation of Locke's theory of property 
which denies tha t  it is a defence of private property at all, but an argument for individual 
use-rights arising out of an original positive  community. This is the burden of James 
Tully’s book, A Discourse on Property: John Locke and his Adversaries. It would lead 
us too far astray of our main purposes to engage in a detailed examination of Tully’s 
dense book, but, because of the very different picture he draws of Locke’s position, a 
consideration of some of his views is inavoidable.
The very idea of an original positive community is rather odd, and especially so in the 
case of Locke’s theory of property. This is because of some of the characteristics of 
positive community as Pufendorf describes it. He says, in the first place, that positive 
community, like proprietorship, implies “an exclusion of others from the thing which is
Two Treatises, 11.22.
181ELN, Essay VIII, p.207.
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t o o
said to be common.'11^  A positive community is a group of joint owners, marked off 
from an (in this respect) unpropertied remainder of humankind. Obviously, this could not 
be true of an original positive community, for in such a community there are no non- 
owners. Pufendorfs conception of a positive community is of a relation which could not 
have been the original relation between human beings and the earth. For Pufendorf, 
positive community, like private property, arises in the course of human history as the 
result of consent.
This introduces the second oddity. Since Locke’s account of appropriation is designed to 
avoid recourse to consent, the explanation of his position by means of a relation which 
apparently arises through consent is quite unexpected. Tully is aware of this, however - 
he claims th a t  Locke redefines  positive com m unity .100 We shall consider this 
‘‘redefinition” shortly. But there is a further problem regarding the role of consent in 
Locke’s theory if we take it as premissed on a kind of original positive community. This 
is the fact tha t  changes to a system of positive community require consent by all owning 
parties (all human beings). In a system of positive community, says Pufendorf,
it is obvious tha t  one person cannot of his own right dispose of the entire thing, 
but only of his share; and tha t  if any decision is to be reached on the whole 
thing, the consent and authority  of each person concerned in it must be 
secured.184
It might not be clear why this passage should indicate a problem for Tully’s 
interpretation of Locke, since Tully holds only tha t  Locke’s is an account of legitimate 
use, not of converting an original common into private property. There is indeed no 
problem concerning consent on this  m atter. The problem concerns, rather, the 
establishment of a money economy. In the pre-money stage, there is no problem about 
the specification of one’s share: this is fixed by the necessity of preserving oneself. But
the advent of money makes this no longer true. The money economy introduces
possessions which go well beyond the original share, so, for the establishment of the 
money economy, “the consent and authority of each person concerned in it must be 
secured.” Now it may be thought that there is no problem here, since Locke not only 
holds th a t  money is introduced by consent, but also tha t  “disproportionate and unequal
l82DJNG,  IV.iv.3. 
18oTully, op.cit., p.127. 
lS4DJNG,  IV.iv.2.
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Possession of the Earth"1 is thereby consented to .18'* The problem, however, is indicated 
by the fact that Locke clearly has in mind a tacit consent only. But it has been argued 
above tha t  tacit consent, while it is well suited to the burdens consent must bear given an 
original negative commumnity, does not seem nearly sufficient for dissolving (or even 
restructuring) positive communities. Filmer’s argument, that abandonment of original 
community required an explicit and universal consent (and was therefore inconceivable), 
was dependent, it was argued, on positing an original positive community. If Locke also 
begins from an original positive community, then he is in need of a stronger form of 
consent than he provides - the departure from “natural shares” tha t  is such a feature of 
the money economy is otherwise a p n m a  facie  case of unauthorised taking from joint 
owners. (At this point it is useful to remember Proudhon’s famous remark, that 
“property is theft.” Property is indeed theft when it is constituted by unauthorised 
departure from a positive common.) However, Locke does accord an important role to 
express consent in his account of property, since he holds that “in Governments the laws 
regulate the right of property” 18(*, and since the establishment of governments requires 
express consent (“compact” 18~). So, although “Labour, in the Beginning, gave a right o f  
Property”, the contemporary disposition of property is not explicable without recourse to 
express agreements. By establishing political societies in order to avoid the ills of the 
s ta te  of war, men have (among other things) “6y Compact and Agreement, settled the 
Property which Labour and Industry began.” 188 But even such settling of property by 
consent remains vulnerable to a Filmerian criticism (if we suppose th a t  it is this 
agreement which initiates the move away from “natural shares” ) since such a consent is 
not universal, but arises in particular parts of the earth as the need arises.
The idea of an original positive community, and the supposition of such a state in 
Locke's conception of the original common and the method of departure from it, is not, 
then, without its problems. Tully recognizes tha t  positive community theories were 
subjected to telling criticism in the seventeenth century, but he holds tha t  Locke was 
aware of these criticisms, and met them by redefining positive community. We need to 
examine Tully’s account of this redefinition rather carefully. He says this:
18^Tk;o Treatises, 11.50.
186ibid.
187 •ibid. Locke shows that “compact” in his eyes refers only to express consent because he 
maintains, in this passage, that the value of money is established by “tacit agreement”, that is, 
“without compact”.
188ibid., 11.45
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Locke's solution ... is to redefine positive community. Although the common 
belongs to everyone in the same manner, it belongs to them to use for the duty 
of acquiring the means necessary for support and comfort. Their inclusive rights 
refer to these means which are due to each. Thus, each right does not refer to 
every item on the common. Indeed, it does not refer to any item  on the 
com m on  but, rather, to items made from the common. 3
Tully’s view tha t  the original right to self-preservation in Locke’s theory is an inclusive 
right (a right not to be excluded) is, I believe, quite misleading. This can be explained as 
follows. Locke envisages the original state of the world as a state  of plenty. The natural 
bounty of the earth far exceeds the limited self-preserving needs of the first human beings 
(and their want of money prevents the long-term storing of wealth, so tha t  needs do not 
expand), so the 14economic problem” is simply a m atter  of gathering the acorns that have 
fallen from the Oak trees, or gathering apples from the trees in the wood . 190 Since “in the 
beginning all the world was A m e r i c a it follows tha t  the principal concern of the first 
inhabitants was to limit their improving acts (cultivation, enclosure, etc.) to what was 
needed to “supply the Conveniences of Life.” Whatever was beyond this was useless, so if 
cultivation, for example, had extended beyond needs, it would have been wasted effort, 
and would have been given up by it improvers, and allowed to return “to the wild 
Common of N ature .” 191 In such a situation of plenty, with everything lying ready to 
hand, as it were, how is being excluded from the common possible? The fact is, it simply 
is not possible - at least, not without enslaving, imprisoning, or otherwise denying the 
natural liberty of mankind. Men in natural liberty have no need for a right not to be 
excluded, since exclusion is not possible (without violating natural law). All they need is 
the right to take what is there for the taking. This is what the right of self-preservation 
entails. And, since what is taken can serve no self-preserving purpose if it is not secure 
from being taken away by others, the right of preservation requires also, to be efficacious, 
a right to exclude others from what is  taken. But it is not itself an exclusive right, nor an 
inclusive. It is simply a right to act in a certain way, a way which neither includes nor 
excludes others. It can be described as a legitimate power to act in the ways necessary to 
preserve oneself; a legitimate  power because, in exercising it, one does no wrong.
We are now in a position to see Tully’s central mistake. Although the right to self- 
preservation is not an inclusive right, he correctly holds tha t  it is a right to the means  of
1®9Tully, op.cit., p.127 (emphasis added).
1907 u;o Treatises , 11.28.
191 ibid., 11.49,48.
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preservation, and hence is not a right to particular items of the common. In fact, he says, 
“it does not refer to any item on the common."’ Again he is correct to say this, but in so 
doing he is saying that the right to self-preservation implies tha t  the original common is 
common in such a way th a t ,  while it is open to the use of all, it belongs to nobody. But 
th a t  is exactly to say tha t  it is negatively  common. Once again, Tully is quite correct to 
hold tha t  “the restructuring of common rights so their reference does not conflict is the 
answer to all the critics of positive communi t y. ” But  if such a restructuring removes 
all reference to the actual items of the orginal common, the critics of positive community 
have been met by the assertion of negative community. This is Locke’s move; and, 
unwittingly, Tully shows it to be so.
Tully’s very detailed account of Locke's theory of property deserves a more thorough 
trea tm ent than can be accorded it here. Having shown that  the claim tha t  Locke posits 
an original positive community cannot be sustained, we shall have to settle for a rather 
brief consideration of its companion doctrine - tha t  by “property” Locke means common 
property, not private property. Tully a ttem pts  to establish this equation by
examining Locke’s reply, in the First T reatise , to Filmer’s argument tha t  God’s grant to 
Adam of “Dominion” over every living thing (Genesis 1:28) made Adam monarch and 
proprietor of the whole world. Locke’s reply is two-pronged: that the passage in question 
concerns property alone; and tha t  the grant given to Adam was not private but in 
common with all mankind. He puts it this way:
by this Grant God gave him not Private D om inion  over the Inferior Creatures, 
but right in common with all Mankind; so neither was he M onarch , upon the 
account of the Property here given h im .194
Locke’s point here is tha t ,  once we accept tha t  the grant to Adam concerns property alone 
(and not sovereignty), we can also see th a t  the property given to Adam was not private, 
but a right in common with others. This suggests tha t  Locke is here using “property” in a 
broad sense to mean both “Private  Dominion” and “right in common” - i.e., the sense we 
employ when distinguishing private property from common property. Tully, however, 
draws the remarkable conclusion tha t  this passage shows tha t ,  for Locke, “property is not
49^Tully, op.cit. 
19* ibid., p.61.
*94Tu>o Treatises, 1.24.
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private dominion.” The passage means only that the property given to Adam  is not 
private dominion. Tully converts a historical into a conceptual point, and thereby lays 
the foundation for an ingenious but misleading in te rp re ta tion .^^
In fact, the tendency to read a historical account of the origin and development of 
property as a conceptual analysis is possibly the most characteristic failing in 
interpretations of Locke's theory. This is not too surprising, since the ideological context 
of the Two Treatises o f  G overnm ent required tha t  the question of the origin of property 
be discussed in detail. However, the preoccupation with origins should not obscure the 
fact tha t  Locke, like Grotius and Pufendorf, a ttem pts a natural history of property - an 
account of the natural causes that produce it, and of the subsequent developments that 
are necessitated by the natural duties to preserve and improve the whole created world. 
An inability to take off “analytical” spectacles when confronted with natural history has 
obscured from many modern philosophers the fact that when Locke speaks of the origin of 
property he is not thinking of a first principle from which a priori deductions can be 
made, but a historical beginning which is rational in the sense tha t  it is a reflection of 
intelligent divine purposes and tailored to human ends, and which therefore develops 
naturally (predictably and non-violently) into more extensive and sophisticated systems of 
property through free and rational deliberation on changes in historical circumstances. It 
is therefore appropriate to conclude this section with a brief resume of the history Locke 
provides in the fifth chapter of the Second Treatise.
In the beginnings of human society, God gave the world to mankind in common, for the 
support and comfort of their being. The earliest human beings, being not very numerous, 
enjoyed a great natural bounty which enabled them to immediately appropriate whatever 
they needed. Although such appropriations removed things from the original common, 
this was no injustice to anyone because things were common only in a “negative” sense - 
they belonged to nobody in particular, so simply became the property of whoever took 
them (for use). The bounds of any personas use were the bounds of what that person 
could legitimately appropriate, and such appropriations were legitimate because they were
195Tully! op.cit., p.60.
DMuch of Tully’s argument at pp.60-1 involves playing rather fast and loose. For example, he 
says that “Filmer calls private dominion ‘property’” (whereas Locke calls dominion in common 
“property”). But this is not true. Filmer calls private dominion what Locke, calls property, as
Locke’s text shows clearly: “this Grant of God gave Adam Property, or as our A__ calls it,
Private D o m i n i o n . (1.23). This is clear evidence also that Locke does not restrict his use of 
“property” to mean only right in common.
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taken for use. To take from what others had taken for use was thus to do them injury, to 
endanger their preservation. Such takings were not necessary (because of the natural 
bounty), and, because injurious, could be punished.
This s ta te  continued until men established, by agreement, money in the form of precious 
metals. This made a profound change. No longer was appropriation limited to immediate 
use, since the produce of labour could now be changed for metal which did not decay, and 
hence could be stored indefinitely. This made much larger properties possible, especially 
large estates which could produce a surplus tha t  could be sold. The use of money thus 
greatly accelerated the rate at which land was occupied (by allowing large estates to 
develop), and thereby also allowed the development of great inequalities of wealth. This 
was no harm to the poor, however, since by working on the estates of the rich they could 
be better clothed and fed than  was possible in the independent but poorer state in the 
pre-money society. The improvement in general living standards was due to the great 
increase in productivity through the liberation of the immense capacities of human labour 
from the constraints of satisfying only immediate needs.
The increase in the size of estates, and also of population, tha t  the use of money made 
possible, also made land scarce in various parts of the world. Because it was scarce, land 
became more valuable, so the different societies settled on boundaries for their distinct 
territories, and began to establish legislatures in order to regulate the property of their 
members. So, although in some parts  of the world a natural common may still obtain, in 
other parts of the world property has come to be regulated by laws established by 
governments.
Locke’s account comes to a rather abrupt halt at this point, because he has fulfilled his 
purpose of sketching in the development of property from original appropriation to 
modern legal relations. He does not specify what these modern relations must be, since 
they are determined by the different legislatures. As long as the legislatures themselves 
are constituted by consent, they can pass laws concerning the nature and extent of 
property. Of course, no radical undermining of private property could be consented to, 
since the productivity of the system, and hence the wealth of the whole people, depends 
on maintaining the security of possessions. Nevertheless it is true tha t  in such stable, 
developed societies, property becomes whatever the law makes of it. It must, in order to 
be property, remain exclusive possession, but the precise character and extent of the rights 
encompassed in property become a m atte r  of (tacit) general agreement, entrenched in 
legal rules. In such societies property can become a “bundle” of rights. But Locke’s 
account makes it clear tha t  the original property we have in our persons, or the property
182
established in things for use in the early stages of hum an  history, are no such thing. The 
es tab lishm ent of civil government is the decisive move tow ards m odern legal notions of 
property :
For in G overnm ents  the Laws regula te  the right of property , and the possession 
of land is determ ined  by positive c o n s t i tu t io n s .^ ^
197 Two Treatises, 11.50. This passage should not be taken to imply that the establishment of 
government results in a “spill” - that property has to be renegotiated. Locke’s view is unlikely to 
have been different from Grotius’s: “it is to be supposed that all agreed, that whatever each one had 
taken possession of should be his property” (DJBP, II.II.ii.5). The remark (at Two Treatises, 11.45) 
that men “by Compact and Agreement, settled the Property which Labour and Industry began” 
supports this conclusion.
C h apter F our
F R A N C IS  H U T C H E S O N
I: M ora l Scien ce  and M oral Sense
The rediscovery of the importance of the theological dimension of Locke’s thought has 
led to the somewhat unexpected view that, in sharp contrast to earlier interpretations, 
Locke s influence on the political thought of the eighteenth century was of little 
significance.* The interpretation of Locke’s views provided in the preceding chapter, 
however, weaken this view in one im portant respect. Once it is recognized that Locke’s 
theological doctrines have both a formal and a material aspect, it becomes possible, by 
concentrating attention on the material aspect, to produce secular (or at least overtly 
secular) versions of the original theory. Thus, for example, Locke’s doctrine tha t  we are 
God’s property, if seen to be principally concerned to stress tha t  we do not and cannot be 
the property of each other , can be transformed into a secular doctrine of individual rights 
- tha t  the natural liberty of human beings is an inalienable right. Interpreted in this way, 
Locke’s theory can once again be seen as a direct ancestor of some influential eighteenth 
century doctrines.
Quite apart from the reconsideration of questions such as Locke’s influence on the 
eighteenth century in general, however, there is no doubt tha t  Locke was seen as a thinker 
of considerable significance by the philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment. Moreover, 
his influence on these thinkers was as an interpreter and defender of the modern natural 
law of Grotius and Pufendorf. Thus, as the case of Hutcheson shows, his labour theory of 
the origin of property was read as a theory of the manner of occupation of an original
*My account of the relationship between Locke and the Scots in these opening paragraphs owes 
much to James Moore, “Locke and the Scottish Jurists’ .an unpublished paper delivered to the 
Conference for the Study of Political Thought, 1980. The limited influence of Locke in the 
eighteenth century is a doctrine espoused in particular by John Dunn. See “The Politics of Locke in 
England and America”, in John Yolton (ed.), John Locke: Problems and Perspectives, Cambridge: 
C.U.P. (1969).
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• 9negative com m on.“ As such, Locke's distinctive metaphor of appropriation through 
mixing part of oneself with things is passed over as unimportant, except as evidence of a 
regrettable confusion about the nature of property .0 The interpretation of Locke’s theory 
provided in the preceding chapter is in general agreement with such conclusions.
The conception of Locke’s theory as a contribution to natural law is supported most 
clearly by considering the work of Gershom Carmichael, an im portant transitional figure 
in the development of the social theory of the Scottish Enlightenment. His work has been 
called “the bond which connects the old philosophy with the new in Scotland” ."* As the 
first Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow, a position to which he 
was appointed in 1727 (having been a Regent in the same university since 16942 *5 *9), and the 
immediate predecessor of Francis Hutcheson, Carmichael introduced Pufendorfs De 
O ffic io  H ominis et Civis “into the centre of Scottish moral philosophy” .^ Given the 
profound influence that Pufendorfs  work was to enjoy in eighteenth century Scotland, 
this was itself a significant contribution. But Carmichael’s contribution did not stop 
there. His own lectures included significant amendments to Pufendorfs views, and these 
were included as a commentary in Carmichael’s own editions of De O ffic io  (Glasgow: 
1718, and Edinburgh: 1724). This commentary achieved independent fame, as Hutcheson 
eloquently testifies: “th a t  worthy and ingenious man the late Professor Gershom
Carmichael of Glasgow, by far the best commentator on th a t  book, has so supplied and
2Note that Pufendorf holds that occupation “begins with the joining of body to body
immediately or through a proper instrument”, and that “Therefore it is the customary thing, that
occupancy of movables be effected by the hands, of land by the feet, along with the intention of 
cultivating it” (D JN G , IV.vi.8). Occupation thus requires physical contact, as does Locke’s labour
principle; and the requirement that occupation of land requires the intention to cultivate is
discernable in Locke’s understanding of labour as an improving activity: such labour is tilling,
planting, improving, cultivating (see Two Treatises, 11.32).
9
° “The difficulties upon this subject arise from some confused imagination that property is some 
physical quality or relation produced by some action of men”, Francis Hutcheson, A System of 
Moral Philosophy, London (1755), vol. 1, p. 318; cf. also p. 346; and cf. A Short Introduction to 
Moral Philosophy, Glasgow (1747), p. 152. Both these works are reprinted in the Collected Works, 
Hildesheim: 01ms (1969), facsimile edition.
“*James McCosh, The Scottish Philosophy, London (1875), p. 36; quoted in James Moore and 
Michael Silverthorne, “Gershom Carmichael and the natural jurisprudence tradition in eighteenth- 
century Scotland”, in Wealth and Virtue, p. 73.
^See Moore and Silverthorne, op. cit., Wealth and Virtue, p. 75.
°Thomas A. Horne, “Moral and Economic Improvement: Francis Hutcheson on Property”, 
History o f Political Thought, vol.7 (1986), p. 115.
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corrected De O ffic io \  th a t the notes are of much more value than the tex t” . 1 The notes 
thus praised have a powerful Lockean component; as Jam es Moore puts the m atter, 
“Carmichael referred his readers repeatedly to im provem ents made by Locke on themes 
addressed by Pufendorf” , im provem ents which consistently defended the individual
Q
against the power of the m ag istra te .0 (He was thus also concerned to protect Scottish 
society against the unsettling force of Jacobitism : “the perverse and m alignant spirit 
which inspires evil citizens among us to unsettle the public happiness1’ , and which “has no 
other source ... than ignorance of the true principles of natu ral law” .9) Carm ichael’s 
“im provem ents” of Pufendorf, then , were typically adap tations in a Lockean direction, 
and it is reasonable to suppose th a t  it is such adap tations to which Hutcheson alludes in 
the above quotation. C ertainly, for his part, Hutcheson makes liberal use of a number of 
Lockean concepts and distinctions, although his own political theory, especially in the 
later works, moves a long way from Locke’s conclusions. This shift is implicit in his 
earliest work, however, because it reflects a consistent working out of his distinctive 
doctrines in moral psychology and moral epistemology, doctrines which were - a t least in 
part - designed to rebut Lockean theses. They were, nonetheless, shaped by Lockean 
doctrines, in th a t H utcheson’s concern with moral psychology and epistemology is a direct 
response to Locke’s investigations in the Essay. The moral sense theory, as developed by 
Hutcheson and his contem poraries, is inconceivable w ithout Locke’s a tten tion  to the 
nature of moral goodness and the springs of moral action in the Essay.
It is im portan t to recognize this, not only because of the value of intellectually situating 
the theories of moral sense or moral sentim ent which dom inate moral philosophy in 
eighteenth century Scotland, but because the aims of such theories are thereby better 
understood. They arise as the result of the aim to develop a genuine science of morals, an 
aim which is itself a product of natu ral law theory. A brief sketch can help to show why 
this is so. We have already shown th a t Pufendorf suggests the possibility of a
'Hutcheson, Short Introduction, p. i.
O
°Moore, “Locke and the Scottish Jurists” , p. 4. The passage continues thus: “In his discussions of 
the state of nature, of the family, of master and servant relations, of the causes of civil society, of 
the duties of magistrates and the rights of subjects Carmichael amended PufendorPs texts by notes, 
supplements and appendices which provided the reader with an understanding of the duties of man 
and the citizen which was much more insistent on the rights of individuals and less indulgent 
towards the Dower of magistrates than the text of Pufendorf; the authority most frequently invoked 
for these amendments was Locke’s Second Treatise
9James Moore and Michael Silverthorne, The Political Writings o f Gershom Carmichael, 
unpublished translation of Carmichael’s notes on Pufendorf; quoted by Horne, op. cit., p. 116.
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dem onstrative system of m orals, in part a t least because moral notions, and moral 
institu tions, are the products of hum an activity . Locke’s account of moral ideas as 
archetype ideas is sim ilar to Pufendorfs account of moral entities, and similarly allows 
the conclusion th a t a dem onstrative system  of morals is possible. In support of this 
doctrine he gives a famous example (part of which has been already quoted in another 
context): '‘Where there is no Property, there is no In ju s tic e , is a Proposition as certain
as any Dem onstration in E uclid” .10 But Locke recognizes th a t such a system  of 
dem onstratively true propositions is not a moral science in any worthwhile sense, because 
in such a scheme ‘‘the force of m orality is lost and evaporates only into words disputes &: 
niceties '1 . 1 1  R ather, the force of m orality requires us to give an account of the psychology 
of moral action, especially to answer the question, W hat is it th a t drives us to moral 
action? Locke’s concern with this question, and, more generally, with such a science of 
moral action, arises as a result of the kind of natu ral law theory we have been considering.
This can be outlined as follows. It has been stressed th a t the natural law theories show 
an awareness of historical developm ent, even if only a rudim entary one which divides 
hum an history into simple and sophisticated societies. They therefore imply the possibility 
of a kind of natural history of moral conceptions and social institu tions. In this history, 
the knowledge of the requirem ents of na tu ra l law comes about in history through rational 
reflection on sense-experience. However, the natural history of morals is not merely a 
history of moral knowledge, but of moral practice. The fact of moral practice shows th a t 
there m ust be natural processes in us which move us to moral actions (even if, as the 
history of im m ora lity  shows, they do not infallibly move us). The seventeenth cen tury’s 
new natu ral philosophy, with its characteristically dualistic m etaphysics, denied th a t the 
motive force of moral actions could be performed by reason, even though reason can 
decide on directions, or means to  ends. R ather, because action is bodily action, it requires 
both reason and bodily forces or processes. So the rise of the new natu ral philosophy, 
together with the established concerns and explanations of natu ral law theory, produced 
the need for an account of the forces th a t move us to action, and to moral action in 
particular. This conjunction produced, in other words, the distinctively eighteenth century 
quest for the ■‘springs ’1 of action. This quest is nothing other than  the a tte m p t to work
^ Essay , IV.iii. 18.
^Locke, “Of Ethick in General”, quoted by Colman, op. cit., p. 167. As Colman notes, this 
shows that Locke concurs with Berkeley’s critical assessment of the demonstrative system: “To 
demonstrate Morality it seems one need only make a Dictionary of Words & see which includes 
which at least. This is the greatest part &. bulk of the Work.”
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out in detail, with the aid of the new natural philosophy, the precise meaning of the 
natu ra l lawyers’ commonplace tha t the law of nature is founded in hum an nature.
The theory of the moral sense is one such a ttem p t to provide an account of the springs 
of action in hum an natu re . It is best understood if we see it against the background of 
Locke’s account in the E ssa y , since it is a reaction to the perceived inadequacies of the 
Lockean theory. However, it would detract from the main purpose of this chapter to 
include such an account here, so I have offered a brief account of the Lockean theory and 
its reception in an appendix to this essay. Here we need only observe th a t the theory of 
the moral sense is first advanced by the th ird  Earl of Shaftesbury. In his view, Locke’s 
derivation of all hum an action from self-love, combined with his rejection of innate ideas, 
was a complete denial of moral virtue. Because, for Locke, virtue and vice are not 
“naturally  im printed on hum an m inds” , says Shaftesbury, he has denied th a t they are
1 A
“anything in them selves” . But virtue is  som ething, and is innate in our minds, and is 
perceived by a special sense - the moral sense.
For Hutcheson, however, the case is ra ther different. A lthough he presents himself as a 
defender of Shaftesbury’s doctrines, and identifies the self-love theory of morals as his 
polemical target - represented by Hobbes, 13 and also by “the A uthor of the Fable of the 
Bees” ^  - he does not see the doctrine of the moral sense as part of a defence of innate 
ideas. In fact, he explicitly denies th a t his account of the moral sense depends on a 
doctrine of innate ideas:
We are not to imagine th a t this moral Sense , more than  the other Senses, 
supposes any innate  ideas , Knowledge, or practical Proposition , 15
12 Letters of  the Earl o f  Shaftesbury to a Student at the Universi ty  (first printed 1716), p.45. 
Quoted in Jason Aronson, “Shaftesbury on Locke”, American Political Science Review, vol 53 
(1959) p.1103. Cf. also Norton, op.cit., p.35.
19
°The doctrine “That all the desires of the human M in d , nay of all thinking Natures,  are 
reducible to Self-Love,  or Desire of  private Happiness” is the doctrine of “the old Epicureans” , 
now “revived by Mr. Hobbes, and followed by many better Writers.” Hutcheson, An Essay on the 
Nature and Conduct o f  the Passions and Affect ions,  with Illustrations on the Moral Sense 
(1728), introduction to the Illustrations,  in Collected Works, vol.II, pp.207-8.
^Hutcheson, An Inquiry concerning Beauty and Virtue, sub-title to First edition (1725), in 
Collected Works, vol. I.
13Hutcheson, Inquiry,  second edition (1726), New York: Garland (1971), P. 135. (All
subsequent references to the Inquiry are to this edition.) See also the revised and expanded 
discussion of the nature of moral perception in the fourth edition of the Inquiry (1738), 
Farnborough: Gregg International (1969), pp.129-31.
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Not surprisingly, then, Hutcheson shows little concern to criticise Locke, even though the 
la tte r founds m orality on self-love. This is not, for Hutcheson, sufficient to make Locke 
(or even Hobbes, for th a t m atter) an enemy of m orality. The self-love theory fails, not 
because it underm ines m orality, but because it provides an account which does not 
measure up to  the facts. It is forced to provide tortuous stories for the most simple and 
fam iliar of unselfish acts. In treating  of “our Desires or Affections” , the self-love theorists 
have been forced to make “the most generous, kind, and disinterested of them , to proceed 
from Self-Love, by some subtle Trains of Reasoning, to which honest Hearts are often 
wholly S trangers” . 1^
Not only does Hutcheson detach the doctrine of moral sense from innate ideas, his 
account of moral perception has many Lockean echoes. As we shall see, the perception of 
moral qualities is explained w ith the aid of language quite rem iniscent of Locke’s account 
of the perception of secondary qualities. This has prom pted the view th a t he “deploys a 
Lockian epistemology” to counter the self-love account of m orality. If true, this would 
be a little ironic, since Locke’s own theory is itself one such. The claim has not gone
i o
unchallenged.1 But it is certainly true th a t there are Lockean elements in Hutcheson’s 
theory; and, if we employ Locke’s account of the perception of secondary qualities as a 
guide to H utcheson’s account of moral perception, we can approach an understanding of 
H utcheson’s position, and see also th a t the doctrine of moral sense is strengthened by 
being detached from innatist doctrines. This will be shown in the next section.
1 ft^Preface to Essay, op. cit., p. vi; see also Introduction to Illustrations, op. cit., p. 209.
*~T.D. Campbell, “Francis Hutcheson: ‘Father’ of the Scottish Enlightenment”, in R.H. 
Campbell and A.S. Skinner (ed.), The Origins and Nature of the Scottish Enlightenment, 
Edinburgh: John Donald (1982), p.168.
] Q
See, in particular, Emily Michael, “Francis Hutcheson on Aesthetic Perception and Aesthetic 
Pleasure”, British Journal of Aesthetics, vol. 24 (1984) pp.241-253, and the following works by 
David Fate Norton: “Hutcheson on Perception and Moral Perception”, Archiv fur Geschichte der 
Philosophie, vol. 59 (1977), pp. 181-197; David Hume: Common-Sense Moralist, Sceptical
Metaphysician, Princeton: Princeton University Press (1982), pp.55-93; and “Hutcheson’s Moral 
Realism”, Journal of the History of Philosophy, vol. 23 (1985) pp.397-418.
In this context, Hutcheson’s rejection of innate ideas needs to be stressed. This is not because it 
shows him to be a “Lockean”. (Pufendorf also denies that moral knowledge arises from innate ideas. 
See, for example, De Officio Hominis et Civis, I.iii. 12.) Rather, it shows us how not to 
understand his account of moral ideas in terms of “concomitant ideas”. On this issue see, in 
particular, Norton, “Hutcheson’s Moral Realism”, op.cit. Norton’s case for regarding Hutcheson as 
anti-Lockean is, I think, rather overdrawn. The dissatisfactions Hutcheson registers concerning 
“those, who after Mr. LOCKE have rejected innate Ideas” (Inquiry, p.Sl; 4th edition, pp.78-9) are 
of two kinds: he objects to the careless conclusions drawn from this doctrine (Inquiry, p.81), and he 
shows the frustrations of the moralist at the intricate but, practically speaking, useless theorizings 
of the epistemologist (Essay, p.198). He does not show any affection for innatist doctrines.
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Despite denying tha t  morality is founded in self-love, Hutcheson does not assert tha t  
acting morally is contrary to our self-interest. In fact, he notes tha t  many self-love 
theorists, in their efforts to support their hypothesis, point out the various ways in which 
moral actions serve our interests. But even if it is true tha t  our moral actions serve our 
interests,it does not follow th a t  these actions are founded in, or motivated by, 
considerations of self-interest. Concerning the efforts of these “ingenious speculative Men, 
in their straining to support an Hypothesis” ,1  ^ he says:
Allow their Reasonings to be perfectly good, they only prove, tha t  after long 
Reflections, and Reasoning, we may find out some ground, even from Views of 
Interest, to approve the same Actions which every Man admires as soon as he 
hears of them .-1*
Here we see a familiar natural law theme, only in a different dress. Principles of morals 
are not founded in private interest, but nevertheless morality is not contrary to private 
interest. This is because moral principles are founded in human nature. The new twist, 
however, is tha t  the sociable principles of morality are founded not in the instinct of self- 
preservation, not in self-love, but in a fundamental sociable principle of human nature - 
the benevolent affections of the moral sense.
To suppose a fundamental principle of benevolence in human nature cannot help but 
have profound consequences for the theory of natural law, especially concerning the nature 
of our obligation to obey it. For, if we naturally approve of, and are motivated to pursue, 
benevolent courses of action in ourselves, and to reward them in others, there appears to 
be less need to call on the divine power to enforce moral behaviour. It seems that the true 
ground of morality is not simply “the Will and Law of a God, who sees Men in the dark, 
has in his Hand Rewards and Punishments, and Power enough to call to account the 
Proudest Offender” .21 Rather, human nature itself has, if not a fundamentally moral 
character, at least a fundamental moral principle enlivening it. This makes it possible to 
explain moral practices w ithout referring to the laws of a superior, whether human or 
divine. Hutcheson deliberately sets out to explain “how we acquire more particular Ideas 
of Virtue  and Vice, abstracting from any Law , H u m a n , or D ivine -*. “ For Hutcheson, the 
moral sense provides a foundation for natural law which implicitly sets aside (at least in
^Introduction to Il lustrat ions, op. cit., p. 209.
Inquiry, p. 125.
o  i
x^Locke, Essay,  I.iii.6.
22Inquiry, p. 266.
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the ideal case“0) the purely formal obligation to follow the requirem ents of natural law. 
Instead, na tu ra l law is made to depend on the m aterial element as embodied in our moral 
sense. To set aside formal obligation, however, is to concede th a t natural law does indeed 
have ‘‘a degree of validity” , even if it is allowed th a t “there is no God, or tha t the affairs 
of men are of no concern to Him” . The developm ent of the doctrine of the moral sense 
thus rehab ilita tes the G rotian  conception of an obligation to obey the dictates of natural 
law th a t is independent of belief in God. Hutcheson draws back from holding th a t this 
(m aterial) obligation is sufficient to ensure obedience, given the weaknesses of our nature 
and the lim its to our understanding, so the laws of a supreme being are still necessary in 
the end. However, G od’s role is reduced to patching up the system where it shows 
weaknesses, ra ther than providing the necessary coercive power which makes the 
recognition of obligation e f f ec t ive . In the general run of things, this task is obviated by 
the operations of the moral sense.
If it should then be further argued th a t, although natural law does require, to be 
efficacious, a coercive power in those cases where natural m otivation fails, this coercive 
power can be found in the operations of a civil power which itself is established entirely by 
hum an action, then the way is open for an account of natural law in which G od’s power is 
no longer necessary. Thus we are able to see both how Hum e’s theory develops out of 
H utcheson’s, and one way in which it can be seen as a return to a G rotian theory. But 
this is to provide a merely tantalising sketch. To properly understand the im pact of the 
theory of m oral sense, it is necessary to spell out just w hat this sense is, what it 
recom m ends, and the consequences it has for the account of natural law and the 
obligation to obey it. This is the task of the next section. We will then be in a position to 
see how Hutcheson a ttem p ts  to build a theory of rights and of property from this base, 
and to recognize a central problem which the account of moral sense creates for the theory 
of justice - a problem which Hum e’s account of justice is designed to solve.
II: M oral Sense and M oral Sensibilia
Hutcheson develops his account of the moral sense indirectly, by first arguing for a sense 
of beauty. He holds th a t our aesthetic responses to objects depend on a form of 
distinctively aesthetic perception, and therefore on a sense of beauty. “Were there no 
Mind with a Sense  of Beauty to contem plate O bjects” , he says, “I see not how they could
9 ° The formal element is required in Hutcheson’s full account because in real cases it is true that 
our moral sense can be weak, our selfishness “grown strong”, and our understanding weak - see 
Inquiry, p. 268.
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be call’d beauti fu lv. After developing this thesis, th a t there is a sense of beauty natural 
to the hum an mind, he then offers a parallel account of the moral sense. His m ethod here 
is not . mere idiosyncracy, nor is it an a ttem p t to “buy” acceptance of a less plausible 
thesis by tying it to one more plausible. Rather, the parallel is, for Hutcheson, an 
im portan t ingredient of his general '‘sen tim entalist” (i.e. an ti-ra tionalis t”5) position - th a t 
not only do we perceive directly the beauty of objects, we also perceive the beauty of 
actions, which la tter beauty we denote as moral virtue. Judgem ents of m oral goodness 
have their foundation in the perception of a peculiar kind of beauty: moral beauty. It is 
appropriate , then, th a t we follow H utcheson’s order of exposition, and consider the 
foundations of aesthetic judgm ents before turning to consider the foundation of moral 
v irtue in the moral sense.
Beauty is one idea am ongst a num ber commonly neglected by philosophers:
The only Pleasure of Sense, which our Philosophers seem to consider, is th a t 
which accompanys the simple Ideas of Sensation: But there are vastly greater 
Pleasures in those complex Ideas of Objects, which obtain the Names of 
Beauti July Regular, H a r m o n io u s .^
Since the pleasures of sense play a vital part in shaping the courses of action we naturally  
pursue, this neglect is rather surprising, so Hutcheson sets himself to remedy the fact. But 
it is im portan t also for us to notice th a t in this, and in succeeding, passages, Hutcheson 
employs characteristically Lockean concepts. Thus he contrasts simple w ith complex 
ideas, and employs a broad notion of pleasure to bring out the a ttrac tive  (or distasteful) 
features of a very wide range of our sensory experiences.This extends to his trea tm en t of 
the sense of beauty and the moral sense, where his language invites an explication in 
term s of the Lockean account of secondary qualities. W hether such an explication is, in 
the final analysis, a correct account of Hutcheson’s views has been challenged by David 
Fate Norton in a num ber of works concerned with H utcheson’s epistemology. N orton 
holds th a t this epistemology, when carefully examined, shows Hutcheson to have adhered 
to a distinctive Scottish epistemology for which a theory of concom itant ideas functioned
o j
* Inquiry, p. 15.
or
“°The anti-rationalism of the sentimentalists - by whom I mean to include all the moral sense 
philosophers and their explicitly sentimentalist successors (most notably Adam Smith) - is simply 
their denial that reason can alone provide a sufficient explanation for moral phenomena. The 
rationalists (Cudworth, Clarke, Wollaston, in particular), they argued, could explain the nature of 
the good, but could not explain moral obligation. This will be considered in more detail below.
O f t
° Inquiry, p. 7.
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as an alternative to the Lockean corpuscularian account with its emphasis on prim ary and 
secondary qualities. This issue is a difficult one, and is perhaps best not entered into 
here beyond observing th a t, although Hutcheson may have held to an epistemology of a 
much less Lockean colour than is often supposed, there is ample textual evidence to 
support a com patibility thesis: th a t Hutcheson did not view his account of the senses as a 
com petitor with Locke’s views. His willingness to employ im portan t elements of the 
account of prim ary and secondary qualities supports such a possibility.
The fact of our recognition of the beauty of objects shows us “T hat there is some sense 
of B eauty  natural to M en” . Beauty itself is an “Idea rais'd  in  u s” , and the sense of 
beauty is “our Power o f  receiving th is  Idea” ,29 However, despite the fact th a t our idea of 
beauty is always the idea of the beauty of an object, we go astray  if we suppose th a t our 
idea arises because of som ething in the object which is itself beautiful. Rather, beauty
is not understood to be any Quality suppos’d to be in the Object, which should 
of itself be beautiful, w ithout relation to any Mind which perceives it: For 
Beauty, like other Names of sensible Ideas, properly denotes the Perception of 
some Mind; so Cold, Hot, Sweet, B itte r , denote the Sensations in our Minds, to 
which perhaps there is no resemblance in the Objects, which excite these Ideas in 
us, however we generally imagine th a t there is som ething in the Object ju st like 
our Perception.
This is precisely the m anner in which, for Locke, our ideas of secondary qualities differ 
from our ideas of prim ary qualities. The former, unlike the la tte r, do not resemble the 
“P a tte rn s  [which] do really exist in the Bodies them selves” .31 The secondary qualities are 
always connected to “the Perception of some M ind” because they are powers in (or of) 
objects:
9  n"'See the works referred to in footnote 18, and also note the remarks there on one aspect of 
Norton’s thesis.
98“ Inquiry, p. xvii. Of course, thus put, Hutcheson’s view is not adequate. That we perceive some 
things as beautiful no more establishes a distinct sense of beauty than perceiving some things to be 
green establishes a distinct sense of greenness. Hutcheson would not, however, be worried by such 
an observation. At bottom, what matters for him is not so much the constitution of our sense- 
organs (he does not suppose that the sense of beauty, or the moral sense, are discrete sensory 
apparatuses like our external senses, our sense-organs); rather, his point is that beauty, and moral 
virtue, are, like colours or sounds or tastes, perceived, and are therefore ideas which correspond to 
specific qualities in (or of) objects or actions.
^ Inquiry, p.7.
ZOibid., p. 14.
31 Locke, Essay , II.viii. 15.
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Powers to produce various Sensations in us by their prim ary Qualities, i.e. by 
the Bulk, Figure, Texture, and Motion of their insensible parts, as Colours, 
Sounds, Tasts, etc
Beauty can thus be understood in much the same way as the fam iliar (Lockean) account 
of the secondary qualities of objects. Most im portantly , like all such qualities, it must be 
perceived, or sensed. Hutcheson’s decision to speak of a sense of beauty, rather than 
speaking more simply of beauty as sensed , is for reasons of convenience:
It is of no consequence whether we call these Ideas of Beauty  and H arm ony  , 
Perceptions of the External Senses  of Seeing and Hearing, or not. I should 
rather chuse to call our Power of perceiving these Ideas, an INTERNAL SENSE, 
were it only for the Convenience of distinguishing them  from other Sensations of 
Seeing and Hearing, which men may have w ithout Perception of Beauty  and 
Harm ony.
The sense of beauty can properly be called a sense because, like all senses, it is 
independent of the will; in sensing “the Mind ... is passive” . T ha t is, it
has not Power directly to present the Perception or Idea, or to vary it a t its 
Reception, as long as we continue our Bodys in a s ta te  fit to be acted upon by 
the external O bject.0“4
Thus a sense is nothing more than a “D eterm ination of the M ind” to receive impressions 
of a specific sort. The sense of beauty is our (passive) ability, the “determ ination” , or 
constitution, of our mind to perceive beauty in the objects of our experience. Hutcheson 
goes on to add th a t beauty is essentially a m atter of “Uni fo rm ity  am ids t  variety” th a t 
the experience of beauty is th a t particu lar pleasure we derive from the recognition of 
uniformity am idst variety; and th a t it is generally excited by “Form s, Proportions, 
Resemblances, Theorem s” .
Once we have recognized th a t there is this sense of beauty, we very quickly can come to 
see th a t it is not the only “internal sense” . Quite the contrary:
9 0  . . . . . .° ibid., II.viii.10. In this passage Locke does say that secondary qualities “in truth are nothing 
in the Objects themselves” , but this must be regarded as a slightly careless formulation. The 
secondary qualities are powers of objects because they are reducible to specific configurations of the 
primary qualities, and thereby cause in us the ideas they do.
° Inquiry, p. 8.
°^ibid., p. 2.
9 C
° ibid., p. 17 and passim.
u^ibid., p. xvii.
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If the Reader be convinc'd of such Determ inations  of the Mind to be pleas’d 
w ith Forms, Proportions, Resemblances, Theorem s , it will be no difficult m atter 
to apprehend another superior Sense, natural also to Men, determ ining them to 
be pleas'd with Action, Characters, A f fec tio n s .  This is the moral S e n s e d
Thus we arrive at the moral sense. It is th a t passive ability of the mind to perceive the 
m oral goodness of actions, characters, and affections. Moral goodness can be understood 
as those qualities of actions, characters, and affections which cause an observer to approve 
of them . The '‘Notion of pleasing a moral Sense” is the notion th a t
certain A ffe c t io n s  or Actions  of an Agent, standing in a certain Relation to 
other Agents, is approved by every Observer, or raises in him a grateful 
Perception, or moves the Observer to love the A gent.38
There can, then, be no explication of moral goodness, of “the Notion of pleasing a moral 
Sense” , which excludes reference to an observer. If moral goods are understood as 
com parable to secondary qualities, this is what we should expect. Secondary qualities are 
not simply in the objects themselves, but are, as Locke stresses, powers in objects to 
produce the relevant “Idea” in an appropriately placed observer.39
Does this mean th a t moral goodness is simply in the (moral) eye of the beholder? Some 
accounts of the m atte r appear to imply as much, and Hutcheson has been taken to mean 
so. Hume, most notably, in a letter to Hutcheson in 1740 (a passage apparently extracted 
from the then forthcoming th ird  book of the Treatise ), compares “vice and virtue” to
sounds, colours, heat and cold, which according to modern philosophy, are not 
qualities in objects but perceptions in the mind.
Although Hume apparently thought it so, this is not Hutcheson’s position, nor is it 
Locke’s. It is not th a t the secondary qualities are perceptions in minds rather than  
qualities in (or perhaps, of) objects. It is the ideas of secondary qualities th a t are 
perceptions in minds, but so are the ideas of prim ary qualities. The secondary qualities 
are qualities of objects, but qualities which, unlike prim ary qualities, do not “resemble” 
the ideas they generate in the perceiving mind. Therefore, accounts of secondary qualities
Z7ibid.
90
Illustrations, sections II and III; in Essay, op. cit., p. 252.
39Locke, Essay, II.viii.10.
^9David Hume to Francis Hutcheson, 16 March 1740. No. 16 in J.Y.T. Greig’s edition of The 
Letters o f David Hume. Reprinted in D.D. Raphael (ed.), British Moralists 1650-1800, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press (1969), vol. 2, p.110. Cf. Treatise, p.469.
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must take account of the perceptions of a mind in order to show what the idea of a 
secondary quality is like. The account of primary qualities need not do this, since the 
ideas resemble the qualities themselves. But it does not follow from this that secondary 
qualities are merely in the mind; rather they are in the object, being specific 
configurations of the primary qualities, as Locke says above. In like spirit, Hutcheson 
speaks of beauty and harmony as “being excited upon our Perception of some primary  
Q uality .”44
So the proper account of beauty and, indeed, other forms of internal sensing, requires a 
part to be played by both object and perceiving mind. Undoubtedly, some of the 
confusions tha t  have arisen concerning the proper understanding of secondary qualities, 
and our ideas of them, can be traced to Locke’s occasional carelessness in explaining them. 
But it is nonetheless clear tha t  Hutcheson at least wanted to avoid the Humean 
interpretation in his own account of beauty and virtue. He stresses this in later 
formulations of the theory. In the 1738 edition of the Inquiry  he says
The Quality approved by our moral Sense is conceived to reside in the Person 
approved, and to be a Perfection and Dignity in him ... The Perception of the 
Approver, tho ’ a ttended with Pleasure, plainly represents something quite 
distinct from this Pleasure; even as the Perception of external Forms  is attended 
with Pleasure, and yet represents something distinct from this pleasure. This 
may prevent many Cavils upon this Subject.* 4^
And in .4 System  o f  Moral Philosophy  he stresses tha t
T ho’ the approbation of moral excellence is a grateful action or sensation of the 
mind, ’tis plain the good approved is not this tendency to give us a grateful 
sensation. As, in approving a beautiful form, we refer the beauty to the object; 
we do not say tha t  it is beautiful because we reap some little pleasure in viewing 
it, but we are pleased in viewing it because it is antecedently beautiful. Thus, 
when we admire the virtue of another, the whole excellence, or tha t  quality 
which by nature we are determined to approve, is conceived to be in that other; 
we are pleased in the contemplation because the object is excellent and the 
object is not judged to be therefore excellent because it gives us pleasure.43
Despite thus stressing the reality of beauty and virtue, however, it may seem tha t  one 
particular feature of an account couched in terms of secondary qualities, or heavily 
dependent on such an account, will vitiate any anti-sceptical conclusions drawn from 
it.(To produce such conclusions being, of course, Hutcheson’s intention). The problem is
44Inquiry, pp. 14-15.
4^Inquiry, 4th edition (1738), pp. 130-1. 
System, vol. I, pp. 53-4.
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this: although they are powers possessed by objects, these powers are the effect of the
prim ary qualities, and, most im portantly , they produce ideas in us which do not resemble 
those (patterns of) prim ary qualities. R ather, the ideas of secondary qualities seem to be 
the product of a thoroughly contingent relation between the prim ary qualities of objects 
and our perceptual capacities, a relation which naturally leads us to believe th a t objects 
are coloured, etc ., in ju s t the way they are extended or solid. Therefore it may well be 
concluded th a t secondary qualities are not part of an anti-sceptical moral theory, because 
such qualities are "‘deceitful” . Hume’s relative, Henry Home, Lord Karnes, in fact does 
speak of secondary qualities of objects as deceitful. -14 But if moral virtue, because akin to 
secondary qualities, is deceitful, is not this to undermine m orality after all? So, on such an 
account, what can remain of natural law?
At this point Karnes calls on the providential teleology of the workm anship model. We 
are m ade for a certain providential purpose, and as long as this purpose is not violated, 
the precise relation, or resemblance, between our ideas of objects and the qualities of the 
objects themselves is a m atte r on which sceptical argum ents cannot gain a foothold. 
Given the sim ilarities of doctrine and purpose of his and H utcheson’s moral theories, we 
can reasonably safely allow Karnes’s argum ent to serve for Hutcheson as well.
Karnes grounds his argum ent on a Lockean view of the purposes of human life, and 
thereby of the bounds of knowledge:
It was not intended th a t man should make profound discoveries. He is framed to 
be more an active than  a contem plative being; and his views both of the natural 
and moral world are so adjusted, as to be made subservient to correctness of 
action rather than  of belief. 5
From  this we may conclude th a t secondary qualities are not deceitful because they do not 
cause us to act wrongly, even though we may be quite m istaken about the nature of, for 
example, coloured surfaces. So, despite widespread false beliefs about the precise nature of 
secondary qualities, man is not thereby in the least misled. On the contrary, the ends of 
life and action are better provided for by such artifice, than if these perceptions were more 
exact copies of their objects. D This is because, for example, colours enable us to
44Henry Home, Lord Kames, Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion, 
Edinburgh (1751); New York: Garland facsimile edition (1976), pp. 152ff.
i5 ibid., p. 152.
46'ibid., pp. 152-3.
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distinguish more easily between objects, thus facilitating the carrying out of particular 
courses of action. But the hand of Providence is displayed most clearly in the fact that 
the secondary qualities do more than facilitate our practical purposes: they enrich all 
aspects of our experience. Karnes stresses the difference tha t  colours make to our world:
Colour in particular is a sort of visionary beauty, which nature has spread over 
all her works. It is a wonderful artifice, to present objects to us thus differently 
distinguished: to mark them out to the eye in various attires, so as to be best 
known and remembered: and to paint on the fancy, gay and lively, grand and 
striking, or sober and melancholy scenes: whence many of our most pleasurable 
and most affecting sensations arise.4 '
For Hutcheson, moral experience satisfies both of these features. Not only does it, in the 
strongest way possible, facilitate our practical purposes - since, by being necessary for 
social life, it is also necessary for self-preservation - it is also at bottom a sort of beauty, 
since moral perception is the perception of the beauty of action.
Given the providential framework, with its supposition tha t  human beings are intended 
to be active rather than contemplative beings, we can see tha t  an account of moral virtues 
and vices in terms of (or, as comparable to) secondary qualities does not undermine 
morality. Although our ideas of secondary qualities, because they do not resemble the 
dispositions of primary qualities in the objects tha t  cause them, may be said to be 
“deceitful’’ , nevertheless moral phenomena involve no deceit because morals is not so 
much a m atter  of correct beliefs about the nature of the world as of appropriate  action 
within it. (If we take the providential teleology out of the picture, we are left with the 
bare fact of inconsistencies between the beliefs we naturally depend on for acting within 
the world, and the beliefs we arrive at through study and reflection: a conflict, tha t  is, 
between natural beliefs and philosophy. This is the position Hume Finds himself in; his 
solution is to offer a philosophy of human nature in which “moderation” and “mitigated 
scepticism” play central roles. This will be considered in the next chapter.)
*  *  *
This section has been principally concerned to show what Hutcheson understands the 
moral sense to be. Some brief remarks on what the moral sense enjoins, or approves of, is 
necessary in order to show the impact that the doctrine of the moral sense has on the 
theory of property (and of politics in general) Hutcheson develops from a Lockean 
starting-point.
W hat does our moral sense lead us to approve? Hutcheson’s answer is very simple:
47ibid., p. 154.
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"tis plain that the primary objects of this faculty are the affections of the will, 
and tha t  the several affections which are approved, th o ’ in very different degrees, 
yet all agree in one general character, of tendency to the happiness of others, and
4 Q
to the moral perfection of the mind possessing them.
Benevolence is the affection of the will which desires the happiness of others, so 
benevolence lies at the heart of all moral action:
some sort of benevolent affections, or some dispositions imagined to be connected 
with them, are the natural objects of approbation .^9
This means, significantly, that we have a natural tendency to approve, and therefore 
also reward (in others) and perform (ourselves) benevolent actions. For this reason 
Hutcheson is led to endorse important elements of a politics of virtue, rather than of rules. 
This is implicit in his early works, but becomes more explicit in the later ones. In the 
System , for example, he accepts that the duties of the citizens cannot be spelt out in 
detail, but can (in fact, m u st) be determined by the virtuous (benevolent) citizenry 
themselves:
It is superfluous to heap up common-place maxims, well known, but of difficult 
application to particular cases; a good m an’s heart will always be zealous for the 
interest of any innocent association for a publick interest, in which, by the 
Divine Providence, he is engaged; and will look upon this situation of his 
fortunes as the voice of God directing him to tha t  part  of his fellows who should 
be more peculiarly the objects of his affectionate concern .50
Such a shift away from a rule-based system of politics is indeed odd for a theory which is 
worked out within the framework of natural law. For his intellectual inheritors, Karnes 
and (especially) Hume, it was, particularly with regard to tha t  realm of justice properly or 
narrowly conceived (the realm of property relations), not merely odd but quite 
unacceptable. This will be a major concern of the next chapter.
A further oddity (at least to modern ears) stems from Hutcheson’s programme of 
deriving the more complex moral notions, including tha t  of obligation, from the moral 
sense. Since the moral sense naturally approves of benevolence, Hutcheson concludes that 
we have an obligation to be benevolent.5  ^ This seems strange because it appears to violate
^ S y s t e m ,  vol. 1, p. 62. 
ibid., p. 63.
50System ,  vol. 2, pp. 375-6. 
51 Inquiry,  pp. 249-50.
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the principle tha t  “ought” implies “can” : obligation binds the will, but, while the will can 
effectively govern our actions, it often has little influence over our states of mind. If we do 
not feel benevolence, there is little that can be done about this by an effort of will. So, 
while it is unproblematic to speak of an obligation to beneficence , benevolence seems a 
different m atter  altogether. However, Hutcheson’s willingness to speak of an obligation to 
benevolence is not, I suggest, evidence of confusion on his part. Why it is not will become 
clear when we consider the question of obligation more fully in the next chapter, in order 
to explain some famous Humean remarks on obligation.
I l l :  R igh ts ,  P r o p e r ty ,  and P o l it ic a l  C on st itu t ion
It has been pointed out above tha t  the doctrine of the moral sense is able to ground an 
account of natural law in which formal obligation plays no part; an account in which we 
can explain “how we acquire our more particular ideas of Virtue and Vice, abstracting 
from any Law , H u m a n , or D ivineV  Such an account can be called a naturalistic account, 
in tha t  it requires no appeal to any particular set of religious or metaphysical beliefs. By 
relying on no more than the moral sense and the implications which ordinary (non­
metaphysical) reasoning recognizes as flowing from it, Hutcheson grounds his system in 
the observation tha t
many have high Notions of H onour , F aith , G enerosity , Ju stice , who have scarce 
any Opinions about the DEITY, or any Thoughts of fu tu re  Rew ards; and abhor 
anything which is Treacherous, C ruel, or U njust, without any regard to fu ture
"  cy
P unishm ent s.
In this way he thus sharply differs from Locke on the question of the foundations of 
morals; and, as already indicated, the essential selflessness of the moral sense allows it to 
provide a direct foundation for human sociability:
In the same manner we are determin’d to common Friendships and 
Acquaintances, not by the sullen Apprehensions of our N ecessitys , or Prospects 
of In terest; but by an incredible variety of little agreeable, engaging Evidences of 
Love , G ood-nature , and other m orally amiable Q ualities  in those we converse 
w ith .53
Since human sociability is the foundation of the natural law, the moral sense is also the 
ultimate foundation of natural law. The natural law is a system of “maxims, or rules of 
conduct” derived from the moral sense. It is derived naturally  from the moral sense both
52ibid., p. 128.
53 ibid., p. 257.
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because it derives necessarily, and because it does not depend on any supernatural 
commitments. It is, rather, moral philosophy which, by reflecting on the approbations of 
the moral sense, establishes what is the content of natural law. The moral-sense-approved 
maxims of conduct are established
as far as it can be done by observations and conclusions discoverable from the 
constitution of nature, without any aids of supernatural revelation: these
maxims, or rules of conduct are therefore reputed as laws of nature, and the 
system or collection of them  is called the LAW OF NATURE” .04
It is rather odd tha t  Hutcheson should speak of the moral sense as explaining our 
particular ideas of virtue and vice, without reference to a law, and then to call the system 
of such ideas the law of nature. The laws which the law of nature is independent of, 
however, are the commands of any agent (hence the reference to laws “Hum an,  or 
D ivine”), the formal element of a voluntarist account of obligation or law. The moral 
sense can thus produce laws of nature if and only if such laws are not voluntaristically 
conceived; and indeed Hutcheson’s are not. This is sufficient to dissolve the paradoxical 
character of Hutcheson’s remarks about law and the moral sense. Futher, we shall see 
below that Hutcheson’s commitment to the moral sense implies a strong commitment to 
individual judgement, such tha t ,  in dire circumstances, particular rules can (indeed m u s t ) 
be set aside. Thus the rules of conduct which comprise the natural law, although not 
merely rules of thumb, are nonetheless not indefeasible. (We have seen a hint of this 
position already, in Hutcheson’s appeal to “the good m an’s heart” in the passage quoted 
at the end of the previous section.)
The natural law provides an account, based on the moral sense, of the particular 
obligations of social life. But Hutcheson does not speak much of obligations at all: he
points out tha t  from the moral sense “we derive our Ideas of RIGHTS” ,00 and then 
proceeds to explain natural law largely in terms of rights. It would be a grave mistake to 
conclude from this, however, tha t  Hutcheson thus provides what would now be called a 
“rights-based” theory. Rather, since the moral sense shows tha t  “some sort of benevolent 
affections” are the foundation of all moral goodness, Hutcheson’s account of rights has a 
distinctively utilitarian character:
Whenever it appears to us, that a Faculty o f  doing, demanding, or possessing  
any thing, universally allow'd in certain C ircumstances, would in the whole
54 System, vol. 1. p. 1.
55 Inquiry, p. 277.
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tend to the general Good , we say that any Person in such Circumstances, has a 
Right to do, possess , or dem and that Thing. And according as this Tendency to 
the publick Good is greater or less , the Right is greater or lessP®
By speaking here of rights as faculties, Hutcheson shows his indebtedness to Grotius and 
Pufendorf. As a “faculty” , a right is a power to act with a moral effect, and, since for 
Hutcheson there is only one moral effect, the tendency to the general good, rights are 
powers to enhance the general good.
Therefore, Hutcheson speaks of rights that are “greater” or “less” than others. Unlike 
some modern conceptions, Hutcheson’s rights are unashamedly hierarchical. Although 
greater rights do not necessarily override lesser rights, they are nevertheless more 
im portant; and the greatness of any right is inversely related to its separability from the 
general good. Those rights which are not separable from the general good are Perfect 
rights:
The Rights  call’d perfect, are of such necessity to the publick Good, that the 
universal Violation o f  them  would make hum an Li f e  intolerable; and it 
actually makes those miserable, whose Rights  are thus violated. On the 
contrary, to fulfil these Rights  in every Instance, tends to the publick Good , 
either directly , or by promoting the innocent Advantage of a Part .* 07 8
The observance of these rights is therefore essential for achieving the general good, and as 
a result compliance with these rights must be enforced. So, in exercising a perfect right 
the use of force is justified. Hutcheson’s justification is simply consequentialist:
as to the general Consequences, the universal Use of Force in a State o f  Nature, 
in pursuance of perfect R igh ts , seems exceedingly advantageous to the Whole, by 
making every one dread any a ttem pts  against the perfect Rights  of others.5®
In other words, perfect rights are those moral powers which tend to the general good, and 
because enforcing, or “violent Defence, or Prosecution” , of them further tends to the 
general good, perfect rights are enforceable. Thus Hutcheson adapts Pufendorfs 
distinctions to his own ends.
W hat are these rights th a t  are so closely tied to the general good? Hutcheson gives a 
short list:
56ibid.
o7ibid.
o8ibid., p. 278. 
59ibid., p. 277.
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Instances of perfect Rights  are those to our Lives ; to the Fruits of our Labours; 
to demand Performance of Contracts  upon valuable Considerations, from men 
capable of performing them; to direct our own Actions either for publick , or 
innocent private Good, before we have submitted them to the Direction of others 
in any measure; and many others of like na tu re .®0
Of these four rights, the first is a right to life, the last a right to natural liberty, while the 
second and third are rights to acquisition and contract. Given tha t  acquisition and 
contract are those forms of free action which are, for the purposes of physical preservation 
at least, perhaps the most important kinds of liberty, we can see tha t  Hutcheson’s short 
list of perfect rights can be explained in terms of Locke’s right of original property in 
oneself (i.e., to life and liberty), from which all other properties (estate) are derived. In 
Hutcheson’s later work, the debt to Locke is made clear by his remark th a t  “each man is 
the original proprietor of his own liberty” . 1 But it is also implicit in the earlier work.
This debt can, of course, be traced back to Grotius and Pufendorf, since we have seen 
tha t  the idea of being proprietor of oneself reflects the central notion of the suum .  
(Grotius, in fact, holds th a t  promising itself depends on our being proprietors of our
/ » o
actions00; but it is im portant to remember here as well that he means tha t  our actions 
belong to us, are part of our suum.)  It is necessary to stress the debt to Pufendorf at this 
point, since Hutcheson accepts the distinction between natural and adventitious rights, 
and therefore accepts that the rights to “the Fruits  of our Labours” and to “demand 
Performance of Contracts” are not natural but adventitious. (They both arise as a result 
of “some previous act of m an.”®4) These rights are the most important elements of 
justice, of giving to each his due, so we see that, for Hutcheson, justice is essentially 
concerned with adventitious r ights .®5 (This is equivalent to saying, in Humean language, 
tha t  the virtues of justice are artificial; although Hume’s reasons for saying this are more 
explicitly connected to motivational m atters, as we shall see.)
60ibid., p. 278.
®^ System,  vol. 2, p. 211.
®'^ See Inquiry, p. 283.
63DJBP,  II.XI.i.3.
®4Pufendorf, De Officio,  Il.ii.l.
®5In the Inquiry, Hutcheson does not address this matter; but in the System his distinctions are 
a straightforward application of Pufendorf. See System,  vol 1, pp. 293ff.
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The second major category of rights are the Im perfect rights. These are rights because, 
like all rights, they “tend to the improvement and increase of positive Good in any 
Society” . Nevertheless they are not perfect rights because they “are not absolutely 
necessary to prevent universal Misery” . Their violation does not deprive human beings of 
any good they previously enjoyed, but “only disappoints Men of the Happiness expected 
from the Humanity or Gratitude of others” . From this it follows “That a violent 
Prosecution of such R ights  would generally occasion greater Evil than the Violation of 
them ” . Imperfect rights, therefore, despite tending to the general good of society,
cannot be justly enforced. Furthermore, such acts as kindness, to which there is an 
imperfect right, are impossible to enforce. Kindness enforced is kindness no longer: as
ATHutcheson puts it, it “would cease to appear amiable” . Imperfect rights are most 
frequently adventitious, since they are usually appropriate to quite specific situations 
shaped by human actions. Hutcheson’s examples suggest this much:
Instances of im perfect R ights  are those which the Poor have to the Charity of 
the Wealthy; which all M en  have to offices of no trouble or expense to the 
Performer; which B enefactors  have to returns of Gratitude, and such like.
Hutcheson spells out one aspect of the distinction between imperfect and perfect rights 
in a way tha t  gives it something of a modern flavour. Roughly, the former are not 
enforceable because they correspond to om issions  of positive goods, whereas the latter are 
enforceable because they involve com m issions  of actual evils. Hutcheson’s account only 
roughly corresponds to this modern distinction because he is as concerned with 
motivations as with actual performances. The violation of imperfect rights is best 
tolerated, he says, because it “only argues a Man to have such weak Benevolence , as not 
to study advancing the positive Good of others, when in the least opposite to his own” . In 
contrast, the violation of perfect rights cannot be tolerated because it
argues the in ju rious Person to be positively evil or cruel; or at least so 
im m oderately se lfish  as to be indifferent about the positive M isery  and R uin  of
£>Q
others, when he imagines he can find his In terest in it.
Violating the former shows merely “a weak Desire of publick H appiness , whereas
Inquiry, p. 279. 
Q1ibid.
68ibid.
69 ibid., pp. 279-80.
204
violating the latter shows the violator to verge on being “entirely negligent of the Misery  
of others” .7(1 Any such persons must be restrained in their actions, because such neglect 
of the condition of others shows them to be, at best, neglectful of the moral sense on 
which all social affections are based, and on which social life itself depends.
Hutcheson’s third kind of right is the most removed from the general good. His account 
of this right helps to show the important differences between his general understanding of 
rights, and those of more recent defenders of rights. This third kind of right he calls an 
“External” right. It is best understood as a degenerate perfect right: perfect because
“using Force in pursuance o f  i t” is justified; degenerate because the right has lost its 
connection with the general good. In the System  this right is referred to as “rather a 
shadow of right than any thing deserving tha t  honourable name” , ' 1 and, although this 
and other remarks in the later work are perhaps stronger than those in the Inquiry , 
nevertheless much the same a tt i tude  seems to be manifest in the two works. The very 
choice of name for this right suggests as much: the point seems to be tha t  the rights in 
question are “external” because they are no more than the shell or husk of a right. They 
have the outer appearance of a right, and must in the ordinary run of things be treated as 
a right; but they remain a defective or degenerate sort of right, lacking the heart 
appropriate to rights - the tendency to promote the general good. External rights are 
rights which have lost their telos. To say, however, tha t  a right can lose its telos , but yet 
remain a right, may seem rather odd. There are, however, two reasons for putting it this 
way. Hutcheson mentions only one of these, but the second seems implicit in his own 
examples. They can be brought out by examining his account of these degenerate rights.
External rights are enforceable rights which conflict with imperfect rights: they arise
when the doing, possessing, or demanding o f  any thing is really detrimental to 
the Publick in any  particular Instance, as being contrary to the imperfect Right 
o f  another.* 7^
Why then should these external rights be observed? Firstly, violations of imperfect
n  o
rights, as already observed, “give no Right to force” , so the fact of such violations alone 
provides no ground for interfering with or denying external rights. Secondly, although
70ibid., p. 280.
11System, vol. 1, p. 259.
7 ^  Inquiry, p. 280.
73ibid., p. 282.
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each individual external right is detrim ental to the general good, honouring external 
rights as a whole is ju st the opposite:
the universally  denying M en th is  Faculty  ... would do more m isc h ie f than all 
the E vils  to be fear 'd  from  the Use o f  th is  F acu lty .1^
So, although it is always “more hum ane  and kind* not to exercise one’s external rights, 
nevertheless the denial of such rights would be “vastly more pernicious* 7^
Why should this be so? The answer can be gleaned from the types of examples 
Hutcheson provides. He says:
Instances of external R ights  are these; th a t of a wealthy M iser  to recall his Loan 
from the most industrious poor Tradesm an at any time: th a t of demanding the 
Perform ance of a Covenant too burdensome on one side;
and so on. The significant feature of these examples is their specificity. The problem is 
not, for example, w ith contracts per se, but with contracts of a particular sort. The 
specificity of the examples is not surprising, however, if we recognize th a t they are all 
undesirable special cases of desirable general rules. T ha t loans should be repaid, and th a t 
covenants should be fulfilled, are both unexceptionable general rules, w ithout which 
transactions between hum an beings, and thus a particu lar form of social life, could not be 
m aintained. But both allow special cases which are anything but worthwhile, such as 
those quoted above. Moreover, if a general rule is to be socially efficacious, the parties 
governed by it cannot unilaterally decide whether or not it is binding in any particular 
case. To fail to require this would be to render the rule unenforceable. This would of 
course underm ine completely even such perfect rights as “to demand Performance of 
C ontracts* . Consequently, all the undesirable special cases of im portant general rules 
m ust be treated , not on their own m erits, but in the light of the relevant general rule. 
This is the situation  with external rights. They are special cases of more general perfect 
rights, those cases which conflict w ith imperfect rights. Because of this, they remain 
enforceable rights: to deny them is impossible w ithout sim ultaneously denying perfect 
rights. The vital im portance of perfect rights to social life is the fundam ental reason why 
the denial of external rights would be “vastly more pernicious* than  their acceptance.
(This line of argum ent, however, is clearly at odds with the tru st in the virtuous 
citizenry he shows in the quotation from the System  a t the end of Section II. A fully-
' ^ibid., pp. 280- 1.
75ibid., p. 282.
76ibid., p. 281.
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fledged politics of virtue would have to significantly weaken, perhaps even abolish, 
external rights. The seriousness of the problem here is seen when it is recognized tha t  the 
benevolent affections of the moral sense prompt us to act in opposition to external rights. 
For his critics, particularly Karnes and Hume, this is precisely the point where 
Hutcheson’s theory is most unsatisfactory: the sense of duty is essential for maintaining 
justice, but the moral sense does not ground the sense of duty. A separate foundation for 
duty must therefore be fo u n d . ' ' )
It was mentioned above tha t  Hutcheson’s notion of external rights would help to show 
how different is his conception of rights from some characteristically modern conceptions. 
Some of these differences can now be indicated. Firstly, it is necessary to point out that 
all notions of rights have some conception of a good as their telos, or point. Clearly, the 
point of Hutcheson’s rights is to promote the general good. But to conceive of their point 
so broadly not only allows a rich variety of rights, it also ensures tha t ,  provided the 
general good can be accurately specified, all rights will in general be in harmony with one 
another. They are not in harmony only in those specific cases where external rights are 
generated. But external rights are rights which ought not to be exercised (because it is 
always “more hum ane  and k ind” not to exercise them). Therefore Hutcheson’s rights 
either work harmoniously together to promote the general good, or, where they do not, 
ought not to be exercised.
Many modern notions of rights tend to be quite different. One rather blunt formulation 
puts it this way: “Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group may do 
to them (without violating their rights)” . ' 8 On an account such as this, the point of 
rights is obviously much narrower than Hutcheson’s: they aim at nothing larger than 
preventing interference to discrete individuals. Not only, then, do they not aim at any 
social good, not aim at providing a mutually supporting harmonious system, they in fact 
tend to assume the absence of any such harmony: my right to X is intended to protect me 
from the effects of your actions, including you exercising your right to Y. In this scheme, 
then, the exercise of rights is not an activity tha t  aims to promote social harmony, but 
may even engender conflicts. And, since the point of rights thus conceived is not the 
promotion of any social good, there will be little likelihood of finding rights which ought 
not to be exercised.
77See Karnes’s complaints about Hutcheson’s inadequate treatment of duty and justice, in 
Essays, op. cit., pp. 55-7; and Hume’s account of the artificiality of the sense of duty in Treatise, 
pp. 477ff.
78Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, p. ix.
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Because, on Hutcheson’s view, perfect rights are those rights which are necessary for the 
general good, perfect rights cannot come into conflict. As he puts it, “there can be no 
Opposition of perfect Rights  among themselves” .”  ^ Nor can perfect rights conflict with
• • Q A
imperfect rights. This does not mean that Hutcheson is being overly optimistic about 
social harmony. Rather, as the preceding account of the relationship between perfect and 
external rights implies, any otherwise perfect right which conflicts with an imperfect right 
is ipso facto  an external right. Thus there is no conflict of perfect and imperfect rights. (It 
is, however, difficult to see why Hutcheson should also claim that “external Rights cannot 
be opposite among themselves” .81)
We should now turn to the important question of the alienability  of rights. For 
Hutcheson, some rights are alienable, others are not. A right is alienable if it satisfies two 
conditions:
(i) the alienation must be possible;
(ii) the alienation must '‘serve some valuable Purpose” .8^
The first condition shows tha t  the “ Right of private Judgem ent , or of our inward  
S e n t im e n ts , is unalienable”, since we cannot conform our thoughts to anyone else’s will. 
The second condition makes freedom of worship inalienable, and also implies an 
inalienable right to liberty:
a direct Right over our Lives  or Lim bs , is not alienable to any Person; so tha t  
he might at Pleasure put us to death, or maim us.8j
Hutcheson has here introduced the central inalienable right of Locke’s political theory. It 
is the inalienable natural right to liberty, the right implied by having property in one’s 
person. For Hutcheson, as for Locke, its crucial function is to ban slavery. In contrast to 
Locke, however, Hutcheson does not refer to a fundamental right of self-preservation. We 
may suppose tha t  this is deliberate, tha t  his commitment to the general good renders self-
Inquiry, p. 282.
80ibid.
81 ibid.
82ibid., pp. 282-3. 
83ibid., p. 283.
208
preservation, as distinct from the preservation of the species, no longer a fundamental 
right. This supposition is strengthened by the fact that, having asserted the existence of 
the right to liberty, Hutcheson immediately introduces another right which is precisely 
the opposite of a right of se i/ - preservation. This further right may well require tha t  we 
surrender power over our very lives to the authority of others:
We have indeed a R ight to hazard our Lives in any good Action which is of 
importance to the Publick; and it may often serve a most valuable end, to 
subject the direction of such perilous Actions to the Prudence of others in 
pursuing a publick Good ; as Soldiers do to their G eneral, or to a Council of 
W ar.84
He adds “so far this right is alienable71, thereby showing th a t  this “ Right to hazard our 
Lives in any good Action” can lead to the over-riding of the general “Right over our Lives  
or L im bs71.
We see here, then, Hutcheson accepting a basic Lockean concept, but then immediately 
reshaping it to fit his fundamental commitment to advancing the general good. This is a 
pattern  repeated in a number of aspects of Hutcheson’s political theory. Two of these will 
be considered here: the foundation of property, and the formation of a civil polity from a 
state  of nature. For our purposes, the account of property is particularly significant, 
because Hutcheson’s account includes elements tha t  his successors were anxious to 
incorporate in their own theories, and because it simultaneously threatens to undermine 
the stability of property - a m atter  which all preceding and subsequent natural law 
writers were anxious to preserve.
Hutcheson’s account of property is strongly indebted to both Locke and Pufendorf. 
From Locke he takes over the stress on the importance of labour, and the non-necessity of 
any original agreement, but he discards many of the more metaphysical or religious 
components of Locke's theory - he does not ground property in an original property in 
one’s person (even though, as we have seen, he allows an original propriety in one’s 
liberty), nor is property established by things becoming “part  of oneself” . ^  (In fact he 
castigates those who understand property as a “physical quality or relation” rather than a
84ibid.
®^See Two Treatises, 11.26.
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moral quality.3® Neither does he appeal to the divine command to Adam to labour.37 In 
practice, he returns to the narrower conception of property employed by both Grotius and 
Pufendorf of property in things (Locke’s “estate’’); and his affinities with Pufendorf are 
further shown by his explicit acceptance that the original community of things was a 
negative community, and by close parallels in the treatment of necessity. These 
parallels can be attributed to the fact that Pufendorfs implicit dependence on a rational 
consensus in settling the nature and limits of the right of necessity is quite congenial to 
Hutcheson’s approach, since it builds in the flexibility and concern for practical 
effectiveness implicit in the moral sense concern for establishing the general good.
This leads to a theory of property which, perhaps even more than does Locke’s, stresses 
the significance of “Labour and Industry.”3  ^ The difference is not that Hutcheson places 
a greater value on labour than Locke - indeed this is scarcely possible, since for Locke 
"labour makes the far greatest part o f the value of things, we enjoy in this World.” In 
fact, Hutcheson’s estimation of the value of labour appears to be taken directly from 
Locke, as the following passages show. Locke says:
I think it will be but a very modest computation to say, that of the Products of 
the Earth useful to the Life of man 9/10 are the effects o f  labour
Hutcheson finds no reason to dispute this “modest Computation” . He says:
That we may see the Foundation of some of the more important rights of 
Mankind  let us observe, that probably nine Tenths, at least, of the things which
86uSystem, vol.l, pp. 318, 346; and vol. 2, p. 12. Since, for Hutcheson, property is a kind of right, 
it is a moral quality “competent to some person” (vol. 1, p. 253), and is therefore founded in 
justice, that is, in the law of nature (vol. 1, pp. 346-7). Perhaps Pufendorf can be blamed for part 
of the problem Hutcheson sees in Locke. He says: “Ownership then is the right by which the
substance, so to speak, of a thing belongs to a man” [De Officio, I.xii.3.).
37Cf. Two Treatises, 11.31; Genesis 3:17-19.
88This is also sufficient, he holds, to show that no original agreement was necessary to establish 
property. In the Inquiry, he does not consider the nature of the original community, but in the 
System he stresses that, because of the original negative community, there was no need for an 
original agreement (as in Pufendorf) nor for an explicit parental grant (as in Filmer). See System, 
vol. 1, pp. 330-1.
3^Inquiry, p. 284.
^Two Treatises, 11.42.
91ibid., 11.40.
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are useful to Mankind, are owing to their Labour and In d u s tr y * 9^
The difference between the two theories lies in the fact tha t  Hutcheson seeks no further 
justification for property. But how does the value or usefulness of labour provide a 
foundation for property? For Hutcheson, it does so simply by providing a justification for 
rights which protect and encourage “Labour and Industry”. These rights are property 
rights. Of course, if this is what property rights are, it follows tha t  in any situation where 
the protection or promotion of industry is not necessary, then neither is property.9  ^
Hutcheson implicitly accepts this, observing that property becomes necessary at that 
particular stage in human history,
when once Men become so numerous, tha t  the natural Product of the Earth is 
not sufficient for their Support, or Ease, or innocent P leasu re .^
There is thus no question, for Hutcheson, of property being necessary for, or implied by, 
the eating of an acorn or an apple in the wild.9  ^ Property is only necessary, and thus 
generally arises, where there is scarcity, and thus com petition for resources - whether 
natural or generated by industry.
The chief cause of this scarcity is population increase. With more mouths to feed, but 
with only a fixed stock of resources,
a necessity arises, for the support of the increasing System , tha t  such a Tenour 
of Conduct be observ’d, as shall most effectually promote Industry , and tha t  
Men abstain from all Actions which would have the contrary effect.9^
General benevolence works to this end; and the strong ties of blood and friendship, and 
the desire for honour, all work together to support i t .9 ' But these are not enough. For all 
such mutually supporting passions and affections are undermined where any person is not 
confident of securing “the Fruits of his own innocent Labour” . Where the fruits of 
industry are not protected,
97, Inquiry, p.284.
93°Of course, property may still exist in such situations, but for other reasons: for example, as a
relic of a bygone system of economic organization.
9^Inquiry, p.284.
95Cf. Two Treatises, 11.28.
9^Inquiry, p.284.
97 ibid.
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it exposes the Industrious  as a constant prey to the S lo th fu l , and sets Self-love 
against I n d u s t r y .^
So, without the adequate protection of the fruits of industry, all social endeavour is in 
vain. The necessity of industry for both individual and social good thus renders property 
also necessary. We have discovered, therefore, '‘the Ground of our Right of Dominion  
and Property in the Fruits  of our Labours”. We cannot do without property, because 
w ithout this right “we could scarce hope for any Industry , or anything beyond the 
Product of uncultivated Nature” .00 Further, the value of such industry will only be 
partially achieved if there is not only protection for, but also unhindered disposal of, any 
surplus beyond our needs. Thus Hutcheson derives, from the one principle, the rights to 
accumulate, to trade, to donate, and to dispose by tes tam en t . 100 His view appears to be 
not only tha t  incentives for industry require protection over the fruits of industry, but 
th a t  such incentives (and thus society’s material well-being) are maximized when power 
over the fruits of industry is itself maximized. The im portant role assigned to industrious 
activity in promoting the general good of society leads Hutcheson to advocate a system of 
property constrained only by the operations of the moral sense. This means that, as 
Thom as Horne puts it,
his property theory is both an explicit defence of inequality and an effort to 
educate those in polite society to the moral, political and economic virtues that 
would justify their eminence. 101
Such justifying virtues are, as they are for Locke, the effective promotion of industry and 
productivity so tha t  the general good is promoted. The pre-eminence of some is simply a 
pre-condition for the betterm ent of all.
p.285.
00ibid. Cf. the discussion of Hutcheson on this point in Donald Winch, Adam Smith’s Politics, 
Cambridge: C.U.P.(1978), pp. 49-50.
100Inquiry, p.286. On the matter of testamentary succession, Adam Smith takes exception to 
Hutcheson’s rather breezy derivation. Smith points out that testamentary succession is a late and 
sophisticated development in the history of property, and that this is so because the necessity of 
maintaining an incentive for industry is satisfactorily achieved by having the property pass to those 
who had (or who could be perceived to have had) a significant hand in the development and 
maintenance of the property. Such legal succession, which normally favours next-of-kin, can thus 
even be invoked to challenge the validity of testaments. See Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence, 
LJ(B), 156. (Although typically going to next-of-kin, such forms of legal succession are, however, 
founded “not so much on account of their relation to the father as on account of the labour they 
had bestowed on acquiring them”.)
l01Thomas A. Horne, “Moral and Economic Improvement: Francis Hutcheson on Property”, 
History of Political Thought, vol. 7 (1986) p.118.
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Limitations on how far the institution of property can itself be extended are dealt with 
in the same way:
as property is constituted to encourage and reward industry, it can never be so 
extended as to prevent or frustra te  the diligence of m ankind . 102
Hutcheson has particularly in mind preventing any person or society from acquiring a 
right in "‘a vast tract of land quite beyond their power to cultivate.” If property is not 
thus limited, ‘‘the caprice or vain ambition of one state  might keep half the earth desolate, 
and oppress the rest of m ankind . " 105 His commitment to facilitating and protecting 
industry thus leads Hutcheson to bar appropriations where they are not useful. So, 
although his reasoning is rather different from Locke’s, his conclusions are very similar.
On the place of property in civil society, however, Hutcheson’s conclusions differ 
significantly from Locke’s. In part  this difference is more apparent than real, since Locke’s 
doctrine tha t  the protection of property is the end of government does not imply tha t  the 
protection of our property in things (estate) is the end of government. Nevertheless the 
protection of such things is an im portan t  concern for Locke, whereas for Hutcheson the 
end of government is the promotion of the general good. Therefore property in things, 
like other rights, is protected by government as long as, or to the extent tha t ,  it promotes 
the general good. (In practice, of course, this extent is quite considerable.) W hat 
consitutes this general good is always open to the reassessment of moral agents employing 
their moral sense. Thus,
our moral Sense , by a little reflection upon the Tendencys of actions, may adjust 
the R igh ts  of M a n kin d .10^
The rights of mankind bind, then, only in the general course of events. Where necessity 
or emergency requires, they can - indeed m ust - be set aside. 105 Necessity itself is 
determined by the moral sense, and thus by those agents in the relevant situation. The 
implications of this view extend well beyond merely property in things, to the justification 
and extent of political powers. As a result, the twist tha t  Hutcheson gives to the meaning
102System, vol.l, p.326.
103 •ibid., pp.326-7. Adam Smith employs the same reasoning to reject entails, “the greatest of all 
extensions of property”. Entail is precisely a system which frustrates industry, so “upon the whole 
nothing can be more absurd than perpetual entails” (LJ(B), 166-8).
10^Inquiry, p.288.
105ibid., p.298.
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of the Lockean notion of a trust is of profound significance. In order to show this, it is 
first necessary to consider how the civil polity arises.
For Hutcheson, the advantages of civil polity are clear, and so the motives for entering 
into it are unexceptionable. Nevertheless, he accepts tha t  it has to be created by human 
beings from a pre-civil condition. In this respect he is at odds with his moral sense 
precursor, Shaftesbury. Shaftesbury’s dismissive remark that “the learned have such a 
fancy for this notion, and love to talk of this imaginary state  of na tu re” 100 reflects his 
view th a t  political society is instinctively natural, not the result of artifice. For 
Hutcheson, the moral sense is the foundation of sociability, but civil polity is not thereby 
instinctive. He accepts the reality of the state  of nature, treating civil government as an 
artifice.10' But he also stresses that, if we lacked the moral sense, our natural state 
would be “universal W ar, according to Mr. HOBBS” .1®®
How then is civil government constituted? Hutcheson’s account is Lockean in structure, 
but with significant modifications. Firstly, government is constituted by men transferring 
“their alienable R ights  to the Disposal of their Governours, under such L im ita tio n s  as 
their Prudence suggests” .109 These alienable rights include, significantly, the right to 
punish and the right to war, and provide the foundation for the M agistra te’s right to 
punish. 110 The limitations of prudence are simply the limitations any people choose to 
place on their government, or, to put it another way, those alienable rights the people 
choose to retain themselves. Even where they do not require such limitations, however, 
the government remains limited by the inalienable rights of the people. Thus
there can be no Government so absolute, as to have even an external Right to do 
or command every th ing.111
106^Shaftesbury, Characteristics; quoted by Isaac Kramnick, Bolingbroke and His Circle, 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press (1968), p.89.
107This acceptance is made explicit in the System, vol. 1, pp.280ff. In the Inquiry he refers to it 
twice (p.278 and p.303), but neither occasion is directly connected to the question of the formation 
of government.
10®Inquiry, p.303.
109i'6td., p.287.
110i6id., p.278.
U 1ibid., p.294.
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In fact, where a government does invade inalienable rights, the people can exercise their 
right of resistance. However, this right may be either perfect or external, depending on 
whether the exercise of the right would do a net good or a net harm. So, although 
uUnalienable Rights  are essential L im ita tions  in all Gover nment s” and such rights 
are protected by the people’s right of resistance, nevertheless there are circumstances 
where this protective right ought not to be exercised. Thus considerations of the general 
good constrain even the right of resistance. Hutcheson’s position, in contrast to Locke’s is 
tha t  the “appeal to God” needs to be tempered by an appeal to our moral (good) sense.
The civil government is institu ted  by the people with an eye to
promoting the publick Good , and of defending themselves against mutual or 
foreign I n j u r y s . *
This therefore constitutes the end of government, and any government is a trust designed 
to achieve this end. Not only is a government a trust, an institution designed to achieve a 
particular worthwhile end, it must also, in Hutcheson’s scheme, be itself an object o f  trust 
by the people. He says:
in all states this tacit Trust  is presuppos’d... tha t  the Power conferr’d shall be 
employ’d according to the best Judgment of the Rulers for the publick good. 114
This judgement is not simply a m atter of determining how best to work within the 
Constitution of the polity, but allows, in cases of necessity, even Constitutional violations. 
Hutcheson is, however, anxious to stress tha t  such violations cannot be allowed except in 
the direst necessity. He does this by drawing a parallel with the people’s right of 
resistance:
in Cases of extreme N ecessity , when the State cannot otherwise be preserv’d 
from Ruin, it must certainly be Just  and Good in limited Governours, or in any 
other Persons who can do it; to use the Force of the State for its own 
preservation, beyond the Limits Fix’d by the C onstitu tion , in some transitory  
A c ts , which are not to be made Precedents. And on the other hand, when an 
equal Necessity  to avoid Ruin requires it, the Subjects may justly resume the 
Powers ordinarily lodg’d in their Governours, or may counteract them .... These 
Necessitys must be very grievous and flagrant, otherwise they can never over­
ba lance  the Evils  of violating a tolerable Constitution, by an arbitrary act o f  
Power, on the one hand; or by an Insurrection, or Civil War, on the other. No 
Person, or State can be happy, where they do not think their important Rights
112ibid., p.295.
UZibid., p.287. 
114ibid., p.295.
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are secur'd from the Cruelty , Avarice, Am bition ,  or Caprice of their Governours.
Nor can any Alagistracy  be safe, or effectual for the ends of its Institution, where 
there are frequent Terrors of Insurrections ,11^
Even given his concern to limit this “right of necessity” , Hutcheson has given the 
conception of government as a trust a twist th a t  Locke certainly had not envisaged. His 
rulers, unlike Locke’s, have to be prepared to exercise political virtues which can undercut 
the Constitutional foundations of the state. Although he insists tha t  the possession of 
such virtues (“superior W isdom , or Goodness” 11^) cannot itself provide the foundation 
for a government - can give “no right to Men to govern others” 11  ^ - this is only because
no A ssum er  of Government, can so demonstrate his superior Wisdom or 
Goodness to the satisfaction and security of the Governed, as is necessary to 
their Happiness . 118
Not only does this allow th a t  divine government, unlike human government, can be 
founded on wisdom and goodness; it also shows just how far Hutcheson’s commitment to 
the benevolent and utilitarian moral sense undercuts and refashions a prima facie 
Lockean political theory.
*  *  *
For Hutcheson’s intellectual successors, this was an unacceptable legacy. While, on the 
one hand, the doctrine of the benevolent moral sense provides a firm foundation for 
human sociability, on which the law of nature rests, on the other hand it champions the 
judgement of benevolent individuals to such an extent tha t  almost all social rules become 
defeasible. Hume’s reaction is to preserve the moral sense’s role in founding sociability, 
but to stress its limitations. Human benevolent affections have only a very limited 
ex ten t , 119 and therefore in all matters of justice it is most important to insist on the
l l 5 ibid., pp.298-9.
U 6ibid., pp.299-300.
117ibid., p.300.
11Sibid., p.299.
119Hume’s most famous remark bearing on this m atter concerns the “avidity... of acquiring 
goods and possessions for ourselves and our nearest friends” , an avidity which “is insatiable, 
perpetual, universal, and directly destructive of society.” (Treatise, pp.491-2).
216
necessity of “the steady prosecution of the rule” ,* 1“11 not on the contextual judgements of 
the moral sense. For Hume, then, the most pressing political task is to Find a Firm 
foundation for tha t  sense for which the moral sense can not adequately account - the sense 
of duty.
Hume's religious scepticism also leads him to abandon another feature of Hutcheson’s 
theory - its providential teleology. (Indeed, in the System  in particular, this teleology is 
most explicit, with its enquiry - in Book I Part  II - into the supreme good of human 
nature.) Thus, for Hume, the question of what is natural to human beings, and therefore 
also of what is properly regarded as the law of nature, must be reviewed. In a letter to 
Hutcheson, written before the publication of the third book of the Treatise , he indicates 
the crucial methodological difference between his own and Hutcheson’s enquiries into the 
law natura l to human beings. He says there:
I cannot agree to your sense of natural. It is founded on Final causes; which is a 
consideration, th a t  appears to me pretty uncertain and unphilosophical. For 
pray, what is the end of man? Is he created for happiness or for virtue? For this 
life or for the next? For himself or for his Maker? Your deFinition of natural 
depends on solving these question, which are endless, and quite wide of my 
purpose . 1“ 1
In the next chapter, we will examine Hume’s a ttem pt to ground the sense of duty without 
resorting to an “unphilosophical” conception of nature, or of the law of nature.
T rea tise , p.497.
1^ 1L etter of 17 Septem ber 1739; N o.13 in J.Y .T . G reig’s edition of The Letters o f  David Hume\ 
reprin ted  in D.D. R aphael (ed.), B r itish  M oralists 1650-1800, Oxford: C larendon Press (1969), pp.
108-9.
C h ap ter  F iv e
D A V ID  H U M E
I: In tro d u c tio n
The preceding chapter provides a sketch (filled out in the Appendix) of how the concern 
for a psychology of action adequate to the requirem ents of natural law - th a t is, a theory 
of action which is both firmly founded in hum an nature, and which shows sociability as an 
essential expression of th a t nature - leads to the rejection of the “selfish” aspect of Locke’s 
psychology of action, while retaining its hedonism. By broadening the sources of pleasure 
to include the perception of beauty, and by providing an account of v irtue in term s of the 
beauty of actions or characters, the theory of the moral sense a ttem p ts  to provide a 
foundation for hum an sociability, as an adequate natural law theory m ust. But sociability 
is more than  the mere desire for, or enjoym ent of, hum an society. It also requires a social 
order which reflects the m easure of hum an intelligence; and, of the elements of this order, 
it is justice - which most essentially means the rules of property - which is of most 
im portance. But justice requires the following of a rule regardless of its consequences in 
particu lar cases (in Hutcheson’s language, it requires the recognition of external rights), 
and where these consequences are contrary to benevolence the Hutchesonian moral sense 
theory cannot account for our obligation to justice. It cannot explain our sense of justice, 
which is our sense of duty.
In the second of his E ssays on the Principles o f  M orality  and N atural Religion 
(published in 1751), entitled  “Of the Foundation and Principles of the Law of N ature” , 
Hum e’s older relative Henry Home, Lord Karnes, argues th a t the law of nature is founded 
in hum an natu re , as do all the natu ral law w riters, and concludes from this th a t, for a 
complete account of natu ral law, “it will be necessary to trace out hum an nature with all 
the accuracy possible.” 1 This leads him to give an account of the principles of human 
action, and, in order to account for our recognition of the beauty of the actions of free 
agents, and of the characters of such agents, a recognition which leads us to praise and, in 
appropriate  circum stances, to em ulate them , he defends the reality of the moral sense. 
However, he criticises all previous accounts of this moral sense, including Hutcheson’s, for 
the reason already given. He then goes on to give an account of justice, and of our
1Kam es, E ss a y s , p. 42.
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obligation to justice, which a ttem pts  to overcome the shortcomings of the previous 
theories. One im portan t insight of this account is later taken up by Adam Smith - the 
negativity  of the virtue of ju s t i c e /
The main (but by no means the only) target of Karnes’s Essays  is Hume’s Treatise , 
published just over ten years earlier. But Kames does not attack Hume for abandoning 
na tu ra l  law, nor does he see him as outside the context of the natural law debate. In fact, 
he sees “the author of the treatise upon hum an na tu re” ** as a contributor to the same 
debate. And, when we consider the nature of Hume’s constructive  programme - in the 
second and third books of the Treatise  - it is easy to see why he should have thought so. 
For Hume shows himself there to have the same positive programme as Kames: an 
account of the principles of action (as part of a more complete account of the constitution 
of the human passions, which are themselves the mainsprings of all human action), 
together with an account of the nature and origins of justice, with special attention to the 
nature  of our obligation to obey its rules - the latter  following a short section which both 
defends the moral sense and accepts tha t  alone it cannot provide a complete account of 
our moral obligations. It is not surprising, then, tha t  Kames should have considered Hume 
to be a contributor to the development of an adequate account of natural law. I shall 
argue in this chapter th a t  Kames was correct in thinking so.
To claim Hume as a contributor to natural law, however, seems to fly in the face of 
some well established conceptions of Hume the philosopher. Of these, the conceptions of 
Hume as the Newtonian philosopher who introduced experimental reasoning into moral 
subjects* 4, or as the sceptical destroyer of all established philosophy, are here the most 
pertinent. So, before defending the natural law interpretation of Hume - mainly by 
showing why he should have described his theory of justice as akin to that of Grotius, and 
by showing in what way justice is artificial rather than  natural - it will first be necessary 
to show how, or to what extent, a natural law in terpretation is compatible with these 
established conceptions.
9
“ibid., pp. 59-61. Cf. Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments , ed. D.D. Raphael and A.L. 
Macfie, Oxford: Clarendon Press (1976), IL.ii.1.9 (“Mere justice is, upon most occasions, but a
negative virtue”), and II.ii. 1.5. The negativity of justice lies in the fact that the moral sense (for 
Kames), or propriety (for Smith), recognizes the evil of injustice, rather than the good of justice.
''Kames, Essays, p. 57.
4As the title-page of the Treatise announces - Treatise, p. xi.
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At this point it is appropriate to acknowledge tha t ,  in defending a natural law 
interpretation of Hume, I am following a lead established by Duncan Forbes in H u m e’s 
Philosophical P o l i t i c s and owe a general debt to tha t  work. Particular debts will 
become more clear along the way. But the task itself, of reconciling, as far as possible, the 
various conceptions of Hume’s philosophy, can now be turned to. The picture of Hume as 
the Newtonian philosopher presents fewer problems for our interpretation, so it is best 
considered First.
II: The N ew ton ian
Hume owes his reputation as the Newtonian philosopher to his intention, expressed on 
the title-page of the Treatise , “to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into 
moral subjects” . At a rather superficial level, this intention leads Hume to engage in the 
“thought experiments” of the Treatise ; more importantly, it is reflected in a self-conscious 
methodology, involving in particular commitments to the principle of parsimony, and to 
grounding all conclusions firmly in experience. To illustrate the la tte r  first. In the 
Abstract he (indirectly) describes his overall aim in these terms:
’tis at least worth while to try if the science of m an  will not admit of the same 
accuracy which several parts of natural philosophy are found susceptible of.®
To secure this end, the author of the Treatise
proposes to anatomize human nature in a regular manner, and promises to draw 
no conclusions but where he is authorized by experience. He talks with contempt 
of hypotheses ... '
This Final remark echoes Newton’s s tatem ent in the O pticks  th a t  “hypotheses are not to
Q
be regarded in experimental philosophy” . Reconciling it, however, with what Hume 
actually does say about “hypotheses” in the Treatise  (where, particularly in Book II, he 
uses it in much the way we would use a term like “theory”^), requires a good deal of 
charity in interpretation. His intention, however, is essentially to reject a priori
®Duncan Forbes, Hume’s Philosophical Politics, Cambridge: C.U.P. (1975).
®Abstract, in Hume’s Treatise (2nd ed.), p.645.
~ ibid., p.646.
^Quoted by John Passmore, Hume’s Intentions (3rd ed.), London: Duckworth(1980), p.45. 
9ibid.
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principles.10 An example of this can be found a t the end of the Enquiry concerning 
H um an Understanding , where the ancient m axim , ex n ih ilo , nihil f i t , is dealt a 
summ ary execution: it “ceases to be a maxim, according to this philosophy” .11 The same 
requirem ent, th a t all knowledge be grounded firmly in experience, is not to be restricted 
to natural enquiries, but m ust occur in morals as well. This is succinctly expressed in the 
2nd Enquiry :
Men are now cured of their passion for hypotheses and system s in natural 
philosophy, and will hearken to no argum ents but those which are derived from 
experience. It is full tim e they should a ttem p t a like reform ulation in all moral 
disquisitions; and reject every system of ethics, however subtle or ingenious, 
which is not founded on fact and observation.* 1^
The m ethod to be followed requires, according to  the Treatise , “a cautious observation of 
hum an life ... in the common course of the w orld.” 13 The fruit of such labour will be a 
new science:
W here experim ents of this kind are judiciously collected and com pared, we may 
hope to establish on them  a science, which will not be inferior' in certain ty , and 
will be much superior in u tility  to any other of hum an com prehension.14
These rem arks give us an indication of the nature  and aims of Hum e’s “experim entalism ” .
Hume's other significantly Newtonian principle is parsim ony, or as he usually describes 
it, simplicity. In the opening sections of Book II of the Treatise , he observes that
we find in the course of nature, th a t th o ’ the effects be m any, the principles, 
from which they arise, are commonly but few and simple, and th a t ’tis the sign 
of an unskilful na tu ra list to have recourse to a different quality , in order to 
explain every different opera tion .15
He adds th a t, because this principle is so rarely observed, “m oral philosophy is in the
10For a more detailed discussion, see Passmore, chapter 3.
^D avid Hume, Enquiries concerning H u m a n  U nderstanding and concerning the Principles o f  
M orals , ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge, 3rd edition revised by P.H. Nidditch, Oxford: Clarendon Press 
(1975), p. 164.
1 9" E n q u ir ie s , pp.174-5.
1°Trea tise , p.xix. 
l 4ibid.
15i’6td., p.282; cf. also p.473, for example.
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same condition as natural, w ith regard to astronom y before the time of Copernicus” 
The same principle is invoked in Book III to defend the account given of the role of 
sym pathy in moral judgem en ts.* 1' In the A bstract, the task of natural philosophy is 
described as finding “those few simple principles, on which all the rest depend.18 and, by 
showing th a t “all the operations of the mind m ust, in a great measure, depend” on the 
three principles of the association of ideas; further, “’tis the use he makes of the principle 
of the association of ideas” , showing it to be one of those few simple principles, th a t can 
“in title  the author to so glorious a name as th a t of an inven tor” Once again, however, 
perhaps the clearest sta tem en t is in the 2nd E nquiry  (which, unlike the Treatise , also 
a ttem p ts  to display a sim plicity of intellectual s tructu re). The account of the role of 
u tility  in the social virtues is there justified on the ground th a t
It is entirely agreeable to the rules of philosophy, and even common reason; 
where any principle has been found to have a great force and energy in one 
instance, to ascribe to  it a like energy in all sim ilar instances. This indeed is 
New ton’s chief rule of philosophizing.
Despite these remarks, it should be noted th a t Hume is not lacking in a measure of 
agreem ent with critics of the Newtonian passion for simple principles. Berkeley had seen 
as a weakness of Newtonian science its encouragem ent of “th a t eagerness of the mind, 
whereby it is carried to extend its knowledge to general theorem s” ,“^1 and in the 1st 
E nquiry  Hume allows th a t m oralists, in their “search for some common principle” on 
which moral sentim ents m ight depend, “have sometimes carried the m atte r too far, by 
their passion for some one general principle” . It is probable th a t Hume has in mind the 
type of objection raised by Hutcheson against the determ ination of some moral theorists - 
particularly  Mandeville - to  ground all moral distinctions in self-love. For Hutcheson, the
iQibid.
1^ibid., pp.578,580,588.
1 80Abstract, in Hume’s Treatise (2nd ed.) p.646.
^ibid ., pp.661-2. 
o n Enquiries, p.204. The reference is to Newton’s Principia, Bk.III. For discussion cf. Passmore, 
op.cit., esp. pp.43-4.
91“ABerkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge, para.106. Quoted by Passmore, p.44.
Enquiries, p.15.22
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drive for simplicity causes a blindness to the relevant facts. As he puts the m atter in the 
Preface to his E ssay  on the Nature and Conduct o f  the Passions :
Some strange love of simplicity in the structure of human nature ... has engaged 
many writers to pass over a great many simple Perceptions which we may find in 
ourselves.2**
We have to presume th a t  Hume has this caveat in mind, when, in the 2nd Enquiry’s 
appendix on self-love he remarks tha t  the “selfish hypothesis” in morals arises from a 
determ ination to reduce all appearances to a single cause:
All a ttem pts  of this kind have hitherto  proved fruitless, and seem to have 
proceeded entirely from that  love of s im plic ity  which has been the source of 
much false reasoning in philosophy.24
T ha t  this remark should be seen within the rather limited context suggested, rather 
than as indicating a wider methodological commitment - as is the case with Berkeley, for 
example - is necessitated by what would otherwise be a directly contradictory remark only 
a few pages later in the same appendix. Hume says there tha t ,  “if we consider rightly of 
the m a t te r” , we would prefer his own view to the “selfish hypothesis” because it “has
o r
really more s im plic ity  in it, and is more conformable to the analogy of na ture” / 0 This 
shows th a t  Hume does not, after all, back away from the search for parsimonious 
explanation, but continues to adhere to what he calls “Newton’s chief rule of 
philosophizing” .
Hum e’s Newtonianism, then, consists chiefly in what he saw to be the major elements of 
the experimental method - the search for simple general causes, and the determination to 
found all doctrines on fact and observation. Thereby a moral science could be developed 
with the same levels of accuracy as - but with much greater utility than - the philosophy 
of nature. This moral science would be founded on the science of human nature, because 
hum an nature  is “the capital or centre of these sciences” . In fact,
There is no question of importance, whose decision is not compriz’d in the 
science of man; and there is none, which can be decided with any certainty, 
before we become acquainted with th a t  science. In pretending therefore to 
explain the principles of human nature, we in effect propose a compleat system 
of the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon
2SHutcheson, Essay, 3rd ed. (1742), p.ix. Quoted by Selby-Bigge, Enquiries, p.xxiv.
24Enquiries , p.298. 
25ibid., p.301.
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which they can stand with any security.“®
Hume’s Newtonianism, then, is his commitment to what he took to be the central features 
of New'ton’s method, in order to produce a new moral science grounded firmly in human 
nature.
Our concern here is not to evaluate his practical conformity to these stated ideals, but 
to determine whether there is any inconsistency - or even incongruity - between these 
ideals and the natural law tradition. The first clue that there is not is provided by Hume 
himself in the paragraph immediately following the passage quoted above. For, although 
his talk of building on a new foundation may suggest he is a ttem pting  to tread a course 
hitherto untrodden, he acknowledges tha t  he is in fact engaging in an enterprise already 
underway; initiated by “some late philosophers in England, who have begun to put the 
science of man on a new footing” / '  These “late philosophers” (not then all dead, 
incidentally) are acknowledged in a footnote: they are “Mr. Locke , my Lord S h a ftsb u ry ,
o o
Dr. M andeville , Mr. H u tch in so n , Dr. B u tler , &c. ° This list is something of a “mixed
O Q
bag” , as Duncan Forbes notes. However, the surprising absences are not, pace Forbes, 
Berkeley, Descartes and Malebranche. Quite apart  from the latter pair not being English 
(and hence being a possible embarrassment to Hume's use of this group of philosophers to 
exemplify his claim, much developed in his later E ssa ys , th a t  “the improvements in 
reason and philosophy can only be owing to a land of toleration and of liberty” ;01) all 
three fail to conform to the requirements of the experimental method, as understood by 
Hume. Descartes' search for “clear and distinct ideas” rather than for empirical evidence, 
M alebranche’s occasionalism about causes, and Berkeley’s rejection of simple general 
explanations - all these are sufficient to rule out these philosophers. But Forbes is right in 
stressing the omission of Hobbes: although Hobbes’s conclusions hardly commend his
inclusion in a list intended to show the virtues of a land of liberty, his method is
“®Treatise, p.xvi.
0 7 .
ibid., p.xvii.
2Sibid.
9Q #
H u m e’s Philosophical Politics, pp. 8-9.
°®Cf. in particular. “Of Refinement in the Arts” , in David Hume, Essays, Moral, Political, and 
Literary, ed. T.H. Green and T.H. Grose, London: 1886.
^ Treatise, op.cit.
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adequately experimental. Hume has, in all probability, a simple reason for this omission: 
Hobbes is rather too early a figure to illustrate Hume’s view that  moral philosophy, in the 
modern as in the ancient world, comes to flourish “at the distance of above a whole
o n
century” after the establishment of a new natural philosophy. L This would allow him to 
class Hobbes as a typical precursor - i.e., providing im portant illuminations, but tainted 
by misconceptions.
For present purposes, however, the im portant thing about this list is tha t ,  with the 
exception of Mandeville, it is not a list of philosophers antipathetic  to the natural law 
tradition. Hume’s support for the experimental method-in morals is not, therefore, ipso 
fa c to  opposition to natural law. In fact, many philosophers deeply embedded in the 
natural law tradition explicitly avow either the advantages, or even the necessity, of the 
new experimental science. This can be readily illustrated by the views of Hutcheson, for 
our purposes the most instructive member of Hume’s list of “late philosophers” . Not only 
does Hutcheson see no barrier between natural law and experimental philosophy, he 
positively identifies the method proper to natural law theory to be the development of a 
science of human nature by the employment of what can only be called experimental 
method. In the Short In troduction, he describes the task of natural law as follows:
All such as believe tha t  this universe, and human nature in particular, was 
formed by the wisdom and counsel of a Deity, must expect to find in our 
structure and frame some clear evidences, showing the proper business of 
mankind, for what course of life, what offices we are furnished by the providence 
and wisdom of our Creator, and what are the proper means of happiness. We 
must therefore search accurately into the constitution of our nature, to see what
99
sort of creatures we are ...
How should we conduct this search? Hutcheson clearly has in mind an empirical 
investigation:
Now the intention of nature with respect to us, is best known by examining what 
these things are which our natural senses or perceptive powers recommend to us, 
and what the most excellent among them? ...
In this art, as in all others, we must proceed from the subjects most easily 
known, to those th a t  are more obscure; ... and therefore don’t deduce our first 
notions of duty from the divine Will; but from the constitution of our nature,
9 0  . . . .ibid., p.xvi.
9 9
°°Hutcheson, Short Introduction, p. 2.
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which is more immediately known...34
The same commitment to empirical enquiry, as a necessary feature of natural law theory, 
is shown in the System . In the opening paragraph of th a t  work, Hutcheson asserts that
The intention of moral philosophy is to direct men to tha t  course of action which 
tends most effectually to promote their greatest happiness and perfection;35
and th a t  the proper method to be followed is
as far as it can be done by observations and conclusions discoverable from the 
constitution of nature, without any aids of- supernatural revelation: these 
maxims, or rules of conduct are therefore reputed as laws of nature, and the 
system or collection of them is called the LAW of N A TU R E.36
It may be thought, tha t  since the publication of both of these Hutchesonian works post­
date Hume’s Treatise , the views just canvassed represent a hasty defence against the 
inroads of Newtonian philosophy. We cannot rule out the possibility of a Humean 
influence on Hutcheson’s account in these works of the method appropriate  to natural 
law. But there is no compelling reason to think this, because Hutcheson’s views are not 
atypical. This can be shown by considering the case of George Turnbull.
In 1740, the year of publication of Book III of Hume’s T reatise , Turnbull published his 
Principles o f  Moral Philosophy. In this work he announced his aim to be to “vindicate” 
human nature, “by reducing the more remarkable appearances in the human system” to 
“general laws” , and avoiding any hypotheses which are not grounded firmly in experience. 
Moral philosophy is not, however, just a system of facts discovered by observation, but, 
like natural philosophy, is a m atter  of experiments and reasonings from experiments. 
Failure to follow this method generates “mere” hypotheses. Given all this, it should then 
come as no surprise to the reader to be referred to Newton’s Princip ia ,37 These
methodological remarks are amplified in another work, published the following year. 
Significantly, this is Turnbull’s translation of one of the well-known natural law texts of
34ibid.
System,  vol. 1, p. 1.
36ibid.
o r
The quotations are from George Turnbull, Principles of  Moral Philosophy, London (1740), ii, 
iv, 19, 20, 22. My own source is Forbes, op.cit., p.l; and on whose account I have relied heavily in 
this paragraph.
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the period ,00 Heineccius’ Methodical System  o f  Universal Law , together with the 
trans la to r’s annotations and an appended discourse on the nature and origin of moral and 
civil laws. This final discourse is described by Turnbull, in the Preface to the Methodical 
S y s te m , as “an a ttem pt to introduce the experimental way of reasoning into morals, or to 
deduce human duties from internal principles and dispositions in the human mind” . 
These duties are those universal laws which underlie all civil laws: they are the natural 
law .39
Far from being inimical to natural law, then, Hume’s espousal of the experimental 
method is an enthusiasm shared with writers firmly in the natural law tradition. The 
natural jurists seem to have had much the same reaction to the new experimental method 
as the philosophers of nature (the physical scientists): th a t  is, an enthusiastic adoption of 
a more refined method which promised more accurate results, and therefore greater 
possibility of success in achieving their end: an accurate specification of the rules of 
conduct appropriate to human life. We can see, then, th a t  the common picture of Hume 
the Newtonian philosopher does not of itself rule out or even discourage understanding 
Hume as a contributor to the natural law account of human society.
A shared enthusiasm for the experimental method should not, however, blind us to an 
im portant difference between Hutcheson and Turnbull, on the one hand, and Hume, on 
the other, as to just what the experimental method involves. Both Hutcheson and 
Turnbull speak of an enquiry into the constitution of our nature, and by this mean the 
task of discerning the extent and limits of characteristic human powers and excellences, so 
th a t  the specific requirements for human happiness can be determined. W hat is envisaged 
can perhaps be described, rather broadly, as a biological enquiry to determine the nature 
of the telos of human beings. Their experimental method is thus a method for 
determining a final cause. As we have seen, Hume objects to the role tha t  final causes 
play in Hutcheson’s scheme, so his conception of the experimental method is much more 
like the modern conception of social science. To properly conduct the “science of m an” we 
must eschew all concern with ultimate principles. Instead,
We must therefore glean up our experiments in this science from a cautious 
observation of human life, and take them as they appear in the common course
90
33Cf. Knud Haakonssen, “Natural Law and the Scottish Enlightenment”, Man and Nature, vol. 
IV, ed. D.H. Jory and C. Stewart-Robertson, Edmontion: Academic Printing and Publishing 
(1985), pp. 52-3, and Forbes, op.cit., p.l.
9 Q
Forbes, op.cit., pp.1-2.
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of the world, by m en’s behaviour in company, in affairs, and in their pleasures .40
Hume does not always appear to be consistently anti-teleological, however. For example, 
his famous remark that “reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions” 41 shows 
him to remain under the influence of a conception of human nature which goes beyond the 
merely observable to a conception of a harmoniously functioning system with its own 
distinctive telos.
If such elements of teleology in Hume’s philosophy could be discarded (as nothing more 
than  regrettable but unim portant lapses on Hume’s part), so tha t  the difference between 
Hume's experimental method and that of his contemporaries was precisely the absence or 
presence of any teleological elements, this would not be sufficient to mark off Hume from 
natu ra l  law. For, while many of the natural law writers have very markedly teleological 
theories, all do not. This is most obviously the case with Grotius, a fact which might 
provide one clue to Hume’s willingness to see himself as, in at least one area, Grotius’s 
intellectual heir. But this also shows us th a t  not only does Hume’s espousal of 
experimental method fail to separate him from the natural law writers, but also tha t  even 
the distinctive character of his version of this method so fails.
III: The Sceptic
An adequate treatm ent of Hume as a sceptic is a much more difficult matter. This is 
principally because, in one sense or other, scepticism is very close to the heart of Hume’s 
philosophy. As a result, no a ttem pt to get to grips with Hume can avoid conclusions 
about the nature or extent of his scepticism; and , as interpretations vary, so do accounts 
of this feature itself. This remains true of recent work on Hume, although there is in this 
work a discernable tendency to treat Hume's scepticism as an overrated matter. The 
reason for this is not hard to find. For most of this century, Hume interpretation has been 
part  of the self-justification of positivism. Hume, accorded the s ta ture  of a precursor of 
positivism, has been studied mainly by positivists. Not surprisingly, such interpreters 
have concentrated their attention on those parts of Hume’s philosophy which were most
40Treatise, p. xix.
^ ib id . ,  p. 415 (emphasis added).
A 9z According to a recent commentator, Hume’s Newtonianism has been considerably overrated. 
Although Hume does of course invoke Newtonian principles, as we have seen, Peter Jones concludes 
that “Hume’s own philosophical reflections led away from Newton”. Hume's Sentiments: Their 
Ciceronian and French Context, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press (1982), p. 19.
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relevant to their concerns. So, Hume interpretation has begun with a preconceived view of 
its object, and, by selective attention, the philosopher has been found to fit the 
preconception. The first im portant step towards an adequate understanding of Hume, 
then, is to free him from his posthumous role of postivist saint.
The second, no less im portant, step is to remove the spectacles ground out by post- 
Kantian philosophy: the conception tha t  philosophy consists of a core - composed of
logic, metaphysics, and epistemology - which is then applied to other, more practical, 
areas of endeavour. Applied to Hume, this has two important consequences. Firstly, it 
identifies the core of Hume’s philosophy to be the first book of the Treatise  (and, if one is 
prepared to slum it a little, the 1st Enquiry  as well), and so helps to reinforce the 
monument to the postivist saint. Secondly, because Hume’s sceptical metaphysics is 
conjoined with a decidedly non-sceptical philosophy of morals, politics, and “criticism” ,43 
a fact which shows us tha t  Hume’s larger philosophy is not the application of a sceptical 
core to practical affairs, this very modern conception of philosophy has encouraged the 
view tha t ,  where he is not being a sceptical metaphysician, Hume is being either a 
charlatan (his principles swept away by his “love of literary fame” , his self-confessed 
“ruling passion”44) or the victim of confusion. In either case, his overall corpus cannot be 
considered a great philosophy; Hume may himself, however, be regarded as a great 
philosopher if we charitably restrict our a ttention to what is after all the core of his work: 
the Treatise , Book I.
By remembering tha t  Hume was not a precocious postivist, nor a pupil of the modern 
philosophical curriculum, recent Hume scholarship has, to a substantial degree, liberated 
itself from the grip of these distorting preconceptions. Most importantly, it has 
recognized the necessity of dealing with Hume’s work as a whole, and so has returned 
a ttention to those works, or parts of works, which have suffered neglect. Although it 
would be a gross oversimplification to suggest tha t  this has resulted in a consensus, 
nonetheless there is a distinct tendency to the conclusions tha t  the extent of Hume’s 
scepticism has been overrated, and its nature misunderstood. Once we understand the 
nature of Hume’s own brand of scepticism, we can also understand why it has a more 
limited - or, perhaps better, a much less damaging - effect than we would otherwise 
expect.
A ^^T h a t  is, aesthetic judgement. See Treatise , pp. xv-xvi.
44As he says in “My Own Life”, in Essays , op. cit., vol. 1, p. 8.
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The important difference between the meaning of scepticism in Hume, and modern 
employments of the term, is well described by John Wright. He says:
the present-day notion of scepticism leaves no room for an understanding of the 
sense in which Hume himself is  a sceptic. Hume is a sceptic because he thinks 
tha t  our fundamental beliefs about reality and our inferring procedures cannot 
be derived solely from scientific investigation; rather, he thinks that they derive 
from man as a natural organism .45
This might seem to be beside the point, but this is because we easily tend to overlook the 
im portant difference that
Philosophical scepticism as it appears in the writings of David Hume is not 
primarily a philosophy of knowledge (a philosophy of science) nor a philosophy 
of nature (a general metaphysic): it is a philosophy of man. Hume was mainly 
interested in the philosophy of knowing in so far as it tells us about the knowing 
being himself.46
In the same spirit, we can add tha t  he was also interested in the philosophy of action 
( tha t is, in the eighteenth century sense, moral philosophy) in so far as it tells us about 
the active being himself. Thus, Wright concludes,
Instead of being primarily interested in justified or true belief he is interested in 
the source of belief as such. Instead of being primarily interested in right action 
he is interested in the source of action as such.
This last remark is something of an oversimplification, because Hume is very interested in 
virtuous action. But it correctly points to the fact tha t  Hume is concerned with virtuous 
actions as a species of actions , not simply as a method of enquiry into the nature of the 
good, and so his moral philosophy is centrally concerned with the source of virtuous 
action. Hume’s philosophy of man, and thus his philosophy of knowing, is sceptical 
because it shows us both tha t  we hold mutually contradictory beliefs, and tha t  we employ 
opposed principles in arriving at different, but equally indispensable, beliefs.4®
Thus understood, Hume’s scepticism is by no means at odds with another important
45John P. Wright, The Sceptical Realism of David Hume, Manchester: Manchester University 
Press (1983), p. 32.
46iWd., p. 30.
^ib id .,  p. 32.
48'ibid., p. 31.
230
aspect of his philosophy which has recently been emphasised - his Ciceronian humanism.40 
One remark of Hume’s which is often invoked to support the Ciceronian connection come 
from the letter to Hutcheson quoted at the end of the preceding chapter. Speaking of 
Cicero's De O f f i c i i s , he says, “I had, indeed, the former book in my eye in all my 
reasonings.” 50 (This particular remark needs to be treated with great caution, however, 
since the reasonings referred to are not Hume’s life work, but at most the Treatise - and 
perhaps only Book III.) More solid connections with Cicero, however, can be seen in 
H um e’s stress on the social dimensions of human life, the unacceptability of a destructive 
“to ta l” scepticism, and thus the need for a more limited form of scepticism which 
encourages moderation in the conduct of one’s life.51 But it is most important to 
remember tha t  even this limited scepticism, although obviously an imporant feature of 
Hume’s philosophy, will not alone explain it. As we shall see, we get a good deal closer to 
an adequate understanding of Hume once we fill out the notion of “moderation” with its 
common eighteenth-century content. We can illustrate the inadequacy of limited 
scepticism alone as the key to Hume by considering a recent interpretation which follows 
ju s t  this strategy.
At one point, Hume distinguishes “true philosophers” by their “moderate scepticism” .52 
Remarks such as these, especially those recommending “mitigated” scepticism in the 1st
r «>
Enquiry , have encouraged David Miller, in a recent book, to see mitigated scepticism as
a thread running through Hume’s corpus.54 If we restrict ourselves to Hume’s explicit 
remarks about such scepticism, this turns out to be a rather unenlightening hypothesis. 
In the 1st Enquiry , Hume distinguishes two kinds of mitigated scepticism. I shall 
consider the second of these first. He describes it as “the limitation of our enquiries to
40This is particularly emphasised by Peter Jones, op. cit.
— A
0ULetter of 17 September, 1739; op. cit. Ramsay’s painting of Hutcheson nicely catches an 
important difference between the two, as Hume emphasises in this letter: in the portrait,
Hutcheson holds a copy of Cicero’s De Finibus.
51These are all stressed by Jones, op. cit., pp. 29-43.
52See Treatise, p.224.
See, e.g., Enquiries, pp.161-2.
54David Miller, Philosophy and Ideology in Hume’s Political Thought, Oxford: Clarendon Press 
(1981).
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such subjects as are best adapted to the narrow capacity of human understanding* ,55 
This does give us a clue to the rather neglected question of the purpose of Hume’s 
metaphysical scepticism - as, in part, a demonstration of the inevitable absurdities that 
arise when we fail to observe the narrow limits of our understanding - but it achieves little 
more. As it stands it fails to distinguish Hume from Locke, who is not normally classed as 
a sceptic. Perhaps more importantly, neither does it suggest that a practising sceptic of 
this sort, one who does keep within the necessary bounds of human understanding, will 
espouse any sceptical views, of even the mildest sort, on topics that fall within those 
bounds. Those unimaginative souls who spend their lives without expressing anything 
more than the most down-to-earth views on commonplace subjects, would, in all 
probability, qualify as mitigated sceptics of this sort. More pertinently, in Hume’s own 
case the requirements of this form of mitigated scepticism would be satisfied by his essays 
on morals, politics, and aesthetics even if they expressed not a single sceptical viewpoint. 
The subject m atter  alone alm ost guarantees conformity to this brand of scepticism. So, 
this type of mitigated scepticism does help to explain why Hume wrote essays on morals, 
politics, and aesthetics. But it does not help to explain why those essays express the 
views they do.
The other form of mitigated scepticism is of rather more interpretive value, but equally 
cannot stand alone as an explanatory device. This form of scepticism is simply the 
maintenance of an undogmatic spirit. Hume describes it as the recognition th a t  “there is 
a degree of doubt, and caution, and modesty, which, in all kinds of scrutiny and decision, 
ought for ever to accompany a just reasoner* .5  ^ This is a principle which Hume not only 
avows in the concluding section of the 2nd E nquiry , but also clearly practises there.5' 
(Equally, however, he appears to forget it in the concluding paragraph of the 1st E nquiry , 
where, on the basis of his main epistemological principles, he recommends a biblioclastic 
orgy which, as John Passmore has observed, ought not to exclude the 1st Enquiry  
itself.58)
55Enquiries, p.162.
56i.bid.
57ibid., p.278.
r o
° Enquiries, p.165. Cf. John Passmore, Philosophical Reasoning, London: Duckworth (1961), 
ch. 1.
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Independently of these cases, however, this form of scepticism is not especially helpful in 
understanding Hume. Once again it does provide some insights, but not of any precise 
detail. It does, for example, show why Hume came to feel more at home with the polite 
essay than the more traditional type of academic treatise, developing the former into
a sophisticated and flexible mode of moral discourse, capable of a ttracting an 
intelligent salon and coffee-house readership as well as philosophers and men of 
letters.5^
It also helps to explain a good deal of his practice in the more political essays at least, 
where he undermines the more pretentious claims of Whig and Tory alike, normally 
settling for a more restricted middling position of some sort. Hume says, in a letter to 
Karnes, speaking of his essay “Of the Protestant Succession” , tha t  “the conclusion shows 
me a Whig, but a very sceptical one” . Nevertheless, these essays can be explained at 
least as well by stressing, as Duncan Forbes does, Hume’s commitment to the version of 
moderation made famous by the third Earl of Shaftesbury.
It will be remembered that Shaftesbury is included among those “late philosophers in 
England , who have begun to put the science of man on a new footing” listed in a footnote
ö  1
to the introduction of the Treatise. 1 In his Characteristicks , Shaftesbury described a 
political outlook characteristic of “men of moderation” . Forbes summarizes the qualities 
of such men as follows:
men who were too secure of their temper and who possessed themselves too well 
“to be in danger of entering warmly into any cause, or engaging deeply with any 
side or faction” . ^
The politics of such men he describes as being
the science of men united in society and dependent on each other. This science 
was modern in style, suited to the circumstances and interests of a modern, 
commercial society, informed by the new scientific method and the 
predominantly secular outlook . ^ 0
^Nicholas Phillipson, “Adam Smith as Civic Moralist” , in I. Hont and M. Ignatieff (ed.), 
Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping of Political Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment, p.180.
^Q uoted in T.H. Grose’s introduction, “History of the Editions”, to Hume’s Essays, vol. 1, p. 
48.
^^Treatise, p.xvii.
^Forbes, op.cit. p.91.
ibid. cf. Treatise, p.xv.
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Not only can we see tha t  such a view would be temperamentally suitable to Hume:64 we 
can see tha t  he has the concept frequently in mind in his E ssa ys , for example when he 
speaks of the necessity of moderating the zeal of party-men ,65 also observing that 
■‘moderation is not to be expected in party-men of any kind” ,66 and so on. More 
importantly, we are also able to explain some of Hume’s most spectacularly unsceptical 
views, such as his great optimism about the benefits to be secured by the development of 
commerce and the refinement of the arts in general. Hume is so far from being any sort of 
sceptic on the blessings tha t  flow from commerce and refinement in the arts that it is 
tempting to charge him with “enthusiasm” (a quality which, in another context, he 
a ttributes to, among other things, hope, a warm imagination, and ignorance!* 6 ') This 
would be quite unfair, however, since “enthusiasm” involves a blindness to argument 
which is certainly not characteristic of Hume. Nevertheless it is true not only tha t  in 
these economic writings Hum e’s great optimism renders any, even the most mitigated, of 
sceptical tags simply inappropriate - his main thesis is “tha t  the ages of refinement are 
both the happiest and the most virtuous” ;D° it is also the case tha t  Hume lacked even the 
misgivings of the other leading figures of the Scottish Enlightenment. Certainly he was far 
less the sceptic here than Adam Smith, despite the la t te r ’s posthumous co-option as the 
most optimistic of advocates of commercial development.
Hume’s great optimism about the benefits to be achieved through development of 
commerce and refinement of the arts in general is clearly at odds with mitigated 
scepticism in the sense under consideration. His views here show none of the “degree of 
doubt, and caution” he advocates. So, even the figure of Hume the mitigated  sceptic is 
inadequate to explain this not unimportant aspect of Hume’s thought. An adequate
64Cf. Adam Smith’s eulogistic remarks in his letter to William Strahan immediately after 
Hume’s death, that Hume’s “constant pleasantry was the genuine effusion of good-nature and good- 
humour, tempered with delicacy and modesty, and without even the slightest tincture of malignity” 
etc.; in Hume, Essays , vol. 1, p.13.
65Essays, op.cit., pp.107-8. Cf. also Treatise, 559 n.
66ifefd., p.121. See also pp.126,162,184n,300,464,469,475,478.
67a Of Superstition and Enthusiasm”, ibid., p.145.
6®“Of Refinement in the Arts”, ibid., p.300.
oyCf. Forbes, op.cit., pp.87-8. For a particular example, compare Hume’s untroubled optimism 
on the effect of the arts on martial spirit (Essays,p.304), with Smith’s views on martial spirit and 
standing armies after “refinement”. This matter is discussed by Donald Winch, Adam S m i th ’s 
Politics, pp. 103-20.
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explanation would need to invoke the more complex figure of Hume the man of 
“moderation” , which incorporates the virtue of mitigated scepticism, but is not limited to 
it. Also, we can see tha t  the modern, secular style of such a man accords quite well with 
the figure of Hume the Newtonian. So we can now turn to consider how Hume’s 
Newtonianism and scepticism both contribute towards a philosophy of human life, tha t  is, 
a philosophical defence of human practice.
In so far as Hume is to be seen as a Newtonian, he is not sceptical. The commitment' to 
retain onlythose principles which are firmly grounded in experience or reasonings from 
experience is not a commitment to scepticism, despite the inevitability of its generating 
many conclusions which, to the 18th century world in particular, are of a decidedly 
sceptical cast. It is, rather, a commitment to a rigorous methodology, a methodology 
which itself is not without epistemological commitments: there is hardly a point to
restricting our methods of enquiry to experience and its fruits unless there is genuine 
benefit to be gained thereby. And Hume’s own explicit intention, of establishing a science 
of hum an nature which will provide the only secure foundation for “a compleat system of 
the sciences” , ^  can hardly make sense if the methods appropriate to establishing such a 
science do not of themselves admit of some security.
Nevertheless the security Hume offers us is rather thin. We trust to experience, he says, 
not because we have any sound arguments for doing so - in fact, we cannot have any such 
arguments, since our reasonings are themselves uncertain - but because we have no choice 
in the matter. We are simply compelled by nature - that is, by our nature - to believe in 
the reality of our experience. Some of the most famous passages of Book I of the Treatise  
assert just this. In his discussion of “the sceptical philosophy” , Hume points out tha t
the sceptic still continues to reason and believe, even tho' he asserts, th a t  he 
cannot defend his reason by reason; and by the same rule he must assent to the 
principle concerning the existence of body, th o ’ he cannot pretend by any 
arguments of philosophy to maintain its veracity. Nature has not left this to his 
choice, and has doubtless esteem’d it an affair of too great importance to be 
trusted to our uncertain reasonings and speculations. We may well ask, What 
causes induce us to believe in  the existence o f  body? but ’tis in vain to ask, 
W hether there be body or not? That is a point, which we must take for granted 
in all our reasonings. '1
Perhaps more importantly for Hume’s philosophy as a whole, it is also a point which we
70Treatise, p.xvi.
71ibid.., p.187. cf. Enquiries, p.55.
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must take for granted in all our practice. This point is made in a famous, but much 
underestimated, passage in the Conclusion to Book I, where Hume takes up the sceptical 
problem as his own problem. He there describes the melancholy condition to which 
scepticism reduces him (by heating his brain!). It is “to fancy myself in the most 
deplorable condition imaginable, environ’d with the deepest darkness, and utterly depriv’d 
of the use of every member and faculty” .72 Fortunately, this is a passing condition. 
Nature, particularly in the guise of ordinary life, provides the solution:
Most fortunately it happens, tha t  since reason is incapable of dispelling these 
clouds, nature herself suffices to tha t  purpose, and cures me of this philosophical 
melancholy and delirium, either by relaxing this bent of mind, or by some 
avocation, and lively impression of my senses, which obliterate all these 
chimeras. I dine, I play a game of back-gammon, I converse, and am merry with 
my friends; ... Here then I find myself absolutely and necessarily determ in’d to 
live, and talk, and act like other people in the common affairs of life.7**
Thus it is that nature, through the common affairs of human life, provides the effective 
foundation for all our thought and practice. As Hume puts the m atter in the 1st Enquiry , 
“custom ... is the great guide of human life” . This is not a remark made merely in 
passing: his adherence to this principle is illustrated not merely by the numerous appeals 
he makes to it throughout his writings, with their stress on the superior rationality of 
practice;7  ^ it is also implicit in his various accounts of the “artificial” virtues - of justice, 
promises and contracts, and allegiance to government. It is shown in both his concern for 
economic issues in Part  II of the E ssa y s , and also in the use he makes of history in 
writing his own History o f  England. His rather summary dismissal of “any fine imaginary 
republic, of which a man may form a plan in his closet” , and his stress tha t  justice is a
72ibid., p.269.
7 9 . . . .ibid. It is important to recognize here that by “determin’d” Hume does not mean an act of 
will. He means precisely the opposite: he is compelled by nature to, he cannot help but, live, and 
talk, etc.
7^Enquiries, p.44.
7^See especially Treatise, p.569: “The practice of the world goes farther in teaching us the
degrees of our duty, than the most subtile philosophy, which was ever yet invented”. Cf. also 
Treatise, pp.547,552,558; Enquiries, pp.201n.,230,236,269; Essays, pp.126,185,292,
295,374,447-451,460. Cf. also Adam Smith’s Lectures on Jurisprudence, which further develop 
this line of thought.
DEssays, p.126. Cf. also “Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth”, ibid., esp. pp.480-1.
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slow g ro w th ^  which reflects the particular “convenience and necessities of m ankind” /® 
and which “acquires force ... by our repeated experience of the inconveniences of 
transgressing i t” ; all these can stand as examples of his com m itm ent to ordinary life as 
the foundation on which hum an life, including reliable human knowing, depends. It is 
also necessary to keep this foundation in mind when interpreting his frequent stresses on 
the role of utility  in the 2nd Enquiry. It is clear th a t he does not invoke utility, as do 
m odern utilitarians, as an abstract principle by which any existing social institution or 
practice is to be judged. Rather, social institu tions necessarily reflect utility  because they 
are based on useful or practical considerations, because only such considerations are 
efficacious in ordinary life. He supports this by observing th a t even system -builders, when 
confronted with the task of providing rules for hum an life, have to resort to utility as 
their u ltim ate justification, despite the requirem ents of their systems.®^
This very compressed summ ary of some characteristic Humean doctrines provides a 
rough picture of w hat has been called Hume’s philosophy of common life.®* Hume’s claim 
in the Preface to the Abstract , th a t in all m atters of common life our knowledge is 
securely based, because in all such m atters we can make “an appeal to the people, who in 
all m atters of common reason and eloquence are found so infallible a tribunal” , can serve
O f t
as a m otto  for this philosophy. Thus understood, as a philosophy which stresses the 
superior rationality  of hum an practice, Hume's philosophy of hum an nature fits rather 
nicely with the implicit com m itm ent to rational practices, and thus to historical 
developm ent, we have seen to be implicit in natural law accounts of human social
T TTreatise, p.490; cf. Enquiries, p.192. Also cf. Knud Haakonssen, The Science of a Legislator, 
Cambridge: C.U.P. (1981), p.17.
O
1 0Enquiries, p.195.
Treatise, op.cit.
®^Enquiries, op.cit.
81 See Donald Livingston, Hume’s Philosophy of Common Life, Chicago: Chicago University 
Press (1985).
82 Abstract, in Treatise, p. 644. The happy situation in common life is contrasted with the very 
unhappy situation in metaphysics and theology, where we must depend on the judgement of the 
few, “whose verdict is more apt to be corrupted by partiality and prejudice.” Also, as he says in a 
letter to his friend Gilbert Elliot of Minto in 1751, in these abstract endeavours, “nothing there can 
correct bad Reasoning but good Reasoning: and Sophistry must be oppos’d by Syllogism” (quoted 
by Norton, David Hume, p. 192.)
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institutions. Karnes s implicit acceptance of Hume as a contributor to this tradition 
further testifies to the conclusion.
Others of Hum e’s contemporaries, however, saw his views as essentially sceptical, and as 
therefore directly antithetical to natural law. His account of the artificality of the virtue 
of justice (including rules of property, fidelity (promise-keeping), and allegiance to 
government), and of the greater importance of the artificial, rather than the natural, 
virtues, was a focus for this particular charge. This is well shown by one of the charges 
brought against Hume in a pamphlet circulated in Edinburgh in 1745, as part of a 
successful campaign to prevent his appointment to the Chair of Moral Philosophy in the 
University there. The pamphlet charges him
With sapping the Foundations of Morality, by denying the natural and essential 
Difference betwdxt Right and Wrong, Good and Evil, Justice and Injustice; 
making the Difference only artificial, and to arise from human Conventions and 
Com pacts.84
The following two sections will be concerned with the justice of this charge. It will be 
argued that ,  by characterising some virtues as artificial, Hume is not showing sceptical 
conclusions or even intentions, but simply adapts Pufendorfs distinction between natural 
and adventitious s ta tes  in order to solve the twin problems of the origin of justice and of 
our obligation to observe the rules of justice.
He is therefore responding to a problem within the natural law tradition (a problem 
which arises as a result of the a ttem pt to provide a psychology of action adequate to the 
requirements of natural law doctrines), and seeks to solve it by employing conceptual 
resources already available within th a t  tradition. The next section will be concerned with 
whether or not Hume can be seen to have destructive intentions, and will consider some 
aspects of his relationship to Grotius in particular. The subsequent section will show how 
the artificiality of justice is derived from Hume’s Newtonian project to establish the 
efficient causes of moral entities, by determining what “original instincts” , if any, give rise 
to the rules of property and the other elements of justice.
8°Treatise, p. 590.
Q i
Quoted by Hume in his A Letter from a Gentleman to his friend in Edinburgh (1745); 
facsimile edition edited by E.C. Mossner and J.V. Price, Edinburgh: the University Press (1967),
p.18.
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IV: A rtif ic ia l  V irtues: H u m e ’s In ten tion
Philosophical commentators on Hume's division of the virtues into “natural” and 
“artificial” often content themselves with spelling out the explicit features of the 
distinction. To go no further than this, however, is to fail to to ask why Hume should 
have thought this distinction im portant, or what sort of impact he intended (or hoped) 
his distinction to have on his readers. The two questions are not unrelated; rather, they 
focus on different aspects of the same general issue. This issue, of Hume’s intentions, is a 
neccessary part of the effort to come to an adequate understanding of Hume’s philosophy 
in general, and Book III of the Treatise  in particular. In this section, two matters which 
throw light on Hume’s intentions will be considered.
The first can be dealt with rather briefly, because it poses in a fairly general way a 
problem which, in finer detail, will be considered further in the next section. This is the 
question of the somewhat curious structure of Book III itself. The book opens with a short 
part, entitled “Of Virtue and Vice in General” , in which it is argued (following the titles 
of the two sections contained therein) tha t  moral distinctions are not derived from reason, 
but derive instead from a moral sense. The first section rehearses a set of arguments 
against the views of the ethical rationalists, such as Clarke and Wollaston, views which
Q  r
explained moral goodness as conformity with some abstract rational relation . 0 0  It
o n
concludes with an “observation” which Hume admits he “cannot forbear adding ” 0 0  - the 
famous (and, as I shall endeavour to show, in some respects undeservedly famous) 
“is-ought” passage. The second section, however, is quite surprising. It quickly reaches its 
main conclusion - tha t  because moral distinctions are perceptions, they are impressions 
rather than ideas; which means tha t  “Morality, therefore, is more properly felt than 
judg’d o f 0  - it then immediately stresses how little is gained by this result. The “in a 
manner, infinite” number and variety of our moral duties itself shows this to be so, since
’tis absurd to imagine, tha t  in every particular instance, these sentiments are 
produc’d by an original quality and primary  constitution. 0
o r
Cf. Francis Hutcheson’s arguments against the same views in his Illustrations on the Moral  
Sense, published with the Essay  on the Nature and Conduct o f  the Passions  (1728), Collected 
Works, Vol.II.
Treatise, p.469. 
87ibid., p.470. 
88ibid., p.473.
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Such a supposition would render all moral education unnecessary, making moral 
behaviour purely instinctive. Its absurdity lies in its implication th a t  we are pre­
programmed to respond appropriately to the greatly diverse and variable situations which 
call for moral assessment and action. Hume notes tha t  such a view runs directly counter 
to those principles of simplicity which the experimental method champions. As he says,
Such a method of proceeding is not conformable to the usual maxims, by which
nature is conducted, where a few principles produce all th a t  variety we observe
in the universe, and everything is carry’d on in the easiest and most simple 
89manner.
So the conclusion reached above, tha t  morality derives from a '‘moral sense” - a primary 
impulse or constitution - is of rather little value. Rather, to explain moral notions 
successfully,
’Tis necessary ... to abridge these primary impulses, and find some more general 
principles, upon which all our notions of morals are founded ."
Hume proposes tha t  these “more general principles” may be found in “the designs, and
projects, and views of men” , since these “are principles as necessary in their operation as
heat and cold, moist and dry” . However, since it is usual for us to set our own activities
“in opposition to the other principles of na ture” simply because they are our own, the
fruit of our choices and actions, it follows th a t  to locate general principles of morals in
human activity is, in one sense at least, to deny them a natural foundation. Any moral
distinctions founded in human social practices can be called arti fic ia l rather than natural 
91virtues.
In Part  II, entitled “Of Justice and Injustice” , Hume a ttem pts  to establish that many of 
our accepted virtues are artificial in the sense outlined. These include not only justice (by 
which he means, first and foremost, abstaining from the property of others), but also 
promise-keeping, allegiance to government, laws of nations (what would now be called 
international justice), and the (for him) characteristically female virtues of chastity and 
modesty. By grounding these virtues in human social practices, Hume arrives at two 
im portant conclusions. The first of these, tha t  it is not individual acts but the whole 
system  of such acts that has value, will be considered below. The second of these is the
&9ibid.
90ibid. 
91ibid., pp.474-5.
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central role of reason. The “designs, and projects, and views of men "1 all essentially 
involve the employment of reason. In fact, when Hume returns, in Part III, to consider 
the natural virtues, those which are founded simply on a “primary impulse” , he devotes 
much of the opening section of tha t  part to stressing the greater practical importance of 
reason and the artificial virtues founded on it: it is by reason tha t  we “determine all the 
great lines of our du ty” . This unexpected stress on the role of reason in a work which 
begins by denying a foundation in reason to its subject matter is best explained, I believe, 
by a ttr ibu ting  to Hume a complex purpose. The full complexity of this purpose will 
become more clear below. At this point, we can describe Hume’s purposes as being first of 
all to “show his colours” on an issue tha t  had generated much debate among his older 
contemporaries, by plumping for the “moral sense” position against the rationalists. 
Secondly, and most importantly , he intends to show that, whatever the original 
foundation of morals, the role of reason is central in settling many issues concerning the 
most im portant aspects of morals. His position is thus a compromise between the moral 
sense and rationalist views.
In Part  III, on the natural virtues, Hume is certainly not without his ambitions, but, in 
contrast to Part II, these are fairly limited. The m atter  is over-simplified by Mackie, who 
suggests tha t  in Par t  III
Hume turns to the natural virtues, having rather oddly dealt first with those 
aspects of morality which are the more puzzling from his general point of view, 
and only later coming to more straightforward matters.
Hum e’s procedure is not puzzling if we see Part  II as the central point of the third book, 
with Par t  III being more necessary for the sake of completeness, for “rounding-off” a work 
which aims at providing a complete account of human nature, than for any vital didactic 
purpose. Hum e’s overall philosophic programme requires tha t  his writing on morals 
should have the character of a complete system. His main purpose, however, is both more 
limited and more precise: to show tha t  those virtues most necessary to society are not 
natural in the sense of being grounded in some primary impulse, but are generated by the 
employment by human beings of the non- metaphysical reasonings of everyday life. They 
are due to (rational) artifice, and hence are artificial.
This brings us to our second problem concerning Hume’s intentions. What impact did 
Hume seek to have on his readers by his stress on the artificiality of justice, fidelity,
^ ib id ., p.590.
^ J o h n  Mackie, Hume's Moral Theory, London: RKP (1980), p. 5.
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allegiance, chastity and modesty? As we have already seen, in the opinion of the 
pamphlet circulated against him in 1745, he had sapped the foundations of morality, and 
had denied the “natural and essential Difference betwixt Right and Wrong” . Was this 
part of his intention? Selby-Bigge, in his introduction to the Enquiries , has no doubts on 
the m atter. He remarks there of Hume that
In the Treatise he insisted vigorously, though not very intelligibly, that justice 
was not a natural but only an artificial virtue, and it is  pretty plain that he 
m eant to be o f fen s ive  in doing so.9^
Selby-Bigge offers only a casual observation in support of this claim, but some reasons can 
be given to support it, especially if we remember tha t  Hume includes the female virtues of 
chastity and modesty among the artificial virtues. To show why this should be worrying, 
at least, we need to recognize one important feature of the artificial virtues. Hume 
explicitly discusses this feature when considering the case of justice. It is the 
Hutchesonian issue of external rights, couched in characteristic Humean fashion as a 
problem of motivation.
Hume stresses tha t ,  although the whole system of justice is beneficial to society, 
nevertheless it is true th a t  “a single act of justice is frequently contrary to public 
in terest” , in fact it “may, in itself, be very prejudicial to society” .95 When we consider 
the examples he offers here - for example, a beneficent man who restores a fortune to its 
rightful owner, a miser or a seditious bigot, “has acted justly and laudably, but the public 
is a real sufferer” - the Hutchesonian connection is clear. But the disturbing moral 
Hume draws is as follows: if justice, or any of the other artificial virtues for that matter, 
depends for its value not on the effects of each virtuous act, but only on “the mutual 
assistance and combination of its corresponding parts” , * 1 then there appears to be no 
reason for being more virtuous than the next man or woman. Certainly there is no reason 
for the conscientious  pursuit of such virtues, at least in the sense of pursuing virtue 
whatever the circumstances. The practice of the artifical virtues is a conditional matter. 
This has a particularly dire consequence for the female virtue of chastity, not only because 
Hume's (male) readers would have been anxious to defend their households against the
Enquiries, pp.xxvii-xxviii. (emphasis added). 
95Treatise , p.497.
96i'bid.
1 Enquiries , p.305. Hume’s analogies of the vault and the wall in this passage axe instructive, 
and show the Stoic influence on his treatment of justice. See chapter 2 above.
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advocacy of any doctrine likely, or believed to be likely, to encourage licentious behaviour; 
but also because, in contrast to justice and allegiance, violations of chastity have both a 
constant motive in natural pleasure and  an ease of opportunity .98 Clearly, to add to 
these factors a theory of virtue which places no value in each particular instance of 
chastity is to create an environment particularly encouraging to the libertine! (Was Hume 
himself suspected of such impurity? He was noted for his enjoyment of female company, 
and it is perhaps significant tha t  in his short autobiography he should point out tha t  it 
was in the company of modest women tha t  he “took a particular pleasure” !99)
These observations help to show why Hume did  offend some of his readers. But whether 
he sought to offend, and even whether such offence was a reasonable response, are quite 
distinct issues. I shall argue that, although it may well be that Hume sought to be 
provocative in labelling the relevant virtues “artificial” , he did not seek to offend. His 
later treatm ents  of the issue suggest rather tha t ,  in the Treatise , he failed fully to 
appreciate the strength of the public reactions. Having once had his fingers burnt by a 
adverse public reaction, his later formulations show a pronounced anxiety to avoid 
offence.
Before turning to consider these formulations, one thing should be recognized. This is 
tha t  Hume’s a ttem pt to produce a theory of the origins of justice which does not include 
any appeals to divine purposes, etc., cannot itself be considered a source of offence. 
Hutcheson, as we have seen, had already argued th a t  by appealing only to the 
constitution of our nature, more particularly to the moral sense, the law of nature could 
be determined without reference to any law, human or divine. But this view is itself new 
only in its details: in its general outline it is simply the rationalist version of natural law 
as advocated by Grotius, Suarez, and others, and most famously captured in Grotius’s 
etiam&i darem us  passage. Of course, this position did not enjoy widespread support; but 
it seems fanciful to imagine tha t  its reassertion could be considered offensive.
It may be thought tha t  in one crucial respect, the position of Grotius, and indeed
98Cf. Enquiries, pp.238-9; Treatise, 570-3.
" “My Own Life”, in Essays , op.cit., p.8. There is certainly a positive side to Hume’s view here 
(not merely self-defence). Cf. “Of the rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences”, Essays, p.194: 
“What better school for manners, than the company of virtuous women; where the mutual 
endeavour to please must insensibly polish the mind, where the example of the female softness and 
modesty must communicate itself to their admirers, and where the delicacy of that sex puts every 
one on his guard, lest he give offence by any breach of decency”.
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Hutcheson, differs from that  of Hume. This is in the fact tha t  the former, unlike the 
latter, do accord at least some recognition to the divine will; they certainly do not deny 
either God’s existence, or his concern for human affairs. Hume’s position here is however a 
good deal more difficult to determine than is often supposed. For, on the one hand, a 
system of morals which has no need to call in God to patch up deficiencies in the system 
does not thereby deny the existence of a divine being; it may well show the simple fact 
tha t  the constitution of nature is indeed a fully interlocking system, and therefore works 
harmoniously without the need j of a cosmic repairman. If God’s existence is not denied in 
such a theory, the absence of appeals to divine activity can be attr ibuted to the complete 
efficacy of the original divine creative act. Significantly, although interpretations of 
Hume’s views is a t  this point very difficult, it is not impossible to a ttr ibu te  such a 
position to him. Although he avoids, as far as possible, any appeals to God in his moral 
theory, this is not because he denies outright the existence of a Deity. In fact, on at least 
one occasion we see quite the opposite. The standard  of morals, he says in the Enquiry  
concerning the Principles o f  M orals ,
arising from the internal frame and constitution of animals, is ultimately derived 
from that Supreme Will, which bestowed on each being its peculiar nature, and 
arranged the several classes and orders of existence.1^
This is just the position of Grotius. Whether or not Hume’s views were considered 
acceptable by his contemporaries, then, there seems to be no warrant for regarding them, 
as does Selby-Bigge, as deliberately offensive. His position is, a t bottom, a commonplace 
of natural law: th a t  justice arises from, or reflects the requirements of, human sociability. 
The rules of justice are necessary for the establishment of a social order which, as Grotius 
puts it, is “consonant with human intelligence.” 101 
We have so far considered the m atter  of Hume’s views. Is there any good reason for 
seeing his particular terminology as offensive? I suggest there are two quite distinct 
reasons for concluding the opposite: Hume’s initial apprehensions about his distinction, 
and, once offence had been clearly caused, his efforts to remove the perceived cause 
w ithout changing the distinction itself. A third, more general, factor can also be invoked, 
although it will not be investigated further here: Hum e’s frequently repeated ambition “of
Enquiries, p.294. (Conclusion of Appendix I: “Concerning Moral Sentiment” ). 
DJBP, Prol., para. 8.
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being esteemed a friend to virtue” .* 11“*“ If we can take it at face value, this would be a 
curious ambition to find in a man who sought to offend his readers! It is also well worth 
noting tha t  Hutcheson, in his Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy , allows tha t  the 
notion of a moral law can becalled artificial because it is not i n n a t e , b u t  “formed upon 
observation” . 11*4 Hutcheson also refers to moral distinctions which are the “Effect of Art77 
in his E ssay . 11*5
To turn now to the first type of reason for believing Hume to be innocent: his obvious 
apprehensions about the terminology when he introduces it. This is clear from an 
attentive reading of the Treatise  itself, where, when he first introduces the distinction, in 
Section II of Part  I (“Moral distinctions deriv'd from a moral sense” ), Hume stresses the 
difficulty in defining the word “N ature” : “than which there is none more ambiguous and 
equivocal” . He then distinguishes three senses of the term, and argues that in one of 
these senses, virtue is not clearly natural. In the other two senses it is indeed natural. In 
any case, at the end of the following section (Part  II Section I: “Justice, whether a
natural or artificial virtue” ), Hume again stresses how the distinction is to be taken: when 
the naturalness of justice is denied, this is only “na tu ra l” in the third sense, natural as 
opposed to a human construction. His reason for reiterating this point is his desire “to 
avoid giving o f fence”, and he goes on to add tha t  “th o ’ the rules of justice be 
a r ti f ic ia l , they are not arbitrary” . He then concludes the section with the following 
crucial remark:
102 Letter to Francis Hutcheson, 17 Sept. 1739. Quoted here from D.D. Raphael, British 
Moralists 1650-1800, Oxford: Clarendon Press (1969), vol. 2, sect.630. For other indications of 
Hume’s friendliness to virtue cf. Essays, pp.151-2 and p.219n.; the conclusion of the Treatise, 
where Hume includes himself among “lovers of virtue”, seeks to show the nobility of his theory, and 
concludes with his analogy of the anatomist and his service to the painter (pp.619-21); also his 
defence in the Letter from a Gentleman that, like Hutcheson, he “concurs with all the antient 
moralists” against the modern (op.cit., p.30), but does not, either in fact or intention, undermine 
morality.
103 Cf. Inquiry concerning Beauty and Virtue (second edition), p.135.
11*4Short Introduction, p.110.
105 Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions, quoted by Norton, “Hutcheson’s Moral 
Realism”, op.cit., p.399.
Treatise, p.474.
107ibid., p.484. (My emphasis).
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Nor is the expression improper to call them Laws o f  Nature; if by natural we 
understand what is common to any species, or even if we confine it to mean what 
is inseparable from the species. 1^8
Since the law of nature is, for Hume’s predecessors, those necessary laws of human 
conduct, necessary because they are grounded firmly in human nature, Hume’s 
formulation here is a perfectly adequate account of a non-voluntarist version of natural 
law, such as we find in Grotius. His cautious expression here reflects his desire to avoid 
being misunderstood it is not hesitation over the use of the term, nor does it indicate a 
drastic thinning-out of the notion of natural law.
Further evidence for Hume’s early worries over his terminology can be found in the 
letter to Francis Hutcheson to which we have already referred. In the letter it appears 
tha t  he seeks, among other things, to clear up a confusion of Hutcheson’s on precisely the 
point at issue: “I have never called justice unnatura l” , he says, “but only artificial” . 1^
He then offers what can only be a simultaneous explication and defence of his position. 
He quotes a line from “one of the best moralists of antiquity” , the poet and satirist 
Horace: “atque ipsa utilitas justi prope mater et aequi” .110 This can be roughly 
translated as “usefulness can be said to be the mother of justice and right” . It may be 
thought tha t  this is indeed a sceptical principle to which Hume is appealing: that justice 
is, after all, a m atte r  of mere expediency. However, if we carefully consider the passage 
from the Satires, we can see th a t  this is not Hume’s intention.
Horace’s point in this passage is not sceptical or reductionist, but to demonstrate that 
an awareness of the relevant facts of human existence is the key to a more sensitive moral 
and legal code than th a t  implied by the Stoic paradox tha t  all offences are equal. 111 We 
may even interpret him as providing an empirically minded protest against the plausible
l 0Sibid.
1(“^ Letter to Hutcheson, 17 Sept. 1739. Raphael, op.cit. 
l i 0 ibid.
111-H. Rushton Fairclough (trans. and ed.), Horace: Satires, Epistles, and .4rs Poetica, London: 
Heinemann (1942), Loeb Classical Library, introduction to Satires I.iii, pp.30-1. It is worth noting 
here that, by following Horace, Hume is opposing Cicero (see De Finibus, iv, 19,55). This can serve 
as a cautionary reminder to those modern interpreters of Hume who see him as a latter-day 
Ciceronian. Although Hume tells us, in the very next paragraph of this letter, that “Upon the 
whole, I desire to take my catalogue of virtues from Cicero’s Offices”, and that “I had, indeed, the 
former book in my eye in all my reasonings” (Raphael, op.cit.; letter no. 13), this quote from Horace 
indicates that the Ciceronian connection can be overdone. (It does, however, provide support for a 
more general “antient” connection.)
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foolishness of a priori reasoning; which is, as I have argued above, a characteristically 
Humean position. In fact, we can see Horace as making two distinct points, both of 
which, I suggest, have a Humean character. The first is that the Stoic view is too crude 
because repugnant to common sense:
Those whose creed is th a t  all sins are much on a par are at a loss when they 
come to face facts. Feelings and customs rebel, and so does Expedience herself, 
the mother, we may say, of justice and r i g h t . ^
This we can call the negative thesis. The second is a positive thesis, in the sense that it 
shows how social institutions develop in response to changes in human circumstances, or, 
in more modern language, how moral and legal codes reflect human social evolution. In 
making this point Horace relies on the speculative account of social evolution provided by
i  i
Lucretius. It is well worth quoting at some length, since it helps to show what Hume 
saw to be im portant about his own account of justice. Horace says this:
When living creatures crawled forth upon primeval earth, dumb, shapeless 
beasts, they fought for their acorns and lairs with nails and fists, then with 
clubs, and so on step by step with the weapons need had later forged, until they 
found words and names wherewith to give meaning to their cries and feelings. 
Thenceforth they began to cease from war, to build towns, and to frame laws 
tha t  none should thieve or rob or commit adultery... If you will but turn over 
the annals and records of the world, you must needs confess tha t  justice was 
born of the fear of injustice.114
In other words, the primitive history of human life is a history of violence, until the 
increasing sophistication of human life led to the recognition tha t  rules of justice were 
necessary in order to safeguard social advances, and to make further developments 
possible. We have seen tha t  accounts of this sort are a commonplace of the main natural 
law theories, with their account of the development of rules of property as societies 
develop from primitive simplicity to more complex forms of social interdependence. Hume 
does not himself tell such a story in the Treatise  (he may have resisted this partly because 
of doubts about the reliability of the usual sources), but equally he takes for granted that 
there is some such story to tell. His insistence tha t  justice is a gradual development 
indicates this well. In the 2nd Enquiry  he gives the following instructive example:
suppose, th a t  several distinct societies maintain a kind of intercourse for mutual
112 Horace, op.cit., p.41.
l l u i6z<f., p.41n. (In De Rerum Natura,  v. 780ff.)
114 ibid.
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convenience and advantage, the boundaries of justice still grow larger, in 
proportion to the largeness of men's views, and the force of their mutual 
connexions. History, experience, reason sufficiently instruct us in this natural 
progress of human sentiments, and in the gradual enlargement of our regards to 
justice, in proportion as we become acquainted with the extensive utility of that 
v irtue . 115
It is in this sense tha t  Hume agrees with Horace’s claim tha t  utility is the mother of 
justice. Justice is a historical development, made necessary by and for changes in society. 
The utility of justice is shown most emphatically by the negative case, that without 
justice society would simply collapse. So, for Hume, the historical growth of justice shows 
tha t  we do not have any pre-rational impulse to be just, but learn its value over time as 
we perceive its utility. In this sense, then, he sees utility to be the mother of justice, and 
for this reason he sums up the m atter, in this letter to Hutchseson, by saying that, not 
only is utility the mother of justice, but “Grotius and Pufendorf, to be consistent, must 
say the same’’ . They must say the same because their own accounts show justice to be 
a historical development, and therefore a m atter  of utility.
This is a provocative claim, since Grotius explicitly resists Horace’s view that usefulness 
(or expediency) is the mother of justice. However, part of the problem here is the very 
ambiguity of the word “na tu re” of which Hume complains in the Treatise. For Grotius, 
after stressing tha t  justice is  founded in nature, albeit rather remotely, being three 
degrees removed - “nature  may be considered, so to say, the great-grandmother of 
municipal law” - nevertheless concedes tha t  there is no opposition between nature and 
expediency. Rather, “the law of nature... has the reinforcement of expediency” , and so 
“those who prescribe laws for others in so doing are accustomed to have, or ought to have,
1 1 »T
some advantage in view” .11' Grotius is opposed to utility to the extent that utility is 
opposed to nature. For Horace, such opposition is inevitable, and his reason for so 
thinking provides a clue to why Hume should have agreed. He says:
Between right and wrong Nature can draw no such distinction as between things
•I I  Q
gainful and harmful, what is to be sought and what is to be shunned.
l i e
Enquiries,  p. 192.
l i f t
°Letter to Hutcheson, op. cit.
U 1 D J B P , Prol., 16.
118Horace, op.cit.
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Although a little unclear, the point of this remark seems to be tha t  we are not directly led 
by nature to seek justice, whereas we are led by nature to seek what is clearly gainful and 
avoid what is harmful. Or, to put it another way, we have no natural motive, no original 
instinct, to pursue justice. This is exactly the point Hume makes in the Treatise when 
arguing for the artificiality of justice, and which, despite terminological changes, remains 
essential to his account of justice in both the Essays  and the 2nd Enquiry  
The important conclusion to be drawn here is tha t  Hume’s characterisation of the virtue 
of justice as artificial does not indicate a new, more sceptical, theory of this virtue. 
Hume’s theory grounds justice in sociability in just the way his natural law predecessors 
do; his insistence tha t  it is grounded in utility is not the denial of sociability, but an 
insistence on it. This accords well with Hume’s own explanation of the m atter  in the 
Letter from  a G en tlem an , where he stresses the long and respectable pedigree of his 
opinions: like Hutcheson, “he concurs with all the antient Moralists” 120 in his treatm ent 
of moral matters. His further remark in this place, that in the Treatise  the author (i.e. 
himself)
seems sensible tha t  he employed Words tha t  admit of an invidious construction; 
and therefore makes use of all proper Expedients, by D efin i t ions  and 
Exp lana tions , to prevent i t121
is perfectly in line with what we do find in the Treatise. In the light of these 
observations, there also seems to be no good reason for doubting Hume’s insistence that 
his is an inoffensive doctrine. As he puts it in the Letter (again speaking of himself in the 
third person),
by the artif ic ia l Virtues  he means Justice , Loyalty , and such as require, along 
with a natural Instinc t ,  a certain Reflection on the general Interests of Human 
Society, and a Combination with others. In the same Sense, Sucking is an 
Action natural to Man, and Speech is artificial. But what is there in this
^^Treatise  III.II.i, pp.477-84; Essays, “Of the Original Contract” , pp.454-5; Enquiries, p.202, 
cf. p.307, and 307n.2.
1 20 Letter, op.cit., p.30. Cf. Enquiries, pp. 170-1, where this matter is also discussed, and where 
“the elegant Lord Shaftesbury” is mentioned as one “who, in general, adhered to the principles of 
the ancients” . In “Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences”, Essays,  p.191, Shaftesbury 
is classed among “some of the more zealous partizans of the ancients”. This last passage is 
significant because it clearly shows the status of ancient opinions: Shaftesbury and others criticised 
some modern manners by adopting the standpoint of the ancients.
121 Letter, op.cit., pp.30-1.
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Doctrine tha t  can be supposed in the least pernicious?*"^
In subsequent sta tem ents of his position he took a more “m oderate” course: without 
altering the distinction, he sought to remove the offence by removing its source in the 
troublesome terminology. So, in the essay “Of the Original Contract” , first published in 
1752, we see Hume distinguishing between two kinds of moral duties. The distinction is 
the same as in the Treatise , but the offending terminology is absent:
All moral duties may be divided into two kinds. The f irs t  are those, to which 
men are impelled by a natural instinct or immediate propensity, which operates 
on them, independent of all ideas of obligation, and of all views, either to public 
or private utility ...
The second kind of moral duties are such as are not supported by any original 
instinct of nature, but are performed entirely from a sense of obligation, when we 
consider the necessities of human society, and the impossibility of supporting it, 
if these duties were neglected.*^
Our primary instincts are too unruly to conform to the stringent requirements of justice, 
loyalty, and allegiance; these requirements are founded on, and require for their 
performance, an established recognition of “the general interests or necessities of 
society” . * This is exactly the view th a t  led Hume, in the Treatise , to call justice, etc.,
i o r
artificial, but in this essay justice and fidelity are described only as “natural duties” .
The tactic of the Enquiry concerning the Principles o f  Xforals, published in 1751, is 
similar, but does not exhibit such a complete break with the language of the Treatise. In 
the  body of this work, justice is argued to be entirely dependent on utility. For example,
public utility is the sole origin of justice, and ... reflections on the beneficial 
consequences of this virtue are the sole foundation of its merit.*^6
This is the position of the Treatise, but once again the terminology has been revised, the 
doctrine of the artificiality of justice makes only a timid appearance in a footnote to an
*“^i'6zd., p.31.
12°° Essays, vol. 1. pp .454-5. 
*“ z^‘6xd., p.456.
*^z'6zd., p.455.
126 Enquiries, p.183.
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appendix. In the text to this footnote, it is worth noting tha t  justice is classed as natural 
because it arises necessarily, a point made in the Treatise, but there treated as less 
im portan t than the fact tha t  it arises as the result of rational artifice. In the 2nd Enquiry  
the roles seemed to have been reversed. Firstly we are told tha t  justice arises necessarily 
in human life, and
In so sagacious an animal, what necessarily arises from the exertion of his 
intellectual faculties may justly be esteemed na tu ra l.12'
The footnote then adds a toned-down version of the distinctions made in the Treatise:
Natural may be opposed, either to what is unusual, miraculous, or artificial.
In the two former senses, justice and property are undoubtedly natural. But as 
they suppose reason, forethought, design, and a social union and confederacy 
among men, perhaps th a t  epithet cannot strictly, in the last sense, be applied to 
them  ... But all these disputes are merely verbal.
Hume's final disclaimer here is a far cry from the confident young man who, despite some 
caveats in the text, could boldly ask, in the title to one of the sections of the Treatise, 
“Justice whether a natural or artificial virtue?”
It should now be clear that ,  in avoiding as far as possible what was perceived to be the 
offensive language, Hume behaves in a way tha t  is extremely odd for a man seeking to 
offend. We can only conclude the opposite: tha t ,  anxious to be esteemed a friend of 
virtue, he was upset to be seen as one of its enemies. He therefore did his best to remove 
the unfortunate choice of terms which created this misunderstanding, and sought to 
emphasize the respectable character of his work. Thus we see him stressing, in the 2nd 
E nqu iry , tha t  by basing justice entirely on utility, he is not introducing a new doctrine, 
but making more obvious, more visible, what is in fact the foundation employed, in the 
last resort, by “the writers on the law of nature” . These authors “assign, as the ultimate 
reason for every rule which they establish, the convenience and necessities of 
m ankind” .129 The same impulse leads him, I suggest, to make the remark with which 
this essay opens: tha t  his theory of justice “is, in the main, the same with that hinted at 
and adopted by Grotius” .109 To emphasize the point, he includes the longish quotation
121 ibid., p.307.
^2^ibid., pp.307-8n. (Emphasis added to last sentence.)
129ibid., p.195.
130ibid., p.307n.
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from Grotius which shows the historical, (in his terms) utility-dependent character of the 
explanation of property in De Jure Belli ac Paczs.131
There remains, then, no reason for thinking Hume to have had any sceptical or offensive 
purpose in describing the important virtues of justice, fidelity, and allegiance as 
“artificial” . Nevertheless, Grotius and his immediate successors saw no need for such a 
description. We need to understand why Hume did. This will be the task of the next 
section.
V: A rtific ia l an d  N a tu ra l V ir tu es
In the preceding section, it was argued tha t  Hume’s division of the virtues into natural 
and artificial cannot be interpreted as a division between genuine and purely imaginary, 
or false, virtues. It is not a separation of the real virtues from the mere pretenders. This 
is not to say th a t  Hume is not concerned with such a separation - indeed his treatment of 
the “monkish virtues” in the 2nd Enquiry , where he argues tha t  it is just to “transfer 
them to the opposite column, and place them in the catalogue of vices” , i s  exactly such 
an operation. Rather it is to stress tha t  the natural/artificial distinction is neither 
intended for, nor capable of doing, this work. The “monkish virtues” are, according to 
Hume’s philosophy, neither natural nor artificial virtues, and therefore  are not virtues at 
all.133
If we are to take Hume’s distinction at face value, then - as a distinction between those 
virtues which are always morally good, independently of any particular circumstances, 
and those which, because they are a rational response to the exigencies of particular 
circumstances, only have value given those circumstances, and only achieve their end 
when part of an interdependent system of like actions - we are still left with the problem 
of explaining why he saw this distinction as a distinction between the natural and the
i n ibid., D JBP , II.II.ii.4-5.
Enquiries, p.270.
1 ^D avid  Miller, op.cit., p.120, fails to recognize the philosophical impetus behind Hume’s view 
here. Indeed, his philosophy/ideology distinction (really an epistemology/unexamined asumption 
distinction; see pp.12-13) prevents understanding, both in this particular case, and, I suggest, of 
Hume’s philosophy in general. Miller has. I believe, been led astray by asking the wrong kind of 
question, a question shaped by concerns and assumptions far different from those which occupied 
philosophy in 18th century Scotland.
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artif ic ia l.  Why not, more simply, put the m atter  in terms of the simple and the complex; 
or of the individual and the social? After all, he allows, both in the Treatise  and the 2nd 
Enquiry , th a t  justice, because necessary to, or inseparable from, human life, can be 
correctly understood as na tu ra l .1^4 Why then does Hume not esteem it natural? What is 
it about a virtue founded in reason and reflection tha t  leads him to feel uncomfortable 
about calling it a natural virtue?
To answer this question we need to understand Hume’s view of virtue in general. This 
is, in some respects at least, a difficult task, since in the Treatise  Hume says rather little 
th a t  bears directly on the topic, and what he does say there has often proved more of an 
obstacle than an aid to interpretation. The problems can, however, be significantly 
reduced if we first consider the structural problem of Treatise Book III - tha t  is, if we first 
answer the question, Why does Book III have the structure it has? Attempting to answer 
this question is particularly pertinent here because Hume’s general remarks on morality 
are very largely contained in the brief first part. If we understand the role of Part I in 
Book III as a whole, we then become capable of conducting our further enquiries more 
sensibly by knowing where to look for their solution.
It was suggested above th a t  in Book III Part  I Hume is principally concerned to “show 
his colours” on a dispute tha t  would have been familiar to his readers, the moral 
sense/reason controversy. He also wants to insist that, despite being manifestly the 
correct viewpoint, the moral sense theory is not a sufficient explanation of our moral 
convictions. In fact, it shows some of our convictions to be rather paradoxical - most 
obviously, those concerning justice. The task of P a r t  II, Hume’s principal contribution in 
the area of moral theory, is to remove these paradoxes. This interpretation of the place of 
P a r t  I in Book III has the important consequence of showing th a t  Part  I owes its brevity 
not to- its lack of import in Hume’s views as a whole, but to its relation to his main 
purpose in Book III. This purpose, to resolve a problem generated by moral sense theory, 
requires no more than a brief introduction, a general outline of tha t  theory, in order to 
pose the problem to be discussed in the body of the work. Thus moral sense theory figures 
hardly at all in the main features of the new theories or explanations developed, despite 
(or because of) the fact tha t  it is as a contribution to moral sense theory tha t  the work is 
offered. This should not seem strange: most work in philosophy, asin most areas of
intellectual endeavour, can be characterised as being within a particular paradigm and as 
such tend not to discuss the paradigm. This is despite the fact that ,  in order to explain
134 Enquiries, p.307, cf. Treatise, p.484.
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the author s philosophical commitments, nothing is more im portant - more germane to 
the task - than explaining the paradigm. (We become philosophically educated by coming 
to understand the paradigms which underlie debates, and thereby overcome the 
strangeness which at first afflicts us, and continues to afflict non-participants. We come to 
see the point of asking whether, for example, there can be a “private7’ language, or 
whether machines can think, or how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. In all 
such cases, we can only understand if we know what is not being discussed.)
If, as suggested here, the purpose of the Treatise  Book III Part  I is principally to situate 
the discussion, we know th a t  we can clarify remarks by Hume that are opaque or obscure 
by consulting other moral sense writers, or by considering central features of the moral 
sense viewpoint. This needs to be done carefully, of course, for the moral sense defenders 
are not all of a piece, and P a r t  III of Treatise  Book III clearly shows tha t  Hume is aiming 
not simply at adopting the moral sense view, but at sophisticating it. He aims to explain 
the notion of moral sense in terms of the operation of the more general psychological 
principle he calls sym pathy. 00 As long as this is kept in mind, then, we can interpret 
some of Hume’s less transparent remarks by considering them in the light of other moral 
sense theories. And, just as importantly, we can employ the same insights to educate our 
approach to the 2nd E nqu iry ; for, although the term “moral sense” does not appear in the 
later work, nevertheless the same commitment to an ultimate foundation for morals in 
“sentiment” or feeling, rather than reason, is retained136 - and this, as Treatise  Book III 
Part I shows, is Hume’s original ground for preferring the moral sense view. Furthermore, 
if Hume's commitment to the moral sense paradigm was a factor many of his earlier 
readers overlooked, we would also expect him to a ttem pt to make this commitment (and 
his other non-sceptical commitments, for th a t  m atter)  more visible in his later work. This 
is exactly what we do Find. It will be brought out more clearly in the succeeding 
discussion.
*  *  *
Even a cursory reading of the opening section of Book III of the Treatise  shows that 
Hume’s argument against the possibility of founding morals in reason is tha t  moral
1 9  C
This is especially clear in the Conclusion, pp.618-21, and pp.611-2. The final sentences of the 
Treatise, where the importance of the anatomist is stressed, also implies the necessity of an accurate 
moral psychology. The principle of sympathy is designed to provide this, as Book II shows.
°°Hume does speak of a “finer internal sense” , Enquiries, p.170 (rather surprisingly 
Hutchesonian language).
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notions move us to action. This reason alone cannot do, because it is “the discovery of 
tru th  or falsehood” , no more and no less. Therefore reason is essentially passive. It 
cannot function as an ultimate end; it can only help us to select the best means to any 
given end. Ends themselves are ends only in so far as they are desired  states, so all ends 
are founded in passions, and reason is the instrument to their effective achievement. Thus, 
as the famous dictum from Book II puts it, “reason is, and ought only to be the slave of
190
the passions” . ° The same point, put less colourfully, is “th a t  reason alone can never be
a motive to any action of the will” . y If the reference to “motive” here seems odd, it 
must be stressed tha t  by “motive” Hume does not, in fact cannot, mean a reason for 
action. W hat he means is m otive force , what pushes or pulls us into action. Modern 
philosophers tend to understand “motive” as m eaning  “reason for action” . This is 
something Hume must deny; and where this is not adequately recognized the result is 
much confusion. The classic case will be considered below.
If reason alone cannot influence the will, it follows that morals cannot be founded in 
reason alone, because moral notions do influence the will:
as reason can never immediately prevent or produce any action by contradicting 
or approving of it, it cannot be the source of the distinction betwixt moral good 
and evil, which are found to have tha t  influence ... Moral distinctions, therefore, 
are not the offspring of reason. Reason is wholly inactive, and can never be the 
source of so active a principle as conscience, or a sense of morals.14^
It is im portant to emphasize Hume’s description of morals here as an active m atter. We 
misunderstand Hume if we fail to see the intimate connection between morality and 
a c t i o n . H i s  distinction between the anatom ist and the painter at the close of the 
Treatise  perhaps runs counter to this; and it is worth noting Hutcheson’s complaint to 
Hume of the want, in the T reatise , of “a certain warmth in the cause of virtue” . L It 
appears th a t  Hume did later accept the legitimacy of this complaint, for the 2nd Enquiry
Treatise , p.458. 
ibid ., p.415. 
^^ib id. ,  p.413. 
^®ibid. ,  p.458.
* ^ cf .  Essays,  p.244. 
142 Hume, letter to Hutcheson, op. cit.
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not only manifests a good deal of warmth in the cause of virtue, it also contains a passage 
which undermines the ana tom is t/pa in te r  distinction. Even though he points out that his
1 4 0
concern in the Enquiry  is “more the speculative, than the practical part of morals , he 
nevertheless allows tha t  “the end of all moral speculations is to teach us our du ty ” . 144 He 
adds:
Extinguish all the warm feelings and prepossessions in favour of virtue, and all 
disgust or aversion to vice: render men totally indifferent towards these 
distinctions; and morality is no longer a practical study, nor has any tendency to 
regulate our lives and actions . 145
The context of this passage prevents us from treating it as necessarily  Hume’s view. 
However, it seems likely tha t  it is;146 and, if so, it implies th a t  even the writer on morals 
cannot properly extinguish all warm feelings on the m atter. Moreover, those warm 
feelings which naturally arise in connection with morals do so because of the active nature 
of morals itself. Hume hints at this connection when he goes on to speak of “that  which 
renders morality an active principle and constitutes virtue our happiness, and vice our 
misery” . 4 ' W hat is this connection between activity on the one hand, and happiness or 
misery on the other? Quite simply, it is tha t  we are moved to action by the sensations of 
(or the prospects of) pleasure and pain. As Hume says, “the chief spring or actuating 
principle of the human mind is pleasure or pain” . 148 Desires and aversions, happiness and 
misery, are real or imagined pleasures or pains which we see to be connected either to 
ourselves or others. If, as is the case, it is passion and not reason that moves us to action, 
and pains and pleasures are the source of passions , 149 then it is pains and pleasures which 
move us to action. In Hume’s language, pains and pleasures are motives  to action.
It follows from this tha t  moral motives must be pleasures or pains of a particular sort:
Enquiries, pp. 177-8.
U4ibid., p.172.
145i6id.
14^He describes it as a “specious” view, and puts aside its resolution to Appendix I. This 
appendix does, I think, imply that the speciousness of this passage is not mere speciousness.
1 A.714 Enquiries., p.173.
1487Veatise, p.574.
149cf. Treatise, p.276.
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“M orality, therefore, is more properly felt than judg 'd  o P . 15® The subject matter of 
morals, for Hume, is the actions or characters of human beings, 151 so moral approbation 
is precisely the feeling of pleasure generated by the contemplation of a character or action. 
It is im portant to note here that by “contemplation” Hume means recognizing the 
“principles in the mind and tem per” , the “qualities or durable principles” , which the
i  ~  O
character or action exhibits.  ^ He stresses feeling  in order to bring out what it is that 
moves or activates us; but what we approve of in any act of moral approbation is the
i  -  o
durable motives displayed by others . 130 Hume is not trying to reduce morality to “mere” 
feeling; he is a ttem pting  to explain the psychological mechanisms of moral reality. He 
puts it as follows:
We do not infer a character to be virtuous, because it pleases: But in feeling that 
it pleases after such a particular manner, we in effect feel tha t  it is virtuous.
The case is the same as in our judgements concerning all kinds of beauty, and 
tastes, and sensations. Our approbation is imply’d in the immediate pleasure 
they convey to us .154
This leaves us with a difficulty, however. W hat makes approbation, in any particular 
case, moral approbation? We know th a t  it must be a pleasurable feeling generated by 
contemplation of a character or action. But clearly this is not sufficient. For many 
manifestly non-moral, even immoral, characters or actions can generate pleasure by 
contemplation. Hume does not give a direct answer to this particular problem; but it is 
not difficult to imagine what he would say. In fact he indicates an answer in another of 
his short summaries of the basic facts of moral psychology. He says:
virtue is distinguished by the pleasure, and vice by the pain, tha t  any action, 
sentiment or character gives us by the mere view and contemplation . 150
In the immediately following sentence, he speaks of the reaction produced in us by an 
action viewed from “the general view or survey” . I shall suggest tha t  the expressions “the
150
151
152
153
154
155
ibid., p.470.
cf.Hume to Hutcheson, letter no.16; Raphael, op.cit., p .l l l .  
Treatise, p.477; letter no. 13, op.cit.
Treatise, ibid, 
ibid., p.471.
ibid., p.475.
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general view or survey” , and '‘'the mere view and contemplation” , have the same meaning, 
and that tha t  meaning is disinterested contemplat ion.  The pleasure which is moral 
pleasure, then, is the pleasure caused by an action or character, independently of any 
advantages or disadvantages which accrue to the observer; pleasure caused by the action 
or character considered for its own sake. Self-interest or advantage cause us to feel 
pleasure at actions or characters which benefit us; the pleasure which is moral 
approbation is th a t  pleasure caused by any such actions, etc., considered apart from such 
interest or advantage.
The interpretation of Hume at this point depends a good deal on the connection with 
the moral sense writers argued for above. Hume’s remarks do suggest the type of 
interpretation offered, but it is Hutcheson who frequently stresses tha t  considerations of 
interest and advantage can contam inate our moral perceptions, or over-rule them. Moral 
perceptions themselves are entirely disinterested. For example, moral good is, he says,
our Idea of some Quality apprehended in Actions, which procures Approbation, 
and Love toward the actor, from those who receive no Advantage by the 
Action . 156
For this to be possible, tha t  is, for disinterested contemplation to produce pleasure, moral 
qualities must exhibit a kind of beauty. It is this beauty of the action or character which 
in turn motivates our actions. Hutcheson spells this out clearly:
The A U T H O R  o f  Nature  has much better furnished us for a virtuous conduct, 
than our Moralists seem to imagine ... He has made Virtue a lovely Form , to 
excite our pursuit of it:^and has given us strong A f fe c t i ons  to be the Springs of 
each virtuous action.15'
Hume denies our benevolent affections the strength Hutcheson accords to them: his
im portan t principle of l imited  benevolence is a deliberate backing away from Hutcheson’s 
strong benevolence, without going over to the opposition camp of those who base morals 
on self-love.15  ^ (His principle is, in other words, a medium between extremes - just what 
we would expect from a man of “moderation” .)
We are now in a position to sketch in the general outlines of the moral sense view of the
1 Hutcheson, Inquiry, p. 111.
157 .
ibid., p.xiv-xv.
°For Hume, this latter camp includes not only Mandevillc, but also Hobbes and Locke, both of 
whom, he says, “maintained the selfish system of morals” (Enquiries, p.296). In this view he is 
certainly at one with Shaftesbury (cf. Norton, op.cit., pp.34-5); Hucheson appears to be committed 
to much the same conclusions, but he appears somewhat hesitant about specifically including Locke 
(cf. Inquiry, p. 81).
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nature and practice of morality. It must be stressed that, for Hume in particular (because 
of his concern for the efficient causes of action), the task of moral philosophy includes not 
only an account of what morality is, but of why we do it - why morality is a practice 
characteristic of human beings. So an im portant part of the following sketch is to show 
the nature and causes of a characteristic form of human behaviour.
Firstly, as the above quotation from Hutcheson shows, what the moral sense perceives 
(or, what we sympathetically respond to) is the beauty of certain kinds of characters or 
actions. Moral goodness is a species of beauty. Thus it is no accident tha t  Hutcheson 
should write an Inquiry concerning Beauty and Virtue , or tha t  Hume occasionally speaks 
of beauty as a genus, divided into the two species of moral and natural: he employs 
expressions such as, for example, “beauty whether moral or na tura l” ,169 and “if we 
compare moral beauty with natura l” .160 These are not examples of a theoretically 
innocent eighteenth century idiom, but part and parcel of the moral sense view. (The 
rationalists, as far as I have been able to determine, do not speak of moral beauty, but 
rather more directly of moral good and evil.161) Moral actions are founded on the 
apprehension of a species of beauty. The apprehension of beauty moves us to action 
because pleasure is the mainspring of human action, and, as Hume puts it in A 
Dissertation on the Passions , “the very essence of beauty consists in its power of 
producing pleasure.” 10,6
Hume follows Hutcheson in seeing moral and aesthetic perception as akin to the 
perception of secondary qualities. However, as we saw in the previous chapter, Hume 
differs from Hutcheson in the account he offers of secondary qualities, placing them firmly 
in the mind of the observer. This difference is preserved in his account of beauty, as we 
would expect. The beauty of a circle, he says, “is only the effect which that figure 
produces upon the mind, whose peculiar fabric or structure renders it susceptible of such 
sentiments. From the point of view of moral philosophy, however, differences about the 
precise location of perceptions of moral beauty are not of great importance. What m atters
169Enquiries, p.165. 
lQOibid., p.291.
1 ß  11See the writings of Samuel Clarke and William Wollaston included in Raphael, op.cit., vol. 1.
16^Essays, vol. 2, p. 148.
1 ft ^°Enquiries, pp.291-2. The same passage occurs in “The Sceptic” , Essays,p.219.
259
is th a t  beauty is perceived, and predictably so. Thus Hume can be in complete agreement 
with Hutcheson’s confident assertion tha t  we know an object is beautiful because, 
whenever we perceive th a t  object, we perceive the beauty. Such pleasures as the 
perception of beauty, he says, “will as necessarily strike the Mind, as any Perceptions of 
the external Senses.”
This conception of beauty, including moral beauty, as akin to the secondary qualities of 
colour, taste, etc., differing only in being perceived by what may be called a “finer internal
i  '
sense” iD0 rather than  by another external sense-organ, has a significant implication. All 
ideas of secondary qualities, and thus of moral goodness itself, require for their realization 
perception by an appropriate  perceiver. Thus the moral sense theorists occasionally speak 
of the role of a spectator in moral determinations; and, as pointed out above, since the 
moral viewpoint is a disinterested viewpoint, it becomes possibleto think of settling moral 
disputes by appealing to the impartial spectator .ADD Adam Smith takes up this challenge 
in The Theory o f  Moral S e n tim e n ts , providing an account of moral good, and of our 
motivations to pursue moral courses of action, in terms of the complex constitution of the 
impartial spectator of human affairs.
Of more immediate importance here, however, is the fact tha t  any theory of moral 
goodness which assigns a central role to the perceptions of a mind must insist on at least 
the u n i fo rm ity  of the disinterested perceptions of the relevant minds if the public, or 
social, character of the moral world is to be retained. This may seem an impossibly 
stringent requirement, but it is noteworthy th a t  with respect to the classical secondary 
qualities the requirement is readily accepted. Sugar is  sweet, fire engines are red, and so 
on. So, since for Hume moral beauty is akin to the more familiar secondary qualities of 
physical objects, we would expect him to acknowledge the existence of the relevant kind of 
uniformity in human minds, or human nature; and tha t  moral beauty and deformity can 
therefore be recognized as real features of characters and actions, and the motives 
underlying them. This is precisely what we do find him asserting. In a “philosophical” 
footnote to his essay “The Sceptic” , he says this:
Were I not afraid of appearing too philosophical, I should remind my reader of
^^Hutcheson, Essay, p. 101.
^^Hume, Enquiries, p. 170; cf. Hutcheson, Inquiry, p. 8. (Also cf. Enquiries, p.294).
^^Both Hume and Hutcheson speak of the spectator. For Hume, cf. Enquiries, p.292; also 
Treatise, pp.472, 581-2, 589, 591.
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that famous doctrine, supposed to be fully proved in modern times, “That tastes 
and colours, and all other sensible qualities, lie not in the bodies, but merely in 
the senses” . The case is the same with beauty and deformity, virtue and vice. 
This doctrine, however, takes off no more from the reality of the latter qualities, 
than from that  of the former; nor need it give any umbrage either to critics or 
moralists. T ho’ colours were allowed to lie only in the eye, would dyers or 
painters ever be less regarded or esteemed? There is a sufficient uniformity in 
the senses and feelings of mankind, to make all these qualities the objects of art 
and reasoning, and to have the greatest influence on life and manners. And as 
’tis certain, tha t  the discovery above-mentioned in natural philosophy, makes no 
alteration on action and conduct; why should a like discovery in moral 
philosophy make any a lteration?1^'
Here we see Hume not only adopting the secondary quality model, but also accepting 
two im portant consequences - the uniformity of the relevant perceptions, and their 
undiminished reality. The parallelism between natural beauty and virtue is also 
indicated. Thus Hume fully accepts the implication of the moral sense/secondary qualities 
model, tha t  moral approbation is founded in the perception of moral beauty, in the 
perception of the beauty of particular actions or characters by any disinterested observer.
We can now return to the task of spelling out the general features of the moral sense 
view of morality and moral action. The starting  point, tha t  moral distinctions are 
founded on a moral sense, is the view just explained tha t  morality begins with the 
perception of moral beauty. Beauty itself, whether moral or natural, is simply a pleasing 
perception. This does not mean tha t  beauty is arbitrary - far from it, for what is pleasing 
to any sense is itself not arbitrary . Particular combinations of colours are hard on the 
eye; some sorts of repetitive sounds are so hard on the ear tha t  they disturb our 
equilibrium - crying babies, for example.1 For Hutcheson, natural beauty requires 
uniformity amidst variety; Hume is more circumspect, but agrees, in an im portant essay, 
tha t  there is a s tandard  of taste. Both agree th a t  acts of benevolence in particular are 
pleasing to any disinterested observer.
1 R7 “The Sceptic”, Essays, p.219n. It is important to point out here that, although this essay 
and the three accompanying it - “The Epicurean”, “The Stoic”, and “The Platonist” - are literary, 
or imaginative , constructions of the four different positions, rather than Hume’s own view, there is 
good reason for taking this particular essay as a literary device precisely for airing his own views. 
And there is particular reason for taking this part of the essay to represent Hume’s views, because 
the text which this footnote is commenting on includes a passage - six sentences long - which is 
identical to a paragraph of the 2nd Enquiry, pp.291-2. This passage is in part quoted above as the 
text to footnote 164. It also needs to be noted that Hume errs in his footnote, suggesting that all 
sensible qualities lie in the senses, according to the “famous doctrine”. This is not true. Shape and 
size, for example, are primary sensible qualities, and hence remain firmly in the object.
iD0Cf. Karnes, Essays , p.43: “a spreading oak, a verdant plain, a large river, are objects which 
afford great delight. A rotten carcase, a distorted figure, create aversion, which in some instances, 
goes the length of horror”.
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Now it has already been pointed out tha t ,  for Hume, “the chief spring or actuating 
principle of the human mind is pleasure or pain" . 169 In fact, this view is essential to 
moral sense theories as a whole, and reflects their Lockean provenance. Pleasure moves us 
to action because what pleases is attractive  - which is to say, we are a ttracted  to it. It is 
im portant to stress th a t  there is no equivocation here. The point is simply that we are 
creatures of a determinate nature, who by being pleased by particular objects or events, 
are a ttrac ted  to them, and thus seek to secure or preserve or repeat them. We pursue 
what pleases us, and thereby are moved to action. In like manner we seek to avoid what 
is painful, what disturbs us or causes us unease. But many things please or pain us 
simply because of their impact on our private interests. These pleasures or pains, and 
hence these interests, are not specifically moral pleasures or pains, since morality is 
essentially disinterested. All and only our disinterested perceptions, and the pleasures or 
pains tha t  arise from them, give no pre-eminence to our private ambitions, and thus 
display the public character necessary for the moral viewpoint. Therefore all and only 
disinterested perceptions are moral perceptions, and all and only disinterested pleasures 
are moral pleasures. Furthermore, because pleasures or pains are the chief springs or 
actuating forces of the mind, and thus the causes of actions, they are the m otives - which 
is to say, the motive forces - for actions. Moral actions being those actions which have 
moral motives, they are simply those actions where the motive force is an a ttraction to a 
moral pleasure based in a disinterested perception. Benevolent acts, for example, are 
moral acts because benevolence is a moral motive: it is tha t  motive force which is 
generated by the disinterested, pleasing perception of the happiness of others. It is only 
because the disinterested perception of the happiness of others is  pleasurable to us tha t  we 
have a motive to perform benevolent acts. Therefore, w ithout such pleasures there can be 
no moral motivation.
This is a vitally im portant conclusion, but its importance does not become clear until we 
recognize the relationship between motivation and obligation in the moral sense outlook. 
This is best achieved by considering Hutcheson’s account of obligation. An obligation, he 
says, is
a Determination, without regard to our own Interest, to approve Actions, and to
perform them; which Determination shall also make us displeas’d with our 
r • « 170selves, and uneasy upon having acted contrary to it.
1697reatise, p.574. 
170Hutcheson, Inquiry, p.266; but cf. Karnes, Essays , pp.56-7.
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The first half of this definition is the definition of moral motivation - the disinterested 
motive to approve and perform certain actions; and the latter  half is simply a consequence 
of the former. Where we act contrary to our disinterested motive, it is because this has 
been outweighed by a stronger, (self) interested one. But the stronger motive, despite 
outweighing the weaker, does not destroy it; and, once the stronger motive has been 
successful in moving us to a self-interested action, this motive typically dissipates. Thus 
we are left with the disinterested motive alone, and, where the self-interested act has cut 
off the possibility of the disinterested act, the disinterested motive remains, but without 
means of its satisfaction. Consequently, we remain “uneasy” , or “displeas’d with our 
selves” . If this account is correct, then we can see tha t  by “obligation” Hutcheson means 
simply moral motivation. Obligation is the push or pull on us we feel by perceiving the 
pleasing character - the beauty - of the disinterested action. I have already pointed out 
th a t  it is because disinterested actions are pleasing to us tha t  benevolence is a moral 
motivation. So, if obligations are, for Hutcheson, moral motivations, he must see 
benevolence as an obligation. This he does: “there is” , he says, “naturally  an Obligation 
upon all Men to Benevolence* j l  (The word “natura lly” here is most significant, as we 
shall see below.) The im portant consequence of the identity of moral motivation and 
obligation is this: since, as was argued above, without the pleasing perception of moral 
beauty there can be no moral motivation, then, likewise, there can be no obligation.112
The significance of this conclusion is brought out rather better by a little rephrasing. 
First of all, the pleasing perception of moral beauty, moral perception, is the task carried 
out by the moral sense. Thus without reference to a moral sense, there can be no 
explanation of obligation, tha t  is, no meaning can be given to the word “ought” . All 
theories of morals which a ttem p t to found moral distinctions purely in reason, or abstract 
rational relations, make no reference to moral sense. So these theories, when they 
introduce the word “ought” , have introduced a new relation which they cannot explain. 
But a moral theory without obligation is no moral theory at all, since morality is a 
practical m atter , and it is precisely the obligation which is the motive force - the action­
making element - in moral practice. So through “this small a tten tion” we are able to see 
“th a t  the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects,
171ibid., p.267.
i y o
For Hume, obligation is motivation simpliciter. Thus he talks of natural obligation and 
moral obligation. This does not affect the matter here, however. For a discussion of this matter, see 
E. Sapadin, “Hume’s Law, Hume’s Way”, in David Hume: Bicentenary Papers (ed. G.P. Morice), 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press (1977); and Marcia Baron, “Hume’s Noble Lie: An
Account of his Artificial Virtues”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy XII: 3, pp.540-1.
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1 * ^ 0
nor is perceiv’d by reason71.* 1' °
This should sound familiar. It is, in fact, a summary of Hume’s famous “is-ought” 
passage at the end of Treatise III.I.i. By seeing this passage in the light of the moral sense 
view in general, we can see that Hume is not asserting a fact/value, or a 
fact/interpretation, or any other comparable dichotomy, whether or not there is anything 
to be said for such distinctions. ' Hume’s point in this passage is, rather, that if we are 
to explain morality, we must explain why it moves people to action. The gap he identifies 
is a gap between obligations or motivations (and therefore actions) on the one hand, and 
facts or values on the other.1 ' 0 The essential passivity, or, the instrum entality, of reason, 
guarantees the failure of the rationalist theories. Reason is a tool we use, thus our use of 
it cannot be explained by reason. This is perhaps rather crude, but I think it is close to 
Hume’s view. The rationalist theories fail because they cannot explain why some beings 
are moral, that is morally active, beings. Another way of putting this point would be to 
say that any adequate moral philosophy must include a moral psychology, a psychology of 
moral action . 1 * °
^~^Treatise, p.470.
■I m  A
' 4Not only is Hume not saying that every “ought” conclusion should have an “ought” premise, 
it is also im portant to remember that Hume has very little interest in moral exhortation. He is 
interested in moral advice, but he sees this as a m atter of either pointing out the beauty of virtue, 
or employing good reasoning to correct bad reasoning about the actual relation of means and ends.
175 Cf. Sapadin, op. cit., pp. 214-7. Sapadin rightly stresses that when Hume contrasts “is” 
statem ents and “ought” statements he means just that. “X is a tree” , “X is good” , “X is the right 
thing to do” are all as they appear to be, “is” statem ents - and thus are to be distinguished from 
“ought” statem ents and the new relation the latter introduce.
1 7ft
DThus the larger commitments of moral sense moral philosophy place it in sharp opposition to 
much modern moral philosophy, with the la tte r’s sharp separation of moral issues from questions of 
moral psychology. See especially R.M. Hare, The Language of Morals, Oxford: O.U.P. (1952), pp. 
iii-iv.
It is worth adding here that, from a moral sense viewpoint, the modern separation of moral 
philosophy from moral psychology can only impoverish, or even harm, both endeavours. In 
particular, it is inviting to suggest that, as with earlier “rationalisms”, the notion of moral 
obligation is the casualty. Hence the belief, expressed in different ways and to different ends by 
both Alasdair MacIntyre [After Virtue, London: Duckworth (1981)) and Bernard Williams [Ethics 
and the Limits o f Philosophy, London: Fontana (1986)), that modern morality lacks
intelligibility. If the lack of a moral psychology is the problem here, one option for reconstruction 
would be to return attention in moral philosophy to the moral conscience, and thereby to 
rehabilitate moral obligation itself. One recent work which does return attention to questions of 
conscience is Basil Mitchell, Morality: Religious and Secular, Oxford: Clarendon Press (1980).
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It was mentioned above tha t  Hume's “is-ought” passage is undeservedly famous. This is 
for the quite simple reason th a t  Hume there does little more than follow Hutcheson. In 
both the Inquiry concerning Beauty  and Virtue , and also in the I llustrations upon the 
Moral Sense , Hutcheson charges the rationalists with being unable to explain “ought” , 
“m ust” , “should” , and so on .17' Hume follows in Hutcheson’s footsteps, rehearsing the 
la t te r ’s argument against the rationalists, before settling down to his main concerns of 
justice, government, etc. But this is not all. Karnes, another adherent to the moral sense 
view, in his Essays  criticises both Hutcheson and Hume for failing to provide an adequate 
account of these very terms. The explanation of “ought” and comparable words is a 
typical concern of the moral sense writers, and is so because the question of how morality 
moves us to action is the question the ethical rationalists cannot answer, and which the 
moral sense philosophers all see as the crucial advantage of their position. Hume’s 
“is-ought” passage is undeservedly famous, then, because it is no more than a neat 
encapsulation of a view common to all the moral sense writers.
Karnes’s criticisms of Hume and Hutcheson have just been mentioned. If we consider 
the nature of these criticisms, particularly of Hutcheson, we can gain a useful foothold on 
the key problem of moral sense theory; the problem which Hume’s doctrine of artificial 
virtue is designed to solve. So to those criticisms we will now turn.
The objection to Hume need not detain us here: he is criticised simply on the ground 
tha t  sympathy won’t do the job - it is “far too faint a principle to control our irregular 
appetites and passions” . The criticism of Hutcheson, however, is very instructive, and 
enables us properly to understand the problem that  justice (in particular) poses for moral 
sense theory, and why Hume should resort to calling it an artificial virtue.
The failing of Hutcheson’s account of obligation, according to Karnes, is tha t  it does not 
measure up to the facts:
this account falls far short of the whole idea of obligation, and leaves no 
distinction betwixt it and a simple approbation or disapprobation of the moral 
sense; feelings tha t  attend many actions, which by no means come under the
1 7Qnotion of obligation or duty.
1 ‘ * 1 Inquiry, pp.266-75; Illustrations, in Essay, pp.229-30, 244, 246, 252, 262, 269, in particular; 
the same general issue is also considered in the System, vol. 1, p.264.
1 ~  ft'°Kames, Essays, p.58.
179ibid., p.57.
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In particular, Hutcheson’s problem is this: he
founds the morality of actions on a certain quality of actions, which procures 
approbation and love to the agent. But this account of morality is imperfect, 
because it excludes justice, and everything which may be strictly called Duty. 
The man who, confining himself to strict duty, is true to his word, and avoids 
harming others, is a just and moral man; is intitled to some share of esteem, but 
he will never be the object of love or friendship . 1811
Karnes’s point is tha t  justice (principally “avoiding harm to others” ) is an essential part 
of morals, but the moral sense theory cannot explain our obligation to justice, since 
justice is without moral beauty. This is what he means by saying the just  man (qua just 
man) “will never be the object of love or friendship” . Objects of love or friendship are 
pleasing perceptions, and the just man is not a pleasing perception (no m atter how 
displeasing a perception the unjust man is) because he acts solely according to duty, not 
from any benevolent motive.
But if justice does not procure the approbation of the moral sense, why is justice 
approved of at all? W hat is our motive to just  actions? This amounts to the 
Hutchesonian problem of why we should recognize the “external” rights. Hume shows this 
to be so by employing Hutcheson’s own examples of external rights:
when I relieve persons in distress, my natural humanity is my motive; ... But if 
we examine all the questions, tha t  come before any tribunal of justice, we shall 
find, tha t  considering each case apart, it wou’d as often be an instance of 
humanity to decide contrary to the laws of justice as conformable to them. 
Judges take from a poor man to give to a rich; they bestow on the dissolute the 
labour of the industrious; and they put into the hands of the vicious the means 
of harming both themselves and others. The whole scheme, however, of law and 
justice is advantageous to the society and to every Individual]; and ’twas with a 
view to this advantage, tha t  men, by their voluntary conventions, establish’d 
i t . 181
The advantage, and thus the virtue, of justice, is not in dispute in Hume’s theory. The 
problem is that, because of the lack of moral beauty of many individual acts of justice, the 
moral sense theory is, with respect to justice, in the same apparent position as the 
rationalist theories are with respect to morals in general - the obligation to justice is left 
unexplained. And the fact th a t  individual men and women are moved to perform just
^®ibid., pp.55-6.
1 8 1 *Treatise, p. 579. The addition in square brackets is Hume’s manuscript amendment to the 
first edition. See Nidditch’s textual notes, Treatise, p.672. Also note in the first sentence of this 
passage the use of “motive” where it can only mean “motive (or driving) force” , the sense I have 
argued for throughout section V.
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acts, including  those which are entirely lacking in moral beauty, shows tha t  there is a felt 
obligation which has to be explained. People do feel a force that moves them to just 
actions. But there is no natural force - no “original instinct” - available to do this job. 
Justice is artificial because there is no natural force - no natural obligation - which moves 
us to perform just actions. It is, however, a real virtue because it is founded on a real 
obligation. We can say th a t  it m ust  be so founded, simply because justice exists. Hume’s 
task is to explain how this real obligation arises.
The im m edia te  obligation to perform acts of justice is simply determined: it is the
sense  of justice, or the sense of duty. But this sense is not the bottom of the m atter, since 
it can only exist where justice already exists. It cannot be the original instinct to perform 
acts of justice. The original instinct, or natural obligation, to any virtuous act must be 
“some motive to produce it, d istinct from  the sense o f  its m o r a l i t y . The problem of 
the motivation to justice is th a t  there is no such distinct motive to just acts. Hutcheson 
appealed to a more extensive benvolence, the good of mankind as a system, to solve this 
problem, but for Hume this is no remedy, because “th a t  is a motive too remote and too 
sublime to affect the generality of mankind.” He adds:
In general, it may be affirm’d, tha t  there is no such passion in human minds, as 
the love of mankind, merely as such, independent of personal qualities, of 
services, or of relation to ourself.18,J
In fact, the partiality of our affections restricts even our benevolence to a fairly limited 
sphere. But the natural insecurity of external goods, in particular, makes a system of 
justice absolutely necessary to the security of society. How then is this obstacle to justice 
overcome? Not by any natural, i.e. original, means:
In vain should we expect to find in uncultivated na ture , a remedy to this 
inconvenience; or hope for any inartificial principle of the human mind, which 
might control those partial affections, and make us overcome the temptations 
arising from our circumstances.
Since no inartificial means is effective to establish justice, but social harmony requires 
that justice be established, artificial means must be created. Reason must be employed to 
provide a solution to the problem. Rational reflection on the natural instability of the
Treatise, p. 479.
18Zibid., p. 481.
184 ibid., p. 488.
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possession of external goods, and on the great advantages that flow from overcoming this 
instability and securing to individuals the fruits of their industry, as one important 
ingredient in the “additional /orce, abili ty , and securi ty” which social life provides for
i  q  r
us, shows the necessity of, and motivation for, establishing rules of property. In this 
way, justice becomes established despite the absence of a natural motive to just acts:
The remedy, then, is not deriv’d from nature, but from art i f ice ; or more 
properly speaking, nature provides a remedy in the judgment and understanding, 
for what is irregular and incommodious in the affections.
For Hume, then, justice is an artificial virtue because it is founded in rational reflection 
concerning the necessary supports for the social life, the latter being itself necessary 
because of the great advantages it procures for human life. But this is simply to hold that 
justice is a dictate of right reason, because it is necessary for sociability and self- 
preservation. Hume’s position is, in other words, just tha t  of the natural lawyers. Justice 
is an artificial virtue because, as Pufendorf and Hutcheson put the m atter , property is an 
adventitious, not a natural, state. The advantages tha t  property procures for social life 
are so considerable tha t  the establishment of property cannot be resisted: it is thus a
necessary development. For this reason Hume says it is not improper to call property a 
law of nature - its overwhelming utility makes it inseparable from the species. Property, 
or justice, is for this very reason an artificial virtue. It is not the fruit of some original 
instinct in human nature, but is introduced into human society because of its utility. For 
the same reason it is, as we have seen, a slow growth over time. Justice is a historical 
construction.
The slow growth of justice is not only the fact tha t  the establishment of stability of 
possessions begins, by convention rather than explicit agreement, in a particular place 
at a particular time, and then spreads to other parts of human society as its advantages 
become clearly apparent; it is also a slow growth in th a t  the specification of the rules of 
justice does not happen all a t once, but develops according to the natural workings of the 
human mind, through either the natural association of ideas, or rational reflection on the 
utility of particular innovations. Thus Hume accounts for the four main rules of property: 
occupation, prescription, accession and succession. The case of prescription is the most
ibid., p. 485.
18Qibid., p. 489. 
187See the Appendix for some further remarks on conventional practices.
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interesting of these, for immediate purposes, because not only does prescription require 
the passage of time before it can arise (it is not a rule established a priori, which is then 
applied as it comes to bear on particular cases), but it is in fact caused by the effect of 
time on the human imagination itself. Hume uses this fact as evidence for the 
development of property through the natural workings of the human mind (even though 
we possess no original instinct to recognize distinctions of property). He says:
Possession during a long tract of time conveys a title to any object. But as ’tis 
certain, that, however every thing be produc’d in time, there is nothing real, that 
is produc’d by time; it follows, tha t  property being produc’d by time, is not any 
thing real in the objects, but is the offspring of the sentiments, on which alone
1 O Q
time is found to have any influence.100
The particular rules of property, arising as they do from the natural workings of the 
human mind, arise necessarily and therefore naturally. Because they are not invented in 
advance of the specific circumstances which give them an application, they arise over 
time, as the exigencies of human life require. In this sense Hume shows property to have 
a natural history.
*  *  *
In this chapter I have argued tha t  there is no bar, and much support, for accepting 
Hume’s claim tha t  his theory of property is, in the main, the theory of Grotius; and tha t  
therefore Hume can be recognized to be a contributor to the tradition of modern natural 
law theories of justice. The familiar figures of Hume the Newtonian and Hume the sceptic 
do not bar such an interpretation; and, once the intellectual problematic confronted by 
Book III of the Treatise  is understood, the rather curious structure and distinctive 
concepts developed in it can be are seen to be quite conformable to the natural law 
heritage. In particular, the doctrine of the artificiality of justice is not a rejection of 
natural law, but an attem pted solution to a problem generated by the moral sense 
theory’s conception of the psychology of action. The a ttem pted  solution is, further, a 
traditional solution in tha t  it stresses tha t  justice is adventitious, arising because it is 
required for the secure establishment of human social life. Finally, Hume’s theory is the 
theory of Grotius, rather than of Pufendorf, as a result of its moral sense commitments. 
The theory of the moral sense is an a ttem pt to secure the natural law doctrine of 
sociability against the threat perceived to be implied by “selfish” psychology of Locke’s 
E ssa y , and it pursues this a ttem pt by providing an account of hum an nature which 
renders any form al obligation to follow the dictates of natural law simply otiose.
188ibid., p. 509.
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Hutcheson is quite explicit about this, and Hume;s Newtonian ambition to rely only on 
efficient causes reinforces this, and leads him to offer a recognizably Hutchesonian account 
of (material) obligation as our disinterested motivation to approve and perform 
benevolent actions. In this way, he grounds moral obligation and the law of nature firmly 
in the soil of human nature itself, in the natural workings of the human mind, as the 
theory of natural law requires.
EPILOGUE
A more complete study than  this would first tu rn  to Hum e’s economic and political 
essays to show how his new form of naturalism  applies to specific questions of social 
organization and policy, and then to the History o f  England , where, inter alia , Hume 
seeks to dem onstrate the veracity of his principles through a case history of his own 
society. In this way, an account of the detail and coherence of Hum e’s position could be 
elucidated, thereby overcoming the fact th a t Hume himself did not a ttem p t a system atic 
account of the developm ent of social institutions.*
The first a ttem p t a t such a system atic account of hum an society and its developm ent, 
from its very beginnings in the psychological construction of hum an nature , is provided by 
Adam  Smith, the principal heir to Hume’s social philosophy. Although unfinished, Sm ith’s 
scheme is sufficiently developed to show what it is to provide a natural history of property 
th a t is adequately grounded in the psychological constitu tion of hum an natu re , and to 
show th a t such a history is a critical history. Beginning from a short sketch of the  springs 
of hum an action in The History o f  Astronomy, in which he adapts and extends Locke’s
o
hom eostatic model0  to explain the roots of all hum an epistemic enquiry, Sm ith builds an 
account of the necessary sociability of hum an beings and of the developm ent of the main 
stages of the societies thus produced.
Briefly, the account is this: our natural sym pathetic responses to the feelings of others, 
combined with the individual’s hom eostatic drive, produces an urge tow ards a collective 
equilibrium . Our social nature expresses itself in the pleasure we gain from  “m utual
*The most complete attempt at this is Duncan Forbes, Hume’s Philosophical Politics. An 
attempt to map in detail the theoretical foundations of this type of enterprise in Hume’s own 
epistemological principles has more recently been provided in Donald Livingston, Hume’s 
Philosophy of Common Life. For a discussion of some of the relevant issues, see David Fate 
Norton, “History and Philosophy in Hume’s Thought”, in D.F.Norton and R.H. Popkin (eds.), 
David Hume: Philosopher-Historian, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill (1965).
o
First published in the posthumous collection Essays on Philosophical Subjects, ed. Joseph 
Black and James Hutton, London(l795). Now reprinted in Adam Smith, Essays on Philosophical 
Subjects, ed. W.P.D. Wightman, J.C. Bryce and I.S. Ross, Oxford: Clarendon Press (1980).
3See Appendix.
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sym pathy” , the agreemem t of sentim ents between ourselves and o thers .4 In order to 
m aintain a shared viewpoint, and thus to preserve such pleasures, we are led to construct 
an im partial spectator of hum an affairs, by whose imagined responses we judge the 
actions of ourselves and others, individually and collectively. From  the specta to r’s 
responses we develop our system s of law and morals, and are able to examine the 
developm ent and sta te  of our own society from this viewpoint, seeing to what extent both 
social changes and social realities are explicable in term s of the in situ  judgem ents of the 
spectator. Where such realities are not explicable, or when we can see th a t, although once 
they were, they are so no longer, we are able to critically evaluate and modify the legal 
structu re  of our society. The specta to r’s viewpoint is natural because it arises necessarily 
through natu ral mechanisms; it is historical because it always operates within  the 
constrain ts of particular social circumstances; and it is critical because it transcends the 
operations of self-interest, and also because it checks the effects of specious principles by 
reconsidering them  in the light of experience. Particularly  in the Lectures on 
Jurisprudence, and to a lesser extent in The Wealth o f N ations , Sm ith shows his critical 
na tu ra l history a t work .5 W rit large in the history of societies and social institu tions, the 
specta to r’s task is described by Smith as xthe science of a legislator” .
In light of the subsequent history of British political thought, a t least, the further 
elaboration of a critical natu ral history seems to have been too difficult a task. On the one 
hand, theories of the natu ral history of society lost sight of the possibility of a critical 
perspective, and effectively identified rationality  with history. Thus Edm und Burk« 
established the conservative strand  in British politics. On the other hand, critical theories 
of society lost sight of a positive role for history, coming to see it only as an inherited 
am algam  of irrationality  and error. In this spirit Bentham  set about British legal 
structu res, and spawned a long line of Philosophic Radicals. For the m ost significant later 
em ploym ent of a critical na tu ra l history, we have to tu rn  to Germ any, to a theory which 
combines detailed historical researches with a critical perspective built on a restrictive 
account of the springs of action - the historical m aterialism  of Karl M arx.
4 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, I.i.1-2. Cf. also T.D. Campbell, Adam 
Smith’s Science of Morals, London: George Allen & Unwin (1971), chapter 4.
I^n The Wealth of Nations, as pointed out in chapter one, Smith distinguishes between natural 
history and actual history, thereby creating the space for a critical perspective. The existence of 
such a perspective in Smith’s work is frequently overlooked by his modern apostles. The best 
corrective to this oversight is provided by Donald Winch, Adam Sm ith’s Politics.
®Smith, The Wealth of Nations, IV.ii.39 For the most complete account of this science, see Knud 
Haakonssen, The Science of a Legislator: the Natural Jurisprudence of David Hume and Adam 
Smith.
A P P E N D I X
The P sych ology  o f M oral A ction:
Locke’s Theory and its R eception
For Locke, happiness and misery are the two great springs of hum an action .1 2
Happiness, he says in the E ssay , “every one constantly  pursues, and desires  what makes
o
any part of i t” . This happiness which we pursue is a simple relation between pleasure 
and pain:
Happiness  ... in its full extent is the u tm ost Pleasure we are capable of, and 
M isery  the u tm ost Pain: and the lowest degree of what can be called
Happiness , is so much ease from all Pain, and so much present pleasure, as 
w ithout which any one cannot be con ten t.3
Furtherm ore, pleasure and pain are the source of our valuations:
Now because Pleasure and Pain are produced in us, by the operation of certain 
Objects, either on our M inds or our Bodies; and in different degrees: therefore 
w hat has an aptness to produce Pleasure in us, is th a t we call Good , and what is 
ap t to produce Pain in us, we call Evil,  for no other reason, but for its aptness to 
produce Pleasure and Pain in us, wherein consists our Happiness  and M isery .4
Since we always pursue our happiness, this means th a t we also pursue what is good. 
Human action naturally  is directed at achieving pleasure, a reasonable predominance of 
which (over pain) is happiness, and this is the pursuit of natural goodness. (Moral
goodness, a particu lar species of natu ral goodness, we shall tu rn  to shortly.)
W hat is it th a t prom pts us to pursue happiness? This may seem a foolish question -
says just this in “Of Ethick in General” - see Colman, op. cit., p. 179. Colman goes on to 
argue that Locke shifts “from a quasi-mechanistic theory of the ‘springs’ of action to a hedonistic 
theory of reasons for action” (pp. 179-80). This is, I think, mistaken. Locke’s account of the 
springs of action is an account of the causes of action, but it is not thereby a denial of reasons. 
Unlike Colman, Locke does not operate with a sharp distinction between reasons and causes; rather, 
he accords reasons a role in a causal story. (He does separate rational from “mechanistic” accounts, 
but because the latter are defined as excluding rationality, not because they are causal. See Essay, 
I.iii.14.)
2Essay, II.xxi.43.
3Essay, II.xxi.42.
4ibid.
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after all, w hat is more reasonable than to pursue the greatest happiness or pleasure, the 
greatest good, th a t is available to us? The question is not foolish, however - it is one 
thing to show th a t happiness is, of all possible ends, the most desirable, quite another to 
show th a t we therefore (or even in  fa c t) pursue it. The question requires an answer to 
the more general question, W hat is it th a t moves us to action? By w hat means do hum an 
beings act? As a psychological question (ra ther than  a physiological one), it is to ask: 
W hat determ ines the will? Locke’s original answer to this question was, simply, th a t the 
will is determ ined by its apprehension of the greatest good in view. But in the second 
edition of the E ssay  he offers a different solution:
what is  it that determ ines the Will in  regard to our Actions?  And th a t upon 
second thoughts I am apt to imagine is not, as is generally supposed, the greater 
good in view: But some (and for the most part the most pressing) uneasiness  a 
M an is a t present under. This is th a t which successively determ ines the Will, 
and sets us upon those Actions, we perform.^
As a psychological phenomenon, this uneasiness of the will is simply desire: “This
U neasiness  we may call, as it is, D esire ; which is an uneasiness  of the Mind for want of 
/}
some absent good” .0 But, if desire is the w ant of an absent good, is not the account of 
action in term s of the uneasiness of the will equivalent to the account it replaces, th a t the 
will is determ ined by the apprehension of the greatest good in view? The difference, 
Locke holds, is this:
I am  forced to conclude, th a t good, the greater good, though apprehended and 
acknowledged to be so, does not determ ine the w ill, until our desire,, raised 
proportionably  to it, makes us uneasy  in the w ant of it. Convince a Man never 
so m uch, th a t plenty has its advantages over poverty; make him see and own, 
th a t  the handsome conveniences of life are better than nasty penury: yet as long 
as he is content with the la tte r, and finds no uneasiness  in it, he moves not; his 
w ill never is determ in’d to any action, th a t shall bring him out of i t .7
The revised account thus differs in two respects. It both shows th a t hum an action is not 
always directed to the greatest good (although it is always directed to a limited good), 
and it provides an efficient cause for hum an action. This efficient cause is, in fact, the 
flight from p a in , because uneasiness is a kind of pain. Locke comes close to explicitly 
asserting th is when he says th a t “All pain of the body of w hat sort soever, and disquiet of
Z
Essay,  II.xxi.31. 
Qibid.
Essay,  II.xxi.35.
7
274
Q
the mind, is uneasiness* . In another passage he implicitly identifies uneasiness as
painful:
whilst we are under any uneasiness , we cannot apprehend ourselves happy, or in 
the way to it. Pain and uneasiness  being ... inconsistent with happiness; 
spoiling the relish, even of those good things which we have ... And therefore 
th a t, which of course determ ines the choice of our will to the next action, will 
always be the removing of pain ... as the first and necessary step towards 
happiness .9
Locke’s psychology of action thus hinges not so much on the pursuit of pleasure as on the 
flight from pain. This flight is of course a flight tow ards pleasure, but the actual 
m otivating force, w hat “determ ines the will” , is the a ttem p t to escape present pain. The 
pursuit of happiness, or of the greatest good, is thus som ething of a haphazard affair: a 
zig-zagging, on-again, off-again, process. (The zig-zagging is partly a function of our 
lim ited knowledge - a them e of great im portance in the E ssay  - since our perception of 
our good will not always be accurate; but it is the perception, rather than  the genuine 
good, which plays a role in our behaviour. The account of action in term s of uneasiness, 
however, provides a further reason for allowing m isperceptions to be efficacious. This is 
because it seems reasonable (and true to  our experience) to hold th a t, the greater the 
unease, the more pressing the need to act, and hence the greater possibility of acting on 
insufficient reflection. The proverbial inadequacies of hasty action are to the point here. 
The account of action in term s of unease implicitly recognizes the problems of hasty, 
m isdirected actions.)
Locke’s account of the efficient cause of human action therefore weakens the case for 
alloting a m ajor role to the final cause which, he tells us, “when I first published my 
thoughts on this Subject, I took ... for gran ted” .10 If m otivated by unease, hum an actions 
aim  only haphazardly a t the greatest good. Locke’s revised psychology of action thus 
weakens the supports of the “w orkm anship” model, w ith its strong teleology. This is not 
to say, of course, th a t it fatally or decisively weakens those supports. Locke is alm ost 
certainly aware of ways of reconciling mechanistic and teleological types of explanation. 
M ost im portan tly , his close association with Boyle is unlikely to have left him unaware of 
the la t te r ’s views on efficient causes and teleology. According to Boyle, ends can be either 
sought by purposive actions, or served by non-purposive causes. An explanation in term s
Q
Essay , II.xxi.31.
9Essay, II.xxi.36. 
10 Essay , II.xxi.35.
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of efficient causes is com patible with a teleological explanation as long as the end in 
question is served. It does not have to be sought. Locke’s shift, in his account of action, 
from the pursuit of the greatest good to unease is a shift from a necessarily teleological 
explanation to a possibly teleological one. As long as uneasiness serves to realise the 
greatest good, it rem ains an explanation com patible with teleology. The problem is th a t 
there is no guarantee th a t unease will reliably serve this end. It may serve this end in the 
long run, or in the general course of events, and it may serve the end better than any 
other conceivable m otivation for the actions of free rational agents, but it nevertheless 
does not infallibly and harm oniously serve this end.
However, th a t the psychology of natural actions does not enable us to unfailingly pursue 
the greatest good is not a problem  to which Locke has no answer. He would argue tha t, 
by reflecting on the nature and order of the world, we are able to recognize th a t the world 
has a designer, and th a t this designer has not only power, but legitimate  power over his 
creatures. Once we see th a t we are subject to “the Will and Law of a God, who sees Men 
in the dark, has in his Hand Rewards and Punishm ents, and Power enough to call to 
account the Proudest Offender” ,11 we recognize th a t there is one class of pleasures and 
pains which, although d istan t, are unavoidable, and th a t these therefore have an 
overriding significance. It should be stressed here th a t moral goodness has an overriding 
significance not because moral goods are intrinsic goods, nor because they are 
qualitatively different from other natural goods. Moral goodness is ju st the pleasure 
afforded by the rewards a ttached  to conforming to the laws which express the divine 
will. The overriding significance of moral good or evil is simply the overriding 
significance (the unparalleled uneasiness excited by the contem plation) of the pleasures or 
pains in the hands of the “God, who sees Men in the D ark” .
Locke recognizes, however, th a t even the contem plation, or a t least awareness, of such 
u ltim ate happiness or misery is not always sufficient to determ ine the will; and th a t moral 
practices therefore do not always measure up to moral professions.13 However, although
11Essay , I.iii.6.
1 o
zLocke distinguishes between natural and moral good in “Of Ethick in General” on just these 
lines. Moral good “draws pleasure or paine after it ... by the intervention of divine power.” Quoted 
in Colman, op. cit., p. 168.
13Essay , I.iii.7.
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men have no natural veneration for moral rules, * 1“1 they can learn to take pleasure in 
virtue. So, even though, as Locke says in a famous passage, “The Mind has a different 
relish, as well as the P a la te” , and th a t therefore “the Philosophers of old did in vain 
enquire, whether S u m m u m  bonum  consisted in Riches, or bodily Delights, or Virtue, or 
C ontem plation” ,1  ^ men through education can be “made alive to virtue and can taste  
i t” . As several passages in his writings on education suggest, the (adm ittedly rocky) 
path  to this s ta te  depends on the natural sociability of hum an beings, especially their 
desire to be esteemed by others. Because children are, from a very early age, “sensible of 
Praise and Com m endation” , and “find a Pleasure in being esteemed, and valued” , they 
come to care about those things which will win them  approval - at first for the sake of 
approval, but later simply for the things themselves. At first “the Objects of their own 
Desires are made assisting to V irtue” , and from being “in Love with the Pleasure of being 
well thought on” they can come to be “in Love with all the ways of V irtue” .1*^ In this 
way a self-centred psyche - concerned only with its own pleasures - can come to care for 
wider social goods for their own sakes. Given the necessity of society for hum an survival, 
as well as for the peculiar pleasures it affords a nature which has a strong inclination to 
sociability and the social life, 18 this kind of adap ta tion  is not the oppression of a naturally 
free sp irit, but a rational development which supports hum an ends. For this reason Locke 
is able to say th a t the preoccupation with self-interest has “always been opposed by the 
more rational part of men, in whom there was some sense of a common hum anity, some 
concern for fellowship” .1^ The concern with virtue for its own sake is an integral part of 
this sense of common hum anity.
By constructing the disinterested love of virtue from an originally self-regarding
U ibid.
^ Essay, II.xxi.55.
1 R^Commonplace Book entry “Ethica” (1693); quoted by Colman, op. cit., p. 206.
17 Some Thoughts concerning Education, (§§57-8), in James Axtell (ed.) The Educational 
Writings o f John Locke, Cambridge: C.U.P. (1968); quoted by Colman, op. cit., p. 231.
18Locke speaks of the necessity and pleasure of the social life in terms which obviously owe a 
good deal to Grotius and Pufendorf: God put Man “under strong Obligations of Necessity,
Convenience, and Inclination to drive him into Society, as well as fitted him with Understanding 
and Language to continue and enjoy it” (Two Treatises, 11.77).
19ELN, Essay VIII, p. 205.
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psychology this theory has an im portan t im plication. In the E ssay , Locke holds th a t 
there are three “Laws th a t Men generally refer their Actions to, to judge of their 
Rectitude, or O bliquity” . ^  These three laws are the Divine Law, the Civil Law, and the 
“Law of O pinion  or R eputa tion”. As m entioned in chapter three, the Divine Law includes 
both special divine positive laws, and also natural laws. The Divine Law specifies strict 
moral rectitude - w hat are duties, and w hat sins. The Civil Law determines which actions 
are criminal. For this law, unlike the former, actions are measured by rewards or 
punishm ents imposed not by God but by the force of the Com m onw ealth.21 The third 
law concerns virtue and vice. The content of this law may be no different from the Divine 
Law, as Locke observes:
Vertue and Vice are names pretended, and supposed every where to stand  for 
actions in their own nature  right and wrong: And as far as they really are so
applied, they so far are co-incident w ith the divine Law  abovem entioned.22
The Law of Opinion is not, therefore, a law whose content is inferior to, or necessarily 
d istinct from, the provisions of natu ral law. But it is nonetheless distinct from natural 
and other divine law because it is m arked out by w hat men happen to believe, whether or 
not this is grounded in right reason. The law of opinion is constituted by the established 
beliefs of particu lar societies, and so varies from society to society. V irtue and vice, in 
this sense, are constitu ted  by being judged praiseworthy or blameworthy:
this is visible, th a t these Names, Vertue and Vice, in the particular instances of 
their application, through the several N ations and Societies of Men in the World, 
are constantly  a ttribu ted  only to such actions, as in each Country and Society 
are in reputation  or discredit. Nor is it to be thought strange, th a t Men every 
where should give the name of Vertue to those actions, which am ongst them  are 
judged praise worthy; and call th a t Vice, which they account blamable: Since
otherwise they would condemn themselves, if they should think any thing R ight, 
to which they allow’d not Com m endation; any thing W rong, which they let pass 
w ithout Blame. Thus the m easure of w hat is every where called and esteemed 
Vertue and Vice is this approbation or dislike, praise or blame, which by a secret 
and tacit consent establishes it self in the several Societies, Tribes, and Clubs of 
Men in the World: whereby several actions come to find Credit or Disgrace
amongst them , according to the Judgm ent, M axims, or Fashions of th a t place ...
T hat this is the common m easure o f  Vertue and Vice will appear to any one, 
who considers, th a t though th a t passes for Vice in one Country, which is counted
20 Essay, II.xxviii.7.
21 Essay, II.xxviii.8-9.
22 Essay, II.xxviii.10.
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a Vertue, or a t least not Vice in another; yet everv-where Vertue and Praise, Vice 
and Elame, go together . -0
The Law of Opinion, then, unlike the other two laws, is distinguished not by the nature 
of its formal obligation - the power which enforces it - but by the m anner of its 
generation, and by its lack of a formal obligation. It comes about because certain 
practices are considered praisew orthy, and it is m aintained by the efficacy of praise and 
blame. There is no constitu ted  or legitim ate au tho rity  which establishes it, and hence it 
is doubtful whether it can appropriately be called a law. Locke’s a ttem p t to justify his 
term inology, th a t there is a Law  of Opinion forgets th a t rightful au thority  is necessary for 
a formal obligation. He argues th a t this Law of Opinion must indeed be a law because it 
effectively m otivates com pliant behaviour. But this only shows th a t there is some 
m aterial obligation - some inward consciousness of the desirability of praise, and of the 
necessity of avoiding blame - which effectively m otivates hum an actions. On Locke’s own 
term s, there is no rightful au tho rity  which enforces this “law” , and so it is not, properly 
speaking, a law  governing hum an actions . -4
Nevertheless, as he observes, the “Law of O pinion” does effectively m otivate; in fact, as 
the passages on the education of children show, it is the pre-eminent m otivation for 
hum an action. Human practice conforms to this “law” in  fa c t , even if it properly should 
conform to the provisions of the Divine Law (or, to a lesser degree, of the Civil Law). So 
it is of great practical im portance th a t the Law of Opinion not vary to any significant 
extent from the provisions of the other two laws. ‘The Law of Opinion is necessary to 
support, to generate adherence to, the Divine Law in particular, since the remoteness of 
the la tte r ’s rewards and punishm ents (in the fu ture life) leaves it most vulnerable to 
abuse. In fact, Locke’s account of the developm ent of virtuous conduct through the 
child’s simple desire to please shows th a t the Law of Opinion is a crucial support for the 
law of nature, where their provisions coincide, and, where they do not, it is a powerful 
obstacle to the pursuit of na tu ra l justice.
It is thus im portan t to ask, W hen can we expect the provisions of the two laws to 
coincide? The answer would appear to be, At least in those cases where a particular rule is 
necessary for hum an social life itself. But this is ju st the feature which characterises 
na tu ra l law itself - as Pufendorf says, natural law is distinguished by the fact th a t “the
Essay, II.xxviii. 10-11.
A  i
^See Essay, II.xxviii.12, and Colman, op. cit., p. 170.
279
reason for [it] is sought from the condition of m ankind as a whole-1; it “so harmonizes with 
the natural and social natu re  of man th a t the hum an race can have no wholesome and 
peaceful social organization w ithout i t” .^5 In like m anner, Hume speaks of the laws of 
na tu re  as “w hat is common to any species, or even ... w hat is inseparable from the 
species11. This very necessity of na tu ra l law will make it a t least unlikely th a t the Law 
of Opinion, despite allowing a great variety of views concerning the farther reaches of 
virtue and vice am ongst the “Clubs of Men in the W orld” , will readily allow conceptions 
of v irtue and vice of great variation in those m atters covered by the provisions of natural 
law. So the dependence of the law of nature on the Law of Opinion, in order to secure 
compliance on a broad scale, is not a m atter for great concern, since the Law of Opinion 
will commonlyy support the rational dictates of the natu ral law. (It will not always do so, 
of course - and Locke’s fascination w ith New World practices is a concern w ith ju st this 
issue.)
If, a t this point, we were to revise the account of natu ral law so th a t it would require no 
formal element in order to be obligatory, but would instead derive its obligating force 
directly from the m aterial elem ent, the constitu tion of hum an nature itself, then we would 
have opened up the possibility th a t, because the Law of Opinion can generate the rational 
d icta tes of the natu ra l law, then the natural law itsel f  could be generated by the pre- 
reflective, or semi-reflective, practices presupposed by the Law of Opinion. By recognizing 
the distinction between the context of discovery (or generation) and the context of 
justification , we would be able to give an accont of the development of d ictates of right 
reason, natural laws, from pre-reflective, or conventional, practices. This is one of the 
principal elements of Hum e’s account of justice. In this light, it appears to be no accident 
th a t Hume speaks the language of virtues and vices (ra ther than the more common 
jurisp ruden tia l language of rights and duties) in his account of justice, th a t most “perfect” 
of rights, and th a t he should stress the role of “opinion” in his account of the m aintenance 
of a  ju s t social o rder . ^
We have shown how, despite a psychology of action which shows all hum an beings to 
aim  only a t their own pleasure (albeit rather indirectly, by fleeing painful uneasiness),
"^Pufendorf, DJNG , II.iii.24; I.vi.18.
^Hume, Treatise, p. 484.
27Hume stresses the importance of opinion in his essays “Of the First Principles of Government” 
and “Of the Original Contract”. See Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary, ed. T.H. Green and 
T.H. Grose, London (1882), vol I, pp. 110, 460. in particular.
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Locke is able to show how the desire for praise presupposed by the Law of Opinion can 
lead to a disinterested pursuit of the sociable m axim s of natural law. This last aspect of 
his thought was, however, ra ther overlooked by his contem porary critics. We have also 
noticed th a t when he comes to speak of the suum , w hat is one’s own propriety, he offers a 
narrow account. Even Hobbes, seen by many as attem pting  to undermine the good 
relations of m utual tru st on which society relies/ 0 recognized the im portance of 
distinctively social elements. “Of things held in propriety” , he says, “those th a t are 
dearest to a m an are his own life, and lim bs” , but the next most im portan t, for m ost men 
a t least, are “those th a t concern conjugall affect ion” In contrast, Locke, when he 
speaks of one’s propriety, speaks only of life, liberty, and estate. This is despite the fact 
than  men are “under strong Obligations of Necessity, Convenience, and Inclination” to
on
enter into society, and are adap ted  for the sociable life. A dm ittedly, Locke does not 
talk about different levels of propriety, and perhaps if he had this m atte r could have been 
reasonably resolved. But as things stand, his contem porary critics are able to charge him 
with failing to  understand the full ram ifications of the fact th a t hum an beings are social 
beings, and th a t the story of the origins of political society, property, etc, is, even a t its 
m ost atom ic, the story of the interactions of hum an fam ilies.
This is argued most forcefully by Lord Bolingbroke. Bolingbroke stresses the in tim ate  
interconnection of natural law and sociability, a connection he sees Locke to have loosened 
or overlooked. .
He does not, however, challenge the central role Locke accords to self-love. In an 
im portan t passage in his collected “fragm ents” of essays, he says that:
There is a sort of genealogy of law, in which nature begets natural law, natural 
law sociability, sociability union of societies by consent, and this union by 
consent the obligation of civil laws. When I make sociability the daughter of 
na tu ra l law, and the granddaughter of nature, I mean plainly this. Self-love, the 
original spring of hum an actions, directs us necessarily to sociability .*"1
ty q
^°The most entertaining, at least, of such critics of Hobbes was John Eachard, who satirises 
Hobbes’s views on human nature in Mr. Hobbs’s State of Nature Considered, in a Dialogue 
between Philautus and Timothy (1672), Liverpool: Liverpool University Press (1958).
9Q
Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. XXX; Macpherson edition, pp. 382-3.
°®Two Treatises, 11.77.
^Henry St. John, Lord Bolingbroke, The Works, Farnborough: Gregg International (1969),
reprint of the 1841 edition (Philadelphia: Carey and Hart), in four volumes; IV, p. 164.
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For failing to see how im portan t is sociability, ju st how intim ate is its connection with 
the self-love which founds natural law; by representing m ankind, in other words, “like a 
num ber of savage individuals out of all society” , Locke, one of “our best w riters” , has 
reasoned “both  inconsistently, and on a false foundation” .02 Human beings are, and 
always have been, social creatures, not solitary individuals, even in the rudest or most 
prim itive of states, and even though their actions all spring from self-love.
Locke's m ost radical critic, however, is his own pupil, the th ird  Earl of Shaftesbury. In 
his m ain work, Character!sticks o f  M en, Manners, Opinions, Times, and in particu lar in 
his letters, Shaftesbury denounces the a ttem p t to derive moral practices from self-love. It 
is, he believes, to abolish sociableness and m orality, and to replace it w ith mere
90
self-in terest.0 Against such accounts he stresses both the strength  of the social passions, 
and their irreducibility to any hidden principles of self-love. He suggests th a t even social 
disorder can be traced to the strength  of the social passions:
For my own part, m ethinks, this herding principle, and associating inclination, is 
seen so natu ral and strong in most men, th a t one m ight readily affirm ’tw as even 
from the violence of this passion th a t so much disorder arose in the general 
society of m ankind .04
The irreducibility of the social passions is affirmed by the crucial doctrine of the moral 
sense. The im portance of the moral sense doctrine for the later natural law theorists is 
difficult to overstress, providing as it does the cornerstone of a psychology of action in 
which the social passions are a t the heart. Sociability is, for them , constructed directly 
from the social passions. This is shown by H utcheson’s defence of Shaftesbury’s doctrine
^2ibid., pp. 194-5.
99 t ,
Anthony Ashley Cooper, Lord Shaftesbury, Characteristics o f  Men, Manners, Opinions, 
Times (1711), ed. J.M. Robertson, New York: Bobbs-Merrill (1969), 2 volumes in one, esp. I, pp. 
63-5, 280-2. Shaftesbury’s position is neatly summarised by David Norton, David Hume: 
Common-Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician, Princeton: Princeton University Press (1982), 
pp.. 34-5:
“Such words as courage, friendship, love, and public interest, words which seem to denote 
altruistic acts or tendencies, are found to mean, on Hobbes’s view, nothing different from 
their apparent opposites, for all acts and tendencies are similarly motivated and hence all 
are at bottom alike.”
o  J
^Shaftesbury, Characteristics, I, 75. Hume records his indebtness to Shaftesbury for stressing 
this point. In the earlier versions of his essay “Of the Dignity or Meanness of Human Nature”, he 
says, “I shall observe, what has been prov’d beyond Question by several great Moralists of the 
present Age, that the social Passions are by far the most powerful of any, and that even all the 
other Passions receive from them their chief Force and Influence. Whoever desires to see this 
Question treated at large, with the greatest Force of Argument and Eloquence, may consult my 
Lord SHAFTSBURY’S Enquiry concerning Virtue”. (Essays, op.cit., I, 154n.)
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of the moral sense, a doctrine th a t there is a fundam ental benevolent principle in human 
nature. In Hutcheson's term s, we are so constitu ted  th a t we perceive
an im m ed ia te  natural Good in the Actions call'd V irtuous ; th a t is, T ha t we are 
determ in’d to perceive some B eauty  in the Actions of others, and to love the 
Agent, even w ithout reflecting upon any Advantage  which can in any way 
rebound to us from the Action.
Of course, if it is believed, as Bolingbroke and m any others obviously did believe, th a t 
self-love, properly understood, itself generates social affections, and generally drives us to 
the social life, then there will be no special incentive to abandon the self-love account in 
favour of a m oral sense theory. This will be so even if the la tte r is able to capture some of 
our intuitions about how we see ourselves to be affected by the actions, or the fortunes or 
m isfortunes, of others. A well-worked out theory of the springs of action can survive 
specific weaknesses if it is thought to offer a unifying account of hum an action. If the 
a lternative theory is itself seen to embody seriously implausible assum ptions, then the 
established theory is, by default, all the more preferable . For Bolingbroke, this is the case 
w ith respect to  the self-love theory: the moral sense alternative requires com m itting 
oneself to discredited or absurd views. In a passage in his E ssays on H um an Knowledge , 
clearly aimed a t Shaftesbury, he rejects any appeal to a moral sense, “for to assume any 
such natu ral instinct is as absurd as to assume innate ideas, or any other of the Platonic 
whimsies”
In holding th is, Bolingbroke is m istaken; bu t it is nonetheless understandable th a t he 
should have perceived there to be a close connection between the two doctrines. This is 
because Shaftesbury himself obviously sees a close connection between them . W hether 
this is because he sees the objects perceived by the moral sense to be innate ideas, or for 
some other reason, cannot be resolved here. But he a t least regards innate ideas as a 
bulwark of true m orality against the self-love theorists, the enemies of m orality. For this
o r
^Hutcheson, An Inquiry concerning Beauty and Virtue, second edition (1726), facsimile 
edition, New York: Garland (1971), p. 115. That Hutcheson’s purpose is to defend Shaftesbury’s 
doctrine in the Inquiry is shown by the sub-title to the first edition (1725): in this work, “the 
Principles of the late Earl of Shaftesbury are explained and defended.” Although this sub-title was 
dropped from later editions, this is not because of a change of heart by Hutcheson. Shaftesbury 
remains “that ingenious Nobleman”, and his works a model of humane learning, as one observation 
in the Inquiry (second edition, p.xxi) stresses:
To recommend the Lord SHAFTESBURY’S Writings to the World, is a very needless 
Attempt. They will be esteemed while any Re flection remains among Men.”
36Bolingbroke, Works, III, p. 399.
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reason, Shaftesbury fiercely criticises Locke’s rejection of innate ideas, holding it to be a 
rejection of m oral virtue itself. So, although Shaftesbury sees Hobbes as a manifest enemy 
of morals, by his reduction of all virtue to self-interest, Locke’s account of morals in terms 
of experience and custom makes him a more dangerous, because more insidious, enemy:
It was M r Locke th a t struck the home blow: for Mr Hobbes’ character and base 
slavish principles in governm ent took off the poison of his philosophy. ’Twas Mr 
Locke th a t struck a t all fundam entals, threw  all order and virtue out of the 
world and made the very ideas of these ... unnatural and w ithout foundation in 
our minds.
This is so because
virtue, according to Mr Locke, has no other measure, law, or rule, than fashion 
and custom ; m orality, justice, equity, depend only on law and will ... And thus 
neither righ t nor wrong, virtue nor vice, are anything in themselves; nor is there 
any trace or idea of them  naturally  im printed on hum an minds. Experience and 
our catechism  teach us a ll.3 '
For Hutcheson, however, the case is ra ther different. A lthough he presents himself as a 
defender of Shaftesbury’s doctrines, and identifies the self-love theory of morals as his 
target - represented by Hobbes,38 and also by “the A uthor of the Fable of the Bees” 39 - 
he does not see the doctrine of the moral sense as part of a defence of innate ideas. In 
fact, he explicitly denies th a t the moral sense depends on any doctrine of innate ideas:
We are not to imagine th a t this moral Sense, more than  the other Senses, 
supposes any innate ideas, Knowledge, or practical Proposition .“* 9
Not surprisingly, then, Hutcheson is little  concerned to criticise Locke, even though the 
la tte r founds m orality on self-love. This is not, for Hutcheson, sufficient to make Locke 
(or even Hobbes, for th a t m atte r) an enemy of m orality. The self-love theory fails, not
Letters o f  the Earl o f  Shaf tesbury to a Student at the Universi ty  (1716), p.45. Quoted in 
Jason Aronsen, “Shaftesbury on Locke”,American Political Science Review , vol. 53 (1959), p.1103. 
Cf. also Norton,op.cit., p.35.
j8The doctrine “That all the desires of the human Mi nd , nay of all thinking  Natures , are 
reducible to Self-Love , or Desire o f  private Happiness” is the doctrine of “the old Epicureans” , 
now “revived by Mr Hobbes, and followed by many better Writers.” Hutcheson, An Essay on the 
Nature and Conduct of  the Passions and Affec t ions ,  with Rlustrations on the Moral Sense 
(1728), introduction to the Il lust rat ions , in Collected Works, vol. II, pp.207-8.
39Inquiry , sub-title to first edition (1725).
*9Hutcheson, Inquiry , p.135. See also the revised and expanded discussion of the nature of 
moral perception in the fourth edition of the Inquiry  (1738), Farnborough: Gregg International 
(1969), pp.129-31.
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because it undermines morality, but because it does not measure up to the facts. It is 
forced to provide tortuous stories for the most simple and familiar of unselfish acts. In 
treating of “our Desires  or A f f e c t io n s “1, the self-love theorists have been forced to make 
'‘the most generous, kind, and disinterested of them, to proceed from Sei f -Love,  by some 
subtle Trains of Reasoning, to which honest Hearts are often wholly Strangers”
41Preface to Es sa y , op. cit., p. vi; see also Introduction to Illustrations,  op. cit., p. 209.
SELECT B IB L IO G R A PH Y
Aristotle. Nicomachean E thics, trans. W.D. Ross, revised J.L. Ackrill and 
J.O.Urmson. Oxford: Oxford University Press (1980).
Aronson, Jason. “Shaftesbury on Locke”, American Political Science Review, vol. 53 
(1959), pp. 1101-4.
Aquinas, Thomas. The Political Ideas o f St. Thomas Aquinas, trans. English 
Dominican Fathers, ed. Dino Bigongiari. New York: Hafner Press (1953).
Baldw in, Thomas. “Tully, Locke, and Land” , Locke Newsletter, no.13 (1982), 
pp.21-33.
Baron, M arcia. “Hume’s Noble Lie: an Account of his Artificial Virtues” , Canadian 
Journal o f Philosophy, vol. 12 (1982), pp. 539-55.
Becker, Lawrence. Property Rights: Philosophic Foundations. London: Routledge k  
Kegan Paul (1977).
Bolingbroke, Henry St. John, V iscount. The Works, 4 vols. Philadelphia: 
Carey and Hart (1841), reprinted Farnborough: Gregg International (1969).
Campbell, R.H. and A.S. Skinner, eds. The Origins and Nature o f the Scottish 
Enlightenment. Edinburgh: John Donald (1982).
Campbell, Thomas D. Adam Sm ith's Science o f Morals. London: George Allen k  
Unwin (1971).
Cicero, Marcus Tullius. De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum, trans. H. Rackham. 
London: Heinemann(1914).
----- . De O fficiis, trans. W. Miller. London: Heinemann (1913).
Colman, John. John Locke's Moral Philosophy. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press (1983).
D ay, J .P . “Locke on Property”, Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 16 (1966), pp. 207-21.
Defoe, Daniel. The Life and Adventures o f Robinson Crusoe, ed. Angus Ross. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin Books (1965).
Drury, S.B. “Locke and Nozick on Property” , Political Studies, vol. 30 (1982), pp. 
28-41.
Dunn, John. “Justice and the Interpretation of Locke’s Political Theory” , Political 
Studies, vol. 16 (1968), pp. 68-87.
----- . The Political Thought o f John Locke. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
(1969).
----- . Locke. Oxford: Oxford University Press (1984).
286
F erg u so n , A d am . An E ssay  on the H istory o f  C ivil Society, ed. Duncan Forbes. 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press (1966).
F ilm er , Sir R ob ert. Patriarcha and other Political Works o f  Sir Robert F ilm er, ed. 
with an introduction by Peter Laslett. Oxford: Basil Blackwell (1949).
F o rb es, D u n ca n . H u m e ’s Philosophical Politics. Cam bridge: Cam bridge University 
Press (1975).
F o r sy th , M u rray . “The Place of Richard Cum berland in the History of N atural Law 
D octrine” , Journal o f  the H istory o f  Philosophy, vol. 20 (1982), pp. 23-42.
G ierke, O tto  vo n . N atural Law and the Theory o f  Society 1500-1800, 2 vols. trans. 
Ernest Barker. Cambridge: Cam bridge University Press (1934).
G r o t iu s ,  H u g o . G rotius on the Freedom o f  the Seas, trans. R.V.D. Magoffin. New 
York: Oxford University Press (1916).
----- . De Jure FVaedae C om m entarius, trans. G.L. W illiams, with W.H. Zeydel.
Oxford: Clarendon Press (1950).
----- . De Jure Belli ac P a d s  Libri Tres, trans. F.W . Kelsey. New York: Oceana
publications (1964).
H a a k o n ssen , K nu d . “Hugo Grotius and the History of Political Thought” , Political 
Theory, vol. 13 (1985), pp. 239-65.
“N atural Law and the Scottish E nlightenm ent” in D.H. Jory and 
C. Stew art-R obertson (eds.) M an and N ature, Proceedings of the Canadian Society for 
E ighteenth Century Studies, vol. 4. Edm onton: Academic Printing and Publishing
(1985).
----- . The Science o f  a Legislator: the N atural Jurisprudence o f  D avid H um e and
A dam  S m ith . Cambridge: Cam bridge University Press (1981).
H eld , V irg in ia . “John Locke on Robert Nozick” , Social Research, vol. 43 (1976), pp. 
169-95.
H in to n ,  R .W .K . “Husbands, Fathers and Conquerors” , 2 parts, Political Studies, 
vol.15 (1967), pp. 291-300 and vol. 16(1968), pp. 55-67.
H irsch m a n , A lb ert O. The Passions and the In terests. Princeton: Princeton
University Press (1977).
H o b b es , T h om as. L evia than , ed. C.B. M acpherson. Harm ondsworth: Penguin
Books (1968).
------. M an and C itizen , ed. Bernard Gert. Brighton: Harvester (1972).
H o n o re , A .M . “Ownership” in O xford  E ssays in  Jurisprudence, ed. A.G. Guest. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press (1961).
H o n t, I s tv a n  and M ich ae l IgnatiefF. W ealth and Virtue: the Shaping o f  Political
287
Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment. Cambridge: Cam bridge University Press 
(1983).
H orace Q uintus Horatius Flaccusi. Satires, Epistles and Ars Poetica, trans. 
H. Rushton Fairclough. London: Heinemann (1926).
H orn e, T h om as A .. “Moral and Economic Improvement: Francis Hutcheson on 
P roperty” , History o f Political Thought, vol. 7 (1986), pp. 115-30.
H u m e, D a v id . Enquiries concerning H uman Understanding and concerning the 
Principles o f Morals, 3rd edition, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge, revised P.H. Nidditch. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press (1975).
------. Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary , 2 vols., ed. T.H. Green and T.H. Grose.
London(1882), reprin ted  Aalen: Scientia Verlag (1964).
------. A Letter from  a G entleman to his Friend in Edinburgh , ed. E.C. Mossner and
J.V . Price. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press (1967).
------. The Letters o f David H um e , 2 vols., ed. J.Y .T . Greig. Oxford: Oxford
University Press (1932).
------. A Treatise o f  H um an Nature, 2nd edition, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge, revised P.H.
Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press (1978).
H u tc h e so n , F ra n c is . Collected Works, 7 vols. Facsimile edition, Hildesheim: Olms 
(1969).
------. An Inquiry concerning Beauty and Virtue, 2nd edition (1726). Facsimile edition,
New York: G arland Publishing (1971).
------. An Inquiry concerning Beauty and Virtue, 4th edition (1738). Facsimile edition,
Farnborough: Gregg International (1969).
J o n es , P e te r . H um e’s Sentim ents: Their Ciceronian and French Context.
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press (1982).
K arnes, H en ry  H o m e, L ord. Essays on the Principles o f  Morality and Natural 
Religion (1751). Facsimile edition, New York: Garland Publishing (1976).
K em p  S m ith , N o rm a n . The Philosophy o f David Hume. London: Macmillan 
(1949).
K rieger , L eonard . The Politics o f  Discretion. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
(1965).
L eib n iz , G o ttfr ied  W ilh e lm  v o n . The Political Writings o f  Leibniz, trans. and ed. 
Patrick  Riley. Cam bridge: Cam bridge University Press (1972).
L eyd en , W olfgan g  v o n . “John Locke and N atural Law” , Philosophy, vol. 31 (1956), 
pp. 23-35.
L iv in g sto n , D o n a ld . H um e’s Philosophy o f Common Life. Chicago: Chicago
University Press (1985).
288
L ocke, John . A n E ssay  concerning H um an Understanding, ed. P.H. Nidditch. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press (1975).
------. E ssays on the Law o f  N ature, ed. Wolfgang von Leyden. Oxford: Clarendon
Press (1954).
------. Two Treatises o f  G overnm ent, critical edition with introduction and notes by
Peter Laslett. Cam bridge: Cam bridge University Press, second edition (1967).
L u cretiu s 'T itus Lucretius Carusj. De R erum  N atura, trans. W .H.D. Rouse, revised 
M .F. Sm ith. London: Heineman (1924).
M a cp h erso n , C .B . The Political Theory o f  Possessive Ind iv idua lism : Hobbes to
Locke. Oxford: Oxford University Press (1962).
M a c k ie , J .L . H u m e ’s Moral Theory. London: Routledge k  Kegan Paul (1980).
M a u tn e r , T h om as. “Locke on Original A ppropriation” , A m erican  Philosophical 
Q uarterly, vol. 19 (1982), pp. 259-70.
------. “N atural Rights in Locke” , Philosophical Topics, vol. 12 (1982), pp. 73-7.
M ic h a e l, E m ily . “Francis Hutcheson on Aesthetic Perception and Aesthetic 
P leasure” . B ritish  Journal o f  A esthetics, vol. 24, (1984), pp. 241- 53.
M ille r , D a v id . Philosophy and Ideology in  H u m e ’s Political Thought. Oxford: 
C larendon Press (1981).
------. “The M acpherson Version” , Political S tu d ie s , vol. 30 (1982), pp. 120-7.
M o o re , Jam es. “Locke and the Scottish Ju ris ts” . Unpublished paper delivered to the 
Conference for the Study of Political Thought (1980).
M o o re , Jam es and M ich ae l S ilverth orn e . “N atural Sociability and N atural Rights 
in the M oral Philosophy of Gerschom Carm ichael” in Vincent Hope (ed.) Philosophers 
o f  the Scottish  E n ligh tenm en t. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press (1984).
N o r to n , D a v id  F a te . “History and Philosophy in Hum e’s Thought” in D.F. Norton 
and R.H. Popkin (eds.) David H um e: Philosophical H istorian . Indianapolis:
Bobbs-M errill (1965).
------. “H utcheson’s Moral Realism” , Journal o f  the H istory o f  Philosophy, vol. 23
(1985), pp. 397-418.
------. “Hutcheson on Perception and M oral Perception” . Archiv fu r  G eschichte der
P hilosophie , vol. 59 (1977), pp. 181-97.
------. D avid H um e: C om m on-Sense M oralist, Sceptical M etaphysician. Princeton:
Princeton University Press (1982).
N o z ic k , R ob ert. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic Books (1974).
289
N utkiewicz, Michael. “Samuel Pufendorf: Obligation as the Basis of the State”.
Journal o f the History o f Philosophy, vol. 21 (1983), pp. 15-29.
O livecrona, K arl. “Appropriation in the State of Nature: Locke on the Origin of
Property”, Journal o f the History o f Ideas, vol. 35 (1974), pp. 221-30.
----- . Law as Fact, second edition. London: Stevens and Sons (1971).
----- . “Locke’s Theory of Appropriation”, Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 24 (1974), pp.
220-34.
O ’N eill, O nora. “Nozick’s Entitlements” . Inquiry, vol 19 (1976), pp. 468-81.
P a re l, A n thony  and  Thom as F lanagan. Theories o f Property: Aristotle to the
Present. Calgary: Wilfrid Laurier University Press (1979).
Parry, Geraint. John Locke. London: George Allen &; Unwin (1978).
Passm ore, John. H um e’s Intentions, 3rd edition. London: Duckworth (1980).
Pufendorf, Samuel. De Jure Naturae et Gentium Libri Octo, trans. C.H. and W.A. 
Oldfather. New York: Oceana Publications (1964).
----- . De Off icio Hominis et Civis Juxta Legem Naturalem Libri Duo, trans. F.G.
Moore. New York: Oxford University Press (1927).
R aphae l, D avid  D aiches, ed. British Moralists 1650-1800, 2 vols. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press (1969).
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. On the Social Contract, ed. R.D. Masters, trans. J.R. 
Masters. New York: St. Martin’s Press (1978).
R yan, Alan. “Locke and the Dictatorship of the Bourgeoisie”, Political Studies, vol. 
13 (1965), pp. 210-30.
----- . Property and Political Theory. Oxford: Basil Blackwell (1984).
Sapadin, Eugene. “Hume’s Law, H um e’s Way” in G.P. Morice (ed.), David Hume: 
Bicentenary Papers. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press(1977).
Schlatter, Richard. Private Property: The History o f an Idea. London: George
Allen &; Unwin (1951).
Scott, W illiam  Robert. Francis Htucheson. New York: Augustus M. Kelley 
(1966). (First published 1900).
Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper, 3rd Earl of. Characteristics o f Men, 
Manners, Opinions, Times (1711), 2 vols. in one, ed. J.M. Robertson. New York: 
Bobbs-Merrill (1969).
Skinner, Quentin. The Foundations o f Modern Political Thought. 2 vols. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1978).
290
S m ith ,  A d am . E ssays on Philosophical Subjects ed. W .P.D . W ightm an, J.C . Bryce, 
and I.S. Ross. Oxford: Clarendon Press (1980).
------. A n Inquiry in to  the N ature and Causes o f  the W ealth o f  N a tio n s , ed. R.H.
Cam pbell, A.S. Skinner, and W.B. Todd. Oxford: Clarendon Press (1976).
Lectures on Jurisprudence , ed. R.L. Meek, D.D. Raphael, and P.G. Stein. 
Oxford: C larendon Press (1978).
------. The Theory o f  M oral S e n tim e n ts , ed. D.D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie. Oxford:
Clarendon Press (1976).
S trou d , B arry . H um e. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul (1977).
Suarez , F rancisco . Selections fro m  Three W orks , trans. G.L. W illiams, A. Brown, 
and J. W aldron. Oxford: Oxford University Press (1944).
T u ck , R ichard . “G rotius, Carneades and Hobbes” . G rotiana, New Series, vol. 4
(1983) , pp. 43-62.
N atural R ights Theories: Their O rigin and Developm ent. Cambridge:
Cam bridge University Press (1979).
T u lly ,  J a m es . A D iscourse on Property: John Locke and h is Adversaries.
Cam bridge: Cam bridge University Press (1980).
------. “A Reply to W aldron and Baldwin” . Locke New sletter, no. 13 (1982), pp. 35-46.
W a ld ro n , Jerem y . “Enough and As Good Left for O thers” . Philosophical
Q uarterly , vol. 29 (1979), pp. 319-28.
“Locke, Tully, and the Regulation of P roperty” , Political S tu d ies , vol. 32
(1984) , pp. 98-106.
------. “The Turfs My Servant Has C u t” , Locke N ew sletter , no. 13 (1982), pp. 9-20.
W a tt ,  Ian. The Rise o f  the Novel. H arm ondsw orth: Penguin Books (1957).
W in c h , D o n a ld .  Adam  S m i th ’s Politics. Cambridge: Cam bridge University Press 
(1978).
W r ig h t ,  Joh n  P .  The Sceptical R ea lism  o f  D avid H um e. M anchester: M anchester 
University Press (1983).
Y o lto n ,  J .W .  Locke and the C om pass o f  H um an U nderstanding. Cambridge: 
Cam bridge University Press (1970).
(ed.) John Locke: Problems and Perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press (1969).
